Le consumérisme qui caractérise nos sociétés nous pousse à désirer davantage et à imiter des modèles. Cette course nous laisse insatisfaits et génère rivalité et violence. L'anthropologie que nous propose René Girard va nous permettre de saisir les ressorts de la violence et de dessiner la figure d'un individu pleinement libre, conscient de son mimétisme et choisissant de suivre le modèle qui permet d'échapper à la rivalité. Une invitation à revisiter le christianisme et la figure du Christ.

The Repugnant Conclusion served an important purpose in catalyzing and inspiring the pioneering stage of population ethics research. We believe, however, that the Repugnant Conclusion now receives too much focus. Avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion should no longer be the central goal driving population ethics research, despite its importance to the fundamental accomplishments of the existing literature.

This paper presents the hypothesis that concept possession is sufficient and necessary for self-consciousness. If this is true it provides a yardstick for gauging the validity of different research paradigms in which claims for self-consciousness in animals or human infants are made: a convincing demonstration of concept possession in a research subject, such as a display of inferential reasoning, may be taken as conclusive evidence of self-consciousness. Intuitively, there appears to be a correlation between intelligence in animals and the existence (...) of self-consciousness. I present three discussions to support the hypothesis: an analogy between perception and conception, where both are self-specifying; an argument that any web of concepts will always include the self-concept; and a fresh interpretation of Bermũdez showing how his theory of non-conceptual content provides strong support for the concept possession hypothesis. (shrink)

Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace (...) adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it. (shrink)

Local sustainable food systems have captured the popular imagination as a progressive, if not radical, pillar of a sustainable food future. Yet these grassroots innovations are embedded in a dominant food regime that reflects productivist, industrial, and neoliberal policies and institutions. Understanding the relationship between these emerging grassroots efforts and the dominant food regime is of central importance in any transition to a more sustainable food system. In this study, we examine the encounters of direct farm marketers with food safety (...) regulations and other government policies and the role of this interface in shaping the potential of local food in a wider transition to sustainable agri-food systems. This mixed methods research involved interview and survey data with farmers and ranchers in both the USA and Canada and an in-depth case study in the province of Manitoba. We identified four distinct types of interactions between government and farmers: containing, coopting, contesting, and collaborating. The inconsistent enforcement of food safety regulations is found to contain progressive efforts to change food systems. While government support programs for local food were helpful in some regards, they were often considered to be inadequate or inappropriate and thus served to coopt discourse and practice by primarily supporting initiatives that conform to more mainstream approaches. Farmers and other grassroots actors contested these food safety regulations and inadequate government support programs through both individual and collective action. Finally, farmers found ways to collaborate with governments to work towards mutually defined solutions. While containing and coopting reflect technologies of governmentality that reinforce the status quo, both collaborating and contesting reflect opportunities to affect or even transform the dominant regime by engaging in alternative economic activities as part of the ‘politics of possibility’. Developing a better understanding of the nature of these interactions will help grassroots movements to create effective strategies for achieving more sustainable and just food systems. (shrink)

This article renders a close reading of those passages in Walter Benjamin's work where he uses the term “unscheinbar.” Arguing that this concept cannot be reduced to its privative prefix “un-,” the article explores how moments in time, objects or images that are not meaningful in themselves can nevertheless trigger an experience that is to be called such. The article analyzes Benjamin's ideas on friendliness, commemoration, melancholy, mémoire involontaire and photography with the purpose of understanding how a detail or fragment (...) strikes us as significant, despite the fact that it cannot become visible as a unity or whole in its own right. (shrink)

Quel rôle joue le concept de vie quotidienne dans le scepticisme de Sextus Empiricus? À partir d’une analyse du concept de βιωτικὴ τήρησις, il s’agit de faire apparaître, d’une part (i) que la vie quotidienne, par opposition à la vie philosophique, est un fait empirique qui permet au sceptique d’agir sans pour autant avoir d’opinions et d’autre part que (ii) la vie quotidienne est une valeur qui donne sens à la philosophie sceptique. Bien que ces deux approches paraissent contradictoires, le (...) but de cet article est de montrer que le scepticisme philosophique proposé par Sextus les rend compatibles. (shrink)

Foucault’s Forgotten Marxism. This article tries to point out several methodological issues concerning Foucault’s Surveiller et punir, such as the equivocal status of some of Foucault’s main concepts, or the assumed homogeneity of the various disciplinary institutions analyzed in this book. And it aims at suggesting that such issues might find a solution, should one consider the Marxist background on which, as the Lectures at the Collège de France of the year 1973 clearly show, Foucault’s theories were dependant. In the (...) opinion of the author, only in as much as this heritage is accepted and seriously taken into account, shall Foucault’s concepts and theses regain their political and critical pertinence. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First, we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian (...) Hypotyposes 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy. (shrink)

ArgumentThis paper aims to understand the emergence of comparative anatomy in the eighteenth century in the Parisian Académie Royale des Sciences. As early as the 1670s, a program centered on animal anatomy was conceived, which was a first attempt to give some autonomy to studies on animals and to link anatomy with natural history, but it declined after 1690. However, a variety of studies on animals was published in theMémoiresof the Académie during the eighteenth century. We propose a descriptive typology (...) of them in order to explore the status of animals and the significance of anatomy in each type, and to determine, in particular, which elements of Perrault's program were passed on at the Académie throughout the century. We discuss the influence of this legacy on the development of comparative anatomy after 1750, especially in Daubenton's work. (shrink)

It is often suggested that emotions are intrinsically normative or that they have conditions of correctness that are intrinsic. In order to assess this thesis, I consider whether the main argument in favor of the normativity of belief can be transposed to emotions. In the case of belief, the argument is that when we wonder whether to believe that p, we acknowledge that we must abide by some norms. This is understood as showing that these norms are intrinsic to the (...) concept of belief. In contrast, it appears that no similar constraint applies when we deliberate about emotions. Indeed, I argue that extrinsic norms are suf ficient to understand thoroughly the normativity of emotions. Therefore, the postulation of intrinsic norms or correctness conditions seems unmotivated. Worse, if emotions had intrinsic norms or correctness conditions, they would manifest themselves when we wonder whether an emotion is appropriate in this or that context. But they don’t. (shrink)

This book aims to re-evaluate the relations between two major ideologies that have been increasingly contested in recent years, yet continue to be invoked or rejected as foundational systems for political thought or action. With socialism conceiving of itself as an alternative to economic liberalism, the two systems of thought emerged partially in opposition to each other. However, this book seeks to redefine their specificities and the way in which they have not only opposed each other but drew on common (...) notions or paradigms to become both competing and complementary systems of thought and practices. With contributions from eminent political scientists and historians of political and economic thought, the book examines how the polarisation of debates and politicisation of concepts such as property, freedom, the individual, or the State, serve to construct the adversary and form a basis for political commitment. Offering an interdisciplinary assessment of the relation between liberalism and socialism, the authors help to make sense of current debate on individual freedom, political obligation and the changing role of the State. Providing an innovative perspective, this edited collection will be of interest to scholars and students researching political and economic thought, history or science, as well as anyone seeking to understand current developments affecting Western societies, and their past, present, and future ideologies. (shrink)

In this short piece I defend my position on self-consciousness against the objections raised by Dow and Musholt to a paper in the same issue. These are that (1) Bermudez’s (1998) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness broadly supports the CP Hypothesis; (2) the self-concept requires no further complexity than knowledge of one’s own existence and capacity to take deliberate action; (3) understanding the idea of a perceiver requires understanding the concept of an agent that performs the action of perception; (4) Dow (...) dismisses the possibility of scrub jay self-consciousness too readil. (shrink)

Lacepède was a key figure in the French intellectual world from the Old Regime to the Restoration, sinc e he was not only a scientist, but also a musician, a writer, and a politician. His brilliant career is a good example of the progress of the social status of scientists in France around 1800. In the life sciences, he was considered the heir to Buffon and continued the latter’s Histoire naturelle, but he also borrowed ideas from anti-Buffonian scientists. He broached (...) many important subjects such as the nature of man, the classification of animals, the concept of species, and the history of the Earth. All these topics led to tensions in the French sciences, but Lacepède dealt with them in a consensual, indeed even ambiguous way. For example, he held transformist views, but his concept of evolution was far less precise and daring than Lamarck’s contemporaneous attempts. His somewhat confused eclecticism allowed him to be accepted by opposing camps of the French scientific community at that time and makes his case interesting for historians, since the opinions of such an opportunistic figure can illuminate the figure of the French intellectual better than more original works could do. In turn, Lacepède’s important social and scientific position gave his views a significant visibility. In this sense, his contributions probably exerted an influence, in particular with regard to the emergence of transformist theories. (shrink)

The article aims at assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the objections to Habermas’s epistemic conception of democracy raised by Thomas McCarthy in some of his essays. The author defends two ideas. First, he contends that McCarthy is mistaken in believing that democratic debates would not be a matter of consensus. In this regard, two arguments are raised, showing that the search for agreement and consensus by citizens in public forums can hardly be dismissed and that consensus can be invested (...) with many meanings in democratic life. Secondly, however, the author approves McCarthy when challenging Habermas’s epistemic claims regarding his theory of democracy. Not all democratic deliberations can be analysed in epistemic terms, in particular, debates on values. The pitfalls of any epistemic account of this form of deliberation are pointed out in the end of the essay. (shrink)

La catégorie des anormaux, dont Foucault fait la généalogie dans son cours de 1974-1975 au Collège de France, a complètement disparu au début du XXe siècle. Par l'extension illimitée de l'anormal qu'elle permettait et par la somatisation de toutes les pathologies physiques ou mentales qui la soutenait, cette catégorie peut cependant être rapprochée de notre notion actuelle de « handicap », et tout particulièrement des handicaps psychiques. Ce rapprochement permet d'apprécier ce qui a changé dans notre rapport aux normes. L'intégration (...) sociale et la modification des anormaux a remplacé leur exclusion et contention. Mais l'inquiétude des normes est toujours aussi forte, et s'articule désormais autour d'une recherche de sécurité dont le handicap est l'expression. La méthode généalogique permet ainsi l'étude des lignes de fracture de cette notion, révélatrice des problèmes que produisent notre volonté de prendre médicalement en charge de supposés incurables. (shrink)

La catégorie des anormaux, dont Foucault fait la généalogie dans son cours de 1974-1975 au Collège de France, a complètement disparu au début du XXe siècle. Par l'extension illimitée de l'anormal qu'elle permettait et par la somatisation de toutes les pathologies physiques ou mentales qui la soutenait, cette catégorie peut cependant être rapprochée de notre notion actuelle de « handicap », et tout particulièrement des handicaps psychiques. Ce rapprochement permet d'apprécier ce qui a changé dans notre rapport aux normes. L'intégration (...) sociale et la modification des anormaux a remplacé leur exclusion et contention. Mais l'inquiétude des normes est toujours aussi forte, et s'articule désormais autour d'une recherche de sécurité dont le handicap est l'expression. La méthode généalogique permet ainsi l'étude des lignes de fracture de cette notion, révélatrice des problèmes que produisent notre volonté de prendre médicalement en charge de supposés incurables. (shrink)

Two features are often assumed about emotions: they are intentional states and they are experiences. However, there are important reasons to consider some affective responses that are not experienced or only partly experienced as emotions. But the existence of these affective responses does not sit well with the intentionality of conscious emotions which are somehow geared towards their object. We therefore face a trilemma: either these latter affective responses do not have intentional objects and we should renounce intentionality as a (...) defining feature of emotions; or we have to explain how they actually have intentional, though unconscious, objects; or after all we must deny that they are really emotions. I suggest that the second option is the correct one: we can provide an account of the intentionality of unconscious emotions and its relation to the intentionality of conscious emotions. To do this, I rely on neuropsychological studies that distinguish two kinds of attention: salience as enriched treatment, and focus as a way of turning our attention. Then, given that only salience is always present in unconscious emotional phenomena, I suggest that emotions are intentional because they involve an object being made salient. I further argue that this feature of emotions explains why unconscious and conscious emotions can be taken as organized around their object. Finally, I defend this account against several objections, showing that the account can be applied whatever the cognitive base of the emotions may be and is not falsified by the fact that attentional aspects of emotions may vary in other dimensions. (shrink)

Since at least the mid-1980s claims have been made for rationality in rats. For example, that rats are capable of inferential reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996), or that they can make adaptive decisions about future behavior (Foote & Crystal, 2007), or that they are capable of knowledge in propositional-like form (Dickinson, 1985). The stakes are rather high, because these capacities imply concept possession and on some views (e.g., Rödl, 2007; Savanah, 2012) rationality indicates self-consciousness. (...) I evaluate the case for rat rationality by analyzing 5 key research paradigms: spatial navigation, metacognition, transitive inference, causal reasoning, and goal orientation. I conclude that the observed behaviors need not imply rationality by the subjects. Rather, the behavior can be accounted for by noncognitive processes such as hard-wired species typical predispositions or associative learning or (nonconceptual) affordance detection. These mechanisms do not necessarily require or implicate the capacity for rationality. As such there is as yet insufficient evidence that rats can reason. I end by proposing the ‘Staircase Test,’ an experiment designed to provide convincing evidence of rationality in rats. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the view that our knowledge of our desires is inferential and based on the consciousness we have of our emotions, and on our experiences of pain and pleasure.

L’idée de faire de la liberté individuelle le point d’appui de la philosophie politique normative constitue l’une des manifestations les plus frappantes de l’influence du libéralisme sur la pensée moderne – une influence qui s’est d’ailleurs exercée jusque dans les conceptions non-libérales telles que le républicanisme. Après tout, il n’est pas naturel de vouloir faire passer toute la définition d’un ordre social désirable et d’un gouvernement raisonnable (c’est ce à quoi vise, en général la...

In this paper, I explain the processes undergone by the producer of an awoval. The conditions of its possibility and its effects on the subjet itself through the effects on those to whom the avowal is addressed. I finally wonder to what extent it may be considered a moral transformation.

D'abord, la " Nature ", avec ses composantes bigarrées, ses lois inexorables et ses principes aveugles ; et puis, au-dessus d'elle, la supplantant, l'écrasant, la " Société ", recueil des expressions de l'ingéniosité humaine, somme des arrangements plus ou moins fiables dont nous avons convenu entre nous. Ce schéma dualiste, dans lequel se concentre une partie de l'héritage idéaliste de la pensée philosophique occidentale, a joué un rôle central dans l'autocompréhension historique de la modernité. Certains hommes seraient devenus, justement, modernes, (...) et ils auraient conféré cette qualité éminente à leurs idées, en particulier aux savoirs qu'ils se proposaient de développer, en séparant de façon tranchante Nature et Société. Ce faisant, ils les auraient rendues, dit-on, pensables l'une et l'autre. Le présent ouvrage prend le contre-pied de cette conception en développant deux motifs. Premièrement : la " modernité " s'est aussi construite autour de positions qui insistaient sur l'appartenance des êtres humains à l'ordre englobant de la Nature, qui, par exemple, illustraient la continuité entre les savoirs visant le corps organique et le corps social. Deuxièmement : cette modernité-là ne rompt nullement avec l'Antiquité. Car les Grecs et les latins n'ont pas seulement institué ce partage ; ils se sont aussi inquiétés de sa valeur et de ses limites - ils l'ont discuté, déplacé, dissout, refonde, à mesure qu'ils entendaient justifier de nouveaux savoirs, les séparer d'autres ou les unir en de nouvelles continuités. Ainsi se substitue à la césure moderne le temps long d'une histoire où la multiplicité des façons de faire et de défaire cette frontière accompagne depuis l'Antiquité la production des savoirs. Nous héritons dès lors d'une autre histoire que celle que nous nous sommes racontée. Faudra-t-il renoncer à trier les êtres ou les processus selon qu'ils paraissent relever plutôt de l'existence naturelle ou de l'artificialité sociale ? Il suffira de désinvestir ce geste : lui rendre sa juste mesure, celle de n'être qu'un moyen, tout aussi utile que le geste opposé, lorsque l'on veut faire paraître des objets de pratique ou de connaissance, selon leurs discontinuités plutôt que leurs continuités. Aucune thèse dogmatique ne sort donc du travail de déprise auquel incite cet ouvrage. Peut-être une conviction : l'avenir de notre interprétation philosophique du " social " tiendra probablement beaucoup à notre capacité à le rapprocher du " naturel ", c'est-à-dire à dévoiler la masse des liens d'appartenance, de dépendance, de continuité, d'analogie, d'entrelacement, qui le rattachent à ce que l'on avait pris à tort pour son autre absolu. (shrink)

We should not understand in this title "What does not return to the same" the announcement of a return to Levinas, but rather of what the word or concept of "return" could mean in Levinas's work. There is perhaps no better way of misunderstanding Levinas than imposing on his philosophical gesture the interpretative grid of a "horizon of return". This article will attempt to dismantle the strategies of reading which stipulate that Levinas's philosophy is one of "return". In this way (...) we shall reveal the complexity of Levinasian thought, and that, beyond the numerous slogans, there are the ones of a "return" or of its simple contrary, the ones of a "philosophy of exile". (shrink)

In what sense could discourse ethics be linked with normative problems raised by the ecological crisis? Even if Apel and Habermas have not really addressed this question extensively, and even if their position in moral philosophy seems to develop and reinforce a neo-Kantian anthropocentric point of view, one can find in their works some evidence for the possibility of connecting a dialogical view with an ecological one. In order to defend the philosophical interest in highlighting this possibility, this essay analyses (...) Habermas' position concerning the moral and ontological status of animality in particular, and attempts to situate this position within the history of Critical Theory. (shrink)

This paper seeks to answer the following question: does it still make sense today to speak of political emancipation, in particular in the sense bequeathed to us by Marx, as emancipation from capitalism? I consider three serious objections to this possibility: the objection that reference to “capitalism” is unduly essentialist in view of the multiplicity of historical situations; the anti-utopian objection according to which the programme of emancipation from capitalism lacks any precise, practical content; and the normative objection that emancipation (...) in and of itself does not specify the norms of the putative post-capitalist society. In the final section of the paper, I attempt to respond to these three objections, and seek to outline the different levels at which something like an emancipatory project, understood as a surpassing of capitalism, can still make sense today. (shrink)

Quelle est l’ontologie sociale que réclame l’interprétation du capitalisme en général et du néocapitalisme en particulier? Cet article défend l’hypothèse selon laquelle cette ontologie doit suivre le fil conducteur de « l’aliénation objective ». Comprendre le capitalisme, c’est pour une large part comprendre comment des puissances détachées, expressions autonomisées de nos pouvoirs et de nos actions, en viennent à faire l’histoire sans nous et souvent contre nous, sous la pression de la tendance expansionniste qui les anime. L’article explicite cette hypothèse, (...) en souligne certaines difficultés, et, enfin, montre comment elle se rattache au propos de Marx au début du Capital. (shrink)

In various ways, Marx ascribes a central role to the body in his theoretical and political system. In both his philosophy of praxis and his critique of political economy, the body is presented as a site of forces and needs. This enables Marx to provide a naturalist ground for the dynamics of praxis. It also enables him to define a critical perspective in terms of the effects registered in the body of a structure of domination and exploitation. The aim of (...) the article is to present these themes and to discuss their subsequent treatment by authors such as Merleau-Ponty, Bourdieu and Foucault, while reflecting on the way recent transformations of capitalism have led to their reformulation and to the emergence of two new critical tropes: the body as commodity and as an ideology. (shrink)

Peerages and baronetages were successful commercial directories sold by a number of prominent London booksellers from the beginning of the 18th century. They provided an account of most titled families (peers as well as baronets). As serial publications, they were intended for a larger public in need of identification tools in a context of expanding urban sociability and of major recomposition within the elites. In these pocket books, there were no longer the elaborate tree diagrams that had ornamented most of (...) the visitation books of the College of Arms, and which still could be found among ancient family papers. This transition was required for technical, commercial, and also ideological reasons. The selling point for publishers was to provide an up-to-date account of the ‘modern’ families, which could be better achieved through alphabetical listings, biographical discourses, or tabular charts. However, this formal reconfiguration led to many criticisms. These family directories were accused of compromising the dignity of titled families. The idea of a lost Golden Age when ancient lineages had been exhibited on stone, wooden panels, or vellum regained some appeal among social commentators. After 1760, with the renewal of radicalism and the onset of the age of revolutions, tree thinking came to be rehabilitated, but was also reinvented to better defend and naturalise social hierarchies. In this context, trees were increasingly used as powerful national emblems and less as dynastic emblems. The changing fortunes of family trees in 18th-century British prints enable us to reflect on the ideological aspects of the visualisation of kinship. (shrink)

Il ne subsiste aucun vestige de la charpente du temple d’Apollon construit à Delphes durant le ive s. av. J.‑C., ni de bloc comportant des réservations pour l’appui des poutres. En revanche, de nombreux passages des comptes de construction mentionnent des pièces en bois et font état de travaux sur les parties hautes du monument. Nous présentons ici un commentaire de ces inscriptions qui s’articule autour de trois objectifs principaux : déterminer la destination et la fonction des pièces de bois (...) ; analyser le vocabulaire technique ; établir la chronologie des travaux dans les parties hautes du temple. Au‑delà d’une étude centrée sur l’architecture delphique, le corpus mobilisé contribue à la caractérisation des techniques de charpente et à la connaissance du déroulement des chantiers d’architecture monumentale en Grèce ancienne. (shrink)

Alors que la figure de l’intellectuel chrétien semble aujourd’hui en difficulté de légitimité dans les débats publics en France, il y a un intérêt à s’intéresser à André Dumas (1918-1996), aujourd’hui relativement oublié, qui fut un des intellectuels protestants les plus connus en France de son vivant. Les gestes de son éthique dans le débat public montrent comment il passe d’une figure intellectuelle à une autre : intellectuel universel, officiel, organique, traditionnel, spécifique... Étudier cette mobilité est une manière de reprendre (...) les débats sur la place et le rôle de l’intellectuel, au-delà, de la seule figure de l’intellectuel chrétien. (shrink)

This article aims at showing that in spite of Michel Foucault’s violent rejection of phenomenology, this discipline never ceased to bear a crucial significance for his archaeological and genealogical analyses, in that it can be construed as a symptom indicating the most serious challenge that the contemporary philosophy has to meet: thinking together Experience and Knowledge. The author intends to prove, by resorting to the Marxian concept of ‘objectively necessary appearance’, that Foucault’s main opposition to phenomenology stems from his original (...) conception of the theory as a sort of experiment made by the philosopher on himself and on his own historical a priori. (shrink)

La discussion scientifique sur le langage des abeilles a été initiée par un article devenu assez célèbre d’Émile Benveniste, paru en 1952 dans le premier numéro de la revue Diogène, « Communication animale et langage humain », et republié dans le tome I des Problèmes de linguistique générale de 1966. Benveniste y discutait les thèses de Karl von Frisch, défendues dans des conférences et un livre paru en 1950. Des thèses que l’on peut résumer en s’appuyant sur son discours de (...) réception du Nobe.. (shrink)

Selon von Frisch, les abeilles ont un langage. Benveniste conteste cette thèse dans son article « Communication animale et langage humain ». Pour Benveniste, les abeilles communiquent mais on ne peut pas parler d’un langage. Ses arguments sont intéressants : sa thèse de base est que parler de langage, au même sens que pour celui des humains, est erroné dans ce cas-là. Benveniste veut réintroduire cette rupture fondamentale entre animal et humain qu’on trouvait déjà chez Aristote – et qui chez..

L’ambition de ce livre est de présenter les éléments d’une réévaluation de l’aveu. Introduit par une réflexion sur son usage contemporain dans le droit, il croise des approches philosophiques profondément distinctes si ce n’est opposées. La phénoménologie, la psychanalyse et la philosophie analytique sont autant d’éclairages sur ce phénomène multiforme.

Dans cette introduction, je situe en premier lieu la métaéthique vis-à-vis des autres recherches qui s’intéressent à la morale. Je distingue pour commencer la métaéthique de l’éthique normative et des éthiques appliquées. Alors que ces dernières s’intéressent à ce que la morale nous demande de faire, la métaéthique est une interrogation de second ordre sur la nature de la morale, du discours moral et sur la possibilité de justifier des jugements moraux. Je distingue ensuite parmi ces questions de second ordre (...) celles qui constituent plus proprement la métaéthique par opposition à la psychologie morale tout en soulignant leurs relations de dépendance. Pour finir, je présente assez brièvement les questions centrales propres aux différents sous-domaines de la métaéthique : la sémantique morale qui porte sur la signification des termes moraux, l’épistémologie morale qui porte sur la connaissance morale, et l’ontologie morale qui porte sur les faits moraux susceptibles d’expliquer pourquoi certains de nos jugements moraux sont vrais. Dans cette brève introduction à la métaéthique, notre ambition sera essentiellement de situer la métaéthique par rapport aux autres approches philosophiques de la morale. Nous nous efforcerons en outre de présenter assez sommairement les grandes questions qui structurent ce vaste domaine de recherche. (shrink)