Ancient Buddhist philosophy, with reference to Buddhist economic philosophy.

Ratom pʻilosopʻia, rogorcʻ kritikuli azrovnebis gamocʻdileba -- Kritikuli azrovnebis metʻodis żiritʻadi kitʻxvebi -- Kritikuli azrovnebis metʻodis żiritʻadi debulebebi.

Adolescence is a developmental stage when adolescents are vulnerable to addictive behaviors, such as Internet addiction, which refers to pathological use of the Internet. Although there are views proposing that the links between IA and adolescent problem behavior may be bidirectional in nature, few studies have examined the reciprocal relationships between IA and other maladjustment indicators, and even fewer studies have simultaneously employed both emotional and behavioral maladjustment indicators in a single study. To address the above research gaps, the present (...) study investigated how IA is associated with both depression and delinquency among Chinese adolescents. Two waves of data were collected at two consecutive years, respectively, with 1year apart, from 3,010 students in four junior high schools in mainland China. These students completed the same questionnaire containing measures of IA, depression, and delinquency at each wave. The proposed cross-lagged panel model fitted the data very well, and there were significant positive reciprocal effects between IA and depression as well as delinquency after controlling for background socio-demographic factors. Gender differences were also observed in multi-group comparisons. Specifically, IA showed a stronger longitudinal impact on delinquency among boys than among girls. While depression significantly predicted IA in 1year among boys, such a prediction was not significant among girls. These findings delineate the bidirectionality of the associations between IA and emotional and behavioral maladjustment indexed by depression and delinquency, respectively. The findings also suggest that researchers and practitioners have to take gender differences as well as different developmental indicators in understanding the bidirectional influences between IA and adolescent behavioral and emotional development. (shrink)

In addressing bioethical issues at the beginning of human life, such as abortion, human embryonic stem cell research, and therapeutic cloning, a primary concern is to establish when a developing human embryo or fetus can be considered a “person”; for it is typically held that only persons are the subjects of moral rights, such as a “right to life.” The 13th century philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas defines a person as “an individual substance of a rational nature” (ST Ia.29.1); he (...) further asserts that all human beings are persons (ST Ia.16.12 ad 1), but that an embryo or fetus is not a human being until its body is informed by a “rational soul.” Aquinas’s account of human embryogenesis has been generally rejected today due to its dependence upon medieval biological information. A number of scholars, however, have attempted to combine Aquinas’s basic metaphysical account of human nature with current embryological data to develop a contemporary Thomistic account of a human being’s beginning. (shrink)

Academic performance occupies an important role in adolescent development. It reflects adolescents’ cognitive ability and also shapes their academic and career paths. Students who are satisfied with their school performance tend to show higher self-esteem, confidence, and motivation. Previous research has suggested that students’ problem behaviors, such as Internet Addiction, and academic values, including intrinsic and utility values, could predict satisfaction with academic performance. However, the influence of IA and academic values has not been thoroughly explored in Chinese contexts where (...) the pressure for academic success is heavy. This study examined the relationships between IA, academic values, and satisfaction with academic performance using two waves of data collected from secondary school students in four cities in mainland China. The matched sample included a total of 2,648 Grade 7 or 8 students. Participants completed the same questionnaire containing validated measures at both waves with a 1-year interval. In line with the hypotheses, multiple regression analyses showed that Wave 1 IA was a significant negative predictor of Wave 2 intrinsic value, utility value, and satisfaction with academic performance and their changes. Results of mediation analyses revealed that only intrinsic value, but not utility value, positively predicted satisfaction with academic performance. Structural equation modeling analyses also showed similar findings. Two observations are concluded from the present findings: IA impaired students’ intrinsic value, utility value, and perceived satisfaction with academic performance; two aspects of academic values demonstrated different influences on satisfaction with academic performance. These findings provide implications for the promotion of academic satisfaction experienced by students and the prevention of negative effects of IA. (shrink)

Demokratia, tʻavisupʻleba, kanoni (tʻargmanebi) -- Nikoloz Ruruas publicʻistika -- Upʻlebatʻa iurisprudencʻia, sasamartʻlo precʻedentebi (tʻargmanebi) -- Saqoveltʻao šegonebani.

: J.S. Mill declares the true liberal prays for enlightened opposition. Slavoj Žižek's anti-liberal Kierkegaardian-Leninist philosophy, as presented in On Belief, is sized up as an opponent but fails to measure up philosophically. Žižek is not clear-headed; doesn't understand Kierkegaard; doesn't understand Lenin; or is too much of a soft-hearted liberal who only wishes he weren't. Žižek fears liberalism may threaten freedom. But the threats he sees — although real — are old news to liberals. Lionel Trilling-inspired hints concerning the (...) proper care and feedings of the liberal imagination conclude the paper. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE STATUS AND FUNCTION OF DIVINE SIMPLENESS IN SUMMA THEOLOGIAE Ia, qq. 2-13 PETER BURNS, S.J. l esuit School of Theology Berkeley, California Introduction I N THE FIRST PART of what follows I hope to do four things: a) to give a brief summary of Aquinas's remarks contained in the third question of the first part of the Summa Theologiae, entitled de Dei simplicitate; b) to outline two diferent (...) ways of interpreting what Aquinas is about when making those remarks; c) to assess which interpretation is better from an exegetical standpoint; d) to assess which interpretation is better from a philosophical standpoint. In the second part my aim will be threefold : a) to trace the way Aquinas derives and uses the concept of divine simpleness in questions 2 through 11 ; b) to examine briefly the relationship between this concept and possible cosmological arguments for the existence of God; and c) to evaluate critically some modern treatments of arguments of the cosmological type in the light of this relationship. I shall not be concerned to show that Aquinas's conclusions in question 2 (the Five Ways) are justified by the arguments he adduces; rather, my concern will be to show that an adequate evaluation of his arguments cannot ignore the function of divine simpleness as a key element therein. I. The Status Of Divinle Simpleness (1) A Summary of S.T. la, 3 At the beginning of question 3 Aquinas lists eight points of inquiry. The first is whether God is a body, that is, composed 1 2 PETER BURNS, S.J. of extended parts. He offers three reasons why he thinks the reply must be negative. Firstly, an unchanging first cause of change, which God is (by la, 2, 3) would appear not to be bodily, since experience offers no examples of bodies causing change without themselves changing. Secondly, to be extended in space implies the potentiality of being divisible, but a primary reality is utterly actual, since absolutely speaking, actuality precedes po~ tentiality, and God is the primary reality. Thirdly, since the soul is nobler than inanimate things, and God is the most excellent of beings, God cannot be any less noble than the soul. But the soul in itself is not bodily but that in virtue of which bodies are what they are. In the next article Aquinas denies that God is composed of matter and form because matter is potential and only exists by participating in some form. In addition, since agents act in virtue of their form, God, as the prime source of activity and being in no way potential, must be considered as being essentially form without composition with matter, Aquinas then asks whether God can be identified with his own essence or nature. Given that matter is the individuating factor in beings composed of matter and form, and that such composition is ruled out in case of God, Aquinas claims that the distinctness of his being must be due to form. Hence God is his own form or nature or essence. In a crucial move in the next article Aquinas identifies God, who is his essence, with his existence, for as an uncaused necessary reality this essence must be self-subsistent. Thus God's nature or essence is necessarily self-instantiating, nor does God participate in existence, but essentially is identical with (the act of) 'existing', Therefore the distinction between essence and existence, between what something is and that it is, does not hold for God. Having daimed that God is his own existence, Aquinas argues that this existence is prior to genus in general and to the genus of substance specifically. So there is no possibility of distinguishing in God genus and difference, nor can God receive predicates as a substance, since this would imply potentiality. Therefore God is DIVINE SIMPLENESS IN SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 3 not composed of substance and accidents. In article 7, Aquinas claims that God is altogether simple. After summing up the previous remarks he makes two general points. Everything composite is subsequent to and dependent on its components, whereas God is the first, uncaused necessary being. Secondly, everything composite is caused, for essentially diverse elements must... (shrink)

Berikut ini diperkenalkan tiga buku yang ditulis oleh para dosen Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat dan Teologi Widya Sasana di Malang tentang bagaimana Gereja Katolik perlu menempatkan diri dalam ruang publik Indonesia. Fokus buku pertama, tulisan Prof. Dr. Armada Riyanto (2014), adalah ajaran sosial Gereja Katolik, jadi ajaran mengenai bagaimana Gereja Katolik memahami panggilannya dalam masyarakat yang sekaligus menjadi ruang publiknya. Sepintas alur buku ini dapat mem- bingungkan karena penulis suka melancong ke pelbagai bidang sam- pingan, apalagi ia tidak menjelaskan susunan bukunya. (...) Namun kekaya- an buku ini justru terletak dalam luasnya acuan, penjelasan pelbagai latar belakang, serta perhatian pada konteks-konteks ajaran sosial Gereja yang diangkat penulis. Dengan demikian pembaca dibantu dalam mencari bagaimana umat Katolik Indonesia dapat memberikan sum- bangannya bagi bangsanya dalam segala pergulatannya. Bagian kedua, mulai dari bab ke-10, memasuki situasi umat Katolik Indonesia sebagai minoritas yang sepertinya masih “kurang memiliki” (187). Bertolak dari catatan bahwa waktu Congregatio Missionis (Romo-romo CM) mengam-bil alih wilayah Jawa Timur dari romo-romo Yesuit hanya ada 40 umat Katolik Jawa tercatat (hal. 203), bab 11 menjelaskan kesulitan yang dialami Gereja Katolik sejak dari permulaan abad ke-19 dalam bergiat di Hindia Belanda. Namun kemudian dijelaskan bagaimana orang Katolik Jawa, di antara- nya Pak Kasimo, sebelum Kemerdekaan sudah berjuang sebagai nasionalis Indonesia tulen. Bagian ketiga, dimulai dari bab 12, membahas sifat dialogal ajaran sosial Gereja dalam pelbagai dimensi. Bahwa iman dan teologi Gereja secara hakiki bersifat dialogal merupakan kesadaran teologis (dan sosiologis) baru. Daripada hanya berpegang teguh pada suatu ajaran yang sudah membatu menjadi tradisi, lalu dibawa begitu saja ke dalam dunia, Gereja menyadari bahwa iman maupun teologinya selalu bergerak dalam medan masyarakat di mana Gereja berhadapan dengan segala macam pemikiran dan tanta-ngan. Dengan sifat dialogal dimaksud bahwa iman dan teologi Gereja mau tak mau terwujud dalam menghadapi tantangan-tantangan itu. Kekuatan buku Prof. Armada ini adalah bahwa ia menempatkan ajaran sosial Gereja yang pokok-pokoknya sudah sering diuraikan ke dalam pelbagai konteks, dengan implikasi-implikasi dan acuan pada pelbagai pengalaman Gereja. Pembaca menemukan banyak petunjuk bagaimana ajaran sosial Gereja Katolik dapat menjadi inspirasi bagi umat Katolik Indonesia. Ada juga beberapa kelemahan. Tidak ada daftar nama. Dan barangkali cakupan uraiannya terlalu luas. Misalnya uraian panjang lebar tentang paham Platon dan Aristoteles tentang keadilan sebenarnya kurang relevan, begitu pula uraian tentang perkembangan pemikiran filosofis tentang demokrasi. Padahal pertanyaan sangat relevan, yang muncul di banyak negara, bagaimana sebuah minoritas berpartisipasi dalam sistem demokrasi tidak didiskusilan. Mengapa fungsi suatu Partai Katolik di Indonesia tidak diangkat, padahal seku- rang-kurangnya sudah tiga kali menjadi debat besar dan panas dalam umat Katolik Indonesia: 1960 di zaman demokrasi terpimpin, 1971 sesudah pemilihan umum pertama di bawah presiden Suharto, dan 1999 di masa reformasi. Betul, persepsi “kemiskinan struktural” dibuka dengan Rerum Novarum (h. 24), tetapi istilah itu sendiri tidak ditemukan di dalamnya, melainkan berasal dari teologi pembebasan. Karena penulis menganggap “pluralisme” tak punya arti di luar “pluralitas,” penulis tidak masuk ke dalam kontroversi tajam tentang pluralisme di Indone- sia. Fatwa MUI tentang pluralisme tidak didiskusi-kan. Uraian panjang tentang pendidikan Katolik yang sangat optimis tinggal normatif. Padahal dalam kenyataan Gereja Katolik, juga di Indonesia, biasanya justru mempertahankan pegangan eksklusif atas pendidikan. Dalam kaitan ini seharusnya penolakan UU Sisdiknas — dengan keharusan memberikan pelajaran agama kepada para siswa sesuai dengan agama mereka — oleh sebagian besar penanggap Katolik didiskusikan. Namun kekurangan-kekurangan ini tidak menghilangkan bahwa buku ini amat memperkaya pustaka Katolik berbahasa Indonesia tentang panggilan Gereja, juga panggilan Gereja Indonesia, dalam masyarakat (Franz Magnis-Suseno, Guru Besar Ilmu Filsafat Emeritus, Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara, Jakarta). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON THE PRELIMINARY GRASP OF BEING I IN NUMEROUS PASSAGES, which are to be found scattered throughout his works, Aquinas repeatedly insists that that which is first apprehended or conceived by the intellect is being (ens).1 But from these statements an initial problem immediately arises. When Aquinas affirms that being is that which is first apprehended or conceived by the intellect is he talking about a priority which (...) concerns the logical order or the psychological order? I shall first of all explain what I mean by these two expressions. By the " logical order " I intend to refer to the order of priority and posteriority which holds between different concepts on the basis of the relations of necessary inclusion and exclusion that hold between the contents of these concepts: between the rationcs that these concepts express. Certain concepts contain as a necessary part of their content the contents of other concepts which therefore need to be understood before they themselves can be understood: these other concepts which precede them in this manner are prior to them in the logical order.2 1 See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3 c. and ad 3; In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 2 and ad ult.; De Ver., q. 1, a. l; De Pot., q. 9, a. 7, ad 15; S.T., Ia, q. 5, a. 2; S.T., q. 16, a. 4, ad 2; S.T., Ia-Hae, q. 55, a. 4, ad 1; S.T., Ia-Hae, q. 92, a. 2; In I Met., 1. 2, n. 46; In IV Met., 1. 3, n. 566; In IV Met., 1. 6, n. 605; In X Met., 1. 4, n. 1998; In XI Met., I. 5, n. 2211; Sup. De Causis, Pr. VI, I. 6, n. 174. 2 "Dupliciter enim dicitur aliquid non possit intelligi sine altero. Aut ita quod non possit intelligi si non ponatur alterum esse... Sive ita quod quandocumque intelligitur unum, intelligitur alterum, sicut quicumque intelligit hominem intelligit animal. Et hoc modo "esse" potest intelligi sine vero, sed non e converso: quia verum non est in ratione entis, sed ens in ratione veri... sed numquam potest intelligi intelligibile, secundum hanc rationem, nisi intelligatur ens. Unde etiam patet quod ens est prima conceptio intellectus." In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 2., 555 556 MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P. By the " psychological order " I do not intend to refer to the order of the temporal genesis within individual consciousnesses of particular concepts-as it might be studied, for example, by the developmental psychologist. This is a purely empirical matter and one which might well vary greatly from individual to individual. As such, I do not consider this perspective, whilst of great interest in itself,3 to be of direct relevance to the present consideration. Rather, by the "psychological order " I intend to refer to the order of priority and posteriority which necessarily holds between the various intentional conditions of possibility which must be realized if an act of understanding or intellectual cognition, considered in general, is to be carried out at all. If we now return to the initial problem its import will be immediately evident. After all, Aquinas would hardly identify the logical and the psychological orders, as I have characteried them, and what holds a certain position in one order might well turn out to hold a wholly different position in the other. Nevertheless, as will be seen in the course of this discussion, it seems that for Aquinas being is that which must be attained first in both the logical order and the psychological order. It must be noticed, though, that this primacy or priority which is attributed by Aquinas to our attainment of being in both the logical order and the psychological order only rarely seems to be discussed by him within the one and the same context. Each context where Aquinas affirms that being is that which is first attained by the intellect needs to be considered separately and to be closely scrutinized if one is to arrive at a correct determination of whether the cognitional priority of being which is affirmed in that particular context... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:248 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY be taken from a philosophical point of view. Since it is not certain whether the author of the Prolegomena was or was not a Christian (p. xlix), "god" should not be capitalized, and the translation of T&~ia 5~l~ttovo'f~l~taTa as "God's creation" at IV. 15. 6 is actually misleading. Moreover, for no apparent reason, 0~oX07tz6gis translated as "metaphysical" in the first four chapters, but as "theological" (...) thereafter. Inaccuracies are very few indeed. "Ungrateful" is peculiar for o~5~5t• at I. 2. 25, and so is "adapted state" for ~to~tTe[a~ ~no~ae0g at I. 5.35; X. 26. 38, 40, and 44; at II. 10. 11, there is no need to translate o~Te&0t~6)g bu~yovxctL as "they do not aim at accurate expression," and on p. 32, line 1, "as yet" is not in the Greek of the Prolegomena, although it should have been, if the Anonymous had quoted correctly from Plato, Phaedrus 229 E. But this is trifling criticism of a work which leaves nothing to be desired in any other respect, and which displays the same high qualities of scholarship which we have come to expect of the author on the basis of his earlier achievements. MARTIN OSTWALI) Swarthmore College The Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae). By Solomon ibn Gabirol (Avicebron). Specially abridged edition, translated from the Latin by Harry E. Wedeck, with an Introduction by Theodore E. James. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1962. Unpaged introduction, 133 pp. $4.75.) The romance of the nineteenth-century discovery, by Salomon Munk, that "Avicebron's" Fons Vitae, a major source of neoplatonic thought in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was actually the work of the eleventhcentury Hispano-Jewish poet, Solomon ibn Gabirol, and has often been retold. It is, indeed, a remarkable story. Perhaps its most noteworthy feature is that it reveals how closely alike Muslim, Jewish, and Christian philosophers were; by implication, then, it indicates that theological considerations were of less importance in medieval philosophy than is suggested by most historical accounts. Although the story of The Fountain of Lqe has now become an oft-told tale, the work itself has never been available in English dress. The present edition remedies this situation in part. It presents Tract III of the original text, a section dealing with the existence of simple spiritual substances. Harry Wedeck's translation is lucid and readable. Theodore E. James's introduction is useful for the beginning student but too elementary to be of much use to a more advanced reader. It is good that there is now this much to recommend to our students; we may hope that the day will come when BOOK REVIEWS 249 larger sections of the work will be translated-preferably not from the Latin, but from the Arabic original. JOSEPHL. B~u Columbia University Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans. by John P. Rowan. (Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1961. Pp. xxiii + 955.2 vols., boxed, $25.00.) Generally speaking, the two Summae of St. Thomas, long available in English translation, contain all that is most personal and most profound in his philosophical thought. Nonetheless, it is quite impossible to get a fully adequate conception of St. Thomas' place in the history of western thought from a consideration of his theological writings alone. Hence, by translating St. Thomas' Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle into English, Professor J. P. Rowan has provided the non-Latin reading student of the history of philosophy an invaluable service. For it is in his r61e as Aristotelian commentator that we see St. Thomas creating for the Schoolmen a version of Aristotle which served to render the Stagirite's thought into terms which became fundamental to the philosophical defense of Christianity. Further, by keeping in mind the fully-developed notions of St. Thomas on the existence of God and the nature of being as these are given us to understand in the Summae, the reader becomes better enabled, by a critical reading of Thomas' Commentary, to grasp the sense in which the Saint's theological writings are said by his enthusiasts to represent a "completing" and "perfecting" of... (shrink)

Foreword Philip T. Grier The attempt to retrieve a work of scholarship buried under as much historical debris as was IA Il'in's original two-volume commentary on the philosophy of Hegel presented distinct challenges, as well as possible ...

Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI), was I'ound to correlate with n>casurcs of obsessional thinking and depressive and anxious al'lect, t pridic( signs «I' clinical «hscssion ainong individuals prone (oward «h»c»»i«n >I (hi>>king, (« predict depression tive (h (», and to predict I''iilurc «I' electr«dermal responses to habituate am«ng pci>pic having emotional thoughts. The WBSI was inversely correlated with repression as assessed by the Repression-Sensitization Scale, and so tap» a trait that i» itc unlike rcprc»si«n:is traditi«n;illy c«nccivcd.

Short historical and cultural sketch of France’s decisive years during the Second World War, between occupation and resistance, re f racted by the prism of the Sartrean figure of the engagé intellectual, which was born out of this conjuncture of sharp political crisis. This sketch, however, is extracted out of my analysis of the int e r nal organization of what seems to be, at first sig ht, Sartre’s most d i s e ng a ged work, one that was (...) cons e c rated by tradition as a cons t e l l a t ion of ideas shining on the sky of ‘pure’ philosophy – ‘Being and Nothingness’. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Jane Friedman has argued that attitudes like wondering, enquiring, and suspending judgement are question-directed and have the function of moving someone from a position of ignorance to one of knowledge. Call such attitudes interrogative attitudes. Friedman insists that all IAs are governed by the following Ignorance Norm: Necessarily, if one knows Q at t, then one ought not have an IA towards Q at t. However, I argue that key premisses in Friedman’s argument actually (...) point towards an opposing conclusion; namely, that IAs are not governed by the Ignorance Norm, and IAs have functions other than moving someone from a position of ignorance to one of knowledge. I conclude that the Ignorance Norm should be rejected. (shrink)

In this paper we study with proof-theoretic methods the function(al) s provably recursive relative to Ramsey's theorem for pairs and the cohesive principle (COH). Our main result on COH is that the type 2 functional provably recursive from $RCA_0 + COH + \Pi _1^0 - CP$ are primitive recursive. This also provides a uniform method to extract bounds from proofs that use these principles. As a consequence we obtain a new proof of the fact that $WKL_0 + \Pi _1^0 - (...) CP + COH$ is $\Pi _1^0 $ -conservative over PRA. Recent work of the first author showed that $\Pi _1^0 + CP + COH$ is equivalent to a weak variant of the Bolzano-Weierstraß principle. This makes it possible to use our results to analyze not only combinatorial but also analytical proofs. For Ramsey's theorem for pairs and two colors $\left( {RT_2^2 } \right)$ we obtain the upper bounded that the type 2 functionals provable recursive relative to $RCA_0 + \sum\nolimits_2^0 {IA + RT_2^2 } $ are in T₁. This is the fragment of Gödel's system T containing only type 1 recursion—roughly speaking it consists of functions of Ackermann type. With this we also obtain a uniform method for the extraction of T₁-bounds from proofs that use RT2..... Moreover, this yields a new proof of the fact that $WKL_0 + \sum\nolimits_2^0 {IA} + RT_2^2 $ is $\Pi _1^0 $ -conservative over $RCA_0 + \sum\nolimits_2^0 { - IA} $ . The results are obtained in two steps: in the first step a term including Skolem functions for the above principles is extracted from a given proof. This is done using Gödel's functional interpretation. After this the term is normalized, such that only specific instances of the Skolem functions are used. In the second step this term is interpreted using $\Pi _1^0 $ -comprehension. The comprehension is then eliminated in favor of induction using either elimination of monotone Skolem functions (for COH) or Howard's ordinal analysis of bar recursion (for $RT_2^2 $. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CREATOR AND CAUSALITY: A CRITIQUE OF PRE-CRITICAL OBJECTIONS ANDREW BEARDS University of Oalgary Calgary, Alberta IN SOME QUARTERS arguments ias to the existence or non-existence of God are still regarded as intellectually respectaible. Indeed, interest in such arguments is not restricted to those with a strictly philosophical or theological training. Every so often one may observe some specialist from the physical sciences taking an interest in the philosophical discussion (...) of cosmological issues. Such has been the case with the recent contributions of the physicist Paul Davies.1 However, such contributions are likely to invite from the philosopher the response that the generalized notions which the scientist attempts to transpose from the particular field of his scientific interest are the very notions which feature in the current debates on the philosophy and methodology of the sciences. Such debates bring into question the status of these scientific notions and therefore render any putative generalized or even metaphysical application of them problematic. Discussions of natural theology, then, often appear to be conducted in a manner which tends to take too much for granted with regard to the terms employed. The notion of causality, central to such,argumentation, is a case in point. Often enough a simple ":billiard hall" image of causal interaction seems to he all that one is required to keep before the mind in order to follow the lines of argument involved, he they ~or or aiga.inst the postulation of a First Cause. Thus, in the often referred to r:adio.debate on the existence of God between 1 Paul Davies, God and the New Physics (New York: T'ouchstone Books, 1984). 573 574 ANDREW BEARDS Bertrand Russell and Fl1ederick Copleston, Russell simply averred that he did not feel compelled to accept that a causal chain extended heyond the ·World to some First Cause. For, indeed, if one imagines a line of billiard halls transmitting momentum one to the other, there is nothing unintelligible about picturing a first!billiard hall initiating the process apparently unaided. Hume has surely taught us that much. If one is to heed the present debates raging in that arena known as the philosophy of science (by which term one can understand epistemology, metaphysics and virtually ·any other topic tr:aditiona1ly designated philosophical), then one can.be forgi¥en for asking how the question as to the existence of God could he raised in an intelligiible manner. For if one is to agree with Richa1d J. Bernstein's assertion that contemporary philosophy manifests, in the ma.in, 1a rebellious attitude to the "father figure,, of the methodical Descartes,2 then one can be equally well impressed by the fact that this " rebellious spirit" is no Jess informed iby a respect for the Kantian attempt to descry the parameters of valid human knowing. And was it not the Kantian achievement to have dispelled the oibfuscation of metaphysics, thereby eliminating the grounds which were helieved to have substantiated a rational affirmation of the existence of God? The term 'Pre-Critical ' in the title of this essay is, therefore, intended as an e¥ocation of the Kantian demand for a critical v;alidation of the terms employed in philosophical argumentation. However, I shall attempt to advance the thesis that the Kantian enterprise does not, in fact, result in a happy resolution of the problems which it sets for itself. This is, of course, a thesis which could 'be proposed f.rom a number of divergent philosophical standpoints. It is my intention to argue here, however, that the work of the philosopher Bernard Lonergan provides,a more satisfactory method for the carrying through of the critical endeavour to validate epistemologi2 Richard J, Bernstein, Beyond Objectwism and.Relatwism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 18. CREATOR AND CAUSALITY 575 cally the philosophical,statements we propose. I believe it is the merit of Lonergan's work to have developed positions on the hasis of an explication of the exigences operative in criticism itself, such that any criticism of this explication will he rbut an example of an incoherent criticism,attempting to invalidate its own procedures.3 In what follows I shall attempt to develop the above-mentioned argument to the effect... (shrink)

Le présent essai tente de tirer au clair les différentes significations des termes « conscient » et « conscience » dans la philosophie critique de Kant et en particulier dans la Critique de la raison pure. On considère d’abord les divers types de représentations et ce que veut dire Kant lorsqu’il les dit « avec » ou « sans » conscience. On considère ensuite le concept de conscience tel qu’il apparaît dans la Déduction transcendantale des catégories, où il ne réfère (...) pas à une qualité de représentations particulières, mais à une attitude active de l’esprit. Considérée dans son ensemble, la conception kantienne de la « conscience » mêle inséparablement un aspect que nous appelons, après T. Nagel, « conscience phénoménale », et un aspect proche de la « conscience d’accès » selon N. Block, dans lequel cependant la conscience de soi, exprimable par la proposition « Je pense », joue un rôle central. Cette combinaison fait de Kant un interlocuteur unique dans les débats contemporains sur la conscience et son rôle dans notre vie mentale, ainsi que sur l’IA et sa signification pour l’avenir de l’humanité. (shrink)

In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim.1 This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem,2 as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism.3 We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysical and epistemological view of a given subject matter (...) is accepted, a local counterexample to IA can be constructed. We focus on the domain of basic taste and we develop two variants of a subjectivist and relativist metaphysics and epistemology that seems palatable in that domain. Although we undertake no commitment to this being the right metaphysical cum epistemological package for basic taste, we contend that if the metaphysics and the epistemology of basic taste are understood along these lines, they call for a truth property whose nature is not distinctively normative—contra what IA predicts. This result shows that the success of IA requires certain substantial metaphysical and epistemological principles and that, consequently, a proper assessment of IA cannot avoid taking a stance on the metaphysics and the epistemology of the domain where it is claimed to be successful. Although we conjecture that IA might succeed in other domains, in this paper we don’t take a stand on this issue. We conclude by briefly discussing the significance of this result for the debate on alethic pluralism. (shrink)

Budaya massa, dalam pengertian sederhana adalah “karya kreatif yang dimassalkan, yang diproduksi secara masif, yang ditunjang teknologi dan industri tinggi [...] termasuk model pakaian, fashion, film, televisi, musik pop, lifestyle atau gaya hidup” (hlm. xiii-xiv). Agama, atau lebih tepatnya “tafsir atas agama, atau tafsir atas ajaran agama” (hlm. xiv) dapat menjadi tema karya kreatif itu. Contohnya, terutama, sinetron-sinetron religi bernuansa Islami yang sekarang ini semakin banyak tampil pada layar televisi, tanpa menunggu bulan istimewa Ramadhan. Selain itu, agama juga dapat menjadi (...) sensor untuk menentukan karya kreatif yang pantas dimassalkan lewat media elektronik maupun media cetak. sense yang digunakan oleh para penyensor adalah moral dan ajaran agama, yang dalam keyakinan mereka harus dijaga. Para penyensor ini bukan hanya lembaga sensor, melainkan juga kelompok- kelompok yang menyebut diri pembela agama tertentu. Lembaga sensor menyampaikan larangan; kelompok-kelompok ini menyerukan protes. Mengemban misi menjaga moral dan ajaran agama, para penyensor dan pemrotes lebih sering mengajukan argumen sensor yang tidak masuk akal (doesn’t make sense) alias “ajaib” (hlm. 163) dan konyol. Lebih ajaib dan konyol, mereka, yang mengaku menjunjung agama dan moral, tidak punya sense mengenai ketidakadilan, khususnya yang dialami wanita. Produk budaya massa yang menciptakan image negatif wanita dibiarkan menjejali benak masyarakat. Wanita harus dikendalikan sebab ia binal, nakal—dengan cara diambil hak atas tubuhnya, dibung- kam suaranya, dipermalukan di hadapan publik, dan kalau perlu dira- jam oleh massa, yang adalah laki-laki dan (sama-sama) wanita. Ketidakadilan terhadap wanita, yang dipublikasikan oleh budaya massa dan ajaran agama menjadi sorotan utama Veven Sp. Wardhana di dalam buku ini. Dipublikasikan di sini berarti ditampilkan di ruang publik supaya diterima sebagai sesuatu yang wajar dan sewajarnya oleh masyarakat. Perempuan: seksualitas, sunat, syahwat; Puanografi: Yang Bukan Perempuan (Tak) Ambil Bagian; Televisi dan Fashionista atawa Perempuan Nista; Perempuan di Layar Televisi: Dari Losmen sampai sinema Relijius; dan Catatan sipil, Media Hiburan, dan Fatwa Haram adalah lima judul yang paling sarat dengan gugatan Wardhana atas perlakuan tidak adil terhadap wanita di negeri ini.................. Pembaca perlu mengingat bahwa buku ini merupakan kumpulan delapan belas tulisan Wardhana dari berbagai waktu dan ruang publi- kasi. Oleh sebab itu, ada beberapa pembahasan dan contoh kasus yang muncul berulang-ulang, antara lain, mengenai sensor film Yang Muda Yang Bercinta (1977) karya Sjuman Djaya dan isu perkawinan Bambang- Halimah. Dengan demikian, kedelapan belas judul pada buku tidak merepresentasikan sebuah rangkaian pemikiran yang sistematik. Na- mun, hal ini tidak mengurangi nilai karya Wardhana, tidak pula menum- pulkan kritiknya terhadap keempat penguasa ruang publik: budaya massa, agama, kapitalisme, dan politik. Akhirnya, menyajikan karyanya kepada masyarakat, Wardhana mengajak setiap warga negara ini untuk bersikap kritis terhadap karya- karya kreatif yang dipublikasikan lewat media cetak dan media elek- tronik. Masyarakat tidak perlu menunggu pemerintah dan para kreator budaya massa mengubah haluan dari pembodohan ke pencerdasan. Masyarakat sendiri harus mampu menghentikan proses pembodohan dengan menyeleksi bacaan dan tontonan yang mereka sajikan, dan me- milih hanya yang mencerdaskan dirinya. (Yap Fu Lan, Program studi Ilmu Pendidikan Teologi, FKIP, Universitas Katolik Atma Jaya, Jakarta). (shrink)

According to Hendricks Impairment Argument (IA), abortion is immoral because it impairs the fetus. Here, I argue it is not sufficient to show merely that abortion impairs, Hendricks must show that it harms the fetus. If the fetus is not numerically identical to the person it will become, then it isn't harmed by an abortion. But if the fetus is numerically identical to the person it will become, it is harmed by the deprivation of a future of value. However, taking (...) this route ultimately undermines the novelty of the impairment argument. (shrink)

The central claim of a Consummation Anyway model is that God could bring about eschatological consummation sans the fall—the intended telos of created humanity—apart from the incarnation of Christ. As such, the CA model is an alternative to an Incarnation Anyway model, according to which Christ’s incarnation is a necessary means by which a state of eschatological glory would be achieved sans the fall. This essay seeks to propose an argument for the CA model by drawing from the covenant theology (...) of the Reformed tradition, and it moves in four steps. Firstly, I shall summarize Marc Cortez’s recent arguments for IA, homing in on the major moves that are most relevant for sketching a CA model. Secondly, I will highlight the challenges Cortez has offered against those interested in defending a CA model. Thirdly, I shall sketch a Reformed account of the CA model that seeks to address Cortez’s objections. Fourthly, then, I’ll consider two potential objections against the sketch I have offered for CA, inspired by a recent argument offered by James T. Turner. Finally, I close with a brief conclusion that summarizes some salient features of the proposed thesis. This paper thus proposes at least one way in which the CA thesis could remain a real and live option within this debate. (shrink)

Let κ and λ be infinite cardinals, F a filter on κ, and G a set of functions from κ to κ. The filter F is generated by G if F consists of those subsets of κ which contain the range of some element of G. The set G is $ -closed if it is closed in the $ -topology on κ κ. (In general, the $ -topology on IA has basic open sets all Π i∈ I U i such (...) that, for all $i \in I, U_i \subseteq A$ and $|\{i \in I: U_i \neq A\}| .) The primary question considered in this paper asks "Is there a uniform ultrafilter on κ which is generated by a closed set of functions?" (Closed means $ -closed.) We also establish the independence of two related questions. One is due to Carlson: "Does there exist a regular cardinal κ and a subtree T of $^{ such that the set of branches of T generates a uniform ultrafilter on κ?"; and the other is due to Pouzet: "For all regular cardinals κ, is it true that no uniform ultrafilter on κ is analytic?" We show that if κ is a singular, strong limit cardinal, then there is a uniform ultrafilter on κ which is generated by a closed set of increasing functions. Also, from the consistency of an almost huge cardinal, we get the consistency of CH + "There is a uniform ultrafilter on ℵ 1 which is generated by a closed set of increasing functions". In contrast with the above results, we show that if κ is any cardinal, λ is a regular cardinal less than or equal to κ and P is the forcing notion for adding at least $(\kappa^{ generic subsets of λ, then in V P , no uniform ultrafilter on κ is generated by a closed set of functions. (shrink)

In Kant’s Groundwork II, the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) seems to be the argumentative link between the notion of a categorical imperative and later formulae (e.g. of humanity), its function as this link dependent on its equivalence to both. Some commentators have denied this equivalence and read the section as a failure. Others have abandoned its expository development by reading later formulae into the FUL. I argue that we need do neither if we distinguish the universality of the FUL (...) from that of the will of all and read Groundwork II as extracting the latter from common moral cognition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CATHOLICISM, PUBLIC THEOLOGY, AND POSTMODERNITY: ON RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS'S " CATHOLIC MOMENT" DAVID L. SCHINDLER University of Notre Dame HAT CATHOLICS should assume.their rightful place m the task of forming a culture, and indeed shaping a public philosophy in and for a pluralistic, dernocrwtic society, is ia suggestion which has not often been heard in the history of American culture, and certainly not from. nonCatholics. It is a suggestion (...) thrut Richard John Neuhaus, a Lutheran pastor, nonetheless makes with eloquence and wit in The Catholic Moment.1 The book makes for enjoyable and even exciting reading. It is difficult for a Catholic, even of a non-itriumphalistic sort, nort rto be moved by his suggestion: not to be stimulated into rserious ~efl.ection upon the meaning of Catholic identity, particularly now in the pT"esent cultural situation in America and indeed the West, which seems-note the subtitle of Neuhaus's book-aptly described in terms of a modernity giving way to posrtmodernity, a modernility searching for genuinely postmodern patterns of thought. Neuhaus is insistent-and the insistence is refresb.ing-,that this reflection be carried through with integri,ty (cf., e.g., p. 150) : the Catholicism. for which our-a postmodern-culture [.g ripe is and must be ·a Caitholicisrn which is fiaithful to the Gospel and to tits own tradition. This double intention of Neuhaus to speak on behalf of a Catholicism which is in and for a postmodern world sets.the context for.the questions I wish to pose in the present inquiry. The meaning of Neuhaus's Catholic moment is twofold: 1 The Catholic Moment: The Parado11J of the Church in the Postmodern World, by Richard John Neuhaus (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987). All references in the text are to this book. 107 108 DAVID L. SCHINDLER [It] is the moment in which the Roman Catholic Church in the world can and should be the lead church in proclaiming and exemplifying the Gospel. This can and should also be the moment in which the Roman Catholic Church in the United States assumes its rightful role in the culture-forming task of constructing a religiously informed public philosophy for the American experiment in ordered liberty (p. 282). In.the light of this ~statement, and indeed of the overarching context md[ca;ted by the suhbitle of his book, I wish to direct attention in whait follows to three issues: what Neuhaus takes to be an authentic Catholic Christianity ·and Catholic Christian rtheology (tha;t is, a Christianity which iis f.aithful in" proc1aiming and exemplifyiing the Gospel ") ; what he takes to be the proper sense (the sense required by Ca.tholic Christianity) of the itask of forming ·a culture and " constructing a religiously informed public philosophy" in and for a plumlistic, democrrutic society such as that of America; and finally what he takes to be the ·appropriate sense of this fask in a world which he distinguishes as postmodern. Now Neuhaus develops his response to these issues in terms of wha;t he calls a paradoxical relation between the Church and the world. My purpose in what follows, therefore, will be to e:x;amine the meaning he accords " Catholic, " public," ·and "postmodern," m terms of this central notion of " paradox." I. In his discussion of the relation betwen rthe Church and the world, Neuhaus provides a sketch of the five types proposed by H. Richard Niebuhr (pp. 16ff.). These are: the Church against the world, the Church of the world, the Church above the world, the Church and the world in paradox, and the Church as the transformer of the wor1cl. The first, "the Church against the world," iis what is often identified as a sectarian model, evident for ex;ample in monasticism and in such communities ·as the Hutterites and Mennonites. The second type, " The Church of the world," can be exemplified in nmeitrenth century l.iberial theology 00:d its promotion of a THE CATHOLIC MOMENT 109 " cultural Protesitantism," wherein " rel[gion W18iS to be placed at the service of the besrt in the evolution of society" (p. 19). The model which views: the- Chur'Ch ia;s a transformer of the world "smacks... (shrink)

resumo No chama do período do “estrutura l i s mo” defendeu-se a id é ia de que havia uma oposição ent re essa filosof ia e o idealismo, especia l mente o ide a l i s mo subjetivo. O propósito deste texto é defender a tese oposta, de que há um forte elo interno entre o criticismo kantiano e o método estrutural em história da filosofia. Esse elo é partic u l a r me nte visível no estrutura (...) l i s mo e na Dia no e m á t ica de Gueroult e também pode ser ilustrado na obra do grande intérprete da filosofia kantiana que é Louis Guillermit. Este aplicou seu método de “elucidação crítica” à interpretação da sistematicida de de todo o período crítico de Ka nt e especia l me nte da constituição pro g ressiva da Estética transcendental nas três Críticas. A eluc idação da gênese das estruturas perma nece int e r na ao sistema ka ntia no, de i xando em aberto a questão da natureza de sua ligação com os sistemas pós-kantianos, mas essa neutralida de é mais apare nte que real, e cons o a nte com a escolha do idealismo kantia no em detrimento do idealismo hegeliano. palavras- chave Estrutura l i s mo; Dia no e m á t ica; elucidação crítica; Ma r t ial Gueroult; Louis Guillermit; Idealismo alemão. (shrink)

No texto começa-se por recordar a controvérsia em torno da existência da filosofia portuguesa que se sustenta consubstanciar-se na questão: "há ou não filosofias especificamente nacionais, a cada nação corresponde uma filosofia própria?". Para solucionar o problema, seria indispensável fixar de modo indiscutível as noções de filosofia e nação. Não se aceitando a intuição das essências, que daria de modo directo e imediato as referidas noções, e entendendo-se que conceitos verdadeiros só podem surgir fundados num sistema, tentou-se, apenas, formular definições (...) convencionais de filosofia e nação, para estabelecer relações inegáveis entre elas, o que poderia dar um contributo para a problemática das filosofias nacionais, na hipótese de tais definições serem exactas ou, pelo menos, terem encontrado defensores. Considerou-se filosofia uma concepção do mundo racional, e nação uma certa comunidade de homens ligados pela istória e, porventura, por uma linguagem própria. Se a cada nação correspondesse uma filosofia cair-se-ia no relativismo, que é insustentável. Se se perfilhasse o ponto de vista que a filosofia depende da linguagem, logo da nação, a resposta seria que a linguagem expressa o pensamento, não é o pensamento. Assevera-se que uma concepção racional do mundo é sempre universal e que uma certa comunidade é, a fortiori, particular. A relação entre filosofia e nação será pois a do universal com o particular. Não é lícito absorver a filosofia na nação, como se esta fosse o universal concreto, nem dissolver aquela num universal que, nessa altura, seria abstracto. O universal supera o particular, sem o destruir, estando numa relação dialéctica com ele. O universal é, assim, universalização do particular. Por consequência, a filosofia será nacional mas de um "nacional" que se saiba auto-ultrapassar. O momento nacional é somente um momento da filosofia, não a própria filosofia na sua universalidade. /// Le texte commence par rappeler la controverse autor de l'existence de la philosophie portugaise, dont on affirme qu'elle s'identifie avec la question "y a-t-il, ou non, des philosophies spécifiquement nationales? A chaque nation correspond une philosophie propre?". Pour apporter une solution à ce problème, il serait indispensable de fixer de façon indiscutable les notions de philosophies et de nation. Comme on n'accepte pas l'intuition des essences, qui fournirait de façon directe et immédiate les notions mentionnées et comme on pense que de vrais concepts ne peuveunt surgir que fondés en un système, on a seulement essayé de formuler des définitions conventionnelles de philosophie et de nation en vue d'établir des relations irrécusables entre elles, ce qui pourrait constituer un apport pour la problématique des philosophies nationales, dans l'hypothèse que de telles définitions sont exactes ou ont, pour le moins, rencontré des adeptes. On considère la philosophie comme une conception rationnelle du monde et la nation, une certainne communauté d'hommes liés par l'histoire et, en particulier, pour une langue propre. Si à chaque nation correspondait une philosophie, on tomberait dans le relativisme, ce qui est insoutenable. Si l'on partageait le point de vue d'après lequel la philosophie dépend du langage, par suite, de la nation, la réponse serait que le langage exprime la pensée, n'est pas la pensée. On assure qu'une conception rationnelle du monde est toujours universelle et qu'une communauté donnée est particulière. La relation entre philosophie et nation sera donc celle qui existe entre l'universel et le particulier. Il n'est pas licite d'absorber la philosophie dans la nation, comme si celle-ci était l'universel concret, ni dissoudre celle-là dans un universel qui alors serait abstrait. /// Is there or is there not a specifically national philosophy? To each nation is there a corresponding philosophy? To answer these questions, which are certainly pertinent to the controversy concerning the existence of a Portuguese philosophy, one should state clearly what can be meant by philosophy and nation. By eliminating the approach by which one imagines it possible to have immediate and direct intuitions of these notions and by considering that true concepts are those that can be founded within a system, an attempt has been made here to formulate conventional definitions of philosophy and of nation in the hope that these definitions could be conjugated and made more precise. The idea that there be at the same time a rational world and a particular rationality, belonging to a particular community of men bound together by a common history and language, has been judged illusory. If to every nation there were a corresponding philosophy, an unbearable relativism would prevail. If one were to maintain that philosophy depended on language, and thus a nation, then the response would be that while language expresses thought, language is not thought. It is not legitimate to assimilate philosophy to a nation, as if the latter were a concrete universal; in this sense, it would be simply abstract. The universal overcomes the particular without destroying it, for the relationship is dialectical in nature: the universal is thus the universalization of the particular. Therefore, philosophy in national if one considers national as that which is capable of overcoming itself; the national moment is only a moment of philosophy, and not philosophy as such in its universality. (shrink)

En el siguiente estudio se evalúa un panorama con respecto al comportamiento sociológico en un preámbulo tanto antes durante y después de esta crisis social que se está viviendo debido a la pandemia de hoy en día. Por ello para sustentar dicha investigación se realizó un censo en el cuál, mediante el uso de herramientas estadísticas, se pudo realizar una comparación entre un antes y un durante de la pandemia, lo cual facilitaría intrínsicamente a la predicción de una denominada post (...) pandemia. En este texto se pretende detallar el proceso y forma de la encuesta, al igual que los resultados obtenidos de la misma. Se proveen, además, posibles explicaciones para estos resultados, guiándose por las restricciones de salud nacionales como posibles razones para el cambio de comportamiento actual. Palabras Clave: coronavirus, pandemia, frecuencia de salida. Referencias [1]P. Byass, «Eco-epidemiological assessment of the COVID-19 epidemic in China, January-February 2020,» Web Of Science, vol. 13, nº 1, 2020. [2]P. Stefanoni, «Brasil: pandemia, guerra cultural y precariedad,» Nueva Sociedad, pp. 49-59, 2020. [3]M. J. Báguena Cervellera, «La pandemia de COVID-19 a la luz de la historia de la medicina,» Investigación y Ciencia, 2020. [4]A. Levy, «La pandemia de COVID-19 podr{ia ayudar a resolver una gran incógnita climática,» Investigación y Ciencia, 2020. [5]T. Marcel Ariel, «Relaciones en tiempos de pandemia: COVID-19 y bienestar animal, ambiental y humano,» Revista Facultad Nacional De Agronomia Medellin, vol. 2, 2020. [6]F. Manrique-Abril, «Modelo SIR de la pandemia de Covid-19 en Colombia/SIR model of the COVID-19 pandemic in Colombia,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, pp. 1-6, 2020. [7]D. Arango-Londoño, «Predicciones de un modelo SEIR para casos de COVID-19 en Cali, Colombia/Predictions of a SEIR model for COVID-19 cases in Cali-Colombia,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, nº 2, pp. 1-9, 2020. [8]J. Gonzales-Castillo, «Pandemia de la COVID-19 y las Políticas de Salud Pública en el Perú: marzo-mayo 2020/COVID-19 pandemic and Public Health Policies in Peru: March-May 2020,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, nº2, pp. 1-9, 2020. [9]A. Valenzuela-Cazés y L. Becerra-Ostos, «Práctica clínica, ámbito laboral y riesgos de la fisioterapia ante el COVID-19/Clinical practice, work and risks of physical therapy in the face of COVID-19,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, nº 2, pp. 1-4, 2020. [10]P. Montes-Alarcón y A. Campo-Arias, «Los médicos generales y la salud mental en la pandemia por COVID-19,» Duazary, vol. 17, nº 3, pp. 4-6, 2020. (shrink)