In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 124.1 (2003) 137-141 [Access article in PDF] Qvomodo Stemma Gladiatoris Pellicvlae More Philologico Sit Constitvendvm Martin M. Winklersive Martinvs Satiricvs Philocinematographicvs [Figures]Poetae rervmqve scriptores et antiqui et recentiores lectoribus fabulas suas sententiis vel versibus bene textis soliti sunt adferre. Sed hodie novum exstat narrandi genus, quod fabulas hominibus adfert praecipue picturis eo modo compositis et inter se coniunctis ut oculi humani imagines singulares celerrime et (...) sine ulla motus intermissione ipsas moveri percipiant, personarum dialogis et arte musica sonisque diversis comitantibus et iuvantibus. Adeo enim progressa est ars magna lucis et umbrae, quam primum photographiam deinde cinematographiam nominare consuevimus, ut fabulae cuiusvis modi—breves longae, novae antiquae, laetificae tragicae—imitatione veri paene perfecta spectatoribus persuadeant tempora iam praeterita in vitam novam esse recreata.In ipsa arte narrandi non multum interest inter eos qui verbis utuntur, ut poetae ac scriptores, et eos qui imaginibus, ut cinematographi. Praeclare Horatium in arte poetica exponenda dixisse recordemur ut picturam poesin esse. Qua in re Simonidem illum Ceum aliosque poetas Graecos secutus est Flaccus noster. Utroque enim modo, et verbis et picturis, auctores antiqui atque hodierni homines docent delectant movent. 1 Facillime ergo intellegimus fabulam cinematographicam genus quoddam esse textus, sed textus non tantum legendi aut audiendi sed imprimis videndi vel spectandi. Peritissimus quisque talium fabularum [End Page 137] auctor omne tulit punctum, nam miscuit utile dulci. Is quoque non aliter ac poeta antiquus aut prodesse vult aut delectare.Sed editiones nonnullarum fabularum cinematographicarum inter se differunt et lacunas corruptelas vitia alia exhibent. Non enim raro pelliculas adfectas esse constat eius generis damno quod textuum antiquorum docti in editionibus suis obelis indicare solent. Itemque quomodo fabulae cinematographicae originem suam trahant ab antiquioribus quaerere et explicare haud absurdum est. 2Ergo editorum usum secutus his paginis originem pelliculae Gladiatoris anno MM editae exempli gratia stemmate quasi philologico explicabo. Deinde stemmatis sigla brevibus adnotationibus percurram. 3 Hoc modo me demonstraturum spero principia artis philologicae, quae litterarum Graecarum Romanarumque docti adhuc solum soliti sunt textibus adhibere, fabulis quoque cinematographicis magno cum fructu admoveri posse. In stemmate infra dato titulos fabularum cinematographicarum et auctorum eorum nomina Latine reddidi.Ridlius Scotus, pelliculae Gladiatoris auctor, magna cum acclamatione publica, minore criticorum, narrare studet quae imp. Caes. M. Aurelii Commodi Antonini Aug. aetate in imperio Romano gesta sunt. Sed stemmate monstrabo Gladiatorem imprimis ortum esse a nonnullis fabulis cinematographicis prioribus, quibus sons aut insons copiosissime usus sit ille Scotus. Qua de causa pellicula eius nobis indicat quemadmodum res Romanae temporibus nostris undique floreant. Cum ipsa et ceterae huius modi fabulae falsa inventione abundare soleant, tamen rerum et linguarum Romanarum Graecarumque magistri hodie hoc artis popularis genere in scholis saepius niti consueverunt, ut discipulos a falsa ad veram adducant rerum gestarum scientiam et rebus antiquis accuratius instruant. Quibus igitur magistris hoc offero stemma, nam amicus Scotus, sed magis amica veritas. 4 [End Page 138] [Begin Page 140] Conspectvs Siglorvm WPellicularum res antiquas tractantium archetypus, qui est summa rerum Romanarum a scriptoribus antiquis et recentioribus expositarum.AConsensus fabularum quae vel litteris vel ludis scaenicis vel picturis cinematographicis praecipue Italicis Americanisque res Romanas narrant depinguntque.TTriumphus Animi Helena Riefenstahle auctore anno MDCCCCXXXV editus. 5SSpartacus Antonio Viro—nomine suppresso—et Stanlio Cubrico auctoribus anno MDCCCCLX editus.CCasus Imperii Romani Antonio Viro auctore anno MDCCCCLXIIII editus. 6B1-3Triga Georgii Lucae Bella Galactica inscripta et annis MDCCCCLXXVII MDCCCCLXXX MDCCCCLXXXIII primum edita, quae his picturis cinematographicis constat: Pars Quarta: "Spes Nova" (B1), Pars Quinta: "Imperium Referit" (B2), Pars Sexta: "Iedi Reversi" (B3). 7 Editio trigae altera anno MDCCCCLXXXXVII edita itemque Bellorum Galacticorum trigae novae Pars Prima: "Simulacri Minae" anni MDCCCCLXXXXVIIII nihil ad rem.M1-3Triga Georgii Molitoris Maximus Furens inscripta, annis MDCCCCLXXVIIII MDCCCCLXXXI MDCCCCLXXXV edita et his picturis cinematographicis constans: Maximus Furens (M1), Maximi Furentis Pars Altera vel Bellator Peregrinans (M2), Maximus Furens Vltra Tonitrus Tholum (M3). 8GGladiator Ridlio Scoto auctore anno MM editus. 9 [End Page 140]His alias poteram et plures subnectere causas vel philologicas vel cinematographicas. Qui de Scoti Gladiatore plurima cognoscere velint... (shrink)

In what may seem like an uncharacteristic passage by someone who otherwise described himself as the typical example of the Victorian Englishman, Alfred North Whitehead once wrote that “[t]he notion of pure thought in abstraction from all expression is a figment of the learned world. A thought is a tremendous form of excitement”. It is the patterned signature of its expression that not only gives thought its own distinct character, but also propels it out into the world, exciting its environment (...) with a new variation of interests. Without this ability to repattern, even if just slightly, the atmosphere of feeling in which they are immersed, to make a difference by shifting the way in which a situation may... (shrink)

Given a Mahlo cardinal κ and a regular ε such that $\omega_1 we show that $\diamond_\kappa (cf = \epsilon)$ holds in V provided that there are only non-stationarily many $\beta , with o(β) ≥ ε in K.

Donald Davidson holds that intentional concepts are not reducible to physical or dispositional ones. This is due, he claims, to the constitutive role of normativity in the principles that govern the application of intentional concepts. According to Davidson, the specific way in which norms of rationality and coherence are mobilised by our interpretative principles sets mental concepts off from those of the natural sciences. I agree with Davidson on the irreducibility of the mental. However, I show that irreducibility is due (...) not to the normative character of intentional concepts, but to holism and the flexibility of interpretative principles. I then consider three arguments that Davidson has put forth to support the irreducibility of intentional properties on the basis of their normative character, and show that none of them goes through. (shrink)

Kant will die beständige Möglichkeit des radikal Bösen mit dem zeitlich offenen Charakter des menschlichen Seins rechtfertigen. Jede zu machende Entscheidung setzt voraus, dass der die Selbstachtung ermöglichende gute Wille nicht automatisch die oberste Maxime meiner Handlung ist. So kann und muss der Mensch «bei lauter guten Handlungen dennoch böse» sein.

Diese Arbeit untersucht das Verhältnis zwischen dem frühen Heidegger und seiner Kantinterpretation. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf den Rückbezügen seiner Aussagen zu Kant und auf der Analyse der Endlichkeit in Sein und Zeit. Diese «Gewalttat» ist geleitet von dem Bemühen, in der entwerfenden Einbildungskraft die modale Differenz von Eigentlichkeit/Uneigentlichkeit einerseits und ihre zeitliche Fundierung andererseits unterzubringen. Die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Heideggers Kantbuch führt zu der Frage, ob das Konzept der Zeitlichkeit der Zeit die Hauptaufgabe seiner Kantinterpretation erreichen kann: den Abschied vom (...) Ganzen aufgrund der eigentlichen Zeitigung der Zukunft zu verhindern. Konsequent gelangt die Arbeit zu dem Resultat: Heideggers Kant setzt in einer näher nicht erklärten Weise voraus, daß der Sinn des unverfügbaren Seins mit dem Seinssinn des je einzelnen Daseins in einer durchsichtigen Identität erschlossen liegt. (shrink)

G. E. Moore replies to skepticism by using propositions which from the common sense perspective are trivially true. However, it seems that his replies are not effective, because the skeptic’s doubts concern precisely the common sense truths. This problem became the subject of various interpretations. N. Malcolm and B. Stroud suggest that Moore is not trying to refute skepticism directly . Therefore, they look for an alternative interpretation of Moore’s replies. They find the ground of their effectiveness in his pointing (...) to the use of words, as well as in the illegitimacy of the skeptic’s position. The author offers an interpretation in the terms of reliabilism, which avoids the defects of the previous ones and does not require an alternative understanding of Moore’s propositions: Moore insists on the reliability of perception what enables him to yield effective replies to skepticism in agreement with common sense. (shrink)

La filosofía de la ciencia de Kuhn se ha utilizado en distintas áreas de la biología, y aquí examinamos la posibilidad utilizar dicha filosofía en la helmintología. Ofrecemos dos posibles interpretaciones de la historia de esa disciplina. En la primera de ellas, utilizamos únicamente los conceptos de la primera etapa de la obra de Kuhn. En la segunda interpretación, hacemos uso de los conceptos de matriz disciplinaria y ejemplar. Según la primera interpretación, la etapa preparadigmática de la helmintología se inició (...) entre los siglos XVI y XVII inclusive, y continuó hasta la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, época en donde la helmintología adquiere su primer paradigma. Desde el punto de vista de la segunda interpretación, la primera matriz disciplinaria de la zoología fue inaugurada por Aristóteles, quien también proporcionó el primer "ejemplar" para el estudio de los helmintos. Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science has been used in several areas of biology, and here we examine the possibility of applying kuhnian philosophy to helminthology. We offer two possible interpretations of the history of that discipline. In our first interpretation, we only use the concepts Kuhn introduces in the first stage of his works. In the second interpretation, we use the concepts of disciplinary matrix and exemplar. According to the first interpretation, the pre-paradigmatic period of helminthology started between the 16th and 17th centuries, and continued up until the second half of the 19th century, when helminthology acquired its first paradigm. From the point of view of the second interpretation, the first disciplinary matrix for zoology was inaugurated by Aristotle, who also delivered the first exemplar for the study of helminths. (shrink)

We consider a class of Lindström extensions of first-order logic which are susceptible to a natural Skolemization procedure. In these logics Ehrenfeucht Mostowski (EM) functors for theories with arbitrarily large models can be obtained under suitable restrictions. Characteristic dependencies between algebraic properties of the quantifiers and the maximal domains of EM functors are investigated.Results are applied to Magidor Malitz logic,L(Q <ω), showing e.g. its Hanf number to be equal to ℶω(ℵ1) in the countably compact case. Using results of Baumgartner, the (...) maximal number of isomorphism types of linearly ordered models of regular cardinality is shown to be achieved for theories that admit an EM functor on a typically restricted domain. (shrink)

This article analyzes the lectures and texts from the last period of Czech philosopher Jan Patočka, one of the last disciples of Edmund Husserl, the founding father of phenomenology. The point of departure is Patočka’s critical reception of Husserl’s concept of the crisis of European mankind. There are, however, two other elements distinctive of Patočka’s thought essential for this interpretation. First, he was a classical philosopher aiming at Socratic ‘care for the soul’. Second, he approached the theme of universal human (...) history from his own unique historic position: as a Czech philosopher, involved in the Socratic manner primarily with his own Czech national community, for whom the big question of the future of European mankind and its legacy at the end of its golden modern age is inseparably connected with a ‘small’ one: the question of Czech national existence – the question of the future of his nation in a changing world and the issue of its freedom. (shrink)

En este trabajo partimos de la hipótesis de que Heidegger tiene en miras las nociones aristotélicas de _δύναμις_ (_dýnamis_) y _δυνατóν_ (_dynatón_) al momento de tematizar su concepto de posibilidad (_Möglichkeit_) en _Sein und Zeit_ (1927), pero no con el sólo propósito de asimilar las reseñadas conceptualizaciones –apropiación que, como veremos subsiguientemente, no es plena-, sino también, para radicalizarlas, asumiendo un punto de vista francamente superador. Sustentamos esta tesis, en principio, en el hecho que Aristóteles haya pensado que la _ἐνέργεια_ (...) (_enérgeia_) o _ἐντελέχεια_ (_entelécheia_) es, en términos generales, anterior (_πρότερον_/_próteron_) respecto de la _dýnamis_, siendo esta posición teórica revisada y renovada por Heidegger en el texto reseñado. Por otra parte, Heidegger cuestiona la tesis aristotélica de la fundamentalidad de la realidad efectiva (_Wirklichkeit_) o de la realidad a secas (_Realität_) y como consecuencia de ello, el concepto aristotélico de ser (_εἶναι/eînai_), _ἐστίν_ (_estín_) o lo que es (_ὄν/ón_), señalando no sólo que la posibilidad es más originaria que la realidad efectiva, sino también, que la realización de una posibilidad no implica nunca la transición a una realidad efectiva. Además, el vínculo de Heidegger con Aristóteles se inicia muy tempranamente -más específicamente, en el año 1907-, merced a la lectura de la tesis doctoral de Franz Brentano y se prolonga constantemente desde 1921, cuando Heidegger dicte un seminario sobre _De Anima_ en la Universidad de Friburgo. (shrink)

"Atom," "byte" and "gene" are metonymies for techno-scientific developments of the 20th century: nuclear power, computing and genetic engineering. Resistance continues to challenge these developments in public opinion. This book traces historical debates over atoms, bytes and genes which raised controversy with consequences, and argues that public opinion is a factor of the development of modern techno-science. The level and scope of public controversy is an index of resistance, examined here with a "pain analogy" which shows that just as pain (...) impacts movement, resistance impacts techno-scientific mobilization: it signals that something is wrong, and this requires attention, elaboration and a response to the challenge. This analysis shows how different fields of enquiry deal with the resistance of social-psychological mentalities in the face of industrial, scientific and political activities inspired by projected futures. (shrink)

This research examines whether the items of some of the most well-established five-factor inventories refer to competence. Results reveal that both experts and laymen can distinguish between items that refer to how competently a behavior is performed and items that do not. Responses to items that refer to competence create a higher-order factor in the personality inventories, and the variability in responses to competence-related items in personality self-ratings is best modeled as a general factor rather than as also tied to (...) the specific Big Five factors. We suggest that a focused debate on what personality items should refer to is likely to have considerable positive consequences for both theory and measurement of personality. (shrink)

This paper begins with a discussion of the logical apparatus of Frege, where his use of Sinn suggests a modification of Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Then, it turns to Strawson's basic particulars with its essentially Kantian orientation. This brings forward the logical ground upon which the Identity Thesis rests. Finally, following Frege with some modifications, the paper suggests that an ontological list where concepts can be treated as objective (materially dependent) subsistent entities would be necessary in order (...) to avoid errors of J. J. C. Smart and other analytic philosophers who hold the Identity Thesis. (shrink)

Schlesinger's argument for the confirmation of Theism over Naturalism fails. Principle E on which it is based is unacceptable. But even if Principle E were acceptable the argument would not succeed, for other evidence, not considered by Schlesinger, pulls in the other direction cancelling out the confirmatory effect of the evidence he does cite. Further, granted Principle E, it is not clear that theism as it is usually understood makes the evidence he cites more probable than naturalism; consequently he is (...) not justified in concluding that the evidence he cites confirms theism more than naturalism. Finally, Schlesinger fails to take into account the possibility that the initial credibility of theism may be less than naturalism since theism may be incoherent and naturalism may not be; he also fails to take into account the total available evidence relevant to the confirmation of theism and naturalism. (shrink)

How might we begin to think about deconstruction in relation to the formulation of political policy? Once we begin to ask this question the whole idea of policy as such is put in question and conversely the limitations of philosophy as the basis for political decision making quickly become apparent. Through a consideration of this problem and by reference to a number of key tropes in Derrida's later writings, this essay begins the task of thinking about the deconstruction of policy (...) and of asking what the future role of deconstructive thought might be. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abailard and Non-Things MARTIN M. TWEEDALE On SEVERAL OCCASIONSin his logical writings Abailard extracts himself from embarrassing ontological implications of his analyses of language by resorting to the notion of a something that is not a thing. I shall note here two such occasions and then discuss Abailard's explanations of this procedure based on the grammatical distinction of personal and impersonal constructions. Since the texts on this latter topic (...) are especially confusing, a considerable portion of my effort will be spent on making sense of them as preparation for drawing some conclusions about Abailard's overall approach. My purpose here is to show how Abailard's grammatical analyses are fundamental to his defence of a number of metaphysical positions. I also want to suggest that Abailard's grammatical approach, especially on the question of dicta, contains insights of continuing interest. Not all of Abailard's non-things are particularly associated with analyses of language. For instance, there are the likenesses the mind supposedly constructs for itself in order to think of things that are not being perceived. These Abailard calls fictive things (res ficta), and he refuses to give them the status of real psychological entities. ~ The likenesses are compared to mirror images which Abailard is also willing to treat as non-things. However, I wish to restrict my discussion here to cases which arise from Abailard's analysis of the reference of certain words. One such instance occurs in his discussion of universals. The peculiar nonthing here is the "state" (status), which, Abailard maintains, is "the common cause by which the universal word is imposed"7 Abailard is very careful to dis1Glossae super Porphyrium, in Peter Abelards philosophische,.gchriIten, edited by Geyer (henceforth referred ~o as Geyer), Miinster i. W., 1919 (BGPM, vol. 21), pp. 20-21, ll. 23-32: Intellectus autem sicut nec corporeo indigens instrumento est, ita /nec/ necesse est eum subiectum corpus habere in quod mittatur, sed rei ~dmilitudine contentus est, quam sibi ipse animus conficit, in quam suae intelligentiae actionem dirigit. Unde turr,~ destructa vel remota sensus qui in earn agebat, perit, inteUectus autem permanet rei similitudine auimo retenta. Sigut autem sensus non est res sentita, in quam dirigitur, sic nec intellectus forma est rei quam concipit, sed intellectus actio quaedam est animae, unde intelligens dicitur, forma vero in quam dirigitur, res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualm vult, animus conficit.... 11.9-17: Quaero enim, utrum flla quadratura et ilia altitudo vera forma sit intellectus, qui ad similitudinem quantitatis turris ducatur et compositionis eius. Sed profecto vera quadratura et vera altitudo non nisi corporibus insunt, ficta etiam qualitate nec intellectus nec ulla vera essentia forrnari potest. Restat igitur, ut sicut ficta eat qualitas, ficta substantia sit ei subiecta. Fortasae autem et ea speculi imago, quae visui subiecta apparere videtur, nihil esse vere dici potest, quoniam scilicetin alba speguli superficie contrarii coloris qualitas saepe apparet. Ibid., pp. 19-20,II. 14-16- ~ad nunc ea quae breviter tetigimus, diligenter perquiramus, scilicet quae sit iIla communis causa, secundum quam universale nomen impositum est.... 11. 21-29. Singuli homines discreti ab invicem, gum in propriis differant tam essentiis quam formis, ut supra meminimus rei physicam inquirentes, in eo tamen conveniunt, quod homines aunt. Non dico in homine, gum res nulla sit homo uisi discreta, sed in esse hominem. Esse autem hominem non est homo nec res aliqua, si diligentius consideremus, [329] 330 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tinguish three different questions frequently confused in discussions on universals. The first is "What is 'universal' predicated of?", and the answer is simply words --words not in the sense of mere marks or sounds, but of meaningful marks or sounds. Another is "How do we have an idea associated with universals?" Here the aforementioned likenesses enter as that by which the mind can have an idea applicable to many individuals. But there is also the question of what makes a certain word correctly applicable to many things. Abailard does not make the error of thinking that an idea in the mind or some operation of the mind could possibly be the cause, as some conceptualists seem to think. This would lead to the conclusion that... (shrink)