In the last decade, the migrant population in Chile has substantially increased, where the rates have not only increased in the adult population, but also among children and adolescents, creating a potential for social and cultural development in the educational system. The present work analyzes the relationship between self-concept, self-efficacy, and subjective well-being in native and migrant adolescents in Santiago de Chile. The sample consisted of 406 students, 56.65% women, with an age range that fluctuated between 12 and 16 years, (...) with an average of 13.36 years. Student’s t-tests were used to compare the average of the constructs evaluated between natives/migrants and boys/girls participants. Subsequently, two multivariate models of simple mediation were constructed, one for natives and another for migrants, which assumed subjective well-being as a dependent variable, academic self-concept as an independent variable and the general self-efficacy as a mediating variable. In both models, gender was considered as a control variable. Results show that migrant students present higher levels of academic self-concept and general self-efficacy than native students. There are no differences with regard to well-being. In the case of gender, differences are observed only for the case of general self-efficacy, where boys present higher levels. On the other hand, a partial mediation is observed for the model of native students and a total mediation for the model of migrant students. The study yielded interesting results regarding the differences in the evaluation of the constructs of self-concept, self-efficacy, and subjective well-being in both groups. Such data can be used as inputs for the development of public policies for adolescents. (shrink)

Leo Strauss (1899-1973) a inscrit sa pensée dans l'héritage de la tradition grecque, mais également dans celui de la tradition biblique. Se rapportant au judaïsme comme à une révélation de la Loi (pour laquelle la dimension de la foi est secondaire), il fait retour à une pensée juive (Pourquoi nous restons juifs) et tente de prolonger la réflexion de Maïmonide dans les conditions nouvelles des temps présents. Il s'oppose ainsi à sa rénovation par l'approche phénoménologique de Franz Rosenzweig comme à (...) la pensée de Martin Buber, tout en se tenant à distance de la réflexion sur le mysticisme juif de Gershom Scholem avec lequel il dialogue. Cet ouvrage interroge la manière dont Strauss pense les relations de corrélation et de conflit entre philosophie et judaïsme. En quoi la réflexion sur la Loi, dont il poursuit l'élaboration dans la lignée de la pensée médiévale et à contre-courant de la modernité des Lumières, représente- t-elle un approfondissement de la pensée juive et jette-t-elle une lumière crue sur la situation du judaïsme dans le monde? Quels sont les termes du débat avec les penseurs contemporains du judaïsme avec lesquels il est en relation? Quelles sont aujourd'hui les possibilités et les limites d'une telle réflexion pour la vitalité du judaïsme et de la philosophie? Les études présentes ouvrent des voies différentes, voire divergentes, essentiellement heuristiques, sur les possibilités et les limites de la réflexion straussienne pour la vitalité du judaïsme et de la philosophie. Elles s'accompagnent de la parution d'un texte inédit en français : " La situation religieuse actuelle " (1930), qui représente un moment décisif de la réflexion de Strauss sur la question. (shrink)

Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995) zählt nicht nur zu den wichtigsten Ethikern im 20. Jahrhundert. Vor allem entwirft er einen anderen Anfang der Ethik, die nicht auf der gesellschaftlichen Ebene oder als grosse Idee und Erzählung entsteht. Ethik entspringt vielmehr in der konkreten Zwischenmenschlichkeit, wenn man vom Anderen in die Verantwortung gerufen wird - und zwar durch die Verletzlichkeit seines nackten Gesichtes wie durch die Anrede. Die ethische Beziehung verdankt sich dabei nicht etwa der Gleichheit, der Nähe oder der Geschwisterlichkeit, sondern der (...) Andersheit des Anderen, seiner Ferne und vor allem seiner Fremdheit, die sich nicht hintergehen lassen. Damit gründet Lévinas die Gesellschaft nicht nur auf die Zwischenmenschlichkeit, sondern auch auf die Pluralität. So wenig wie die Ethik universelle Ansprüche erheben kann, lässt sich Gerechtigkeit als ein allgemeines Prinzip entwerfen. Vielmehr muss sie den Individuen in deren unendlicher Andersheit gerecht werden. In dieser Unendlichkeit blitzt im nackten Gesicht das Antlitz Gottes auf, denkt Lévinas aus der jüdischen Tradition heraus. Das lässt sich auch rein säkular verstehen, dass alle Menschen anders sind. Sie als Gleiche zu behandeln, unterwirft sie totalen politischen Ansprüchen, macht sie zu gehorsamen Untertanen. In Auseinandersetzung mit Sartre entwickelt Lévinas eine individualistische Ethik der Verantwortung, die jeden Menschen betrifft, indem sie aus der Zwischenmenschlichkeit heraus die Mündigkeit konstituiert. So verfolgt der Einzelne nicht primär seine Interessen, sondern übernimmt Verantwortung für den Anderen: Die Wende der Ethik im 20. Jahrhundert - von Sartre, de Beauvoir und Lacan inspiriert, von Derrida und Butler fortgeschrieben, bestehen zudem Parallelen zu Arendt und Foucault. (shrink)

Recent work on extended mind theory has considered whether the material realizers of phenomenally conscious states might be distributed across both body and world. A popular framework for understanding perceptual consciousness in world-involving terms is sensorimotor enactivism, which holds that subjects make direct sensory contact with objects by means of their active, exploratory skills. In this paper, I consider the case of emotional experience, and argue that although the enactivist view does not transfer neatly to this domain, there are elements (...) of emotional consciousness whose physical underpinnings include parts of the extra-bodily environment. (shrink)

The variety DMM of De Morgan monoids has just four minimal subvarieties. The join-irreducible covers of these atoms in the subvariety lattice of DMM are investigated. One of the two atoms consisting of idempotent algebras has no such cover; the other has just one. The remaining two atoms lack nontrivial idempotent members. They are generated, respectively, by 4-element De Morgan monoids C4 and D4, where C4 is the only nontrivial 0-generated algebra onto which finitely subdirectly irreducible De Morgan monoids may (...) be mapped by noninjective homomorphisms. The homomorphic preimages of C4 within DMM constitute a proper quasivariety, which is shown to have a largest subvariety U. The covers of the variety within U are revealed here. There are just ten of them. In exactly six of these ten varieties, all nontrivial members have C4 as a retract. In the varietal join of those six classes, every subquasivariety is a variety—in fact, every finite subdirectly irreducible algebra is projective. Beyond U, all covers of [or of ] within DMM are discriminator varieties. Of these, we identify infinitely many that are finitely generated, and some that are not. We also prove that there are just 68 minimal quasivarieties of De Morgan monoids. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Vaidya, Guhe, and Williams on the Bloomsbury Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi of GaṅgeśaStephen Phillips (bio)More or less happy with the reviews, I would like mainly, in response, to identify advances made in the study of Gaṅgeśa. Anand Vaidya articulates a clearer overview of Gaṅgeśa's theory of knowledge; Eberhard Guhe shows a better way to render the notion of vyāpti, "pervasion," which is central in the theory of (...) inference as a knowledge source; and Michael Williams, too, shows need for improvement on that score as well as for elaboration of matters taken up by classical commentators that are given short shrift in my running comments. For example, whereas long discussions are provoked by Gaṅgeśa's definition of "knowledge," pramā, major points in the purvapakṣa in the section on proving the existence of an īśvara, a "Lord," seem, as Williams says, "threadbare."Vaidya, following Burge (2003), introduces a distinction between entitlement and justification: entitlement is the kind of unreflective epistemic warrant delivered by Gaṅgeśa's pramāṇa, "knowledge sources," working automatically in our everyday lives, whereas justification requires self-conscious certification, prāmāṇya-jñapti. Thereby splitting the horns of a dilemma posed by internalist accounts of knowledge in opposition to externalist ones, Burge and Vaidya are able to incorporate the most [End Page 519] attractive features of each approach. The entitlement/justification distinction cashes out, I may add, to Vaidya's elucidation, Nyāya's deeply held doctrine of parataḥ-prāmāṇya, "certification by another," against the view of "intrinsic certification," svataḥ-prāmāṇya, of Prabhākara and others. As Williams notes, Prābhākara positions, for which Gaṅgeśa sometimes shows sympathy, may have led him to presume that an anubhava—"awareness" or "presentational experience" in my translation, "fresh news" in Matilal's snappy rendering—is an episode of knowledge, pramā, "unless one knows otherwise," bādhakam vinā.On reflection, one sees that such a presentation (it could be perceptual, inferential, analogical, or testimonial) has been produced by a pramāṇa, or, in abnormal cases, not, and so by a "pramāṇa-pretender," a pramāṇaābhāsa, as in seeing a mirage. Again, an anubhava is not just any old cognition or "thought" (pace Das 2021, p. 162); it is defined as nonrecollective. Unlike a deliverance of a genuine pramāṇa, some instances may, on examination, prove to be a-pramā, "non-knowledge," but are, nevertheless, at the animal level, sufficient to provoke and guide action that would not be unhesitating were there doubt in any way. A thirsty Maya, in Vaidya's example, would naturally move in the direction of the water she "sees." But she would hesitate were she to learn from her friend about the unreliability of water-perception in the current circumstances. At the reflective level, where she is unsure whether the anubhava she apperceives is pramā or apramā, her action, including speech (implying assertability), is altered.So far so good in Vaidya's reconstruction. But Gaṅgeśa does not himself pronounce on the question of whether, after learning about the defeater, Maya would still be entitled to her perceptual belief that there is water in the distance. In the volumes under review, I assumed that she would not be "justified" and indeed that she would no longer have the belief (if we may speak about "beliefs"). The defeater grasped at the reflective level would mean not only that she could not certify the perceptual deliverance but also that there would be no knowledge. Clearly, she can't certify it, and thus, as Vaidya reasons, loses the right to assert. But maybe he's correct that, according to Gaṅgeśa's sensibilities, she does not lose the perceptual knowledge. She would remain entitled to her belief.Personally, I think this is wrong, but Vaidya's understanding does have the merit of explaining why some later Naiyāyikas apparently took absurd positions on epistemic luck (Bhattacharya 1996, p. ix). I think that Maya would lose her entitlement, too, but what if, after being informed of the unreliability of water-perception... (shrink)

H.B. Acton, professor successively in South Wales, London, and Edinburgh, died in June 1974 when he was just sixty-six. His loss is deeply lamented by his friends, not least by students of Hegel; and they extend their profound sympathy to his widow. He was much interested in political, economic and social questions, and his publications on these matters are expressive of a humane and liberal outlook. His remarkable short book on Kant’s moral philosophy shed fresh light on a well-worn topic, (...) and his posthumously printed Comte lecture on The Idea of A Spiritual Power must have many readers wish that he could have seen his idea translated into reality. It is sad that his notes for a book on Hegel in Perspective did not reach a stage at which they could be worked up for publication, but his long preface to a translation of Hegel’s essay on Natural Law is to appear in 1975 from the University of Pennsylvania Press. Not even the shortest notice could exclude mention of his effectiveness as a teacher, his untiring devotion to his students, or the respect and admiration which in them and others he inspired. (shrink)

This paper details an algorithm for a binary, primitive recursive function that apparently computes, for any $i$ and $n$, $f_i\left(i,n\right)$. The algorithm works by exploiting the fact that, in the formal system described, the index assigned to a p.r. function codes the definitional composition of the function. The algorithm exploits such a code to generate a "canonical proof" of $f_i\left(i,n\right)=m$. Since this kind of algorithm is shown impossible by diagonal arguments, the algorithm must be in error. But the error is (...) worth investigating, for it is unclear upon sustained, earnest reflection where it lies. I thus offer this material to readers with a humble request for assistance. (shrink)

Introduction At some point in your life you will have told a lie and have been believed. You will have deceived the person to whom you lied. ...

This paper develops an explicit, pragmatic solution to the problem of deciding when an explanans which only approximately "covers" a desired event-explanandum E is acceptable as an adequate explanation. It shows in detail how comparisons made by the explanation's audience with the numerical value in E are what determine how closely E must be approximated for success. With the aid of several physics examples, it spells out the principles that govern these explanandum-comparisons, the conditions under which those principles hold, and (...) the audience traits that influence which comparisons they take seriously. (shrink)

Way back in the 1980s corporations began collecting, combining, and crunching data from sources through-out the enterprise. This approach was widely accepted as a methodology that provides objectivity and trans-parency in decision-making. Good processing of the garnered data paved way for improved analysis of trends and patterns leading to better business and increased profit margins. Corporations began investing in collect-ing, storing, processing and maintaining enterprise wide data. The focus was always on the quality of data and the process of converting (...) it into knowledge that enables right decisions. It was soon realized that a wide range of personal biases has an impact on the way decisions are made. The entire process is replete with ethical dilemmas. This paper provides a framework to understand the interplay of data, information, personal biases, ethics and decision-making. This approach is suitable for every individ-ual, team, organization or a nation. Several years of turmoil in South Africa make it imminent for it to take a fresh look at the way data is transformed into knowledge. The leadership within South Africa has to arrive at wise decisions that can withstand the scrutiny of generations to come. (shrink)