It is a familiar argument that advocates accommodating the so-called paradoxes of decision theory by abandoning the “independence” postulate. After all, if we grant that choice reveals preference, the anomalous choice patterns of the Allais and Ellsberg problems violate postulate P2 of Savage's system. The strategy of making room for new preference patterns by relaxing independence is adopted in each of the following works: Samuelson, Kahneman and Tversky's “Prospect Theory”, Allais and Hagen, Fishburn, Chew and MacCrimmon, McClennen, and in closely (...) argued essays by Machina. (shrink)

This essay is, primarily, a discussion of four results about the principle of maximizing entropy (MAXENT) and its connections with Bayesian theory. Result 1 provides a restricted equivalence between the two: where the Bayesian model for MAXENT inference uses an "a priori" probability that is uniform, and where all MAXENT constraints are limited to 0-1 expectations for simple indicator-variables. The other three results report on an inability to extend the equivalence beyond these specialized constraints. Result 2 established a sensitivity of (...) MAXENT inference to the choice of the algebra of possibilities even though all empirical constraints imposed on the MAXENT solution are satisfied in each measure space considered. The resulting MAXENT distribution is not invariant over the choice of measure space. Thus, old and familiar problems with the Laplacian principle of Insufficient Reason also plague MAXENT theory. Result 3 builds upon the findings of Friedman and Shimony (1971; 1973) and demonstrates the absence of an exchangeable, Bayesian model for predictive MAXENT distributions when the MAXENT constraints are interpreted according to Jaynes's (1978) prescription for his (1963) Brandeis Dice problem. Lastly, Result 4 generalizes the Friedman and Shimony objection to cross-entropy (Kullback-information) shifts subject to a constraint of a new odds-ratio for two disjoint events. (shrink)

De Finetti introduced the concept of coherent previsions and conditional previsions through a gambling argument and through a parallel argument based on a quadratic scoring rule. He shows that the two arguments lead to the same concept of coherence. When dealing with events only, there is a rich class of scoring rules which might be used in place of the quadratic scoring rule. We give conditions under which a general strictly proper scoring rule can replace the quadratic scoring rule while (...) preserving the equivalence of de Finetti’s two arguments. In proving our results, we present a strengthening of the usual minimax theorem. We also present generalizations of de Finetti’s fundamental theorem of prevision to deal with conditional previsions. (shrink)

This contribution offers a survey of the modern African theological discourse on the Trinity as a distinctive Christian doctrine of God. It is a systematic narrative review of primary literature on the doctrine of the Trinity in modern African theology with a view to identify main trends, key concepts and major proponents. It is argued that the contemporary African Trinitarian Hermeneutics cannot be understood in isolation from African debates on translatability of concepts of God framed first in terms of the (...) reinterpretation of the theological significance of pre-Christian African concepts of God and subsequently as an outcome of African Christological reflection. The article affirms an apophatic resistance to any tendency to take God for granted as recently advanced by Ernst Conradie and Teddy Sakupapa. (shrink)

This article addresses the sacredness of Ayahuasca from the perspective of the global shamanic vocation. If encounters with Ayahuasca are said to revitalize forms of sacredness in contemporary societies, this is perhaps clearest in cases where individuals understand themselves to be called to lead ceremonies. Recognizing the global scale of Ayahuasca shamanism, we compare facilitators of ceremonies in two societies to discern differences and similarities in how Ayahuasca vocations exist in differently modernized societies: Peru, a predominantly Catholic society with a (...) substantial Indigenous Amazonian population and an active Ayahuasca shamanism tourism sector, and Denmark, a secular society in Northern Europe, where Ayahuasca is illegal. Building on recent reappraisals of Weber’s reflection on vocation and Durkheim’s theory of the sacred, we argue that being called by Ayahuasca to follow shamanic vocations in contemporary societies leads to tensions around the need to both justify and resist the rationalization of Ayahuasca. (shrink)

Background Nurses frequently face situations in their daily practice that are ethically difficult to handle and can lead to moral distress. Objective This study aimed to explore the phenomenon of moral distress and describe its work-related predictors and individual consequences for home-care nurses in Germany. Research design A cross-sectional design was employed. The moral distress scale and the COPSOQ III-questionnaire were used within the framework of an online survey conducted among home-care nurses in Germany. Frequency analyses, multiple linear and logistic (...) regressions, and Rasch analyses were performed. Participants and research context The invitation to participate was sent to every German home-care service ( n = 16,608). Ethical considerations The study was approved by the Data Protection Office and Ethics Committee of the German Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Results A total of 976 home-care nurses participated in this study. Job characteristics, such as high emotional demands, frequent work-life-conflicts, low influence at work, and low social support, were associated with higher disturbance caused by moral distress in home-care nurses. Organizational characteristics of home-care services, such as time margin with patients, predicted moral distress. High disturbance levels due to moral distress predicted higher burnout, worse state of health, and the intention to leave the job and the profession, but did not predict sickness absence. Conclusions To prevent home-care nurses from experiencing severe consequences of moral distress, adequate interventions should be developed. Home-care services ought to consider family friendly shifts, provide social support, such as opportunities for exchange within the team, and facilitate coping with emotional demands. Sufficient time for patient care must be scheduled and short-term takeover of unknown tours should be prevented. There is a need to develop and evaluate additional interventions aimed at reducing moral distress, specifically in the home-care nursing sector. (shrink)

Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value theory: (...) first, the problem of why knowledge is better than mere true belief, and second, the relation between epistemic justification and responsibility. (shrink)

Epistemic instrumentalists seek to understand the normativity of epistemic norms on the model practical instrumental norms governing the relation between aims and means. Non-instrumentalists often object that this commits instrumentalists to implausible epistemic assessments. I argue that this objection presupposes an implausibly strong interpretation of epistemic norms. Once we realize that epistemic norms should be understood in terms of permissibility rather than obligation, and that evidence only occasionally provide normative reasons for belief, an instrumentalist account becomes available that delivers the (...) correct epistemic verdicts. On this account, epistemic permissibility can be understood on the model of the wide-scope instrumental norm for instrumental rationality, while normative evidential reasons for belief can be understood in terms of instrumental transmission. (shrink)

In the longstanding foundational debate whether to require that probability is countably additive, in addition to being finitely additive, those who resist the added condition raise two concerns that we take up in this paper. (1) _Existence_: Settings where no countably additive probability exists though finitely additive probabilities do. (2) _Complete Additivity_: Where reasons for countable additivity don’t stop there. Those reasons entail complete additivity—the (measurable) union of probability 0 sets has probability 0, regardless the cardinality of that union. Then (...) probability distributions are discrete, not continuous. We use Easwaran’s (Easwaran, Thought 2:53–61, 2013) advocacy of the _Comparative_ principle to illustrate these two concerns. Easwaran supports countable additivity, both for numerical probabilities and for finer, qualitative probabilities, by defending a condition he calls the _Comparative_ principle [ \({\mathcal{C}}\) ]. For numerical probabilities, principle \({\mathcal{C}}\) contrasts pairs, P 1 and P 2, defined over a common partition \(\prod\) = {a _i_ : _i_ ∈ I} of measurable events. \({\mathcal{C}}\) requires that no P 1 may be pointwise dominated, i.e., no (finitely additive) probability P 2 exists such that for each _i_ ∈ I, P 2 (a _i_ ) > P 1 (a _i_ ). By design, the cardinality of \(\prod\) is not limited in \({\mathcal{C}}\), which Easwaran asserts is important when arguing that the principle does not require more, or less, than that probability is countably additive. We agree that a numerical probability P satisfies principle \({\mathcal{C}}\) in all partitions just in case P is countably additive. However, we show that for numerical probabilities, by considering the size of the algebra of events to which probability is applied, principle \({\mathcal{C}}\) is subject to each of the above concerns, (1) and (2). Also, Easwaran considers principle \({\mathcal{C}}\) with non-numerical, qualitative probabilities, where a qualitative probability may be finer than an almost agreeing numerical probability P. A qualitative probability is regular if possible events are strictly more likely than impossible events. Easwaran motivates and illustrates regular qualitative probabilities using a continuous, almost agreeing quantitative probability that is uniform on the unit interval. We make explicit the conditions for applying principle \({\mathcal{C}}\) with qualitative probabilities and show that \({\mathcal{C}}\) restricts regular qualitative probabilities to those whose almost agreeing quantitative probabilities are completely additive. For instance, Easwaran’s motivating example of a regular qualitative probability is precluded by principle \({\mathcal{C}}\). (shrink)

Out of Time by Baron, Miller and Tallant (henceforth BMT) is a contribution to the analytic philosophy of time. In this monograph, BMT argue that time might not exist, and that (therefore) our conc...

The alien invasive Red King Crab in the Barents Sea represents both a threat, via ecosystem impacts, and a gain as a revenue source from food sales. Uncertainties exist regarding the ecological impacts but debate in Norway has also emphasised the economic benefits to marginalised fisher communities. This paper reports on a Q-methodology study involving key stakeholders to probe the extent to which divisions exist between different groups. While divisions are indeed found and two groupings identified, these are not as (...) clear as suggested by the lines typically portrayed in the media and elsewhere –, i.e. economic gains versus ecological preservation. Stakeholder groups reported here generally agreed that biodiversity concerns should be central and that further invasion was undesirable due to potential impacts on ecosystem services. (shrink)

For Savage (1954) as for de Finetti (1974), the existence of subjective (personal) probability is a consequence of the normative theory of preference. (De Finetti achieves the reduction of belief to desire with his generalized Dutch-Book argument for Previsions.) Both Savage and de Finetti rebel against legislating countable additivity for subjective probability. They require merely that probability be finitely additive. Simultaneously, they insist that their theories of preference are weak, accommodating all but self-defeating desires. In this paper we dispute these (...) claims by showing that the following three cannot simultaneously hold: (i) Coherent belief is reducible to rational preference, i.e. the generalized Dutch-Book argument fixes standards of coherence. (ii) Finitely additive probability is coherent. (iii) Admissible preference structures may be free of consequences, i.e. they may lack prizes whose values are robust against all contingencies. (shrink)

Many have found it plausible that practical circumstances can affect whether someone is in a position to know or rationally believe a proposition. For example, whether it is rational for a person to believe that the bank will be open tomorrow can depend not only on the person's evidence but also on how practically important it is for the person not to be wrong about the bank being open tomorrow. This supposed phenomenon is known as “pragmatic encroachment” on knowledge and (...) rational belief. Assuming that the phenomenon is real, I ask what explains it. I argue that a variant of instrumentalism about epistemic reasons offers a natural explanation, that at the same time is able avoid commitment to a more radical form of pragmatism. (shrink)

This article examines the evolution of nineteenth-century French economist Michel Chevalier’s reputation and self-understanding as a Saint-Simonian. Despite only having served two years as chief editor of the famous Saint-Simonian Globe, Chevalier’s attempt to re-integrate himself into liberal intellectual circles following his split from the Saint-Simonian movement was consistently hindered by his perceived adherence to its illiberal principles. This article mobilizes Chevalier’s reputation as a means to explore the porous boundary between Saint-Simonianism and French liberalism at a time when the (...) contours between the two traditions were still not clearly defined. I also argue that the economist’s continued prioritization of economic development over political liberty grounded a variety of liberalism that many political liberals found intolerable, notably in its willingness to endure Bonapartist authoritarianism for the sake of economic growth. Mobilizing new archival material from the Second Empire, this article illuminates how Chevalier and others understood his relation to Saint-Simonianism and liberalism in the moment when he was at the apogee of his power and influence. (shrink)

Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No, because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether to (...) believe that p. To show this, I reconsider the role of the concept of belief in doxastic deliberation, and I defuse 'the teleologian's dilemma'. (shrink)

Let κ be an uncountable cardinal. Using the theory of conditional probability associated with de Finetti and Dubins, subject to several structural assumptions for creating sufficiently many measurable sets, and assuming that κ is not a weakly inaccessible cardinal, we show that each probability that is not κ-­additive has conditional probabilities that fail to be conglomerable in a partition of cardinality no greater than κ. This generalizes our result, where we established that each finite but not countably additive probability has (...) conditional probabilities that fail to be conglomerable in some countable partition. (shrink)

It is commonly remarked, as a curiosity, that Imruʾ al-Qays’s traditional death resembles that of Heracles, but it has never been meaningfully discussed. This article undertakes to do so, arguing for the Greek provenance of his death tradition and discussing the implications of the Islamic construction of a Greek death for “the greatest Arab poet.” One implication involves his biography more generally, which is argued to have originally formed a different kind of narrative serving particular Islamic interests, later adapted to (...) a biographic mold. The second stems from the recognition that the legendary Greek death of Imruʾ al-Qays is neither incidental nor isolated, which suggests that the horizons of Greco-Arabic studies are unduly narrow: alongside the transmission of written scientific texts, there were also oral popular traditions of Greek origin that left a deep imprint on Islamic culture. (shrink)

In light of scholarly debates on the wicked problems framework, this contribution offers an appraisal of the role of theology in an African context characterized by myriad wicked problems. I argue that within the African context, the decolonization of theology is indispensable for doing theology that is self-consciously contextual and therefore responsive to societal issues. This is crucial not least because of the widely recognized public role of religion in Africa. Drawing on the analytical framework of decoloniality and the theoretical (...) concept of wicked problems, I will argue that although the category of wicked problems emerged within the framework of the intellectual world of the Northern Hemisphere, its analytical capacity is no less significant for contemporary African theological discourse on decoloniality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Radicalizing the Local: 60 Linear Miles of Transborder ConflictTeddy Cruz (bio)2008estudio teddy cruzmedium: collage and vinyl wallpaperThe international border between the US and Mexico at the San Diego-Tijuana checkpoint is one of the most trafficked in the world. A 60-linear-mile cross-section—tangential to the border wall—between these two border cities compresses the most dramatic issues currently challenging our normative notions of architecture and urbanism.This transborder “cut” begins 30 miles (...) north of the border, on the periphery of San Diego, and ends 30 miles south of the border. We can find along this section’s trajectory a series of collisions, critical junctures, or conflicts between natural and artificial ecologies, top-down development and bottom-up organization. It is in the midst of many of these metropolitan and territorial sites of conflict where contemporary architectural practice needs to reposition itself.1. Conflict between master-planned gated communities and the natural topography +30 miles / San DiegoTop-down private development has been installing a selfish, oil-hungry sprawl of detached McMansions everywhere, forming massive subdivisions that collide with the natural topography.2. Conflict between large infrastructure and the watershed +28 miles / San DiegoLarge freeway and mall infrastructure runs the length of coastal San Diego, colliding with a natural network of canyons, rivers, and creeks that descend toward the Pacific Ocean.3. Conflict between privatization and everyday life +25 miles / San DiegoThe archipelago of beige tract homes also exacerbates a land use of exclusion, leading to an apartheid of everyday life, as gated communities retreat from the complexities of mixed uses.4. Conflict between military bases and environmental zones +20 miles / San DiegoIronically, the only interruptions along an otherwise continuous sprawl, 30 miles inland from the border, occur as the military bases that dot San Diego’s suburbanization overlap with environmentally protected lands.5. Conflict between the formal and informal +15 miles / San DiegoThe informal densities and economies produced by immigrants yield three-dimensional land use that collides with the one-dimensional zoning that defines suburban tract subdivisions. [End Page 107]6. Conflict between two border cities 0 miles / San Diego-TijuanaThis territorial conflict is currently dramatized by the hardening of the border wall that divides these cities, incrementally transforming San Diego into the world’s largest gated community.7. Conflict between the natural and political +0.5 miles / TijuanaAs the large infrastructure of the Tijuana River clashes with the border wall, a faint yellow line is inscribed on the dry river’s concrete channel to indicate the trajectory of the border. The border checkpoint is exactly at this intersection.8. Conflict between the informal and natural ecologies-10 miles / TijuanaAdjacent to the checkpoint we can find many slums crashing against the border. The wall acts as a powerful dam, containing the density of Tijuana and preventing it from contaminating San Diego’s picturesque sprawl.9. Conflict between factories and emergency housing-15 miles / TijuanaThese American-style, mini-master-planned communities are intertwined with a series of informal communities or slums, and both provide maquiladora factory enclaves with cheap labor.10. Conflict between density and sprawl-20 miles / TijuanaThousands of miniaturized replicas of typical suburban Southern California McMansions are now scattered around the periphery of Tijuana. In recent years, dwellers have radically transformed them into socioeconomic microengines.11. Conflict between two horizons-30 miles / TijuanaAs we reach the sea on the Mexican side, we witness the most dramatic of all territorial collisions across this 60-mile-section of local conflict. Here, the border metal fence finally sinks into the Pacific Ocean. [End Page 108] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page c1] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 2] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 12] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 22] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 32] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 42] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 52] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page 62] Click for larger view View full resolution[End Page... (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Esteban Céspedes (2015) seeks to defend the contrastive account of singular causation from my criticisms (Steglich-Petersen 2012). Céspedes objects to my argument on three counts: (1) it is circular in presupposing a principle that it seeks to establish; (2) that same principle is false; and (3) even if the principle were true, it would not speak against the contrastive account. In this note I argue that all three objections are unconvincing.

The "traditional" view of normative decision theory, as reported (for example) in chapter 2 of Luce and RaiÃa's [1957] classic work, Games and Decisions, proposes a reduction of sequential decisions problems to non-sequential decisions: a reduction of extensive forms to normal forms. Nonetheless, this reduction is not without its critics, both from inside and outside expected utility theory, It islay purpose in this essay to join with those critics by advocating the following thesis.

We discuss several features of coherent choice functions—where the admissible options in a decision problem are exactly those that maximize expected utility for some probability/utility pair in fixed set S of probability/utility pairs. In this paper we consider, primarily, normal form decision problems under uncertainty—where only the probability component of S is indeterminate and utility for two privileged outcomes is determinate. Coherent choice distinguishes between each pair of sets of probabilities regardless the “shape” or “connectedness” of the sets of probabilities. (...) We axiomatize the theory of choice functions and show these axioms are necessary for coherence. The axioms are sufficient for coherence using a set of probability/almost-state-independent utility pairs. We give sufficient conditions when a choice function satisfying our axioms is represented by a set of probability/state-independent utility pairs with a common utility. (shrink)

This paper discusses some differences between the received theory of regular conditional distributions, which is the countably additive theory of conditional probability, and a rival theory of conditional probability using the theory of finitely additive probability. The focus of the paper is maximally "improper" conditional probability distributions, where the received theory requires, in effect, that P{a: P = 0} = 1. This work builds upon the results of Blackwell and Dubins.

Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss argue that any truth norm for belief, linking the correctness of believing p with the truth of p, is bound to be uninformative, since applying the norm to determine the correctness of a belief as to whether p, would itself require forming such a belief. I argue that this conflates the condition under which the norm deems beliefs correct, with the psychological state an agent must be in to apply the norm. I also show that (...) since the truth norm conflicts with other possible norms that clearly are informative, the truth norm must itself be informative. (shrink)

Epistemic instrumentalists think that epistemic normativity is just a special kind of instrumental normativity. According to them, you have epistemic reason to believe a proposition insofar as doing so is conducive to certain epistemic goals or aims—say, to believe what is true and avoid believing what is false. Perhaps the most prominent challenge for instrumentalists in recent years has been to explain, or explain away, why one’s epistemic reasons often do not seem to depend on one’s aims. This challenge can (...) arguably be met. But a different challenge looms: instrumental reasons in the practical domain have various properties that epistemic reasons do not seem to share. In this chapter, we offer a way for epistemic instrumentalists to overcome this challenge. Our main thesis takes the form of a conditional: if we accept an independently plausible transmission principle of instrumental normativity, we can maintain that epistemic reasons in fact do share the relevant properties of practical instrumental reasons. In addition, we can explain why epistemic reasons seem to lack these properties in the first place: some properties of epistemic reasons are elusive, or easy to overlook, because we tend to think and talk about epistemic reasons in an ‘elliptical’ manner. (shrink)

Nishi Shah has recently argued that transparency in doxastic deliberation supports a strict version of evidentialism about epistemic reasons. I argue that Shah's argument relies on a principle that is incompatible with the strict version of evidentialism Shah wishes to advocate.

When real-valued utilities for outcomes are bounded, or when all variables are simple, it is consistent with expected utility to have preferences defined over probability distributions or lotteries. That is, under such circumstances two variables with a common probability distribution over outcomes – equivalent variables – occupy the same place in a preference ordering. However, if strict preference respects uniform, strict dominance in outcomes between variables, and if indifference between two variables entails indifference between their difference and the status quo, (...) then preferences over rich sets of unbounded variables, such as variables used in the St. Petersburg paradox, cannot preserve indifference between all pairs of equivalent variables. In such circumstances, preference is not a function only of probability and utility for outcomes. Then the preference ordering is not defined in terms of lotteries. (shrink)

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The aim of this paper is to critically discuss the plausibility of legal moralism with an emphasis on some central and recent versions. First, this paper puts forward and defends the thesis that recently developed varieties of legal moralism promoted by Robert P. George, John Kekes and Michael Moore are more plausible than Lord Devlin's traditional account. The main argument for this thesis is that in its more modern versions legal moralism is immune to some of the forceful challenges made (...) to Devlin by Hart, Dworkin and Feinberg among others. Second, however, the paper challenges the new generation of legal moralists and suggests some areas for further development. Although Devlin's position has been scrutinized thoroughly in the literature on the philosophy of law, there has, to my knowledge, been no comparable, systematic critique of these different proponents of legal moralism. (shrink)

Can there be good reasons for judging one set of probabilistic assertions more reliable than a second? There are many candidates for measuring "goodness" of probabilistic forecasts. Here, I focus on one such aspirant: calibration. Calibration requires an alignment of announced probabilities and observed relative frequency, e.g., 50 percent of forecasts made with the announced probability of.5 occur, 70 percent of forecasts made with probability.7 occur, etc. To summarize the conclusions: (i) Surveys designed to display calibration curves, from which a (...) recalibration is to be calculated, are useless without due consideration for the interconnections between questions (forecasts) in the survey. (ii) Subject to feedback, calibration in the long run is otiose. It gives no ground for validating one coherent opinion over another as each coherent forecaster is (almost) sure of his own long-run calibration. (iii) Calibration in the short run is an inducement to hedge forecasts. A calibration score, in the short run, is improper. It gives the forecaster reason to feign violation of total evidence by enticing him to use the more predictable frequencies in a larger finite reference class than that directly relevant. (shrink)

PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1984, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers. (1984), pp. 201-212.

We contrast three decision rules that extend Expected Utility to contexts where a convex set of probabilities is used to depict uncertainty: Γ-Maximin, Maximality, and E-admissibility. The rules extend Expected Utility theory as they require that an option is inadmissible if there is another that carries greater expected utility for each probability in a (closed) convex set. If the convex set is a singleton, then each rule agrees with maximizing expected utility. We show that, even when the option set is (...) convex, this pairwise comparison between acts may fail to identify those acts which are Bayes for some probability in a convex set that is not closed. This limitation affects two of the decision rules but not E-admissibility, which is not a pairwise decision rule. E-admissibility can be used to distinguish between two convex sets of probabilities that intersect all the same supporting hyperplanes. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.1 (2002) 43-56 [Access article in PDF] Jack London's Medusa of Truth Per Serritslev Petersen FROM THE VERY START of his literary career, Jack London believed that a good fiction writer must also be a good thinker—that fictional authenticity and integrity must somehow be imbedded in philosophical authenticity and integrity. In his early essay "On the Writer's Philosophy of Life," and in his early letters (...) to Cloudsley Johns, his intellectually "slovenly" friend (who also happened to share his literary ambitions and interests), London insists, again and again, on the proper philosophical foundation of the successful writer. This is how poor Cloudsley, who had previously been told to "get in and systematically ground [himself] in history, economics, biology and the kindred branches" 1 gets browbeaten by his self-appointed mentor and master, a veritable Jack of all trades, in a letter dated March 15, 1900: "To be well fitted for the tragedy of existence (intellectual existence), one must have a working philosophy, a synthesis of things. Have you a synthesis of things? Do you write, and talk, and build upon a foundation which you know is securely laid? Or do you not rather build with a hazy idea of 'to hell with the foundation.'" London then proceeds to catechize his friend on scientific principles such as the indestructibility of Matter, the persistence of Force, and the overall "dynamic principle, true of the metamorphosis of the universe"—principles that Cloudsley is urged to study "carefully and painstakingly" before he can ever claim to have "a firm foundation for [his] philosophy of life" (Letters, pp. 170-71).In London's admittedly heavy-handed ad hominem argument, one recognizes the philosophical sledgehammer of Ernest Everhard, the revolutionary hero of The Iron Heel and one of the fictional exponents of "that cold forbidding philosophy, materialistic monism," 2 which also [End Page 43] served as the scientific foundation of London's own philosophy of life. There are, however, not one, but two components to London's philosophy, which, as I shall argue in this essay, together constitute an essentially dialectical construction, a dynamic juxtaposition of and negotiation with, on the one hand, the "cold forbidding" Medusa of Truth and, on the other hand, the life-enhancing Aphrodite of Romance, the second of which is one of several versions of the vital Maia-Lie (Maia being the Buddhist term for the power that creates or re-creates the world as cosmic illusion).Two points need to be stressed from the outset. First, London's work is implicitly aligned with literary naturalism—the "Zolaistic Movement" of modern American fiction that the genteel writer and editor Thomas Bailey Aldrich famously condemned for its "miasmatic breath" 3 —even though London himself would always qualify his own naturalism by insisting that, artistically, he was "an emotional materialist" (Letters, p. 329), and that his realism was, in the words of Martin Eden, one of his fictional alter egos, "an impassioned realism, shot through with human aspiration and faith." 4 Second, London's work is explicitly aligned with philosophical naturalism (as distinct from supernaturalism)—that is, naturalism as the philosophical or epistemological view that, to quote The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995), "everything is natural, i.e. that everything there is belongs to the world of nature, and so can be studied by the methods appropriate for studying that world." In philosophical practice, naturalism and materialism have tended to coalesce, materialism being basically understood as the view that everything is made of matter, which can be studied by the methods of natural science. Like London's philosophical alter ego Ernest Everhard (and also like fictional protagonists such as Wolf Larsen and Martin Eden), London declared himself "a materialistic monist," although, as he admitted to Cloudsley Johns, "there is dam little satisfaction in it." Rhetorically impersonating, as it were, Wolf Larsen, London, in the same letter, asks himself and his correspondent, "what squirming anywhere, damned or otherwise, means anything? That's the question I am always prone to put: What's this chemical ferment called life about? Small wonder that small men... (shrink)

In this paper I propose a teleological account of epistemic reasons. In recent years, the main challenge for any such account has been to explicate a sense in which epistemic reasons depend on the value of epistemic properties. I argue that while epistemic reasons do not directly depend on the value of epistemic properties, they depend on a different class of reasons which are value based in a direct sense, namely reasons to form beliefs about certain propositions or subject matters. (...) In short, S has an epistemic reason to believe that p if and only if S is such that if S has reason to form a belief about p, then S ought to believe that p. I then propose a teleological explanation of this relationship. It is also shown how the proposal can avoid various subsidiary objections commonly thought to riddle the teleological account. (shrink)

Background Moral distress is a far-reaching problem for nurses in different settings as it threatens their health. Aim This study examined which situations lead to moral distress in home-care nursing, how and with which consequences home-care nurses experience moral distress, and how they cope with morally stressful situations and the resulting moral distress. Research design A qualitative interview study with reflexive thematic analysis was used. Participants and research context We conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 home-care nurses in Germany. Ethical considerations (...) The study was approved by the Data Protection Office and Ethics Committee of the German Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Findings Twenty (14 female and 6 male) home-care nurses were interviewed between April and August 2023 at their chosen location. The situations leading to moral distress were inadequate care of the person in need of care, not being able to protect one’s health, extended responsibility for the entire care arrangement, work–privacy conflicts, and conflicts between the understanding of care or professional ethics and the performance and billing system. The nurses experienced moral distress as they worked alone and provided care in the patient’s territory. Short- and long-term strains with destructive cognitions, negative emotions, physical symptoms, and health consequences were reported. They faced challenges in coping with moral distress on institutional and individual levels. Conclusions In cases of tension between the service and billing system and the understanding of these nurses’ care services, moral distress is unavoidable. Alternative forms of organization and billing modalities, such as payment by time and the expansion and refinancing of service, should be implemented. The latter relates to systematic case and ethics meetings. Further, a transfer of medical activities, such as the prescription of wound material to registered nurses, could prevent morally stressful situations and improve patients’ quality of care. (shrink)