Will it rain tomorrow? Will there be a sea battle tomorrow? Will my death be painful? Wondering about the future plays a central role in our cognitive lives. It is integral to our inquiries, our planning, our hopes, and our fears. The aim of this paper is to consider various accounts of future contingents and the implications that they have for wondering about the future. I argue that reflecting on the nature of wondering about the future supports an Ockhamist account (...) of future contingents according to which many of them are true. Alternative accounts which maintain that no future contingents are true, either by claiming that they are all false or by claiming that they are neither true nor false, face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. Reflecting on wondering in general, and wondering about the future in particular, suggests that in wondering how the future will go, we implicitly assume that there is a determinate fact of the matter. After presenting an attractive account of interrogative attitudes that has been recently proposed by Jane Friedman and outlining some norms governing wondering, I argue that all accounts of future contingents except Ockhamism face difficulties concerning why it is appropriate to wonder about them. (shrink)

An argument with roots in ancient Greek philosophy claims that only humans are capable of a certain class of thought termed conceptual, as opposed to perceptual thought, which is common to humans, the higher animals, and some machines. We outline the most detailed modern version of this argument due to Mortimer Adler, who in the 1960s argued for the uniqueness of the human power of conceptual thought. He also admitted that if conceptual thought were ever manifested by machines, such an (...) achievement would contradict his conclusion. We revisit Adler’s criterion in the light of the past five decades of artificial-intelligence research, and refine it in view of the classical definitions of perceptual and conceptual thought. We then examine two well-publicized examples of creative works produced by AI systems and show that evidence for conceptual thought appears to be lacking in them. Although clearer evidence for conceptual thought on the part of AI systems may arise in the near future, especially if the global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness prevails over its rival, integrated information theory, the question of whether AI systems can engage in conceptual thought appears to be still open. (shrink)

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make (...) emotions ?embedded? or ?extended? in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of ?embedded? emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are ?extended? or ?distributed.? (shrink)

On its intended interpretation, logical, mathematical and metaphysical discourse sometimes seems to involve absolutely unrestricted quantification. Yet our standard semantic theories do not allow for interpretations of a language as expressing absolute generality. A prominent strategy for defending absolute generality, influentially proposed by Timothy Williamson in his paper ‘Everything’, avails itself of a hierarchy of quantifiers of ever increasing orders to develop non-standard semantic theories that do provide for such interpretations. However, as emphasized by Øystein Linnebo and Agustín Rayo, there (...) is pressure on this view to extend the quantificational hierarchy beyond the finite level, and, relatedly, to allow for a cumulative conception of the hierarchy. In his recent book, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Williamson yields to that pressure. I show that the emerging cumulative higher-orderist theory has implications of a strongly generality-relativist flavour, and consequently undermines much of the spirit of generality absolutism that Williamson set out to defend. (shrink)

The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment aggregation refers to that problem as the discursive dilemma. In this paper, we motivate that many groups do not only want to reach a factually right conclusion, but also want to correctly evaluate the reasons for that conclusion. In (...) other words, we address the problem of tracking the true situation instead of merely selecting the right outcome. We set up a probabilistic model analogous to Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and compare several aggregation procedures by means of theoretical results, numerical simulations and practical considerations. Among them are the premise-based, the situation-based and the distance-based procedure. Our findings confirm the conjecture in Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2008) that the premise-based procedure is a crude, but reliable and sometimes even optimal form of judgment aggregation. (shrink)

Discussions about a replicability crisis in science have been driven by the normative claim that all of science should be replicable and the empirical claim that most of it isn’t. Recently, such crisis talk has been challenged by a new localism, which argues a) that serious problems with replicability are not a general occurrence in science and b) that replicability itself should not be treated as a universal standard. The goal of this article is to introduce this emerging strand of (...) the debate and to discuss some of its implications and limitations. I will in particular highlight the issue of demarcation that localist accounts have to address, i.e. the question of how we can distinguish replicable science from disciplines where replicability does not apply. (shrink)

Kant’s repeated statement in the Critique of Pure Reason that the so-called table of judgements and, as a consequence, the table of pure concepts of the understanding or categories, is fully exhaustive is well-known. This ambitious assertion has worried and challenged generations of authors. However, thus far the entire discussion has completely disregarded the fact that in his Critique of Practical Reason Kant undertakes a coordinate venture. For the “Table of the Categories of Freedom”, which he sets out, with only (...) a few explanations, in the “Second Chapter” of the Critique, Kant makes, when looked at more closely, the very same claim to completeness. This article shows that this same claim is made, even though Kant does not state this assertion as explicitly as one might have expected. And it poses the question, which underlying, yet concealed assumptions this view might appeal to. Or is it that Kant has merely failed to provide the evidence in this case? (shrink)

We define a notion of difference-making for partial grounds of a fact in rough analogy to existing notions of difference-making for causes of an event. Using orthodox assumptions about ground, we show that it induces a non-trivial division with examples of partial grounds on both sides. We then demonstrate the theoretical fruitfulness of the notion by applying it to the analysis of a certain kind of putative counter-example to the transitivity of ground recently described by Jonathan Schaffer. First, we show (...) that our conceptual apparatus of difference-making enables us to give a much clearer description than Schaffer does of what makes the relevant instances of transitivity appear problematic. Second, we suggest that difference-making is best seen as a mark of good grounding-based explanations rather than a necessary condition on grounding, and argue that this enables us to deal with the counter-example in a satisfactory way. Along the way, we show that Schaffer's own proposal for salvaging a form of transitivity by moving to a contrastive conception of ground is unsuccessful. We conclude by sketching some natural strategies for extending our proposal to a more comprehensive account of grounding-based explanations. (shrink)

An ethical evaluation of employee participation to decision-making has to be based, obviously, on a theory about ethics, but also on an understanding of the role and the impact of participation in the organisation. This paper aims at sketching different organisational paradigms, and analysing their normative prescriptions w.r.t. participation. It will appear that the recognition of the social nature of man and the acknowledgement of the existence of differentiated goals could enhance the positive outcomes of participation. Next, we will examine (...) to what extent a systemic approach and a stakeholder concept of the firm can meet these requirements. The necessity of a global approach to participation will be emphasised. Consequently, we suggest in the last section of this paper that participation should be extended to the definition of a shared value horizon. (shrink)

Science strives for coherence. For example, the findings from climate science form a highly coherent body of knowledge that is supported by many independent lines of evidence: greenhouse gas emissions from human economic activities are causing the global climate to warm and unless GHG emissions are drastically reduced in the near future, the risks from climate change will continue to grow and major adverse consequences will become unavoidable. People who oppose this scientific body of knowledge because the implications of cutting (...) GHG emissions—such as regulation or increased taxation—threaten their worldview or livelihood cannot provide an alternative view that is coherent by the standards of conventional scientific thinking. Instead, we suggest that people who reject the fact that the Earth’s climate is changing due to greenhouse gas emissions oppose whatever inconvenient finding they are confronting in piece-meal fashion, rather than systematically, and without considering the implications of this rejection to the rest of the relevant scientific theory and findings. Hence, claims that the globe “is cooling” can coexist with claims that the “observed warming is natural” and that “the human influence does not matter because warming is good for us.” Coherence between these mutually contradictory opinions can only be achieved at a highly abstract level, namely that “something must be wrong” with the scientific evidence in order to justify a political position against climate change mitigation. This high-level coherence accompanied by contradictory subordinate propositions is a known attribute of conspiracist ideation, and conspiracism may be implicated when people reject well-established scientific propositions. (shrink)

This paper is an essay review of Steven French and Harmke Kamminga (eds.), Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics. Essays in Honour of Heinz Post (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993). I distinguish a varity of correspondence relations between scientific theories (exemplified by cases from the book under review) and examine how one can make sense of the the prevailing continuity in scientific theorizing.

In a recent contribution to this journal, Etzioni (1998) has introduced a “communitarian note on stakeholder theory” based on a principle of fairness. While we do not challenge the principle of fairness itself, we claim that when this principle is applied only to those who invest in the corporation, it cannot serve as the ground for an ethical stakeholder theory. A focus on low-skilled workers as astakeholder group will help us to illustrate this claim.

This chapter provides a critical overview of various influential accounts of de se attitudes including those proposed by Frege, Lewis and Perry. It also addresses the charge that there is nothing distinctive about de se attitudes. The second half outlines a widely accepted and influential model of communication and various complications that arise in applying this model to the communication of de se thoughts. The final section provides an overview of the papers in this volume.

The goal of this paper is to examine moods, mostly in comparison to emotions. Nearly all of the features that allegedly distinguish moods from emotions are disputed though. In a first section I comment on duration, intentionality, and cause in more detail, and develop intentionality as the most promising distinguishing characteristic. In a second section I will consider the huge variety of moods, ranging from shallow environmentally triggered transient moods to deep existential moods that last much longer. I will explore (...) what their sources are, and how they impact one another, other affective processes, and our being in the world. I follow several eminent emotion researchers and try to carve out their insights, many seemingly mutually excluding each other. As it will turn out, most of them are, in fact, not excluding each other, but contribute to a layered picture of moods that fits well in between emotions and personality traits. Eventually, I will shortly discuss what we can do with our moods. (shrink)

In 2015 scientists called for a partial ban on genome editing in human germline cells. This call was a response to the rapid development of the CRISPR–Cas9 system, a molecular tool that allows researchers to modify genomic DNA in living organisms with high precision and ease of use. Importantly, the ban was meant to be a trust-building exercise that promises a ‘prudent’ way forward. The goal of this paper is to analyse whether the ban can deliver on this promise. To (...) do so the focus will be put on the precedent on which the current ban is modelled, namely the Asilomar ban on recombinant DNA technology. The analysis of this case will show (a) that the Asilomar ban was successful because of a specific two-step containment strategy it employed and (b) that this two-step approach is also key to making the current ban work. It will be argued, however, that the Asilomar strategy cannot be transferred to human genome editing and that the current ban therefore fails to deliver on its promise. The paper will close with a reflection on the reasons for this failure and on what can be learned from it about the regulation of novel molecular tools. (shrink)

Anthropology of Consciousness, Volume 32, Issue 2, Page 129-153, Autumn 2021.

The reported birth of genetically modified twins in late 2018 has given new fuel to debates about the ethics of germline genome editing (GGE). There is a broad consensus among stakeholders that clinical uses of GGE should be temporarily banned as the technology is not yet deemed safe for use in humans. However, the idea of a complete ban is dismissed by many based on the expectation that more research will eventually allow scientists to make the technology safe without having (...) to put humans at risk first. In this article, I will analyse this assumption and argue that it is undermined by recent developments in the postgenomic life sciences. In particular, I will argue that in a postgenomic view of germline editing a complete ban on specific uses of the technology is warranted, because the research needed to assess the safety of these interventions would not be morally defensible. (shrink)

Computational modeling is now ubiquitous in psychology, and researchers who are not modelers may find it increasingly difficult to follow the theoretical developments in their field. This book presents an integrated framework for the development and application of models in psychology and related disciplines. Researchers and students are given the knowledge and tools to interpret models published in their area, as well as to develop, fit, and test their own models. Both the development of models and key features of any (...) model are covered, as are the applications of models in a variety of domains across the behavioural sciences. A number of chapters are devoted to fitting models using maximum likelihood and Bayesian estimation, including fitting hierarchical and mixture models. Model comparison is described as a core philosophy of scientific inference, and the use of models to understand theories and advance scientific discourse is explained. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The question of axiomatizability of first-order temporal logics is studied w.r.t. different semantics and several restrictions on the language. The validity problem for logics admitting flexible interpretations of the predicate symbols or allowing at least binary predicate symbols is shown to be ?1 1-complete. In contrast, it is decidable for temporal logics with rigid monadic predicate symbols but without function symbols and identity.

This is a conversation about the application of modeling methods in philosophy and how modeling helps to address philosophical issues that are otherwise difficult to solve. We also talk about the role of mathematics and language in modeling. As an illustration, we analyze the No Alternatives Argument.

La catégorie des pronoms est éminemment difficile à circonscrire ; on reconnait usuellement l’existence de sous-catégories de pronoms assez dissemblables. À partir d’un corpus oral, nous examinons les caractéristiques phonétiques et phonologiques de différents types de pronoms utilisés en discours afin d’identifier des phénomènes communs à leurs emplois et de recenser leurs traits définitoires partagés. À travers l’examen de deux phénomènes corrélés mais distincts, à savoir la réduction et l’accentuation phrastique, nous mettons en évidence certains des liens qui existent entre (...) forme phonétique et valeur sémantique des pronoms et dégageons de nos observations certains principes généraux. Postulant l’existence de deux types de pronoms : les pronoms phonologiquement faibles et les pronoms phonologiquement forts, nous suggérons en effet qu’il existe une relation étroite entre le poids phonétique et la référentialité des formes pronominales. Sur la base de nos observations, nous formulons également l’hypothèse qu’il existe en dernière analyse un rapport étroit entre la masse phonétique des pronoms et le degré d’accessibilité mentale de leur référent. (shrink)

On one important notion of irrelevance, evidence that is irrelevant in an inquiry may rationally be discarded, and attempts to obtain evidence amount to a waste of resources if they are directed at irrelevant evidence. The familiar Bayesian criterion of irrelevance, whatever its merits, is not adequate with respect to this notion. I show that a modification of the criterion due to Ken Gemes, though a significant improvement, still has highly implausible consequences. To make progress, I argue, we need to (...) adopt a hyperintensional conception of content. I go on to formulate a better, hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance, drawing heavily on the framework of the truthmaker conception of propositions as recently developed by Kit Fine. (shrink)

Autistic children do not consistently show conventional signs of social engagement, which some have interpreted to mean that they are not interested in connecting with other people. If someone does not act like they are interested in connecting with you, it may make it difficult to feel connected to them. And yet, some parents report feeling strongly connected to their autistic children. We conducted phenomenological interviews with 13 mothers to understand how they experienced connection with their 5- to 14-year-old nonspeaking (...) autistic children. Mothers of nonspeaking autistic children represent a unique group in which to study connection because their children both may not seem interested in connecting with them and have limited ability to communicate effectively using speech, a common way people connect with each other. The mothers in this study interpreted a range of child behaviors—some unconventional, but many conventional—as signs that their children were interested in connecting with them, (re)framed child behaviors that could undermine connection as caused by factors unrelated to the relationship, and expressed several convictions that may help build and sustain connection in the face of uncertainty about the meaning of their children’s behavior. Even though their autistic children may not consistently act in conventional socially oriented ways, these mothers reported perceiving their children’s behavior as embedded within an emotionally reciprocal relationship. (shrink)

François Jullien’s idea of landscape in Chinese philosophy and art is taken from the refinement of highly literate writers and artists, unrelated to the techniques of location that find good sites and make places in landscape. This article is based on a study of fengshui (Chinese geomancy). It argues that fengshui is a practice of identifying not things or beings but moments and circumstances of a client. It works with an epistemology of pattern recognition, which is based on observation and (...) experience but does not test the truth of the signs that are the means of recognizing patterns. This epistemology of pattern recognition is not peculiarly Chinese but can also be found in building, urban planning, and the art of medical diagnosis. (shrink)

Deliberation is a standard procedure to make decisions in not too large groups. It has the advantage that the group members can learn from each other and that, at the end, often a consensus emerges that everybody endorses. But a deliberation procedure also has a number of disadvantages. E.g., what consensus is reached usually depends on the order in which the different group members speak. More specifically, the group member who speaks first often has an unproportionally high impact on the (...) final decision: She anchors the deliberation process. While the anchoring effect undoubtably appears in real deliberating groups, we ask whether it also appears in groups whose members are truth-seeking and rational in the sense that they take the information provided by their fellow group members properly into account by updating their beliefs according to plausible rules. To answer this question and to make some progress towards explaining the anchoring effect, a formal model is constructed and analyzed. Using this model, we study the anchoring effect in homogenous groups, for which we provide analytical results, and in inhomogeneous groups, for which we provide simulation results. (shrink)

BackgroundNarrative reviews are the commonest type of articles in the medical literature. However, unlike systematic reviews and randomized controlled trials (RCT) articles, for which formal instruments exist to evaluate quality, there is currently no instrument available to assess the quality of narrative reviews. In response to this gap, we developed SANRA, the Scale for the Assessment of Narrative Review Articles.MethodsA team of three experienced journal editors modified or deleted items in an earlier SANRA version based on face validity, item-total correlations, (...) and reliability scores from previous tests. We deleted an item which addressed a manuscript’s writing and accessibility due to poor inter-rater reliability. The six items which form the revised scale are rated from 0 (low standard) to 2 (high standard) and cover the following topics: explanation of (1) the importance and (2) the aims of the review, (3) literature search and (4) referencing and presentation of (5) evidence level and (6) relevant endpoint data. For all items, we developed anchor definitions and examples to guide users in filling out the form. The revised scale was tested by the same editors (blinded to each other’s ratings) in a group of 30 consecutive non-systematic review manuscripts submitted to a general medical journal.ResultsRaters confirmed that completing the scale is feasible in everyday editorial work. The mean sum score across all 30 manuscripts was 6.0 out of 12 possible points (SD 2.6, range 1–12). Corrected item-total correlations ranged from 0.33 (item 3) to 0.58 (item 6), and Cronbach’s alpha was 0.68 (internal consistency). The intra-class correlation coefficient (average measure) was 0.77 [95% CI 0.57, 0.88] (inter-rater reliability). Raters often disagreed on items 1 and 4.ConclusionsSANRA’s feasibility, inter-rater reliability, homogeneity of items, and internal consistency are sufficient for a scale of six items. Further field testing, particularly of validity, is desirable. We recommend rater training based on the “explanations and instructions” document provided with SANRA. In editorial decision-making, SANRA may complement journal-specific evaluation of manuscripts—pertaining to, e.g., audience, originality or difficulty—and may contribute to improving the standard of non-systematic reviews. (shrink)

The proper evaluation of a theory's virtues seems to require taking into account what the theory is indirectly or implicitly committed to, in addition to what it explicitly says. Most extant proposals for criteria of theory choice in the literature spell out the relevant notion of implicit commitment via some notion of entailment. I show that such criteria behave implausibly in application to theories that differ over matters of entailment. A recent defence by Howard Peacock of such a criterion against (...) this objection is examined and rejected. I go on to a develop a better proposal on which, roughly speaking, a theory is counted committed to a claim if and only if its best fully explicit extension is explicitly committed to the claim. Such extensions in turn are evaluated by ordinary standards of theory choice adapted to the case of theories assumed to articulate their intended content in a fully explicit fashion. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie jüngste höchstrichterliche Rechtsprechung zur Selbstbestimmung der Patienten und zur Normierung medizinischer Handlungen am Lebensende hat eine intensive Debatte ausgelöst. Das Urteil und die akademisch vorgetragene Kritik werden einer grundlegenden medizinethischen Analyse unterworfen. Sie betrifft die objektive Eingrenzung der Zulässigkeit einer Behandlungsbegrenzung und die Subsumtion des Wachkomas als irreversibel tödliches Grundleiden, das ärztliche Ermessen bei der Indikationsstellung, die normative Einordnung einer Ernährungstherapie am Lebensende und die Verbindlichkeit von Patientenverfügungen. Die medizinethische Kritik offenbart eine unzureichende Wahrnehmung medizinischer und medizinethischer professioneller Dokumente (...) und den Rückgriff auf medizinethisch veraltete Konzeptionen der Sterbehilfe durch das Gericht. Die Folge ist eine fehlerhafte Subsumtion der Wachkomapatienten in die Kategorie irreversibel tödlicher Erkrankungen und eine inhaltliche Schwächung der Verbindlichkeit von Patientenverfügungen. Beides bedarf dringend der Korrektur. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 3 Seiten: 430-460.