The pioneering work of Edwin T. Jaynes in the field of statistical physics, quantum optics, and probability theory has had a significant and lasting effect on the study of many physical problems, ranging from fundamental theoretical questions through to practical applications such as optical image restoration. Physics and Probability is a collection of papers in these areas by some of his many colleagues and former students, based largely on lectures given at a symposium celebrating Jaynes' contributions, on the occasion of (...) his seventieth birthday and retirement as Wayman Crow Professor of Physics at Washington University. The collection contains several authoritative overviews of current research on maximum entropy and quantum optics, where Jaynes' work has been particularly influential, as well as reports on a number of related topics. In the concluding paper, Jaynes looks back over his career, and gives encouragement and sound advice to young scientists. All those engaged in research on any of the topics discussed in these papers will find this a useful and fascinating collection, and a fitting tribute to an outstanding and innovative scientist. (shrink)

The past decade has witnessed significant advances in our understanding of nonlinear systems, both theoretically and experimentally. In turn, these insights have led to applications over a broad range of subjects, as well as to new interpretations of complex behavior. Inevitably, it seems, there has been a concomitant rush to re-interpret various well-understood aspects of thermodynamic behavior in manybody systems by means of these mechanisms. It is perhaps useful, therefore, to examine these notions critically, and in doing so we are (...) able to illuminate somewhat the origins of, and motivations for, various dubious descriptions of these systems. Among other things, one notices in such discussions an unfortunate focus on “randomness,” rather than on the actual role of probabilities in describing the phenomena. Although valuable insights into some areas of complex behavior have arisen from studies of so-called “deterministic chaos,” we can detect no influence they may have on the predictions of statistical mechanics, and thus conclude that they are of little relevance to the thermodynamic behavior of large systems. (shrink)

An elementary-particle picture developed primarily by Barut as an alternative to the standard model is re-examined. This model is formulated on the basis of strong short-range magnetic interactions among the stable particles (p, e−, v) and at present is able to account qualitatively for most of the known phenomena.

The results of two recent articles expanding the Gibbs variational principle to encompass all of statistical mechanics, in which the role of external sources is made explicit, are utilized to further explicate the theory. Representative applications to nonequilibrium thermodynamics and hydrodynamics are presented, describing several fundamental processes, including hydrodynamic fluctuations. A coherent description of macroscopic relaxation dynamics is provided, along with an exemplary demonstration of the approach to equilibrium in a simple fluid.

The concept of entropy in nonequilibrium macroscopic systems is investigated in the light of an extended equation of motion for the density matrix obtained in a previous study. It is found that a time-dependent information entropy can be defined unambiguously, but it is the time derivative or entropy production that governs ongoing processes in these systems. The differences in physical interpretation and thermodynamic role of entropy in equilibrium and nonequilibrium systems is emphasized and the observable aspects of entropy production are (...) noted. A basis for nonequilibrium thermodynamics is also outlined. (shrink)

The Adverse Outcome Pathway (AOP) concept is a knowledge assembly and communication tool to facilitate the transparent translation of mechanistic information into outcomes meaningful to the regulatory assessment of chemicals. The AOP framework and associated knowledgebases (KBs) have received significant attention and use in the regulatory toxicology community. However, it is increasingly apparent that the potential stakeholder community for the AOP concept and AOP KBs is broader than scientists and regulators directly involved in chemical safety assessment. In this paper we (...) identify and describe those stakeholders who currently—or in the future—could benefit from the application of the AOP framework and knowledge to specific problems. We also summarize the challenges faced in implementing pathway-based approaches such as the AOP framework in biological sciences, and provide a series of recommendations to meet critical needs to ensure further progression of the framework as a useful, sustainable and dependable tool supporting assessments of both human health and the environment. Although the AOP concept has the potential to significantly impact the organization and interpretation of biological information in a variety of disciplines/applications, this promise can only be fully realized through the active engagement of, and input from multiple stakeholders, requiring multi-pronged substantive long-term planning and strategies. (shrink)

kind of joke to ask what is the case if the antecedent is false—“And where are the biscuits if I don’t want any?”, “And what’s on PBS if I’m not interested?”, “And who shot Kennedy if that’s not what I’m asking?”. With normal indicative conditionals like.

Unconditionals are syntactic conditionals whose affirmation affirms their consequent, unconditionally. Prominent instances were addressed by J.L. Austin ('There are biscuits if you want some') and Nelson Goodman (even-if 'semifactuals'). Their detailed features are explained in a Decision-Theoretic Semantics (DTS) which extends, by certainty and relevance conditions, the "CCCP" conditional probability construal of conditionals due to Ernest Adams and others. The construal of assertions of conditionals as conditional acts, defended by Keith DeRose and Richard Grandy in 1999 against objections arising from (...) Austin's unconditionals, is shown to be incompatible with any known version of CCCP. However, an ad-hoc decision-theoretic construal of their proposal is seen to work for Austin's unconditionals, albeit for these only. The DTS account of unconditionals hinges on stochastic independence or irrelevance conditions. For Austin's variant, it also involves changes in the expectations of non-indicator random variables, i.e. properly valuational relevance relations. The widely assumed speaker's knowledge presumption for assertion in general is reconstrued non-transcendently as a proposal to update to ostensible common certainty. This imperative replaces the factive 'T-axiom', KA-> A, of modal logical explications of knowledge to yield an doxastically imperatival, but evidence-sensitive theory of assertoric truth claims. On such a basis, Max Black's and G.E. Moore's ostensibilist account of assertors representing themselves as knowing is defended against Tim Williamson's 1996 and Igor Douven's 2006 respective deontic proposals for a knowledge or rational credibility requirement. Moreover, ostensibly unconditional, unhedged assertion is reconciled with a reality of dimly perceived potential defeaters on recognizing it to be a tacit semifactual, if need be. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Discussions AGOSTINO NIFO'S EARLY VIEWS ON IMMORTALITY Various historians of Renaissance philosophy have taken some notice of the prolific author and important philosopher of the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Agostino Nifo (1470-1538), x but no one has yet studied his writings in a methodical and exhaustive fashion. 2 He not only published philosophical works in logic, physics, psychology and metaphysics, but he also authored treatises (...) on humanist topics? Recent scholars have tended to concentrate their attention on his psychological doctrines, no doubt because he was one of the major opponents of Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525) during the immortality controversy.4 Nifo published his De Immortalitate Animae in 1518 as a reply to the De lmmortalitate Ardmae, On the year of Nifo)s birth, see Bruno Nardi, Saggi sull'aristotelismo padovano dal secolo xav al xvl ('Florence, 1958), p. 284, n. 8. There is contemporary evidence that he died on January 18, 1538. See Bartolommeo Capasso, "Le cronache de li antiqui ri del regno di Napoli di D. Gaspare Fuscolill0," Archivio storico per le province napoletane, I (1876), p. 538. The standard bio-bibliography still remains Pasquale Tuozzi, "Agostino Nifo 9 le sue opere," Atti e memorie della R. Accademia di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Padova, Nuova scrie, XX (Padua, 1904), pp. 63-86. But see also Giuseppr Tommasino, Tra umanisti e filosoft (Maddaloni, 1921), Porte I, pp. 123-147; and Edward P. Mahoney, "A Note on Agostino Nifo," Philological Quarterly (forthcoming). z See Franeeseo Fiorentino, Pietro Pomponazzi; Studi storici su la scuola bolognese e padovana del secolo xvI (Florence, 1868); Carlo Giacon, La seconda scolastica: 1 grandi commentatori di San Tommaso (Milan, 1944); Etienne Gilson, "L'affaire de l'immortalit6 de l'fime ~t Venise at* d6but du xvIe si~ele," in Umanesirno europeo e uraanesimo veneziano, ed. Vittore Branea (Florence, 1963), pp. 31-61; Miehele Giorgiantonio, "Un nostro filosofo dimentieato dcl '400 (Luea Prassicio e Agostino Nifo)," Sophia, XVI (1948), pp. 212-214 and 303-312; Bruno Nardi, Saggi sulraristotelismo padovano dal secolo x]v al xvI (Florence, 1958); idem, Sigieri di Brabante nel pensiero del Rinascimento Italiano (Rome, 1945); Giovanni di NapoH, L'immortalitd delranima nel Rinascimento ('Turin, 1963); John Herman Randall, Jr., The School of Padua and the Emergence of Modern Science (Padua, 1961); Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit, I (Stuttgart, 1964); Eugenio Garin, La cultura [ilosofica del Rinascimento Italiano (Florence, 1961); idem, Storia della filosofia italiana, II (Turin, 1966). See Nifo's De Armorum Literarumque Comparatione Commentariolus (Naples, 1526); De Pulchro et Amore (Rome, 1531); De Re Aulica (Naples, 1534); and Prima Pars Opusculorum (Venice, 1535). The second of these works has been studied by Jules Houdoy, La beaut~ des femmes dans la litt#rature et darts rart du xII" au xvIe si~cle; Analyse du livre de A. Niphus du Beau et de l'amour (Paris, 1876). 4 For recent discussion of the immortality controversy, see Etienne Gilson, "Autour de Pomponazzi, ProbMmatique de l'immortalit~ de l'~me en Italic au d~but du xvIe si~.cle," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litt~raire du moyen dge, Ann6e 1961, pp. 163-179; Giovanni di Napoli, op. cit., especially pp. 227-338; Paul Oskar Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford, 1964), pp. 72-90; Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence, 1965); Martin Pine, "Pomponazzi and the Problem of 'Double Truth'," Journal ot the History of Ideas, XXIX (1968), pp. 163-176; Harold Shulsky, "Paduan Epistemology and the Doctrine of the One Mind," lournal of the History of Philosophy, VI (1968), pp. 341-361. [451] 452 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (1516) of Pomponazzi, who had argued that personal immortality cannot be philosophically demonstrated, s But while these scholars correctly point out that Nifo abandoned an Averroist interpretation of Aristotle concerning the unity of the intellect and the immortality of the soul for the position which they assume to be Thomistic, they are not precise as to just when Nile made the shift.6 They have not observed that in his first two printed works, namely, the commentary on Averroes' Destructio Destructionum (1497) and the early commentary on the De Anima (1503), Nifo explicitly accepts Averroes as the... (shrink)

Il XII secolo rappresenta per il mondo monastico un periodo di grande splendore dal punto di vista culturale e filosofico, in particolare grazie a figure come Bernardo di Chiaravalle e Guglielmo di Saint-Thierry, la cui riflessione rappresenta da una parte la maturità della tradizione monastica altomedievale, dall’altra il coronamento e la chiusura di un periodo, più che l’apertura di uno nuovo.Paradossalmente il XII secolo segna anche un periodo di crisi profonda, in cui i monaci, che per secoli sono stati al (...) centro dei dibattiti teologici e filosofici, sembrano lasciare il posto agli ordini mendicanti. Nel secolo successivo i francescani raccolgono in un certo senso l’eredità monastica, riprendendola in modo originale, come Guglielmo ha fatto con Agostino, riuscendo così a renderla capace di partecipare ai nuovi dibattiti filosofici e a trovare posto all’interno degli ambienti universitari. Un esempio chiaro è offerto da Bonaventura da Bagnoregio, uno dei più grandi rappresentanti nel XIII secolo della tradizione agostiniana rivista alla luce dell’ispirazione francescana. Bonaventura riprende dalla tradizione monastica alcuni temi: la superiorità dell’amore, della volontà e del bene sull’intelletto, la centralità della relazione e dell’analogia nel rapporto tra uomo e Dio. Il linguaggio del filosofo francescano è in un certo senso simile a quello usato da Guglielmo: non è semplicemente evocativo, letterario e platonico, in quanto condivide le forti esigenze logiche e la nuova terminologia caratteristica dell’aristotelismo diffuso nell’università parigina.Prendendo in esame la riflessione di Bonaventura, con particolare riferimento a Legenda maior e a Itinerarium mentis in Deum, e prestando attenzione ai temi riconducibili alla tradizione agostiniana e monastica, si può cercare di chiarire fino a che punto esista un legame con tale tradizione e quanto ci sia invece di originale e tipicamente francescano. The twelfth century is a period of great splendor for the monastic world from the cultural and philosophical point of view, thanks to philosophers like Bernard of Clairvaux and William of Saint-Thierry in particular. Their philosophical thought represents not only the maturity of the early medieval monastic tradition and its crowning achievement, but also the closing of a period, rather than the opening of a new one.Paradoxically, the twelfth century is also a period of profound crisis, in which the monks, who for centuries have been at the center of theological and philosophical debates, seem to leave their place to mendicant religious orders. In a sense, during the following century the Franciscans collect the monastic legacy, recovering it in an original way, as William of Saint-Thierry did with Augustine’s philosophy. The Franciscans also succeed in making this inheritance capable of participating in the new philosophical debates, also in university environments. A clear example is Bonaventure from Bagnoregio, one of the most important philosopher in the thirteenth century that recovered the Augustinian tradition reconsidering it thanks to his Franciscan inspiration. Bonaventure picks up from the monastic tradition some themes: the superiority of love, of will and of good over the intellect, the importance of relationship and of analogy in the link between man and God. In a sense we can say that the language of the Franciscan philosopher is similar to William’s language: it isn’t simply evocative, literary and platonic, because it shares the strong logical requirements and the new terminology of Aristotelianism spread in Parisian university.Considering Bonaventure’s philosophy, focusing on Legenda maior and Itinerarium mentis in Deum, and paying attention to the themes related to the Augustinian and monastic tradition, we can try to clarify the link with this tradition and what on the contrary is original and “typically Franciscan”. (shrink)

Le philosophe Anton Wilhelm Amo (c.1703-c.1759), qui a grandi en Allemagne où il a enseigné sa discipline dans les universités de Halle et d'Iena avant de retourner en Afrique et de mourir en sa terre natale du Ghana, a très tôt été célébré comme un exemple. Ou plutôt un contre-exemple portant un démenti au préjugé que la philosophie, cette manifestation par excellence d'une humanité accomplie, ne pouvait concerner les Africains. C'est ainsi que l'Abbé Grégoire parle de lui au début (...) du XIXe siècle tandis qu'aujourd'hui le philosophe ghanéen Kwasi Wiredu invite à voir en lui un auteur qui a apporté une perspective africaine au problème philosophique de la relation du corps à l'esprit. Il s'imposait, pour celui qui est devenu une figure majeure de la philosophie africaine, de revenir à son principal ouvrage pour étudier avec soin la relation que sa réflexion entretient avec les philosophes mais aussi et surtout les médecins de son temps. Car montrer que sa pensée s'inscrit dans le climat intellectuel allemand de son époque et l'éclaire est un préalable nécessaire à l'étude du sens qu'elle donne à l'expression 'philosophie africaine '. C'est ce que réalise ici Daniel Dauvois, un historien de la philosophie en France et en Allemagne aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, avec la précision et la minutie requises. (shrink)

Ceux qui sont nés, comme l'auteur de ce livre, dans les dernières années du siècle précédent, qui ont eu leurs vingt ans au front, avaient encore grandi non seulement sans autos ni avions, ni radios, mais même, s'ils n'étaient pas riches, sans l'électricité chez eux. Lorsqu'ils sont tombés, à peine sortis de l'enfance, dans la machinerie de l'autre guerre, ils n'avaient eu pour formation que les humanités classiques, la morale de Kant, le symbolisme et les marches à pied. Depuis, (...) en une quarantaine d'années, à un rythme presque infernal, ils ont dû avaler, venant d'ailleurs un peu pêle-mêle, la révolution russe, les guerres civiles en Europe, la psychanalyse, la dialectique hégélienne, le marxisme, la phénoménologie, l'existentialisme, le national-socialisme, l'invasion de la France, la dislocation des empires coloniaux, la physique nucléaire, les bombes atomiques, le retournement contre l'Europe occidentale des idées et des connaissances qu'elle avait produites et qu'elle continuait à produire, la fin de son hégémonie. C'était peut-être beaucoup. C'était peut-être trop? Le résultat en a peut-être été la rupture définitive avec le passé? C'est ce que se demande Brice Parain. Il a eu souvent le sentiment qu'il risquait de se perdre, que courir les routes, se déplacer en avion, téléphoner un peu partout, savoir qu'il existe des camps de concentration en Europe, regarder de la peinture dite abstraite, faire tout dépendre de l'avenir, ne pouvait rien avoir de commun avec la vie qu'il avait menée au temps des gendarmes à cheval et des lampes à pétrole. Ce sentiment lui a fait peur. Il a voulu y réfléchir. L'Occident s'était peut-être trompé, à un moment ou à un autre? La liberté, telle qu'il l'a définie, a engendré la solitude et la solitude engendre le suicide. L'Occident a peut-être sacrifié la vie à ses ambitions? Faudra-t-il qu'il rapprenne à vivre pour éviter de périr? Brice Parain ne se résout pas à s'en tenir à la dialectique comme méthode de raisonnement pour comprendre l'histoire et la vie. Il croit que la dialectique est pareille à une ligne tortueuse qui a pourtant un axe. La connaissance de cet axe rétablirait une logique, qui permettrait de refaire une morale. Ajoutons qu'il sait le russe, s'étant mis à l'apprendre très vite après son retour de la Grande Guerre, en 1920. Depuis, sa réflexion s'est largement alimentée à la confrontation entre l'Occident et la Russie, qui lui était toujours présente. On n'aura pas de peine à en suivre les démarches. Elles nous sont exposées à travers le récit des simples événements d'une enfance et d'une adolescence aussi passionnées de sentiments que de pensée. (shrink)

Sukale, M. Wahrheit, Referenz und Bedeutung in der modernen Sprachphilosophie.--Carnap, R. Empirismus, Semantik und Ontologie. Bedeutungspostulate.--Quine, W. V. O. Bemerkungen zur Referenztheorie. Bedeutung und Übersetzung.--Davidson, D. Wahrheit und Bedeutung.--Field, H. Tarskis Theorie der Wahrheit.--Grandy, R. E. Referenz, Bedeutung und Glaube.--Harman, G. Bedeutungstheorien und Wahrheitstheorien.--Rorty, R. Die glücklich abhandengekommene Welt.--Kripke, S. Identität und Notwendigkeit.--Benacerraf, P. Mathematische Wahrheit.

These provocative essays by leading philosophers of science exemplify and illuminate the contemporary uncertainty and excitement in the field. The papers are rich in new perspectives, and their far-reaching criticisms challenge arguments long prevalent in classic philosophical problems of induction, empiricism, and realism. By turns empirical or analytic, historical or programmatic, confessional or argumentative, the authors' arguments both describe and demonstrate the fact that philosophy of science is in a ferment more intense than at any time since the heyday of (...) logical positivism early in the twentieth century. -/- Contents: -/- "Thoroughly Modern Meno," Clark Glymour and Kevin Kelly "The Concept of Induction in the Light of the Interrogative Approach to Inquiry," Jaakko Hintikka "Aristotelian Natures and Modern Experimental Method," Nancy Cartwright "Genetic Inference: A Reconsideration of "David Hume's Empiricism," Barbara D. Massey and Gerald J. Massey "Philosophy and the Exact Sciences: Logical Positivism as a Case Study," Michael Friedman "Language and Interpretation: Philosophical Reflections and Empirical Inquiry," Noam Chomsky "Constructivism, Realism, and Philosophical Method," Richard Boyd "Do We Need a Hierarchical Model of Science?" Diderik Batens "Theories of Theories: A View from Cognitive Science," Richard E. Grandy "Procedural Syntax for Theory Elements," Joseph D. Sneed "Why Functionalism Didn't Work," Hilary Putnam "Physicalism," Hartry Field. (shrink)

The Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency found in Wonderful Life can be dissected into three premises: palaeontological, macro-evolutionary, and developmental. Discussions of evolutionary contingency have revolved primarily around the developmental. However, a shift in methodological practice and new palaeontological evidence subsequent to the book’s publication appears to threaten the palaeontological premise that asserts high Cambrian disparity, or, roughly, that morphological differences between the Cambrian species were high. This presents a prima facie problem: Did the Cambrian consist of enough anatomical variety (...) to fuel a different outcome upon a replay of the tape of life? I investigate the role that disparity plays in the Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency and conclude that the reduced disparity view does not undermine the argument, per se. As for the macro-evolutionary premise, Gould never offers any explicit justification for the idea that species sorting was indiscriminate or ‘lottery-like’ (though he certainly gestures at it). Putting aside the exegetical, I consider certain empirical avenues for underwriting the macro-evolutionary premise and argue that the most plausible route is to appeal to the special status of mass extinctions, a move that is not entirely unfamiliar to macro-evolutionists. That is, mass extinctions can be good sources of contingency due to their being ‘chancy’ in at least three respects. In sum, I update the palaeontological and macro-evolutionary premises as to reconstrue the Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency in its strongest form. (shrink)

In this path breaking volume, leading researchers from psychology, linguistics, philosophy and primatology offer complementary perspectives on the role of intersubjectivity in the context of human development, comparative cognition and...

Ethics; philosophy; linguistic analysis; western thought.

Supercommentary on Dīdhiti of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, commentary on Vyādhikaraṇa section of Tattvacintāmaṇī by Gaṅgeśa, 13th cent. basic work on Navya-Nyaya philosophy.

کتاب حاضر تقریری از درسهای استاد محمد سند است که به زبان عربی بیان گردیده و با اضافات تکمیلی به زبان فارسی تحریر شده است.

Sanskrit text with Hindi verse translation of Aṣṭāvakragītā, work on Vedanta philosophy.

Can God create an unliftable stone? Beall & Cotnoir propose that ‘God can create an unliftable stone’ is a truth-value gap (neither true nor false). However, this yields a revenge paradox on whether God can eschew gaps. Can God avoid gappy ascriptions of power? Either way, God’s power seems to have limits. In response, it may be said that ascribing God the power to avoid gaps is itself gappy—it concerns a power that God neither has nor lacks. Yet this ends (...) up being inconsistent, for it implies that God definitely lacks that power. Following Aquinas, perhaps Beall & Cotnoir could accept this lack and still uphold omnipotence, suggesting that the power to avoid gaps is impossible for God. Yet the Aquinian stratagem is enough to block the original paradox, which saps the motivation to proffer truth-value gaps in addition. I conclude that the gappy solution is either inadequate or insufficiently motivated. (shrink)

T. S. Champlin; VII*—Tendencies, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 91, Issue 1, 1 June 1991, Pages 119–134, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/9.

I argue here that in the end Bourdieu's theory of practice fails to overcome the problem on which it expressly centers, namely, subject-object dualism. The failure is registered in his avowed materialism, which, though significantly "generalized," remains what it says: a materialism. In order to substantiate my criticism, I examine for their ontological presuppositions three areas of his theoretical framework pertaining to the questions of (1) human agency (as seen through the conceptual glass of the habitus), (2) otherness, and (3) (...) the gift. By scrutinizing Bourdieu's powerful and progressive social theory, with an eye to finding fault, I hope to show the need to take a certain theoretical action, one that is patently out of keeping with the usual self-presentation and self-understanding of social science. The action I have in mind is this: because the problem of subject-object dualism is in the first place a matter of ontology, in order successfully to address it there must take place a direct shift of ontological starting point, from the received starting point in Western thought to one that projects reality in terms of ambiguity that is basic. With this shift the dualism of subject and object dissolves by definition, leaving a social reality that, for reasons of its basic ambiguity, is best approached as a question of ethics before power. (shrink)

Jc Beall is known for defending modest dialetheism; this is the view that there are dialetheia, but only in the form of “spandrels” arising from otherwise reasonable semantic terminology (e.g., the Liar paradox). Beall also regards his view as modest in partaking of a deflationary view of truth, a view where ‘true’ is a device of disquotational inference which expresses no “substantive property.” Beall supports deflationism by an appeal to Ockham’s razor; however, the premise that ‘true’ is fundamentally disquotational is (...) found dubious. Nonetheless, we can craft an ultra-modest dialetheism which assumes only that at least one utterance of ‘This sentence is not true’ uses ‘true’ as a disquotational device, and maintains neturality on whether it expresses a substantive property. The limited scope of the ultra-modest view will be disappointing to formal semanticists hoping to capture the behavior of ‘true’ throughout the language. But its modest basis gives dialetheism the best hope for wider acceptance in the discipline. (shrink)