The subject of this study are the argumentation strategies applied by the Polish and German apex courts competent in criminal matters, namely the Supreme Court and the Federal Court of Justice, respectively. The investigation encompasses a total of 200 rulings issued by the criminal panels of these bodies. Particular focus was put on examining which arguments both courts apply to solve interpretation problems, and secondly, how these courts systematize the interpretation process. Methodologically, the examination utilizes, inter (...) alia, the principles of qualitative research, without neglecting the legal dogmatic perspective. A crucial theoretical foundation underlying this study is the distinction between formalistic and substantive legal cultures. The examination reveals that neither the Polish nor the German legal culture is purely formalistic or value-oriented. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Poland shows greater affinity for formalistic arguments, whereas the substantive interpretation methods are more widespread in the judicature of the German Federal Court of Justice. In particular, the Polish Court prefers the linguistic interpretation, whereas the German Court favours the purposive approach. (shrink)

This paper investigates the phenomenon of judicial law-making in the practice of the highest courts dealing with criminal matters in Germany and Poland on the basis of 200 of their decisions. While German jurisprudence principally acknowledges the right of the judiciary to create new law, the Polish legal theory generally rejects this notion. Still, research indicates that, in practice, the differences in the frequency and intensity with which these courts pass creative rulings are not as substantial as the discrepancy in (...) the theoretical stance would suggest. Owing to circumstances, both the German Federal Court of Justice and the Polish Supreme Court are willing to create new legal norms, but the dimensions of judicial law-making presented by these bodies deviate from each other. In the research sample, the German Federal Court of Justice was more inclined to introduce legal institutions that were foreign to the statutes and rule against the will of the lawmaker explicitly stated in the preparatory works. On the other hand, the Polish Supreme Court used logical conclusions more often, but did not also refrain from passing rulings against the clear wording of the statutory law, and was just as willing to go beyond the wording of the law as was the German Federal Court of Justice. Notably, only the German apex court is willing to openly admit that it creates new legal norms, whereas the Polish Supreme Court does not concede in the reasons that its decisions are of a law-making nature, especially when it applies so-called “interpretation in the wider sense”—which is, in essence, a “concealed” way of creating new legal norms. (shrink)

Among the various human forms alluded to in the Hebrew prayer, mental retardation appears to be one of the most difficult to celebrate. It is the disability that other disabled persons do not want attributed to them. It is the disability for which prospective parents are most likely to use selective abortion (Wertz 2000). And it is the disability that prompted one of the most illustrious United States Supreme Court Justices to endorse forced sterilization, because "three generations of (...) imbeciles are enough." The mentally retarded have at times been objects of pity, compassion, or abuse by their caretakers and society at large. But they have rarely been seen as subjects, as citizens, as persons with equal entitlement to fulfillment. (shrink)

On April 26, 1995, the United States Supreme Court limited the reach of the preemption provision of ERISA in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Tavelers Insurance Co. ). In Travelers, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York statute requiring hospitals to collect surcharges from patients covered by commercial insurers and requiring health maintenance organizations to pay a surcharge to the state's general fund that varies depending on (...) the number of Medicaid-eligible HMO members enrolled. Neither patients insured by Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans nor the plans themselves are similarly charged under the statute. Several commercial insurers and HMOs claimed the surcharges should be preempted under ERISA because they are levied on patients whose insurance or HMO membership premiums are purchased by an ERISA plan.The ERISA preemption clause means that federal regulation, or lack thereof, supersedes state regulation that is related to employee pension and benefit plans. This preemption clause prevents states from changing health care and benefit law for a significant portion of state residents. (shrink)

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45, which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: the Federal Trade Commission's jurisdiction over the California Dental Association ; and the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The (...) class='Hi'>Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns. (shrink)

Congress implemented the Medicaid Act in 1965, acting pursuant to its Spending Clause authority to “provide for the…general Welfare.” Over time, the Act has been amended more than 50 times. Most recently, as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Congress required participating states to extend Medicaid eligibility to childless, non-disabled, and non-elderly adults with incomes below roughly 133% of the federal poverty level.Within hours of President Obama signing the ACA into law, four lawsuits were filed challenging (...) the con-stitutionality of the ACA, including a case in Florida that eventually made its way to the Supreme Court as National Federal of Independent Business v. Sebelius. As part of this case, officials from 26 states argued that Congress was improperly coercing them into participating in the Medicaid expansion. (shrink)

The literature of “power elite” theory is surprisingly silent on the role of the judiciary. This is particularly strange as the judiciary was designed to be the elite institution in the federal system, and there is a good deal of evidence that it has functioned as planned: “The Court's power is a natural outcome of the necessity for maintaining capitalist dominance under democratic forms; …judicial review has proved to be a very convenient channel through which the driving forces (...) of American economic life have found expression and achieved victory.” The elite backgrounds of the judges have been much studied, and might explain a predisposition to respond to elite interests and values. However, the “input” channels remain mysterious. (shrink)

Problems in the field of health law often force tradeoffs between uniformity and particularity in health care decision-making. Patients are highly diverse in terms of their basic health status, willingness to accept risk or uncertainty in new treatments, and ability to pay for care. And health care experts - doctors, research scientists, insurance company reviewers, and health economists - are similarly diverse in their perception of the best treatment and payment structure choices. In a world with such persistent heterogeneity of (...) opinions and preferences, a society's choice between centralized rules for treatment and payment and a more diffuse decisional regime is both crucial and controversial. Opt for a uniform national rule - say, a federal statute governing treatment standards, drug approval, or health finance - and many beneficial autonomous transactions between doctors and patients are squelched, with possible detrimental effects on population health and medical innovation. (shrink)

On June 18, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court in the matter of Amgen, Inc. et al. v. Sanofi, et al.1 unanimously upheld the 2021 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,2 striking down as overbroad Amgen’s patent claim to an entire functional genus of monoclonal antibodies. Amgen’s patent claims were not limited to antibody structure or antibody amino acid sequences. This is significant because Amgen’s patent claims did have amino acid sequences, but (...) they were directed to the epitope. (shrink)

Physicians’ fear of criminal prosecution for prescribing opioid analgesics is a major reason why many chronic pain patients are having an increasingly difficult time obtaining medically appropriate pain relief. In Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022), the Supreme Court unanimously vacated two federal convictions under the Controlled Substances Act. The Court held that the government must prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.

O presente artigo se propõe a analisar a relação entre o Supremo Tribunal Federal e os media, e como as notícias jurídicas do Plenário da mais importante Corte do país são transmitidas pela TV Justiça, pelos canais comerciais, e pelos novos media. Ademais, busca-se explorar a influência dos novos media na democratização da informação referente ao Judiciário. Em termos metodológicos, será utilizada abordagem hipotética dedutiva, com base em pesquisa bibliográfica e documental. Não obstante, este trabalho pretende demostrar como os (...) canais comerciais se incumbem de espetacularizar as imagens do Plenário do STF, com intuitos mercadológicos e de lucro. (shrink)

Florijn’s analysis of the Dutch Supreme Court ruling on the Albert Heringa case demonstrates that the Dutch approach to justifying physician-assisted death is based primarily on the physician...

Heath services come with the promise of confidentiality.1 The ethical mandate to safeguard the confidentiality of personal health information aligns with legal mandates to do the same. Numerous state and federal laws demand one form of health data confidentiality or another, best illustrated by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.2 In early 2011, the Department of Health and Human Services decided to take a tougher stand against HIPAA violators, utilizing powers created by the Health Information Technology for Economic (...) and Clinical Health Act.3 Ushering in a new era, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services imposed an unprecedented civil penalty of $4.3 million on Cignet Health of .. (shrink)

State universities have grown to become monumental enterprises generating revenues of more than $124 billion a year in the sale and delivery of education and other services. They compete in a marketplace composed of private secular, nonsecular and for-profit higher education institutions. In addition, state universities in their own right engage in a number of traditionally for-profit "business" enterprises competing with the private sector. However, as the enterprise aspect of state universities grows; so too does the impact of a unique (...) competitive advantage enjoyed solely by state universities--that is, the ability of state universities to immune themselves from lawsuit in federal court under the guise of "sovereign immunity" for disputes arising under federal employment laws. Indeed, as a consequence of recent Supreme Court rulings, state agencies, including universities, are the only entities in the United States that are effectively exempt from the enforcement of federal employment laws in federal or state courts. This article reviews the condition of the "two faces" of the state university regarding federal employment law and the apparent new barriers to federal court access of employees to judicial review of employment disputes. (shrink)

In Martin v. Ortho Pharmacetrtical Corp. ), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that, although a federal regulation requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to provide direct warnings to consumers about the dangers associated with oral contraceptives, this regulation does not constitute an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine and the manufacture will not be held strictly liable. The court declined to recognize an exception for manufacturers of contraceptives due to important policy considerations and the legislative intent underlying the (...) learned intermediary doctrine. The doctrine is based on the assumption that prescribing physicians, not pharmaceutical manufacturers, are in the best position to provide direct warnings to patients concerning the dangers associated with prescription drugs. The decision may affect patients whose medical care providers are unable to account for drug propensities or patient susceptibilities. Additionally, patients with forgetful or inarticulate health care providers are at risk. (shrink)

Despite historic efforts to enact the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010, national health reform is threatened by multiple legal challenges grounded in constitutional law. Premier among these claims is the premise that PPACA’s “individual mandate” is constitutionally infirm. Attorneys General in Virginia and Florida allege that Congress’ interstate commerce powers do not authorize federal imposition of the individual mandate because Congress lacks the power to regulate commercial “inactivity.” Stated simply, Congress cannot regulate individuals who choose not (...) to obtain health insurance because they are not engaged in a commercial venture. Several courts initially considering this argument have rejected it, but two federal district courts in Virginia and Florida have concurred, leading to numerous appeals and the near promise of United States Supreme Court review. (shrink)

On October 14, 2003, the Supreme Court announced that it would not review a Ninth Circuit Appeals Court ruling that enjoined the federal government from punishing doctors who recommend medical use of marijuana to their patients. The Ninth Circuit case, Conan v.Walters, drew a fine line in distinguishing betweendispensing information and dispensing controlled substances, and held that [p]hysicians must be able to speak frankly and openly to patients under the First Amendments. Although unauthorized use and distribution (...) of marijuana is prohibited, the court found that a doctor s recommendation does not itself constitute illegal conduct that doctors should be free to recommend the use of medical marijuana if based on sincere medical judgment, without fear of retaliation by a government probe or prosecution. (shrink)

I would like to begin by discussing the legal and administrative framework of the role of the federal government in public health. At the heart of it is, of course, the Constitution. At the Department of Health and Human Services we depend, as does much of the federal government, on our power to regulate interstate commerce. Since the Supreme Court in 1942 removed essentially any restraint from the meaning of interstate commerce in Wickard v. Filburn, the (...) federal government has been regulating with wide latitude, in spite of small and, arguably, equivocal reverses in recent years. However, even though the Supreme Court no longer provides any real constitutional check on the federal government's interstate commerce power, some other restraints persist. For example, many parts of the health system have traditionally been deemed inherently state functions, such as the licensing and disciplining of doctors, nurses, and pharmacists, as well as the practice of medicine itself. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta um panorama da jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre o controle judicial do orçamento público e a proteção dos direitos humanos enquanto fim do Estado e do direito, especialmente considerando a recente tese fixada sobre o assunto. A questão de saber se é possível conciliar a atividade judicial com o controle de constitucionalidade dos orçamentos públicos é complexa e polêmica. Diante disso, para além de analisar as implicações orçamentárias decorrentes da judicialização dos direitos sociais positivos, o (...) objetivo do presente estudo é analisar a postura do Poder Judiciário (STF) com relação ao próprio orçamento.AbstractThis article presents the evolution on the Brazilian Supreme Court jurisprudence involving public budget review, in the light of the human and fundamental rights promotion as a state’s goal – specially regarding the most recent court’s ruling on this issue. The question regarding the possibility to reconcile judicial review with public budget control is a complex one. In analyzing its complexity, this study aims at the effects that litigation over economic and social rights produces on public budget and what kind of attitude should we expect from the Judiciary regarding public budget planning. (shrink)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to conclude, in light of clearly established federal law as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that a New York statute providing for the recommitment (...) of specific defendants who plead not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect under a mere “preponderance of the evidence” standard does not violate either due process or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (shrink)

In response to the obesity epidemic, much discussion in the public health and child advocacy communities has centered on restricting food and beverage marketing practices directed at children. A common retort to appeals for government regulation is that such advertising and marketing constitutes protected commercial speech under the First Amendment. This perception has allowed the industry to function largely unregulated since the Federal Trade Commission 's foray into the topic, termed KidVid, was terminated by an act of Congress in (...) 1981. The FTC has since focused on self-regulation as a potential solution to such concerns. However, this method of control has proven ineffective to protect children, and has led to growing recognition that federal regulation may be necessary.Since KidVid, the evidence has only mounted that children are uniquely vulnerable to the effects of advertising. Over the same time period, the exposition of commercial speech jurisprudence has plateaued, as the Supreme Court has not decided a pure commercial speech case since 2002. (shrink)

A Constituição Federal brasileira fixou um desenho estrutural de competências que permite uma ampla atuação do Supremo Tribunal Federal sobre a vida social e os ramos de governo. No entanto, a análise da teoria institucionalista estratégica sobre os julgados relativos ao processo legislativo federal demonstra que não há um panorama assimétrico entre os departamentos estatais. Na verdade, o jogo entre poderes pode criar cenários conjunturais que libertam decisões baseadas na preferência individual dos julgadores ou que restringem a (...) autonomia da Corte quando críticas ou retaliações externas ameaçam sua permanência e autoridade. (shrink)

In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (1980), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that victims of human rights violations could sue their oppressors civilly in US courts under an eighteenth century law now called the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). Controversy raged over the Filartiga decision and the proper interpretation of the ATCA for 24 years. Then in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004), the Supreme Court issued its first ATCA decision. This essay analyzes the effect of the Sosa decision (...) on the development of human rights law in US courts. I find that while the federal judiciary is responding to some of the Supreme Court’s directives, lower courts still retain a great deal of discretion in handling ATCA cases. (shrink)

In its January 20th, 2010 decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission, the United States Supreme Court ruled that certain restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations for political advocacy violate the First Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Justice Kennedy, writing for (...) the 5-4 majority, held that “[b]y suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and non-profit, the Government prevents their voices and view-points from reaching the public and advising voters on which person or entities are hostile to their interests” (Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 38-9 (2010); emphasis added). Much of the language of the opinion, and some of its reasoning, as this passage illustrates, presupposes that corporations are agents capable of speech, and that it is (at least in part) in the light of this that limitations on political advocacy by corporations are prohibited by the Constitution. -/- While there are other strands in the argument, they are interwoven with the conception of the corporation as agent and speaker, with its voice and its viewpoints. The dissenters on the court objected on precisely this point (among others). Justice Stevens wrote sarcastically in his dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, that “[u]nder the majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that corporations are not permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of speech” (558 U.S. 33 (2010)). Justice Sotomayor suggested in oral argument that the Court’s century-old practice of treating corporations as persons rests on a conceptual mistake. -/- My concern in this essay is not with the question whether the restrictions violate the Constitution. There are many issues that bear on this which will be outside the scope of my discussion. My concern is with the proper conceptual framework for understanding the agency of corporations and corporate speech, and the role that conceptions of these play in the background of the majority’s reasoning. The issue is legal, but it also has philosophical, conceptual and semantic aspects. It will be the latter aspects, and their potential to shed light on legal reasoning, that are my main focus. An adequate framework requires saying what properly speaking the corporation is, how agency is expressed through the corporation, whose agency it is, centrally whether the corporation is an agent or person in its own right, and in what sense it can be said to be capable of speech. I draw on recent work in collective action theory, particularly with respect to the semantics of collective action sentences (Ludwig 2007) and the analysis of the proxy agency in collective action (Ludwig 2014), to show (i) that corporations are neither genuine agents nor (therefore) capable of engaging in genuine speech, (ii) that consequently the First Amendment does not apply to corporations per se, and (iii) that a better understanding of the mechanisms of corporate agency casts doubt on more indirect arguments for extending the First Amendment to “corporate speech” as well. (shrink)

In a new era of regulatory oversight, the US Supreme Court upended traditional Chevron deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous Congressional provisions in Loper in June 2024. Federal courts were instructed to make their own assessments of statutory authorities amid an onslaught of public health agency challenges surfacing nationally. Even so, SCOTUS may be eyeing further limits on agency powers despite clear and substantial repercussions for the health of the nation.

On August 18, 1986, seventy-two Nobel laureates, seventeen state academies of science, and seven other scientific organizations submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court of the United States in which they defined and agreed upon the nature and scope of science. The brief was submitted in response to the Louisiana Balanced TreatmentAct for creation science and evolution science that had been struck down in the Federal Court of Louisiana in 1985 and was being appealed (...) to the Supreme Court. The Louisiana trial in general and the amicus curiae brief in particular have historical significance for the history of science, being unique in the collective mobilization of scientists both in defense of and in defining science. This article describes the origin and significance of the brief. (shrink)

On June 28, 1993, the United States Supreme Court ruled on the admissibility of expert scientific opinion and evidence in federal court cases. The importance of the case can be measured by the interest it stimulated. The scientific community turned out in particular force to register its views. At the heart of the controversy was a debate over the nature of scientific knowledge and its relation to law. More than any other Supreme Court case (...) in recent memory, the amici seemed to view the Daubert case both as posing a potential challenge to basic scientific premises and as an opportunity to reclaim a lost prerogative to determine how science is applied in courts. (shrink)

Although the Canadian legal system has many virtues, it has at least one major weakness – its judicial appointments and promotion systems. The paper begins by identifying six key values that need to be considered in order to assess the legitimacy of a judicial appointments process – independence, impartiality, representativeness, transparency, accountability and efficiency. In the following sections, through the use of three case studies of appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, the superior courts of Nova Scotia (...) and a promotion to the Federal Court of Canada, we demonstrate that Canada has failed to live up to these values. We conclude by suggesting that recent reforms to the judicial appointments processes by the current government are an improvement, but that more radical reforms are essential to enhance public confidence in the integrity of Canada’s judicial appointments and promotion systems. (shrink)

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) is America's strongest environmental law. Its citizen-suit provision—permitting “any person” whomsoever to sue on behalf of a threatened or endangered species—awards implicit intrinsic value, de facto standing, and operational legal rights (sensu Christopher D. Stone) to listed species. Accordingly, some cases had gone forward in the federal courts in the name of various listed species between 1979 (Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land & Natural Resources) and 2004 (Cetacean Community v. Bush), when (...) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that animals could not sue in their own name. Because the Supreme Court has interpreted its habitat destruction as the “taking” of a listed species, some have argued that enforcement of the ESA's critical-habitat-protection provision is a “regulatory taking” of private property without just compensation, contrary to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The courts have not agreed. The ESA citizen-suit provision appears to waive federal-court standing requirements devolved from Article III of the U.S. Constitution, creating much confusion and mutually contradictory rulings. A series of cases (culminating with Bennett v. Spear) reconciles the ESA's citizen-suit provision with the particularized and concrete “injury-in-fact” standing requirements devolved from Article III. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Bioethics Commissions: Town Meetings with a “Blue, Blue Ribbon”Susan Cartier Poland (bio)Town meetings are characteristic of New England. In theory, a quorum of registered voters in a small municipality meets annually to decide local public policy. In fact, special interests and the town bureaucracy control the meeting.Like a town meeting, a commission (or committee or council) comes into being, whether on an ad hoc or permanent basis, to direct (...) a government function. Bioethics commissions specialize in one area: the intersection of public policy with developments, either real or anticipated, in the basic and applied sciences.That specialization of commissions carries over into the selection of the members. More often than not commission members are appointed on the basis of expertise in a specific area. Although some commissions are still made up entirely of one kind of expert, usually medical, the majority of these government bodies seek breadth between the fields of law, religion, ethics, and science (including medicine and the social sciences).In the words of Mrs. Rigenbach, the law clerk to Chief Judge Carl B. Rubin of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, selection of persons “knowledgeable in the field” constitutes a “blue, blue ribbon” jury. In contrast, a “blue ribbon” jury is composed of those persons having “the greatest amount of formal education” (In re Richardson-Merrill, Inc. (Bendectin litigation), 624 Federal Supplement 1212 at 1217 (1985)). The problem with persons knowledgeable in the field is that their minds may have already been made up. For a jury, this is a disaster; for a bioethics commission, this directs and shapes the research, investigation, and discussion, or, in short, it makes for more efficient decision making.For this Scope Note, the definition of commission begins with the Bioethicsline description of its index term “advisory committees” as committees or commissions set up to advise government bodies on public policy. Furthermore, a commission [End Page 91] (or committee) receives government funding and support in exchange for its expertise in research, investigation, reporting, and recommendations.Six functions served by bioethics commissions have been clearly and succinctly described by LeRoy Walters (Commissions and Bioethics. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (4): 363–68, August 1989). The functions are: (1) to legitimize action; (2) to delay action or resolution; (3) to identify duplication; (4) to be representative; (5) to do research and find facts; and (6) to provide education and support (pp. 364–65). Since 1989, however, another government function has moved to the forefront. Instead of remaining within the legislative arena, government commissions serve the judiciary as well, in cases involving complex and technical questions. The now defunct Law Reform Commission of Canada recognized this use when it included in its annual reports a section on its “Influence on Law Reform through Judicial Decisions.”In mid-1997, the United States Supreme Court in its consolidated cases on assisted suicide used extensively the writings from a state commission, the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, to support its rationale. Not only did the Court make use of the Task Force’s work, but in so doing the Court extended the efforts of the commission beyond its jurisdiction of New York into another jurisdiction on the opposite coast, Washington state. Furthermore, although the commission was chartered by one state, through the federal court system, its influence became national.Outside the U.S., the United Nations recently adopted its first bioethics text on the ethics of genetic research, and Canada is reworking its human research guidelines into a single set of guidelines that will apply to research in both the natural sciences and the social sciences.This Scope Note attempts to compile for the researcher and the reference librarian those commissions, existing and defunct, that have addressed bioethics issues. Only one other such attempt is known to the author, an Office of Technology Assessment [OTA] Background Paper, Biomedical Ethics in U.S. Public Policy (1993). Due to space limitations, not all publications could be listed; the selections included represent the range of topics from a particular group or the more frequently cited sources. Future updates of this compilation are planned, so please notify the... (shrink)

There is considerable disagreement as to whether any gender differences on the bench are symbolic, substantive, or both. This paper, based on never-before published surveys and personal interviews conducted in the early 1980s, contributes to that discussion by describing what women appointed to the federal bench by President Carter between 1976 and 1980 had to say about gender differences in their first years in office. I conclude that these early experiences and comments by women on the bench are still (...) relevant today and presage much of the research on judicial gender which has followed. (shrink)

Federal discrimination laws have defined two distinct types of activity that constitute sexual harassment – "hostile environment" and "quid pro quo." The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and more recent Supreme Court rulings make it easier for workers to win lawsuits claiming they were sexually harassed in the work environment.While the public accounting profession continues to address gender-related problems, it remains vulnerable to claims of sexual harassment. In an attempt to better understand the underlying risk the public (...) accounting profession faces, this study focuses on identifying (1) the extent of sexual harassment in the public accounting profession, (2) the type of harassing behavior that is most common, and (3) where the harassment occurs. (shrink)

Federal efforts beginning in the 1990's have successfully increased pediatric research to improve medical care for all children. Since 1997, the FDA has requested 800 pediatric studies involving 45,000 children. Much of this research is "non-beneficial"; that is, it exposes pediatric subjects to risk even though these children will not benefit from participating in the research. Non-beneficial pediatric research (NBPR) seems, by definition, contrary to the best interests of pediatric subjects, which is why one state supreme court (...) has essentially prohibited it. It also appears that the only plausible rationale for this research is utilitarian, as it risks some children for the good of all. But that rationale is troubling. This Article answers two related questions: (1) What is the appropriate legal relationship between NBPR and the "best interests of the child" standard? (2) What is the ethical justification for this research? I argue that courts should hold that the "best interests" standard governs pediatric research. But, contrary to existing case law, courts must consider the benefits to each child, including pediatric subjects, from a policy that permits NBPR, and not simply consider that a non-beneficial protocol presents more risk than potential benefit to a child. Moreover, I argue that the justification for the practice need not be utilitarian. There is no need to appeal to the greater good to justify the research because each child has reason to endorse a policy permitting NBPR where there is a very low ceiling on acceptable risk, and each child has reason to participate in a practice from which she benefits. More controversially, I argue that each child, like other persons, has reason to help others when she can do so at little to no cost to herself. The Article then highlights practical implications of the offered justifications. (shrink)

The Supreme Court’s Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision, first leaked to the public on 2 May 2022 and officially released on 24 June 2022, overturned Roe v. Wade and thereby determined that abortion is no longer a federally protected right under the Constitution. Instead, the decision gives individual states the right to regulate abortion. Since the Dobbs decision first leaked, our institution has received numerous requests for permanent contraception from individuals stating that their motivation to pursue (...) permanent contraception was influenced by the Dobbs decision and concerns about their reproductive autonomy. Discussions with patients seeking permanent contraception since the Supreme Court’s leaked decision have led us to ask ourselves, is legislative anxiety an indication for surgery? This article presents a case series consisting of a convenience sample of 17 young, nulliparous individuals who sought out permanent contraception in the six months following the leak of the Dobbs decision. Healthcare professionals often feel discomfort in offering permanent contraception to young and nulliparous individuals. Accordingly, we discuss pertinent legal issues, review relevant ethical considerations, and offer a framework for these discussions intended to empower the consulting healthcare professional to center the bodily autonomy of every patient regardless of age, parity, or indication for permanent contraception. (shrink)

In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission , the US Supreme Court sharply curtailed the ability of the state to limit political speech by for-profit corporations. This new legal situation elevates the question of corporate political involvement: in what manner and to what extent is it ethical for for-profit corporations to participate in the political process in a liberal democratic society? Using Scanlon’s version of contractualism, I argue for a number of substantive and procedural constraints on the (...) political activities of businesses. Central to this contractualist analysis is an identification of the self-governance-based interests of individuals that are affected by corporate political activity and a method for judging the various assignments of social rights, duties and roles according to how they collectively meet those interests. Together, these two features make this contractualist approach distinctive and allow it to generate substantive ethical results. (shrink)

The question of detention of asylum seekers is specific due to the special situation of detainees (persons who have experienced human rights violations and apply for asylum in receiving country) and due to peculiarities of detention itself (persons have not committed crimes, but come or stay illegally because they have been forced to do so by fleeing from human rights violations). Therefore, lately it raises many discussions at the European level. Sooner or later, discussions influence national laws, as after adopting (...) the EU directives their provisions must be properly transposed into national laws. This article describes the recent documents: the study in Lithuania, the UNHCR guidelines, the EU developments, the Lithuania judicial practice. The authors of the article discuss the latest amendments of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens (entering into force on 1 February 2012) related to detention of asylum seekers after the transposition of the provisions of the Return Directive. The practice of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania when applying the new detention-related provisions is also reviewed in the article. The authors do not agree with the position of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania that the provisions of the Return Directive are applicable to asylum seekers. The authors pay attention to the case-law of the European Court of Justice, the preamble of the Return Directive and its legal relations with the EU asylum directives. At the end, the conclusions are drawn as to the way that the provisions of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens should be interpreted in the light of the purposes and provisions of the European Union directives. In order to avoid contradictory practice and at the same time ensure the interests of public order in Lithuania, Article 113(7) of the Law on the Legal Status of Aliens could be applied. (shrink)

The Supreme Court’s construction of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) in Hobby Lobby created a great fear among various civil rights groups, especially in the LGBT community, over what the Court might do next regarding rights of same-sex and transgender couples seeking legal protections in employment, housing, and public accommodations. Indeed, if Justice Alito’s majority position is taken for all that its logic implies, then, as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent warns, there is indeed much for (...) the civil rights community to be concerned about. However, as I show in this article, there are good reasons for not treating the Hobby Lobby case as broadly as the majority opinion’s logic might indicate. Hopefully, courts will be inclined to follow this direction. First, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion suggests that he joined the majority while also holding a much narrower understanding of the reasoning behind that opinion: namely, that because HHS had established an alternative means for meeting the needs of nonprofit employees where the employer had a religious objection, there was little reason in light of the importance of religious liberty not to extend that same alternative to closely held for-profit organizations. Second, a narrower interpretation of the Court’s opinion seems to better fit with RFRA’s legislative history, notwithstanding the majority’s concern that RLUIPA was passed to imply a broadened expansion of RFRA’s religious protections. It is equally possible and more consistent with RFRA’s adoption that, as the dissent notes, RLUIPA was meant to clarify “that courts should not question the centrality of a particular religious exercise.” Third, a narrow interpretation is more in keeping with the Court’s recognition of health care and equality as compelling concerns of many federal and state laws, alongside the protection of religious freedom. Finally, a narrow reading better resolves the conflict of rights lying in the background between the human right of freedom of conscience and the human right to well-being. It resolves this conflict by ensuring that no one suffers objective harm from either the denial of preventative health care or loss of civil rights protections when a compelling state interest is present, or the harm to conscience is less than substantial. (shrink)

The loss of the federally protected constitutional right to an abortion is a threat to the already tenuous autonomy of pregnant people, and may augur future challenges to their right to refuse unwanted obstetric interventions. Even before Roe’s demise, pregnancy led to constraints on autonomy evidenced by clinician-led legal incursions against patients who refused obstetric interventions. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Supreme Court found that the right to liberty espoused in the Constitution does not extend (...) to a pregnant person’s right to an abortion. With Roe’s demise, the right to request specific types of care has been vitiated. The same argument underpinning that holding may now become ballast for attacks on the traditionally more robust right, the right to refuse. Here we discuss how the elevation of fetal and embryonic rights may lead to a cascade of medical intrusions and deprivations of liberty against pregnant persons, and offer an argument opposing these improprieties. (shrink)

According to the German Embryo Protection Act, PGD has been banned in Germany since 1990; one reason is the legislature’s avoiding to insert a revision clause regarding medical advance into the law. The ruling of the German Federal Court of Justice of July 2010 shows the problems resulting out of this approach and declares PGD to be permitted in certain cases. The article discusses the necessity for, as well as the problems of, an interdisciplinary dialogue in the field (...) of reproductive medicine. (shrink)

After the US Supreme Court’s reversal of Roe v. Wade, a number of states have immediately banned abortion. Pro-choice activists are responding by promoting medication abortions – a do-it-yourself form of abortion. Women can take pills at home to induce an abortion in the first few weeks of pregnancy. -/- The Biden Administration [1] has backed the abortion pill, too. Attorney-General Merrick B. Garland and Health and Human Services Secretary Xavier Becerra both issued statements endorsing it. -/- “We (...) stand ready to work with other arms of the federal government that seek to use their lawful authorities to protect and preserve access to reproductive care,” said the Attorney-General. “In particular, the F.D.A. has approved the use of the medication mifepristone. States may not ban mifepristone based on disagreement with the F.D.A.’s expert judgment about its safety and efficacy.” -/- As the New York Times [1] has noted, this sets the scene for legal battles. The obvious one is: will anti-abortion states prosecute medication abortions? -/- But – based on experience in the United Kingdom - the use of the abortion pill could give pro-life doctors headaches as well. -/- In the past year, UK has witnessed the saga of two Catholic doctors who have been brought in front of the professional regulator, the General Medical Council, after accusations of professional misconduct. Their crime? They had supplied abortion pill reversal (APR) treatment to women. Accusations of this misconduct have been brought forward by pro-choice organisations [2]. -/- The problem is that some women might panic when they discover that they are pregnant or are pressured to make a rash decision. They obtain abortion pills, often without seeing a doctor faceto- face, and soon after taking the first pill, they regret their decision. -/- Is it too late for them to save their pregnancy? Not necessarily. -/- A treatment developed in the US works about half the time. It involves the woman taking progesterone after the first abortion pill to counteract the abortifacient action of the drug. -/- Seventy-three women in the UK are reported to have taken a full APR course, of whom, 38 – more than half — successfully remained pregnant. Admittedly, the procedure is controversial [3], with pro-choice writers denouncing it as unproven, unscientific, and unethical. This has triggered some healthcare practitioners and scholars to analyse the commitments of the pro-choice movement to APR. In a recently published paper in The New Bioethics [4], two colleagues, Dominic Whitehouse and Steven Bow, and I argue that those espousing a pro-choice worldview should actually support abortion pill reversal and that the current evidence indicates that they should actually be doing it. -/- While some pro-choice activists might be happy simply to expand women’s reproductive choices, some might also want to ensure that these choices are safe and effective at achieving the desired outcome, which in principle includes maintaining a pregnancy. -/- We then review the scientific evidence with respect to the ability of APR to halt an abortion, look at the potential impact of APR on mental health, as well as its procedural safety. While highlighting that gold-standard evidence is lacking, we note that APR is associated with about two times higher rate of embryo survival compared to not completing the full early medical abortion course, that there is large agreement in the literature that women who are ambiguous about abortion are at risk of poorer mental health outcomes after abortion (and argue that women who request APR fall into this category), and highlight that there is no evidence that APR is more dangerous than abandoning an initiated early medical abortion. -/- The latter fact is important, as the results of the only randomised-controlled trial of APR have been at times misrepresented in the media [5.6], creating the impression that APR is not safe while most of the adverse effects occurred in the study group that did not receive APR. As our paper argues, with respect to APR the two UK doctors were “champions of women’s choice and should be congratulated, not condemned, by pro-choice advocates”. -/- While the cases against the two doctors have now been dropped (and there have even been accusations against a member of one of these pro-choice organisations that they pressurised a patient into complaining about one of the doctors and twisted the patient’s experience of the treatment [7]), we argue that it is important to set-up systems to facilitate the future provision of APR to protect both patients and healthcare staff. -/- Our conclusion is that, while being open to any change in evidence, those espousing a pro-choice outlook should “support calls for an APR framework that will protect women and the healthcare professionals caring for them” “and certainly not oppose” APR. -/- The debate over abortion pill reversal will be heading to the United States soon. It is quite possible that it will be denounced as dangerous misinformation. It’s not. But pro-life defenders should be prepared to defend their ground. -/- This article was first published by Mercatornet. (shrink)

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly is creating quite a stir. Suddenly gone is the famous loosey-goosey rule of Conley v. Gibson that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.Now a complaint must provide enough facts to state a claim to relief that (...) is plausible on its face. Only decided last May, Bell Atlantic has been cited in over 3,700 cases. Already being described as a landmark decision, Bell Atlantic nonetheless has lawyers and judges scratching their heads over the precise pleading standard to apply in its wake. As the Second Circuit (mildly) put it, Considerable uncertainty concerning the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings has recently been created by the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. Just what is a plausible showing that the pleader is entitled to relief under Rule 8(a)(2)?I believe an answer lies in the 26-year-old decision of the Former Fifth Circuit in In re Plywood Antitrust Litigation. Plywood Antitrust requires, at a minimum, that a complaint . . . contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Already used in more than half the circuits, this standard paraphrases advice found in the venerable WRIGHT & MILLER for nearly 40 years.Properly applied, this all . . . material elements standard satisfies Bell Atlantic's plausibility requirement in all respects. The Plywood Antitrust pleading standard works well after Bell Atlantic, first, because the Supreme Court referred to the standard, albeit parenthetically, with approval in Bell Atlantic. Second, it does much to harmonize the Federal Rules' goal of dispensing with pleading technicalities while still requiring enough general factual information about a pleader's claim to make the notice in notice pleading meaningful. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it gives lawyers, litigants, and courts a standard they can actually use when drafting, or assessing the sufficiency of, pleadings. (shrink)

Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission is a 2010 US Supreme Court decision that fundamentally transformed federal election financing. As a result, we have seen a drastic increase in the amount of so-called soft money that wealthy individuals and corporations contribute to political campaigns. Following a brief overview of the case and the precedent that formed the basis for the ruling, this chapter concerns philosophical stakes of the decision and what precisely it says about the public (...) today and the role of philosophy within it. I argue that there are three basic issues here. First is the issue of corruption. Second is the question of propaganda and the potential dangers the Citizens United case might pose for a democratic polity. Finally, I examine the dangers this poses for a democratic polity. (shrink)

The issues before the Supreme Court, arising as they did out of multiple cases and divergent appellate court rulings, were quite complex, and its final decision will be parsed rather differently by lawyers, health policy wonks, and economists (or metaphysical philosophers, in Chief Justice John Roberts's memorable phrase). This essay will focus on one singular element: did the final ruling enhance or detract from our collective power to exercise stewardship over our health care resources? -/- Clearly Americans (...) diverge on key features of a desirable society and on the wisdom of using government to achieve even mutually desirable goals. But before politics settles the fate of the Affordable Care Act (and perhaps also the federal role in health policy for the foreseeable future), we should focus on what the Court has allowed us to consider: if we want it to, federal power may constitutionally be marshalled to compel insurers to end discrimination against the sick and to offer more transparent products so the marketplace will better serve consumers. (shrink)

In June 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the Criminal Code's prohibition on assisted death. Just over a year later, the federal government crafted legislation to entrench medical assistance in dying (MAiD), the term used in Canada in place of physician‐assisted death. Notably, Canada became the first country to allow nurse practitioners to act as assessors and providers, a result of a strong lobby by the Canadian Nurses Association. However, a legislated approach to assisted death (...) has proven challenging in a number of areas. Although it facilitates a degree of accountability, precision and accessibility, it has also resulted in particular challenges negotiating the diverse perspectives of such a morally contentious act. One of these challenges is the tendency to conflate what is legal and what is moral in a modern liberal constitutionalism that places supreme value on autonomy and choice. Such a conflation tends to render invisible the legal and moral/ethical considerations necessary for nurses and nurse practitioners to remain ethical actors. In this paper, we introduce this conflation and then discuss the process of lawmaking in Canada, including the legalization of MAiD and the contributions of nursing to that legalization. We then engage in a hypothetical dialogue about the legal and moral/ethical implications of MAiD for nursing in Canada. We conclude with an appeal for morally sustainable workspaces that, when implementing MAiD, appropriately balance patient choices and nurses’ moral well‐being. (shrink)

In theCitizens United v. Federal Election Commission(2010) decision, the Supreme Court rendered an opinion verifying the legality of unions and corporations to spend funds from theirgeneral treasuriesto finance independent expenditures related to political and electioneering communications. Such speech and communications are constitutionally protected by the First Amendment, according to Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion (558 U.S. 22, 2010). The dissenting opinion questioned whether such rights should accrue to corporations, since corporations differ from constitutionally‐protected “natural persons” (...) (dissent, 558 U.S. 50 at 2, 2010; Johnson2011). The decision ignited a firestorm of controversy, which renewed interest in the legal concept of corporate personhood.This article reviews key findings in theCitizens United v. FECcase, then describes the historical, legal, and theoretical concepts of corporate personhood with the goal of unbundling the nuanced consequences of the majority and dissenting opinions of theCitizens United v. FECcase. The analysis then turns to a shareholder perspective, with particular emphasis on the implications for shareholders’ rights and responsibilities. It concludes with an exploration of options available to shareholders concerned about how to respond when a corporation uses its resources to communicate political opinions at odds with their own. (shrink)

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled, in United States u. Texus Tech University, 171 F.3d 279, that the Eleventh Amendment bars a private citizen from bringing a qui tam action in federal court against a state, absent federal intervention.Intervenor Carol Foulds was a dermatology resident at the Texas Tech Health Services Center. While a resident, Foulds examined patients, made diagnoses, and prescribed treatments for patients. Foulds alleged that she and other residents performed (...) these medical services without the supervision of staff physicians. Foulds further alleged that, after residents performed these services without physician oversight, staff physicians signed charts and Medicare and Medicaid billing forms certifying that they personally performed or supervised the administration of these services. Foulds estimates approximately 500,000 false claims occurred in a span of ten years.In 1995, Foulds filed a qui tam action with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. As regulated by the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, the complaint remained under seal. (shrink)