Abstract„What thinks in man, is not he himself, but his social community.“ These words by the early sociologist Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838–1909) were quoted several times by Ludwik Fleck (1896–1961) and seem to be in complete agreement with his own theory of thought collectives. The assumption that even scientific ideas were not so much generated by the scientist as an autonomous individual but rather by and within the social environment was still considered provocative by Fleck in the 1930s. This article will (...) explore the implications of this assumption by comparing Fleck with Gumplowicz as well as with Tadeusz Bilikiewicz (1901–1980), a psychiatrist, philosopher and historian of medicine working like Fleck in the cultural milieu of Lwów/lemberg. (shrink)

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

The authors of this book, scholars from Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Ukraina, Kirghizia and Poland, seek to answer the question, in what way the Westeuropean and postcommunist countries respond to the challenges posed to them by democratization in Central and Eastern Europe and European constitutional politics and policymaking. New democracies necessarily pose a challenge to non-democratic states, because they liberated themselves from the totalitarian regime. They pose a challenge for the old liberal democracies too, because they try to compromise individual (...) interests and freedoms with traditional prepolitical and political group identities. But just the model of democracy can be followed in many non-Western countries which aspire to establish a democratic order. This book raises the questions that are particularly significant to the present-day political practice in its European and global dimensions. It is intended as a companion volume for all those who combine their academic research with wider interests in the promoting of democracy in the period of globalization and under the new pressures of European constitutional politics. (shrink)

The article presents two concepts of indexicality. The first, more standard and narrow, identifies indexicality with systematic (meaning controlled) context-sensitivity. The second, broader (derived from the work of Jerzy Pelc), conceives indexicality in terms of the potential variability of the general semiotic characteristics expressions (with respect to the context of use). The text introduces the concept of a pragmatic matrix that serves for a schematic representation of contextual variation. I also recapitulate briefly the views of Jerzy Pelc on the meaning (...) (manner of use) and use of expressions, and briefly indicate its relationship approaches with contemporary debates around contextualism and status of non-sentential speech acts. Finally, the relationship between the broader notion of indexicality and the directival theory of meaning is analyzed. (shrink)

I defend an alternative to the two traditional accounts of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognition as primary versus social cognition as primary. These accounts have complementary explanatory vices and virtues. They also share a natural assumption: that interpretation in terms of mental states is “spectatorial”, aiming exclusively for an objective description of the mental facts about self and others. I argue that if one rejects this assumption in favor of the view that interpretation in terms of mental (...) states also plays important regulative roles with respect to minds and behavior, a new and superior conception of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition comes into view. On this conception, person-level metacognitive concepts are socio-cognitive tools that shape us into better cognitive agents and more predictable cognitive objects, thereby enhancing our abilities at social coordination. Mastery of these metacognitive concepts relies on subpersonal, non-conceptual, procedural metacognition. This reconceptualization of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition combines the complementary explanatory virtues of the two traditional conceptions, while avoiding their complementary explanatory vices. (shrink)

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of (...) propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with. (shrink)