Previous studies of auditory expectation have focused on the expectedness perceived by listeners retrospectively in response to events. In contrast, this research examines predictive uncertainty —a property of listeners' prospective state of expectation prior to the onset of an event. We examine the information-theoretic concept of Shannon entropy as a model of predictive uncertainty in music cognition. This is motivated by the Statistical Learning Hypothesis, which proposes that schematic expectations reflect probabilistic relationships between sensory events learned implicitly through exposure. Using (...) probability estimates from an unsupervised, variable-order Markov model, 12 melodic contexts high in entropy and 12 melodic contexts low in entropy were selected from two musical repertoires differing in structural complexity (simple and complex). Musicians and non-musicians listened to the stimuli and provided explicit judgments of perceived uncertainty (explicit uncertainty). We also examined an indirect measure of uncertainty computed as the entropy of expectedness distributions obtained using a classical probe-tone paradigm where listeners rated the perceived expectedness of the final note in a melodic sequence (inferred uncertainty). Finally, we simulate listeners' perception of expectedness and uncertainty using computational models of auditory expectation. A detailed model comparison indicates which model parameters maximize fit to the data and how they compare to existing models in the literature. The results show that listeners experience greater uncertainty in high-entropy musical contexts than low-entropy contexts. This effect is particularly apparent for inferred uncertainty and is stronger in musicians than non-musicians. Consistent with the Statistical Learning Hypothesis, the results suggest that increased domain-relevant training is associated with an increasingly accurate cognitive model of probabilistic structure in music. (shrink)

In this article, I seek to illuminate the texture of moral experience. I pursue that aim through a close reading of David Lean's film, Brief Encounter, produced in 1946. The chief protagonist in the film undergoes a moral odyssey that reveals and tests all that she has understood about how to conduct a life. Her experience sheds light on the constituents of an individual moral sensibility as well as how its enactment appears in practice when one confronts a heartfelt difficulty. (...) I argue that moral experience is best understood through the idiom of narrative and character, rather than through ethical language that places formal or universal principle at the center of the moral life. In the workshop of the moral self, as Lean's protagonist reveals, the task is not to fashion or take on universal principles but rather to cultivate virtuous relations with other people in the here-and-now. (shrink)

In this writing, David Hansen illuminates the aesthetic, moral, and epistemic meaning of bearing witness to teaching and teachers by drawing upon a recently completed field-based endeavor that included extensive school visits. Hansen shows how bearing witness can bring the inquirer close to the truth of teaching. However, the witness must undertake ethical work to ready her- or himself for the task. Even such readiness, which must be continuously re-won on each occasion, guarantees nothing. The witness in the (...) classroom must work with faith, hope, and a deep sense of the worthwhileness of teaching. Hansen suggests that the witness's practice as well as testimony regarding the work can have a valuable influence on the consciousness, and conscience, of all who concern themselves with teaching and teachers. (shrink)

Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (TS) is a childhood neuropsychiatric disorder characterised by the presence of motor and vocal tics. Patients with malignant TS experience severe disease sequelae; risking morbidity and mortality due to tics, self-harm, psychiatric comorbidities and suicide. By definition, those cases termed ‘malignant’ are refractory to all conventional psychiatric and pharmacological regimens. In these instances, deep brain stimulation (DBS) may be efficacious. Current 2015 guidelines recommend a 6-month period absent of suicidal ideation before DBS is offered to (...) patients with TS. We therefore wondered whether it may be ethically justifiable to offer DBS to a minor with malignant TS. We begin with a discussion of non-maleficence and beneficence. New evidence suggests that suicide risk in young patients with TS has been underestimated. In turn, DBS may represent an invaluable opportunity for children with malignant TS to secure future safety, independence and fulfilment. Postponing treatment is associated with additional risks. Ultimately, we assert this unique risk-benefit calculus justifies offering DBS to paediatric patients with malignant TS. A multidisciplinary team of clinicians must determine whether DBS is in the best interest of their individual patients. We conclude with a suggestion for future TS-DBS guidelines regarding suicidal ideation. The importance of informed consent and assent is underscored. (shrink)

In this article, David Hansen works with two conceptions of “being with.” The first is Jean-Luc Nancy's ontological version as found in his Being Singular Plural (1999). The second is Hansen's ontic formulation as expressed in his recent book, Reimagining the Call to Teach: A Witness to Teachers and Teaching (2021). Nancy's notion is ethical as well as ontological. It constitutes a vision of human being qua being and is formulated in critical juxtaposition with the viewpoints on ethics (...) and being of Martin Heidegger and other recent thinkers. Hansen's conception is not ontological, as such, but is ethical in the sense of presuming that teaching is a practice with built-in terms of relationship between teachers, students, and the subject matter of education, where “education” differs from socialization and enculturation. “Being with” constitutes a term of art for the priority in teaching of attunement, responsiveness, and receptivity — both to students and to subject matter — over formal processes of teacher reflection. The latter are indispensable, but they take their identity and their warrant from the fundamental ethical terms of the practice that are rooted in being with. Here, Hansen seeks to show how Nancy's conception of being with enriches the pedagogical idea of being with as the center and circumference of teaching. (shrink)

In this article, I map current conceptions of cosmopolitanism and sketch distinctions between the concept and humanism and multiculturalism. The differences mirror what I take to be a central motif of cosmopolitanism: the capacity to fuse reflective openness to the new with reflective loyalty to the known. This motif invites a reconsideration of the meaning of culture as well as of the relations between home and the world.

It is a truism that the person in the role of teacher matters. Students learn this truth very early in school. Teachers’ testimonials underscore its reality. School administrators relearn it every time they think about collegiality. These commonplaces attest to the truth that it is persons, not roles as such, who educate, or who fail to do so, as the case may be. It takes a human being to bring to life the many-sided nature of the role.As obvious as these (...) points may appear, they beg the question of what it means to be a person in the role of teacher. What does it mean to invest one’s person in the role? What does it mean to allow the role to affect the very person one is becoming? What does it mean to fuse person... (shrink)

As moral injury is a still-emerging concept within the area of military mental health, prevalence estimates for moral injury and its precursor, potentially morally injurious events (PMIEs), remain unknown for many of the world’s militaries. The present study sought to estimate the prevalence of PMIEs in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), using data collected from CAF personnel deployed to Afghanistan, via logistic regressions controlling for relevant sociodemographic, military, and deployment characteristics. Analyses revealed that over 65% of CAF members reported exposure (...) to at least one event that would be considered a PMIE. The most commonly PMIEs individuals reported included seeing ill or injured women and children they were unable to help (48.4%), being unable to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants (43.6%), and finding themselves in a threatening situation where they were unable to respond due to the rules of engagement under which they were required to operate (35.4%). These findings provide support for both the presence of exposure to PMIEs in CAF members and the need for formal longitudinal data collection regarding PMIE exposure and moral injury development. (shrink)

In this article, we describe a longitudinal inquiry into what it means to be a person in our contemporary world. Our method constitutes a dynamic, non-objectifying fusion of empirical and philosophical anthropology. Field-based anthropology examines actualities: how people lead their lives and talk about them. Philosophical anthropology addresses possibilities: who and what people could become in light of actualities while not being determined by them. We describe and illustrate our fieldwork in the classrooms of 16 teachers who work in New (...) York City public schools. We have sought in our observations to identify and think about signs or expressions of persons-in-the-making. We also touch on a series of dinner-discussions we have held with the teachers. These meetings have centered on the question of becoming a person in today’s political and cultural environment, and how education figures into the equation. Finally, we also describe the weekly meetings we have held as a research team, in which we engage the play of concepts and percepts. We close with remarks on the conceptual and existential ties that can link philosophy and fieldwork in schools. (shrink)

In Philosophical Issues in Counseling and Psychotherapy, James Hansen proposes resolutions to four fundamental philosophical questions about knowing, effectiveness, and truth. Presented within the context of the author's struggle to reconcile these philosophical questions with his understanding of patient care, Hansen gives unity and meaning to diverse and seemingly contradictory counseling models.

Illuminates the power in bearing witness as an ethical orientation toward the world and its people.

Bearing witness is a familiar if diversely employed concept. On the one hand, it concerns the accuracy and validity of practical affairs, for example in a court of law, at a wedding, or in a law office. On the other hand, the term can embody powerful religious, social, and/ or moral meaning, whether in bearing witness to historical trauma and human suffering, or in paying heed to everyday, seemingly ordinary aspects of nature and of human life. In this article, we (...) address the question of what renders a witness trustworthy. We characterize ethical and epistemic constituents of witnessing. We examine the work of several exemplary witnesses: W. G. Sebald, Saidiya Hartman, Jonathan Lear, Etty Hillesum, and John Berger alongside Jean Mohr. These sources help us think about the education of a person who aspires to bear witness, whether it be to traumatic events or to quotidian life in educational or other settings. We present criteria of trustworthiness that can support reflection on what we take to be the important place of bearing witness in educational inquiry and practice. (shrink)

The phenomenological attitude is essential for practising phenomenology. Many refer to wonder and wonderment as basic attitudes and ways of being present with and listening to phenomena. In this article a critical view is placed on the typically psychologically-loaded language and tonality that is used by phenomenological researchers in the human sciences in order to describe the wonder and openness they try to be a part of when doing phenomenology. With reference to the difference between Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s views on (...) Socratic dialectics the author points to an ontological dimension in the phenomenology of wonder that cannot be reached by taking only an emotional-bodily-oriented approach (the psychological approach) or an aesthetical-intuitiveoriented approach (the late Heidegger poeticised philosophizing). Instead this dimension must be reached through a Socratic questioning and Community of Wonder. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 12, Special Edition July 2012. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Creativity in Teaching and Building a Meaningful Life as a TeacherDavid T. HansenMy point of departure in this essay is the idea that creativity in teaching often has less to do with inventiveness per se than it does with responsiveness. To draw on terms from John Dewey, creative teachers "rise to the needs of the situation" presented in the educational setting.1 They respond well to circumstances not because they (...) necessarily have the pedagogical equivalent of Twyla Tharp's talent for choreography or B.B. King's brilliance on the blues guitar; rather, I want to suggest that creative teachers, at least in many cases, "rise" and do what is needed because they have learned to pay attention both to students and to the subject(s) at hand. In other words, I propose that we consider the idea that creativity in teaching often manifests itself most vividly, if also subtly, in a kind of ongoing attentiveness, by which I mean a dynamic combination of patience, listening, and initiative.I will begin the discussion by first sketching a conception of creativity in teaching centered around the idea of attentiveness. Then I address two [End Page 57] consequences of this conception. The first is that the most suitable models of good practice for new teachers to start with are not the profession's versions, presuming such exist, of Pablo Picasso, Marie Curie, or Michael Jordan. I do not mean that it is uniformly inappropriate to place such models in front of teacher candidates, any more than it would be wrong to put before art students the work of a Cassatt or Rembrandt. However, I will argue that among the best and most consequential initial models are those experiences in which teacher candidates themselves truly listened to the doings of the world around them and heeded what was said, whether the latter "spoke" in the form of a work of art, a human voice or gesture, or the play of wind in the trees. If new teachers take seriously this kind of experience, they can gain a valuable perspective for approaching the long and often difficult process of appreciating teaching's details and engaging them in educational settings. I illustrate these claims by examining a field-based activity that was part of a teacher education program I used to direct.The second consequence of the conception of creativity in teaching I will put forward points to the title of this essay. If new teachers deepen their ability to pay attention and to engage in creative work, they position themselves to receive one of teaching's primary offerings to its practitioners, namely, a life of meaning."Ordinary" Pedagogical CreativityCreativity in teaching can take many forms. We witness it in the structuring of an artful lesson plan; in the logic, flow, and pacing of a dynamic lecture; or in a timely and evocative example or illustration the teacher employs to clinch a point in the midst of a class. All of this is familiar and an important, indeed indispensable, way to think about good teaching. Creativity in practice is associated here, among other things, with notions of expertise and of knowledge gained through experience.However, I want to add to this portrait the notion that creativity in practice can also spring from responsiveness. Rather than issuing solely from what the teacher brings to the educational setting — consider again terms such as expertise and knowledge — creativity can point to what the teacher is capable of deriving or drawing from it. Creativity as responsiveness denotes a form of openness to the setting, which may or may not complement or fit harmoniously with what is preset, prefigured, or anticipated. Experienced teachers would be the first to say that there are times when it becomes educationally vital to shelve a preset plan. There are times when one form of creativity in teaching, embodied in a well-wrought lesson plan, must give way to another form, embodied in what I am calling responsiveness. The art of teaching consists, in part, of balancing these expressions of pedagogical creativity.Let me share the following vignette as a basis for elucidating this point. One morning in March 2002, during which... (shrink)

Meaning systems and psychological suffering -- Conceptualizations of meaning system -- Meaning systems and mental health culture -- Contemporary culture and objectification -- Training for talk therapists.

Reimagining the call to teach: A witness to teachers and teaching, by David T. Hansen, Teachers College Press, 2021, 192 pp., USD29.95 (pbk), ISBN 978-0807765463David Hansen and the call the teach:...

This article shares reflections from members of the community of philosophers of education in the United States and Canada who were invited to express their insights in response to the theme ‘Snaps...

Stanley Cavell’s account of aesthetic judgment has two components. The first is a feeling: the judge has to see, hear, ‘dig’ something in the object being judged, there has to be an ‘emotion’ that the judge feels and expresses. The second is the ‘discipline of accounting for [the judgment]’, a readiness to argue for one’s aesthetic judgment in the face of disagreement. The discipline of accounting for one’s aesthetic judgments involves what Nick Riggle has called a norm of convergence: the (...) judge aims to get one’s audience to taste see or hear what the judge tastes or sees or hears in the object being judged. Because of the unmistakable difficulty in reaching agreement in aesthetic judgment, Riggle has denied that aesthetic judgment requires a convergence norm and has proposed instead that it requires ‘a kind of harmony of individuality’ (which Riggle calls ‘vibing’). We argue that Cavell offers a version of the convergence norm that is distinct from those that Riggle criticizes, namely Kant’s demand for agreement and Andy Egan’s presupposition of similarity in dispositions in ‘non-defective’ aesthetic conversations. Cavell’s version of the convergence norm is ‘the hope of agreement’. One can hope that one’s audience will agree with one’s aesthetic judgments even when one isn’t in a position to demand agreement or to presuppose similarity in the dispositions that would make agreement more likely. Cavell’s distinct convergence norm avoids Riggle’s criticisms and contributes to a richer account of what’s going on when we disagree about aesthetic matters. (shrink)

Imprisonment is often said to be the ultimate back-up sanction for offenders who do not abide by their non-custodial sentence. From a standard consequentialist perspective this is morally justified, if it is a cost-effective means to crime prevention. In contrast, the use of imprisonment as a back-up is much harder to justify from retributivist perspectives, with their emphasis on just desert or deserved censure. The crux is this: if the reason for a non-custodial sentence is that a prison sentence risks (...) being a disproportionate or inappropriate sanction, retributivists need to explain how a prison term can be warranted as the backup sanction for those who breach the requirements of their non-custodial sentence, even though their original crime wasn’t serious enough to warrant imprisonment in the first place. The aim in this paper is to critically assess the extent to which retributivists can justify the use of imprisonment as the ultimate back-up sanction. In doing so, I first examine two broad strategies that are discussed in the literature, and which retributivists could employ in order to respond to this problem. The first strategy stresses how desert has only a limited role in sentencing such that it demarcates a range of deserved punishment. On this view, associated with limiting retributivism, one could initially opt for a less harsh yet deserved punishment, leaving room for the imposition of back-up sanctions when needed. The second strategy focuses on how the act of breach is a reprehensible act that can allow for a penalty increase, and thereby lead to imprisonment. Although it is argued that both strategies fail, the paper proposes an alternative solution to this problem. (shrink)

The world of John Dewey scholarship recently lost one of its most thoughtful contributors, and teachers of all kinds lost one of their most passionate and committed advocates. Philip W. Jackson was born in 1928 in Vineland, New Jersey, a locale known historically for its excellent grape-growing soil and veterinarian Arthur Goldhaft’s famous pledge to “put a chicken in every pot.” Jackson’s adoptive parents were, appropriately enough, chicken farmers, and, as the story goes, they noticed early on his indisputable knack (...) for singing and poetry recitation. Feeling very at home on the stage, the plucky six-year-old even tried his hand as a vaudevillian, performing a snake charmer act between reels at.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Gildersleeve Prize For The Best Article Published In The American Journal Of Philology In 1998 Has Been Presented ToMarie R. HansenRuth ScodelUniversity Of Michiganfor her contribution to scholarship in “Bardic Performance and Oral Tradition in Homer,” AJP 119, no. 2:171–94.The judges all agree that Scodel’s reformulation of the vexed and venerable problem of the narrators in Greek epic is original and, from among the contenders, the most ambitious. (...) Scodel’s detailed descriptions of bardic narratives and their audiences (and of how they differ from non-bardic narratives and their audiences) make an important contribution not only to the reading of Homer but also to narratological theory.Judges for The Johns Hopkins University PressW. Ralph Johnson, Chair Sander M. Goldberg Mary T. BoatwrightThe Eleventh Annual Gildersleeve Prize of $1,000 will be awarded for the best article to appear in the Journal in 1999. Instructions about nominations will be printed in the Winter 1999 issue of the Journal.Marie R. HansenAssociate Director The Johns Hopkins University PressCopyright © 1999 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

This paper excavates a debate concerning the claims of ordinary language philosophers that took place during the middle of the last century. The debate centers on the status of statements about ‘what we say’. On one side of the debate, critics of ordinary language philosophy argued that statements about ‘what we say’ should be evaluated as empirical observations about how people do in fact speak, on a par with claims made in the language sciences. By that standard, ordinary language philosophers (...) were not entitled to the claims that they made about what we would say about various topics. On the other side of the debate, defenders of the methods of ordinary language philosophy sought to explain how philosophers can be entitled to statements about what we would say without engaging in extensive observations of how people do in fact use language. In this paper, I defend the idea that entitlement to claims about what we say can be had in a way that doesn’t require empirical observation, and I argue that ordinary language philosophers are engaged in a different project than linguists or empirically minded philosophers of language, which is subject to different conditions of success. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 57-62 [Access article in PDF] Listening to People Or Listening to Prozac?Another Consideration of Causal Classifications Jennifer Hansen Keywords causal classification, descriptivism, melancholia, neurasthenia, depression, cultural relativism. The shape and detail of depression have gone through a thousand cartwheels, and the treatment of depression has alternated between the ridiculous and the sublime, but the excessive sleeping, inadequate eating, suicidiality, withdrawal from social (...) interaction, and relentless despair are all as old as the hill tribes, if not as old as the hills. In the years since man achieved the capacity for self-reference, shame has come and gone; treatments for bodily complaints have alternated and crossed with treatments for spiritual ones; pleas to external gods have echoed pleas to internal demons. To understand the history of depression is to understand the invention of human being as we now know and are him. Our Prozac-popping, cognitively focused, semi-alienated postmodernity is only a stage in the ongoing understanding and control of mood and character. (Solomon 2001, 286) ALTHOUGH ANDREW SOLOMON clearly believes that "the shape and detail of depression have gone through a thousand cartwheels," Jennifer Radden gives us pause before assuming that depression is just another name for Dame Melancholy. Solomon's claim depends on a deeper metaphysical claim about the nature of depression and its causes. The current method of psychiatric nosology, descriptivism, does not necessarily support equating melancholia and depression. Furthermore, it appears that adopting descriptivism as the sole method of classifying mental disorders commits us to cultural relativist psychiatry. Below I reconsider whether we want to rule out causal classifications and suggest that embracing both descriptivism and causal classifications offer us greater possibilities in understanding human illness and culture.Although the occasion for Jennifer Radden's essay is to investigate whether or not melancholia and depression refer to the same thing, her essay detours into a consideration of extra-descriptivist models of psychiatric illness versus the descriptivism of current psychiatric nosology. This detour turns out to be warranted; her purely academic question yields to a timelier question concerning the proper methodology for classifying mental disorders. Whereas debates about psychiatric nosology are perennial, the recent success of the new generation of antidepressants [End Page 57] is reviving biological psychiatry and its search for the neurochemical origins of depression. Hence, embedded in Radden's question concerning whether or not melancholia is the same thing as clinical depression, is another important question concerning the causes of mental illness, particularly depression.Currently, with its descriptivist approach, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) does not classify mental illness, such as clinical depression, based on underlying causes. The cluster of symptoms and behavioral signs that lead a clinician to diagnose one as depressed that are contained in either the DSM or the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) may be too fuzzy or elusive to give any clear distinction between major depression, mild depression, and the blues. For example, one group of epidemiologists points out that [t]he DSM-III, DSM-III-R, and DSM-IV acknowledge that depression, like many mental disorders, has no currently obvious natural classes... If natural classes of depression exist, then their nosology awaits the discovery of distinct and reliable genetic, biological, clinical, or other predictors of risk, severity, or clinical course. Clinicians have a tradition of separating depressions into subtypes; however, this subtyping has not yet led to clear-cut delineations of syndromes in populations. (Kaelber 1995, 4) The evidence is still insufficient to establish the biological or psychological origins of depression. Although many theories exist that explain why people become depressed, scientifically we are not yet in a position to determine which is the right theory. From a pragmatic perspective, however, whether or not we know what causes depression, we can nonetheless attempt to alleviate suffering from depression. And it is with this goal in mind that the DSM-IV and ICD-10 classify mental disorders.Now, given that our current methodology for psychiatric nosology does not establish causes, it is also insufficient for determining what... (shrink)

La science du bien et du mal n'a jamais existé, et si Platon s'en désolait, nous avons cessé, nous, les Modernes, de nous en offusquer. Et pourtant, des questions d'ordre éthique nous sont incessamment posées aujourd'hui, ni plus ni moins que par le passé: quelles valeurs morales devons-nous promouvoir à l'école? Est-il acceptable d'abandonner à leur sort les familles de migrants fuyant la guerre? Notre pays, la France, doit-il intervenir militairement contre tel ou tel État dit "terroriste"?, etc. Face à (...) de telles interrogations, nous ne pouvons nous contenter de suspendre notre jugement sous couvert de relativisme ("À chacun sa conception du bien et du mal"). Prenant appui sur les réflexions de grands philosophes et théologiens face au défi du mal, tout en interrogeant la montée de nouvelles formes de violences au XXIe siècle, Laurence Hansen-Love pose la question: le bien et le mal sont-ils vraiment des notions obsolètes? Une fois récusée la fausse évidence d'une symétrie entre le bien et le mal, il est possible de prendre acte de la préséance du mal sur le bien. Dès lors, la certitude du mal, posée comme un fait, cesse de contredire l'incertitude du bien, à laquelle il apparaît sage de se résoudre."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In a reply to Marga Vicedo the philosophical inconsistency of Morgan is emphasized. It is argued that even if a strict classification of scientists according to their philosophical position is not possible, their science may still be influenced by their philosophical ideas. Finally it is suggested that philosophical ideas influence science less by a direct effect on the scientists than indirectly through science policy and administration.

Socrates defends justice against the attack mounted by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic, but it isn’t easy to say what the defense consists of. A careful reading shows that Thrasymachus himself is deeply though unselfconsciously attached to justice. Thrasymachus admires skillful artisans and thinks that devoting oneself to one’s art makes one a good man, worthy of good things. He feels that the skillful and unjust deserve to get the better of the artless and weak, which is to say he unselfconsciously (...) believes in a form of distributive justice. Moreover, his surprising attachment to justice resembles and casts light on the attachment to justice that most people feel. (shrink)

This dissertation interprets Leibniz’ notion of perception through abilities, agency, and action. In chapter 1, I characterize the differences between kinds of Leibnizian perception by considering their relationship to different abilities. I focus on lower cognition, where Leibniz distinguishes bare perception from sensation by their degrees of distinctness and memory. I read this relationship, between kinds of perception and qualities of perception, through actions. I begin with complete lacks of distinctness and memory and how they relate to stupors as an (...) inability to act. I then turn to a range of incrementally more advanced cases of perceptions and actions to highlight the role of distinctness and memory in each. The cases reveal how differences in kinds of action depend on differences in kinds of perception in Leibniz’ system. My approach breaks with traditional readings that invoke consciousness to account for the differences, and it builds in some ways on readings that lead with representation. I also comment on the prospects of such an abilities based approach for 21st century theories of perception. In chapter 2, I articulate the point of view or perspectival nature of Leibnizian perception through expression and agency. I establish some conditions that Leibniz sets on perspectival expression for individual perceivers, and on the particular way that perceptions belong to their perceivers in Leibniz’ system. I argue that spatial, geometrical notions of perspective, though useful, ultimately give way to a deeper, agential notion of perspective for Leibniz. I make a case for including an agential side of POV in perception, beyond the phenomenal flow of perception. I then articulate how agency is unique and fundamental to Leibniz’ notion of perspective or point of view, both in internal action and in the activity and passivity of external action. In chapter 3, I ask about the limits of perceivers in Leibniz’ system—where they arise and where they don’t. I set the question adjacent to Leibniz' celebrated mill argument. I consider readings of the argument that invoke action, and build on them to include questions about how action relates to interaction in different kinds of perceivers. One question concerns the lack of perception in primary matter, and another concerns the lack of perception in an aggregate of secondary matter. After milling through some considerations, I settle on a notion of organic unity, underpinned by a notion of action, that can draw lines between Leibnizian perceivers and non-perceivers. (shrink)

An important challenge to color objectivists, who hold that statements concerning color are made true or false by objective facts, is the argument from interpersonal variation in where normal observers locate the unique hues. Recently, an attractive objectivist response to the argument has been proposed that draws on the semantics of gradable adjectives and which does not require defending the idea that there is a single correct location for each of the unique hues Noûs 50: 3–40),. In ), I argued (...) that the recent objectivist response doesn’t apply to comparative occurrences of color adjectives, so a revised, comparative, version of the argument from interpersonal variation remains a powerful objection to certain types of objectivism. In this paper, I address several unsatisfactory objectivist replies to the comparative version of the argument from interpersonal variation, and offer what I think is a more plausible objectivist reply to the comparative argument from interpersonal variation. (shrink)