Name der Zeitschrift: Millennium Jahrgang: 14 Heft: 1 Seiten: 227-292.

In the effort to defend and demonstrate the (prime) role of philosophy as an activity aiming at uncovering and questioning dogmas underlying our cognitive practices, the present article places under critical scrutiny the epistemic axiology informing organisation/management studies. That is, the plausibility of the largely unquestioned presumption that it is only the quest for truth that matters. This critical endeavour is effected by juxtaposing the conditions under which this would be the case, and in the prism of present conditions concludes (...) that this is not unquestionably the case. Throughout the line of analysis developed, important implications for the present role of philosophical discourses are drawn. (shrink)

This book critically explores the development of radical criminology through a range of written Ancient Greek works including epic and lyrical poetry, drama and philosophy, across different chapters. It traces the development of political power and the concepts of law, legitimacy, crime, justice and deviance in the Ancient Greek world and the political struggles that propelled that development, using the conflict perspective as a conceptual tool of the sociological analysis of reality. Theoretical discussions of crime and justice typically stem from (...) the better known works of Plato or Aristotle although this book explores the works preceding these. This book will appeal to those interested in the history of criminology and the historical production of criminological knowledge. (shrink)

"Volume 16 of Transaction's acclaimed Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities series, continues the work of Project Theophrastus on the School of Aristotle. The subject of this volume is Strato of Lampsacus in Mysia on the Hellespont. Strato was the third head of the Peripatetic School after Aristotle and Theophrastus. He succeeded the latter in c. 286 BCE and was in turn succeeded by Lyco of Troas in c. 268. Diogenes Laertius describes Strato as a distinguished person who became known (...) as "the physicist," because more than anyone else he devoted himself to the careful study of nature. Strato's concern with the physical world is well attested by the titles of his books: On the Void, On the Heaven, and On the Wind. His other books point to a keen interest in human physiology, animal life and diseases. But it would be a mistake to think that Strato was uninterested in other areas of philosophic concern. Indeed, he wrote works on logic, first principles, theology, politics and ethics. None of this work survives intact, but the reports that have come down to us reveal much of present-day interest. Included is a new and complete edition of the ancient sources, together with a critical apparatus to the ancient texts, an English translation, and notes to the translation."--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In his early writings, dealing mainly with problems of agricultural policy, Max Weber at times differentiates between “class” and “estate”, but in general he treats them as synonyms. Only after 1909, when he started to work on Economy and Society and Economic Ethic of the World Religions, he felt the necessity to use these concepts in a more clear-cut manner. “Classes” are only placed within the economic order, while “estates” belong to the social order and take shape through the partition (...) of «social prestige» or «honor», which in turn derives from different sources, including the religious ones. This essay explores the forms of religious stratification which arise from the knowledge of rituals and precedents, from the knowledge of the Sacred Scriptures, or from a specific knowledge of the conditions of possibility of redemption. (shrink)

In _Adversus haereses _2.33-34, Irenaeus rejects the Platonic view of the pre-existence of the soul, and his tale of a daemon who serves up the drink from the Lethe, the river of forgetfulness. Irenaeus’ argument appears in the context of a larger polemic against the Carpocratian view of education and recollection, so it appropriately draws from philosophical discussions on education and recollection. When Irenaeus’ opposes the Platonic myth, his argument reflects Strato of Lampsacus, a Peripatetic philosopher. I will highlight the (...) parallels between them, particularly in their description of the soul as participating in life rather than being life itself, an affirmation that has created some contention within studies of Irenaeus’ theology. Finally, I suggest that this dependence in Book 2 of _Adversus haereses _continues in one of Irenaeus’s most famous descriptions of participation in _haer. _4.20.5, for Irenaeus uses the same metaphor of light and the same verb as Strato. In addition to studying the parallels between Irenaeus and Strato, which has not been done yet, my main contribution is to suggest that Strato’s influence should be recognized in the famous Irenaeus’s view of participation. (shrink)

This book deals with some Peripatetic philosophers of the Hellenistic age who were direct and indirect pupils of Aristotle. The main focus of the book is Aristotle's school in the Hellenistic period, a subject not particularly explored by the scholars. Three main issues are addressed in the chapters of the book: the problem of knowledge, the question of time, and the doctrine of the soul. More specifically the topics addressed are: the problem of sense-perception and the method of multiple explanations (...) in the field of meteorology in Aristotle, Theophrastus and Epicurus, the epistemology of Strato, the notion of time in Eudemus and Strato, the conception of sleep in Clearchus, the doctrine of divination in Cratippus. Finally, the Appendix examines the probable influence of the physics of Strato on the medicine of Asclepiades of Bithynia. These themes are investigated by comparing the positions of the Peripatetics with Aristotle's philosophy, but above all by contextualising the doctrines of the Peripatetics within the broader framework of Hellenistic philosophies. (shrink)

Aristotle's Heirs explores the development of Peripatetic thought from Theophrastus and Strato to the work of the commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. The book examines whether the internal dynamics of this philosophical school allowed for a unity of Peripatetic thought, or whether there was a fundamental tension between philosophical creativity and the notions of core teachings and canonisation. The book discusses the major philosophical preoccupations of the Peripatetics, interactions with Hellenistic schools of thought, and the shift in focus among Greek philosophers (...) in a changing political landscape. It is the first book of its kind to provide a survey of this important philosophical tradition. (shrink)

Aristotle did not view perception as a rudimentary reaction with little content as suggested by Plato, nor as the work of reason and thought as claimed by Strato. Perception is a half-way house between the two. This essay explores Aristotle’s redrawing of the map in which perception is located, and the formal and material causes of perception.

In this article, I claim that the treatise known as περὶ πνεύματος/De spiritu (481a-486b Bekker) was written by Theophrastus. My overall argument unfolds in three stages: first, I briefly summarize the arguments against De spiritu’s authenticity in Aristotle’s corpus. This summary will lead to my first argument which uses the very same reasons that prove the non-Aristotelian authorship to claim the Theophrastean one, in particular linguistic aspects of the text (§2). Next, I will focus on chronology, by discussing the mention (...) of one Aristogenes to show that Aristotle could not have known this individual (§3). Third and last, I will examine various aspects of the work that demonstrate stylistic and argumentative connections (§4), as well as doctrinal affinities with the works of Theophrastus, although some have attributed it to Strato (§5). On the basis of these arguments, I conclude that the weight of the evidence makes On Breath a work by Theophrastus (or his circle) rather than one composed by Aristotle. (shrink)

IN his book, God and Philosophy Professor Antony Flew uses as one of his main weapons against arguments for God’s existence a principle which he calls the Stratonician Presumption. This principle, he explains, was first formulated by Strato, second successor to Aristotle as head of the Lyceum. Flew’s own formulation is as follows.

In a papyrus fragment we have a passage of an Attic comedy of the third century B.C., The Phoenicides by Strato, in which the cook is represented as using archaic, Homeric words for common everyday things, and his exasperated master is obliged “to look through the books of Philitas for their meaning”. This is a farcical application of the new trend of research which the scholar Philitas of Cos initiated in language studies and introduced into Alexandria early in the third (...) century B.C. This new movement took root in Alexandria and was maintained by a distinguished line of scholars, members of the Mouseion. The results of their research soon crossed over to the other shores of the Mediterranean. Thus we have the bitter and rather envious reaction of Timon of Phlius, a poet residing at Pella in Macedonia who, as the representative of a more conservative attitude, resented “modern” intellectual developments and attacked, not only contemporary Stoic and Epicurean philosophers, but also scholars of the Alexandrian Mouseion, “Many are feeding in populous Egypt, scribblers on papyrus, ceaselessly wrangling in the bird-cage of the Muses”. (shrink)

This specimen of a forthcoming book on the void in ancient natural philosophy by using an example illustrates the problems that confront the scholar. The term εὐτονία, used by Chrysippus, occurs in the Pneumatics of Hero of Alexandria in connection with empty pores. Has he borrowed the notion from Stoic philosophy, or was Strato of Lampsacus, older than Chrysippus, the first to use it? In all probability it was Ctesibius who independently of Stoic philosophy applied the term to account for (...) the kinetic qualities of the material used for his inventions, and Philo Byzantius took over the notion from him. Hero may have derived it from Ctesibius either directly or via Philo. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviews 91 A SURVEY OF FREE THOUGHT Chad Trainer 1006 Davids Run Phoenixville, pa 19460, usa stratof{[email protected] Paul Edwards. God and the Philosophers. Edited by Timothy J. Madigan. New York: Prometheus Books, 2009. Pp. 330. isbn 978-1-59102-618-1 (hb). us$28.98. zaul Edwards (1923–2004) is most famous as the editor of the magisterial PEncyclopedia of Philosophy. He was one of three coauthors of its lengthy entry on Bertrand Russell. In 1957, (...) Edwards also edited Bertrand Russell’s Why I Am Not a Christian. A collection of his writings entitled God and the Philosophersz has been recently published, edited by Tim Madigan. Timothy Madigan is a previous editor of Free Inquiry who would visit Ed­ wards when travelling to New York City and who had the privilege over the years of reading several drafts of God and the Philosophers, which Edwards knew would be his Wnal project (p. 8). Madigan explains: “Never one to hide his own unbelief, Edwards often com­ mented that his two main goals were to demolish the inXuence of Heidegger and keep alive the memory of William Reich, the much-reviled psychoanalyst whose critiques of religion Edwards felt still remained valid” (p. 10). God and the Philosophersz is probably best appreciated as a very readable survey that is basically a patchwork of Edwards’ various musings on some of the West’s more iconoclastic philosophers. The work is not a systematic compendium and is probably of most value to those inclined to free thought and making their ini­ tial forays into the history of philosophy. The order in which Edwards discusses the thinkers is chronological, but his method of selection is idiosyncratic, especially in the earlier chapters. It is un­ clear why medieval Wgures like Maimonides and Aquinas are includedz in this col­ lection and great ancient independent thinkers like Xenophanes of Colophon and Strato of Lampsacus are excludedz. In any case, Edwards nowhere explains his criteria, or method, for selecting the thinkers he discusses. Edwards credits Russell with being “probably the most inXuential unbeliever of the twentieth century” (p. 253). And the personal inXuence of Russell on Ed­ wards is clear from Edwards’ mention that, while he himself was already “mov­ ing in the direction of unbeliefz”, reading three of Russell’s critiques of religion “Wxed me for good” (p. 253). Not only does Edwards devote an entire chapter to Russell but he cites him December 2, 2009 (5:28 pm) E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd E:\CPBR\RUSSJOUR\TYPE2901\russell 29,1 060 red.wpd 92 Reviews throughout the book. In the chapter on Hume, Edwards presents the Natural History of Religion’s observation of “religionists’z” insecurity regarding their own beliefs as corresponding to Russell’s view that “believers hate and persecute their critics because they dimly realize that their own beliefs are myths” (p. 96). Ed­ wards takes both Schopenhauer (p. 179) and Spencer (p. 242) to task for assum­ ing that something has no value if it is not permanent and, on both occasions, credits Russell with having a superior rival view. The one occasion where Russell evidently stuns Edwards as being more in the camp of the believers rather than the non-believers is Russell’s discussion of Spinoza’s equation of a mind conceiving something “under a form” of eternity with that mind being eternal. As Edwards sees it, Russell was “apparently under such a spell of Spinoza that he [Russell] reports this view without one word of dissent. My own dissent is very simple: if consciousness cannot exist without the body, no part of it can survive and be Wlled with ‘eternal thoughts’ of God or Nature or anything else” (p. 37). Perhaps Edwards’ most poignant invocation of Russell is at the close of the chapter on Nietzsche. After detailing the “romantic cult of war” and “transition to modern totalitarianism”asamong Nietzsche’s legacies, Edwards illustrates the moral high ground with which German and Austrian establishmentarians could counter contrarian claims that “God is dead”, whereas “[i]n Anglo-Saxon coun­ tries intelligent adolescents have the great fortune of having Bertrand Russell as their guide to unbelief minus... (shrink)

Aristotle's Heirs explores the development of Peripatetic thought from Theophrastus and Strato to the work of the commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias. The book examines whether the internal dynamics of this philosophical school allowed for a unity of Peripatetic thought, or whether there was a fundamental tension between philosophical creativity and the notions of core teachings and canonisation. The book discusses the major philosophical preoccupations of the Peripatetics, interactions with Hellenistic schools of thought, and the shift in focus among Greek philosophers (...) in a changing political landscape. It is the first book of its kind to provide a survey of this important philosophical tradition. (shrink)

In this chapter, Hankinson examines Aristotle's philosophy of science, or the logical structure of explanation as set out in the Posterior Analytics, and which is based on the theory of the syllogism worked out in the Prior Analytics. For Aristotle, definition is fundamental to the project of exhibiting science in its appropriate explanatory form, i.e. proceeding deductively from fundamental principles and axioms about the structure of things. Science and scientific explanation are for Aristotle construed realistically: science must mirror reality, and (...) therefore theory always must cohere with observation and empirical investigation. Hankinson discusses Aristotle's qualitative physics of motion, on the basis of the doctrine of natural places, his account of chemical combination, and his cosmology, which is at once teleological in character, while being empirically adequate. Hankinson also discusses Aristotle's successors Theophrastus and Strato of Lampsacus: Theophrastus developed and refined Aristotle's methodology while bringing some scepticism to the ubiquitous application of teleology; Strato also tends more towards mechanistic explanations. (shrink)

An Archaeology of Disbelief traces the classical origin of secular philosophy in ancient Greece based on a close examination of its few relevant texts still available today. More than a dozen pre-Socratic philosophers are examined as well Aristotle and such later figures as Strato, Carneades, Lucretius, and Cicero.

An Archaeology of Disbelief traces the classical origin of secular philosophy in ancient Greece based on a close examination of its few relevant texts still available today. More than a dozen pre-Socratic philosophers are examined as well Aristotle and such later figures as Strato, Carneades, Lucretius, and Cicero.

The revised and polished version of Inwood’s 2011 Carl Newell Jackson at Harvard University, Ethics after Aristotle surveys the ethical teachings of the original “neo-Aristotelians,” namely those self-identified (although not always named) members of the Peripatetic school from the time of Theophrastus (fl. 300 BCE) until that of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 CE). An initial chapter surveys the sorts of problems in Aristotle’s ethical corpus which would generate subsequent debate amongst members of the Peripatetic school. Chapter Two examines the (...) views of “Magnus,” the name which Inwood gives to the anonymous 3rd century author of the Magna Moralia (which Inwood takes to be pseudo-Aristotle), and those of Strato of Lampsacus, Lycon, and Hieronymus, 3rd century heads of the Peripatetic school, all of whom show the influences of Epicureanism in their re-articulations of Aristotelian positions. Chapter Three, entitled “The Turning Point,” finds in the work of Critolaus—head of the Peripatetic school in the middle of the 2nd century BCE—a move away from the centrality of activity within Aristotelian ethical thought, which Critolaus instead replaces with the notion of possessing specific goods, namely those of the body, the soul, and what is external. The same chapter argues that at approximately the same historical point Cicero, in the character of Piso in De finibus, articulated an account of Peripatetic ethics that was far more faithful to 4th century Aristotelianism. The final two chapters focus on neo-Aristotelian ethical philosophizing within a new and explicitly Roman cultural setting. (shrink)

To unravel the intricacies of the last argument of the Phaedo for the immortality of the soul, the reader has to peel away successive presuppositions, his own, Plato's and not least the presupposition that Plato very skilfully portrays as being shared by Socrates and his friends.A first presupposition is the reader's own. According to our modern ways of thinking, a soul that is immortal, if there is such a thing, is a soul that lives forever. That presupposition is not shared (...) by Socrates and Cebes (Socrates' interlocutor in the final argument). A soul that survives separation from the body, once or a number of times, is held to have survived death and therefore to be immortal. But it does not follow that it will live forever. For a soul to live forever, it must be shown to be not only immortal, but imperishable. Only if the soul is both immortal and imperishable can the assembled company be sure that the Socrates who is talking to them now will still be living when, after sunset, he has drunk the hemlock and can talk to them no more.The modern reader who has divested himself of the presupposition that immortal and imperishable are mere synonyms, and therefore appreciates the need for an argument designed specifically to prove that the soul is imperishable and not merely immortal, has nonetheless to be aware of a second presupposition, a presupposition shared by Socrates and his friends which restricts the meaning that the modern reader might otherwise suppose to be conveyed by the word 'imperishable'. Both Socrates and Cebes, as portrayed in the Phaedo, take it for granted that the only time when the soul might perish is the moment of her separation from the body. Provided it can be shown that the soul will survive separation from the body, no matter how often the body is taken from her, the soul, so they are happy to assume, will have shown herself to be both immortal and imperishable.We do not have to suppose that this second presupposition is shared by the author of the dialogue. Plato's subtle but insistent restriction of the moment when the soul might be threatened with extinction to the moment of her separation from the body has been deliberately designed to alert the reader to a way of thinking which Socrates, Cebes and Echecrates all take for granted, but which Plato does not necessarily invite the reader of the dialogue to share.The restriction is nonetheless essential to the structure of the argument. It is because Socrates does not envisage a possible extinction of the soul at any moment other than the moment of separation from the body that he is able to present a soul that is essentially alive as immune to the death which separates soul from body, however often such a separation may occur, and as therefore (so he claims) not only immortal but imperishable.In presenting that argument, how far has Plato deliberately foregone any attempt to prove that the soul is imperishable subsequently to the moment of her separation from the body? Socrates argues that the soul is unaffected by the death of the body because she is essentially alive. He does not argue that she is immune to destruction or extinction because she is essentially existent. In the face of Plato's silence, in the Phaedo and elsewhere, the modern reader has to hold in abeyance a third and final presupposition, that only a being whose essence it is to exist can of its nature never not exist.To understand the dialogue is therefore no easy matter. The reader needs to distinguish Socrates as the mouthpiece of Plato from Plato as the author of the dialogue. At the same time the modern reader has to distinguish the Plato of history from a fictional Plato who shares our own ideas and our own preconceptions, including the concept of a being cuius essentia est esse. An intricate double task, which other modern readers of the dialogue have so far not even attempted. (shrink)