Drawing broadly on environmental philosophy, literary theory, settler colonial studies, decolonial theory, and speculative realism, Eggan quarries uncanny depictions of the natural world to unsettle not just the concept of nature but the coloniality of Nature. Unsettling Nature at once critiques Heidegger's home(l)y phenomenology and brings it forward through chapters on Willa Cather, D. H. Lawrence, Olive Schreiner, and Doris Lessing. The book concludes with a speculative proposal to transform eco-phenomenology into "exo-phenomenology," which emphasizes ways of being and perceiving (...) that bring us out of ourselves into contact with the Other, and into an encounter with the self as Othered. (shrink)

Incompatibilism, the view that free will and determinism are incompatible, subsists on two widely accepted, but deeply confused, theses concerning possibility and causation: (1) in a deterministic universe, one can never truthfully utter the sentence "I could have done otherwise," and (2) in such universes, one can never really take credit for having caused an event, since in fact all events have been predetermined by conditions during the universe's birth. Throughout the free will.

I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent- and object-active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent-active expectations over object-active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off-load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's role in (...) perception. My objections undercut central arguments which Noë gives for his brand of enactivism. (shrink)

These two interesting papers raise a number of important issues. I will limit myself, however, to drawing out some of the recurring questions, in order to keep myself from wandering too much down fascinating side alleys.I cannot resist, however, beginning with what sounds like a digression. There is a lot of misunderstanding of what I was trying to say, especially in Braybrooke's paper. My author's reflex is to blame my readers. But a moment's quiet thought makes me aware of how (...) far from totally clear I was. More than that, some of what is at issue between us is precisely the grid within which these questions should be debated. I am dissatisfied with the accepted way of putting some of these questions, and I want to propose new terms. It was inevitable that misunderstandings arise in these circumstances. (shrink)

A complete bibliography of Collingwood's publications and manuscripts. Very complete summaries of Collinwood's reflection on Art and History.

I characterize and then complicate Solomon, Thagard and Goldman ' s framing of the issue of integrating cognitive and social factors in explaining science. I sketch a radically different framing which distributes the mind beyond the brain, embodies it, and has that mind - body - person become, as s / he always is, an agent acting in a society. I also find problems in Solomon ' s construal of multivariate statistics, Thagard ' s analogies for multivariate analysis, and Goldman (...) ' s faith in the capacity of the community of users of scientific method to home in on true beliefs. (shrink)

Preparing for the journey -- Memory: who am I? -- True being -- The Lucifer effect -- Blame is socially contagious -- The spiritual quest -- The meaning of it all -- Pets and an afterlife -- Crime and punishment -- The dream within the dream -- A rich inner life -- Love thy neighbor -- What if there were no chapter 13? -- Pursuit of happiness -- The drive for power -- Innocent -- Camelot -- Human rights -- E (...) followed by F -- Certainty -- Biases? -- Growing up -- Meaning: it's all a simulation -- The little lie -- Discernment -- The unexamined life -- Conclusion: the exam. (shrink)

It is a point of some interest to the historian of the social and intellectual development of Athens to determine, if possible, the exact dates between which the philosopher Anaxagoras made that city his home. As everyone knows, the tradition of the third and later centuries was not uniform. The dates from which the Alexandrian chronologists had to arrive at their results may be conveniently summed up under three headings, date of Anaxagoras' arrival at Athens, date of his prosecution and (...) escape to Lampsacus, length of his residence at Athens, The received account , was that Anaxagoras was twenty years old at the date of the invasion of Xerxes and lived to be seventy-two. This was apparently why Apollodorus placed his birth in Olympiad 70 and his death in Ol. 88. I, thus giving the years 500–428 B.C. of our reckoning, The further statement of Apollodorus that Anaxagoras xs1F24ρξατο xs03D5ιλοσοxs03D5εxs1FD6ν xs22EFπxs22EF Καλλίον has given rise to discussion; but when we remember that Demetrius of Phalerum had made what ‘Diogenes’ regards as an equivalent statement in his register of archons, and had said that Anaxagoras was twenty years old at the time, I think there can be no doubt of the meaning. Demetrius had clearly mentioned something about Anaxagoras which was looked on as giving the date at which he ‘began to philosophize,’ and had given his age at the time. The natural interpretation is that Demetrius mentioned the year of Anaxagoras’ arrival at Athens, and that this was taken as the time at which he ρξαtο φιλοσοφεlσ And it is further reasonable to suppose that this date was the source of the further statement of Demetrius, that Anaxagoras was born in or about 500 B.C. We may, I think, infer that Demetrius recorded the arrival of Anaxagoras in Athens under the year 480, giving his approximate age at that time. (shrink)

At first glance, it may appear that those who believe in divine providence have a happier lot and are much less prone to despair than those who reject god and divine providence altogether. That alone may seem to give us good reason to prefer belief to non-belief. I shall argue in this essay that there is almost nothing to be said for either the view that belief in providence provides invincible armor against despair or for the view that the atheist (...) who rejects providence need surrender to a paralyzing despair. (shrink)

This article introduces some of the key philosophical contributions of W. E. B. Du Bois. Du Bois studied with Santayana and William James (among others), but chose social science, social theory, journalism, and activism over academic philosophy. Despite this detour, the philosophic depth of his work has won the attention of scholars in fields such as history, English, post‐colonial theory, African‐American Studies, American philosophy, and Africana philosophy, and it has belatedly begun to attract the interest of philosophers more generally. This (...) brief overview will explore the philosophical dimensions of some of Du Bois’s best‐known positions – his claims about the ‘color line’ and the Talented Tenth, his argument with Booker T. Washington, and his account of double‐consciousness. These positions open onto a rich constellation of views in social ontology, epistemology, political theory, existential phenomenology, and more besides. (shrink)

A layman's view of history.--Old age.--The education of Henry Adams.--Mont-Saint Michel and Chartres.--The Phi beta kappa ideal.--Pieces written during the war: The pathos of America. Sub specie æternitatis. The wisdom of the ages.

This article focuses on the blogosphere as an oppositional field where the meanings around contemporary Western women's singlehood are contested, negotiated and rewritten. In contrast to dominant narratives in which single women are pathologised, in the blogs by, for, and about single women analysed here, writers aim to refigure women's singleness as well as providing resources, support and a textual community where others can intervene and contribute to the re-valuation of single women. These blogs also function as alternative forms of (...) knowledge, seeking to (re)legitimise women's singleness and to trouble their aberrance and social liminality. Rather than only considering the form in isolation from its content, this article analyses the discourses deployed by bloggers and within blogs and how women bloggers publicly perform their very singleness as part of a personal and political strategy of re-signification. In this way, while cautious not to overestimate the democratic potentialities of the so-called blogosphere, it underscores the important cultural – and indeed political – work being undertaken by single women therein. Moreover, by demonstrating how these blogs use discursive tactics commonly associated with feminism's second-wave – women's consciousness-raising; identity politics; deploying and reiterating the famous feminist dictum: ‘the personal is political’; naming discrimination; and empathy and community-building – it argues that they are using so-called ‘new’ media for what is now problematically believed to be ‘old’ (feminist) politics. (shrink)

Incompatibilism, the view that free will and determinism are incompatible, subsists on two widely accepted, but deeply confused, theses concerning possibility and causation: (1) in a deterministic universe, one can never truthfully utter the sentence “I could have done otherwise,” and (2) in such universes, one can never really receive credit or blame for having caused an event, since in fact all events have been predetermined by conditions during the universe’s birth. Throughout the free will literature one finds variations on (...) these two themes, often intermixed in various ways. When Robert Nozick2 describes our longing for “originative value” he apparently has thesis (2) in mind, and thesis (1) may underlie his assertion that “we want it to be true that in that very same situation we could have done (significantly) otherwise.” John Austin, in a famous footnote, flirts with thesis (1). (shrink)

The characterization of the vices as ‘deadly’ has been explained in terms of the fatal harm they bring to those who possess them. Little has as yet been said about their effect on others, though there have been indications that at least potentially, they are likely to be harmful to others as well. A question is raised on whether the disposition of the vicious is such that by possessing a particular vice, they have further vicious tendencies as well.

It appears that both English and French contain a mixture of ergative and transitive verbal constructions. How useful is reference to a dual-structure model of syntax in determining the bias of a particular language? Certain verbal constructions in English and French could be generated from either transitive or ergative deep structures; we must therefore turn to other criteria - syntactic cohesion and predominant constituent structures in 'surface structure' - for a non-arbitrary - and adequate - decision.