This study primarily focuses on feminism and the women’s movement and howthey manifest in Macedonian society. The feminist ideology reflects various forms ofactivism, with the common goal of overcoming the subordinate status of women in societyand achieving equality between men and women. Hence, this study explores thefollowing questions: does feminist activism in Macedonian society contribute to the advancementof women’s rights, and can every women’s movement be situated within theframework of feminist theory? Consequently, through the analysis of specific activities,actions, and movements (...) in public discourse, the relationships of the women’s movementwith feminism will be explored, with an emphasis on their identification with the feministmovement. At the same time, this study will address questions of gender as a centralanalytical category in feminist discourse, as well as the discrepancy between equalityas a universal value, on the one hand, and entrenched patterns of domination regardinggender and sexual orientation, on the other hand. (shrink)

Masculinity and femininity can both be freely defined through the spectrum of certain characteristics, points of view, features, expectations, and explanations linked to the behavioural traits of masculine and feminine individuals. Those are socially constructed dimensions that explain the male and female status, alongside the position of the sexes within societies. The aim of this study is to re-examine the extent to which culture and cultural context impact the shaping of male and female individuals, as well as the ways through (...) which those influences take place. The relationships between the culturally established set of categories, such as those for gender identification in individuals, are referred to as “human taxonomy”, or “cultural classification”. Hence, the norms, regulations, stances, behaviours, conduct, and, ultimately, the expectations of individuals in a sociocultural environment greatly depend on the relations between mannature-culture. In that context, this paper elaborates on different socio-anthropological theoretic concepts revolving around the creation of masculinity and femininity while emphasizing the historical and contemporary d. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly adopted in society, creating numerous opportunities but at the same time posing ethical challenges. Many of these are familiar, such as issues of fairness, responsibility and privacy, but are presented in a new and challenging guise due to our limited ability to steer and predict the outputs of AI systems. This chapter first introduces these ethical challenges, stressing that overviews of values are a good starting point but frequently fail to suffice due to the context (...) sensitivity of ethical challenges. Frequently, additional (ethical) values emerge for specific applications, as e.g. challenges with fraud detection are very different from those around language technologies. Second, methods to tackle these challenges are discussed. Main ethical theories (virtue ethics, consequentialism, and deontology) are shown to provide a starting point, but often lack the details needed for actionable AI Ethics. Instead, mid-level philosophical theories coupled to design-approaches such as Design for Values, together with interdisciplinary working methods, offer the best way forwards. The chapter aims to show how these approaches can lead to an ethics of AI that is actionable and that can be proactively integrated in the design of AI systems. (shrink)

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) aims to help people understand black box algorithms, particularly of their outputs. But what are these explanations and when is one explanation better than another? The manipulationist definition of explanation from the philosophy of science offers good answers to these questions, holding that an explanation consists of a generalization that shows what happens in counterfactual cases. Furthermore, when it comes to explanatory depth this account holds that a generalization that has more abstract variables, is broader in (...) scope and/or more accurate is better. By applying these definitions and contrasting them with alternative definitions in the XAI literature I hope to help clarify what a good explanation is for AI. (shrink)

Users of sociotechnical systems often have no way to independently verify whether the system output which they use to make decisions is correct; they are epistemically dependent on the system. We argue that this leads to problems when the system is wrong, namely to bad decisions and violations of the norm of practical reasoning. To prevent this from occurring we suggest the implementation of defeaters: information that a system is unreliable in a specific case (undercutting defeat) or independent information that (...) the output is wrong (rebutting defeat). Practically, we suggest to design defeaters based on the different ways in which a system might produce erroneous outputs, and analyse this suggestion with a case study of the risk classification algorithm used by the Dutch tax agency. (shrink)

Process reliabilist accounts claim that a belief is justified when it is the result of a reliable belief-forming process. Yet over what range of possible token processes is this reliability calculated? I argue against the idea that _all_ possible token processes (in the actual world, or some other subset of possible worlds) are to be considered using the case of a user acquiring beliefs based on the output of an AI system, which is typically reliable for a substantial local range (...) but unreliable when all possible inputs are considered. I show that existing solutions to the generality problem imply that these cases cannot be solved by a more fine-grained typing of the belief-forming process. Instead, I suggest that reliability is evaluated over a range restricted by the content of the actual belief and by the similarity of the input to the actual input. (shrink)

How do we get out knowledge of the natural numbers? Various philosophical accounts exist, but there has been comparatively little attention to psychological data on how the learning process actually takes place. I work through the psychological literature on number acquisition with the aim of characterising the acquisition stages in formal terms. In doing so, I argue that we need a combination of current neologicist accounts and accounts such as that of Parsons. In particular, I argue that we learn the (...) initial segment of the natural numbers on the basis of the Fregean definitions, but do not learn the natural number structure as a whole on the basis of Hume's principle. Therefore, we need to account for some of the consistency of our number concepts with the Dedekind-Peano axioms in other terms. (shrink)

The Approximate Number System (ANS) is a system that allows us to distinguish between collections based on the number of items, though only if the ratio between numbers is high enough. One of the questions that has been raised is what the representations involved in this system represent. I point to two important constraints for any account: (a) it doesn’t involve numbers, and (b) it can account for the approximate nature of the ANS. Furthermore, I argue that representations of pure (...) magnitude with vehicles that have an imprecision in the value of the unit of measurement (further clarified through a formal model from measurement theory) fit both these requirements. (shrink)

Money in the history of political thought, from ancient Greece to the Great Inflation of the 1970s In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, critical attention has shifted from the economy to the most fundamental feature of all market economies—money. Yet despite the centrality of political struggles over money, it remains difficult to articulate its democratic possibilities and limits. The Currency of Politics takes readers from ancient Greece to today to provide an intellectual history of money, drawing on the (...) insights of key political philosophers to show how money is not just a medium of exchange but also a central institution of political rule. Money appears to be beyond the reach of democratic politics, but this appearance—like so much about money—is deceptive. Even when the politics of money is impossible to ignore, its proper democratic role can be difficult to discern. Stefan Eich examines six crucial episodes of monetary crisis, recovering the neglected political theories of money in the thought of such figures as Aristotle, John Locke, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Marx, and John Maynard Keynes. He shows how these layers of crisis have come to define the way we look at money, and argues that informed public debate about money requires a better appreciation of the diverse political struggles over its meaning. Recovering foundational ideas at the intersection of monetary rule and democratic politics, The Currency of Politics explains why only through greater awareness of the historical limits of monetary politics can we begin to articulate more democratic conceptions of money. (shrink)

ABSTRACT How do non-experts single out numbers for reference? Linnebo has argued that they do so using a criterion of identity based on the ordinal properties of numerals. Neo-logicists, on the other hand, claim that cardinal properties are the basis of individuation, when they invoke Hume’s Principle. I discuss empirical data from cognitive science and linguistics to answer how non-experts individuate numbers better in practice. I use those findings to develop an alternative account that mixes ordinal and cardinal properties to (...) provide a detailed answer to the question: how do we in fact semantically individuate numbers? (shrink)

Can concepts be acquired by testing hypotheses about these concepts? Fodor famously argued that this is not possible. Testing the correct hypothesis would require already possessing the concept. I argue that this does not generally hold for mathematical concepts. I discuss specific, empirically motivated, hypotheses for number concepts that can be tested without needing to possess the relevant number concepts. I also argue that one can test hypotheses about the identity conditions of other mathematical concepts, and then fix the application (...) conditions based on those hypotheses—under the assumption that the neo‐logicist view on abstraction principles is correct. (shrink)

Synthesizing important research traditions in information theory, structuralist semiotics, and generative linguistics, at least three main types of semiotic indeterminacy must be distinguished: Kolmogorov’s notion of randomness defined as sequential incompressibility, de Saussure’s principle of contingency of sign which ensures the possibility of translation between different sign systems, and Chomsky’s idea of indefiniteness in generative mechanisms as a requirement for the explanation of semiotic creativity. These types of semiotic indeterminacy form an abstract system useful for the description of concrete sign (...) processes in their syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic dimension. In his philosophical reflections on modern biology, Jacques Monod used the conceptual opposition chance versus necessity to analyse several phenomena of indeterminacy (especially in molecular biology). The biosemiotic approach to life permits to apply the suggestedsystem of semiotic indeterminacy on these phenomena. (shrink)

Most accounts of our knowledge of the successor axiom claim that this is based on the procedure of adding one. While they usually don’t claim to provide an account of how children actually acquire this knowledge, one may well think that this is how they get that knowledge. I argue that when we look at children’s responses in interviews, the time when they learn the successor axiom and the intermediate learning stages they find themselves in, that there is an empirically (...) viable alternative. I argue that they could also learn it on the basis of a method that has to do with the structure of the numeral system. Specifically, that they (1) use the syntactic structure of the numeral system and (2) attend to the leftmost digits, the one with the highest place-value. Children can learn that this is a reliable method of forming larger numbers by combining two elements. First, a grasp of the syntactic structure of the numeral system. That way they know that the leftmost digit receives the highest value. Second, an interpretation of numerals as designating cardinal values, so that they also realise that increasing or adding digits on the lefthand side of a numeral produces a larger number. There are thus two, currently equally well-supported, ways in which children might learn that there are infinitely many natural numbers. (shrink)

Mathematical cognition has become an interesting case study for wider theories of cognition. Menary :1–20, 2015) argues that arithmetical cognition not only shows that internalist theories of cognition are wrong, but that it also shows that the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition is right. I examine this argument in more detail, to see if arithmetical cognition can support such conclusions. Specifically, I look at how the use of numerals extends our arithmetical abilities from quantity-related innate systems to systems that can deal (...) with exact numbers of arbitrary size. I then argue that the system underlying our grasp of small numbers is an unhelpful case study for Menary; it doesn’t support an argument for externalism over internalism. The system for large numbers, on the other hand, clearly displays important interactions between public numeral systems and our cognitive processes. I argue that the large number system supports an argument against internalist theories of arithmetical cognition, but that one cannot conclude that the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition is correct. In other words, the large number case doesn’t decide between the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition and the Hypothesis of EMbedded Cognition. (shrink)

Linsky and Zalta try to explain how we can refer to mathematical objects by saying that this happens through definite descriptions which may appeal to mathematical theories. I present two issues for their account. First, there is a problem of finding appropriate pre-conditions to reference, which are currently difficult to satisfy. Second, there is a problem of ensuring the stability of the resulting reference. Slight changes in the properties ascribed to a mathematical object can result in a shift of reference (...) and this leads to various problems, e.g., it makes inferring knowledge much harder than it is. (shrink)

In recent years philosophers have used results from cognitive science to formulate epistemologies of arithmetic :5–18, 2001). Such epistemologies have, however, been criticised, e.g. by Azzouni, for interpreting the capacities found by cognitive science in an overly numerical way. I offer an alternative framework for the way these psychological processes can be combined, forming the basis for an epistemology for arithmetic. The resulting framework avoids assigning numerical content to the Approximate Number System and Object Tracking System, two systems that have (...) so far been the basis of epistemologies of arithmetic informed by cognitive science. The resulting account is, however, only a framework for an epistemology: in the final part of the paper I argue that it is compatible with both platonist and nominalist views of numbers by fitting it into an epistemology for ante rem structuralism and one for fictionalism. Unsurprisingly, cognitive science does not settle the debate between these positions in the philosophy of mathematics, but I it can be used to refine existing epistemologies and restrict our focus to the capacities that cognitive science has found to underly our mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

“De jure naturae multa fabulamur” — after 450 years, Luther's statement has lost none of its original validity. After a brief pseudo-renaissance following WWII, one now hears far less in legal theory about natural law, which appears finally to have fallen victim to what Weber early in the century characterized as “a progressive decomposition and relativization of all meta-legal axioms” — a destruction resulting partly “from legal rationalism itself,” and partly “from the skepticism which characterizes modern intellectual life generally.” Law (...) today, wrote Weber, “is all too tangibly (in the great majority of its determinations, and especially in many which are particularly important in terms of principle) revealed to be both the product and the technical medium of a compromise of interests,”. (shrink)

I propose to show that any direct moral bioenhancement procedures that could be realized within a relatively short period of time are not realistic options. This does not have to worry us; however; because alternative options for promoting morality are available. Consequently; moral bioenhancement is not an option for dealing successfully with the increased potential destructiveness of contemporary technologies within a short-term framework; i.e. within this century. In what follows; I will explain why this is the case; and why; contrary (...) to Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu; I think this need not worry us too much. In section 1.; I will critically analyze moral bioenhancement by means of citalopram; aimed at reducing the tendency to harm others directly. I give this prominence because it could be a practical option for altering human emotions and dispositions – to my mind; it seems the most promising practical option in this field. In later sections; I will consider other means of realizing moral bioenhancement; since the first option does not do the job it is supposed to; and because Persson and Savulescu are concerned with alternative approaches. (shrink)

One of the important discussions in the philosophy of mathematics, is that centered on Benacerraf’s Dilemma. Benacerraf’s dilemma challenges theorists to provide an epistemology and semantics for mathematics, based on their favourite ontology. This challenge is the point on which all philosophies of mathematics are judged, and clarifying how we might acquire mathematical knowledge is one of the main occupations of philosophers of mathematics. In this thesis I argue that this discussion has overlooked an important part of mathematics, namely mathematics (...) as it is exercised by ordinary people. I do so by looking at the different theories that have been put forward in the recent debate, and showing for each of these that they are unable to account for the mathematical practices of ordinary people. In order to show that these practices do need to be accounted for, I also argue that ordinary people are doing mathematics, i.e. that they engage in properly mathematical practices. Because these practices are properly mathematical, they should be accounted for by any philosophy of mathematics. The conclusion of my thesis, then, is that current theories fail to do something that they should do, while remaining neutral on how well they perform when it comes to accounting for the practices of professional mathematicians. (shrink)

We present the negative phenomena of understanding in relation to scientific explanations. We begin by formulating the distinction between genuine understanding and lack of understanding, to define the epistemic category of misunderstanding. We illustrate misunderstanding with a short meta-philosophical study on the current debates about distinctively mathematical explanations.

We present the negative phenomena of understanding in relation to scientific explanations. We begin by formulating the distinction between genuine understanding and lack of understanding, to define the epistemic category of misunderstanding. We illustrate misunderstanding with a short meta-philosophical study on the current debates about distinctively mathematical explanations.

We present the negative phenomena of understanding in relation to scientific explanations. We begin by formulating the distinction between genuine understanding and lack of understanding, to define the epistemic category of misunderstanding. We illustrate misunderstanding with a short meta-philosophical study on the current debates about distinctively mathematical explanations.

We present the negative phenomena of understanding in relation to scientific explanations. We begin by formulating the distinction between genuine understanding and lack of understanding, to define the epistemic category of misunderstanding. We illustrate misunderstanding with a short meta-philosophical study on the current debates about distinctively mathematical explanations.

In their Minds and Machines essay How would you know if you synthesized a Thinking Thing? (Kary & Mahner, Minds and Machines, 12(1), 61–86, 2002), Kary and Mahner have chosen to occupy a high ground of materialism and empiricism from which to attack the philosophical and methodological positions of believers in artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life (AL). In this review I discuss some of their main arguments as well as their philosophical foundations. Their central argument: ‘AI is Platonism’, which (...) is based on a particular interpretation of the notion of ‘definition’ and used as a critique against AI, can be counter criticized from two directions: first, Anti-Platonism is not a necessary precondition for criticizing AI, because outspoken Platonist criticism against AI is already known (Penrose, The emperor’s new mind (with a foreword by M. Gardner), 1989). Second, even in case that AI would essentially be ‘Platonism’ this would not be a sufficient argument for proving AI wrong. In my counter criticism I assume a more or less Popperian position by emphasizing the openness of the future: Not by quasi-Scholastic arguments (like Kary and Mahner’s), but only after being confronted with a novel ‘thinking thing’ by future AI engineers we can start to analyze its particular properties (Let me use a history analogon to illustrate my position: In the 19th century, mechanized aviation was widely regarded impossible—only natural organisms (such as birds or bees) could fly, and any science of aerodynamics or aviation did not exist. Only after some non-scientific technicians had confronted their astonished fellows with the first (obviously) flying machine the science of ‘Artificial Aviation’ came into existence, motivated by the need for understanding and mastering that challenging and puzzling new phenomenon). (shrink)

P { margin-bottom: 0.21cm; direction: ltr; color: rgb; widows: 2; orphans: 2; }P.western { font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; }P.cjk { font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; }P.ctl { font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12pt; } Hegel's transient notion of "Aether", developed and finally abandoned again during his short period of time at the University of Jena in the early years of the 19th century, has received comparatively little attention so far – much less than, for example, his Phenomenology (...) of Spirit, or his later systematic works which he published after his departure from Jena. In modern and contemporary physics, on the other hand, novel notions comparable to Hegel's "aether" have become interesting again with the rise of quantum physics. In this essay we recapitulate and explain the notion of "Aether" in Hegel's works and compare it to novel aether concepts which might be appropriate in the context of contemporary quantum physics. Such a juxtaposition would well have matched Hegel's own intentions, since he had always been a keen observer of the latest developments in the natural sciences during his own lifetime. In conclusion we can say that, in spite of a number of differences, both notions of aether can be speculatively characterised by the paradoxical term "reality of possibility". (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I offer an anti-Humean interpretation of the causal interactions in somatic medicine. I focus on life-threatening pathological states and show how Nancy Cartwright’s capacities can offer a plausible epistemology for medical processes and the singular causal claims advanced in medical diagnoses. I argue that the capacities manifested in the emergence of symptoms and signs could be tracked down if healthy organisms are construed as nomological machines and suggest that the causal reasoning from current medical practice bears (...) a tacit adherence to anti-Humean assumptions. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-28 DOI 10.1007/s12136-011-0141-1 Authors Stefan Dragulinescu, Drumul Taberei 20, Bucharest, Romania Journal Acta Analytica Online ISSN 1874-6349 Print ISSN 0353-5150. (shrink)

Carl Schmitt verfügt heute über eine so breite und stets wachsende internationale Leserschaft wie kein anderer deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer des vergangenen Jahrhunderts. Sein Werk wird dabei freilich meist isoliert betrachtet und allenfalls auf den staatsrechtlichen Kontext bezogen. Im Mittelpunkt dieses Buches steht dagegen der politische Intellektuelle, der weit über die Grenzen seines Faches hinauswirkte. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit gilt dabei den Anfangs- und den Endjahren der Weimarer Republik. Während Schmitt in München Strategien zur Zähmung der Revolution entwickelte, setzte er sich in seinen Berliner (...) Jahren für eine autoritäre Transformation der Verfassung ein, die neben der äußersten Linken auch die äußerste Rechte von der Macht fernhalten sollte. Das geschah nicht nur in der Form der verfassungsrechtlichen Expertise für Regierungskreise, sondern auch durch publizistische Interventionen, bei denen der in Bonn gebildete Schülerkreis Schmitts eine tragende Rolle spielte. Zeitschriften wie Der Ring und das Deutsche Volkstum standen in der Endkrise der Weimarer Republik zeitweise vollständig unter dem Einfluß Schmittscher Ideen, und auch im breiteren Umfeld waren sie präsent, etwa in den Organen der Bündischen Jugend oder in der vielgelesenen Tat. Selbst Kritiker Schmitts konnten sich diesem Einfluß nicht entziehen, wie am Beispiel Otto Kirchheimers, Franz Neumanns, Ernst Fraenkels, Waldemar Gurians und anderer gezeigt wird. Gestützt auf nachgelassene Korrespondenzen und eine umfassende Auswertung der zeitgenössischen Publizistik gibt das Buch Aufschluß über Schmitts Netzwerk und seine politischen Strategien. (shrink)

Ștefan Bolea ABSTRACT: In the present paper I analyze the theme of death in Gothic Metal songs such as Forever Failure by Paradise Lost, Everything Dies by Type O Negative, The Hanged Man by Moonspell or Gone with The Sin by HIM. The subthemes I am mostly interested in are the...

In the following paper I will argue that there are interesting connections between the founder of analytical psychology, Carl Gustav Jung, and the school of existentialism. Analytical psychology and existentialism share almost the same Zeitgeist (becoming influential between the 1930’s and 1960’s) and are both interested in the concept of individuality. I would like to follow the liaison between Jung and existentialism regarding authenticity and death. First of all, the concept of authenticity deserves extensive treatment. Heidegger’s Das Man and Sartre’s (...) mauvaise foi have an interesting companion in Jung’s notion of the persona, the psychological concept of the mask. Second of all, existentialist authenticity can be compared to the Jungian integration of the shadow. Moreover, the concept of death (Heidegger’s Sein-zum-Tode) can be compared with Jung’s understanding of death from The Red Book. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article wants to expose some central contributions for a critical theory from the Americas, made first of all from the Ecuadorian-Mexican philosopher Bolívar Echeverría and also by the Spanish-Mexican philosopher Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez, bringing them to an imaginary discussion with Alfred Schmidt, Karl Marx, and some concepts of the original critical theory from the now one-hundred-year-old Frankfurt school. The relationship between use value and value, the critique of some Eurocentric “philosophical” ideas inside nonmainstream theories are some of the (...) departing points. A critical theory from the Americas could be a first step toward the necessary philosophical contributions for a postcapitalist society that may exist without the Today’s self-destructive impulse. It helps not only to understand the world outside the so-called First World in a more exact way, but it helps also to understand the centers of global power in a better way, as their self-consciousness is now probably on the lowest level ever. (shrink)

Philosophers have studied various ways in which things can be said implicitly, and how this can be exploited in both derogatory and political speech. The present paper follows this tradition by focussing on a linguistic phenomenon which has so far received little attention from philosophers, i.e. (linguistic) false friends. In linguistics, false friends are understood as bilingual homographs or homophones which differ (significantly) in some kind of conventional linguistic meaning. We will argue that such false friends can be used for (...) (political) dogwhistling. Hence, by providing a better understanding of the linguistic phenomenon of false friends, the present paper aims to provide a better understanding of dogwhistling, possibly opening up new ways of preventing or at least containing the negative consequences of these speech acts. (shrink)

This article argues for the thesis that there is only one basic form of rationality, which is applied in different areas. First of all, there is one meaning of the term "rational" which applies to all situations in which the term is used: "justified." If "rational" means simply "justified", then rationality can be broken down into as many types as there are kinds of justification. Two distinctions between kinds of justification seem particularly plausible: 1. relative vs. absolute justifications and 2. (...) theoretical justifications of opinions vs. practical justifications of actions. Taken together, these two distinctions yield a division into four types of rationality. I maintain, however, that these two distinctions collapse upon more careful examination. In this article I will simply assume that no form of ultimate justification is convincing; thus, the first distinction does not apply. Against the second distinction I try to argue in this paper that theoretical rationality represents a form of practical rationality. The idea of an optimal choice of aims, actions, and opinions, which nonetheless differs from the orthodox model of practical rationality, thus proves to be the comprehensive central ingredient of the concept of rationality. (shrink)

This is a short systematic introduction to Political Philosophy.

Meritocracy is a key feature of liberal scripts, but it is problematic for a number of reasons. One major line of criticism is that of broken promises: Meritocracies de facto fail to live up to their own promises, leading to the claim that meritocracy is a myth. Another important line of criticism concerns the idea of merit itself. The objection is that merit and meritocracy do not make sense on their own terms and are incoherent with other liberal principles: It (...) is unclear how to impartially assess subjective efforts and deprivations and material contributions. Moreover, one’s actual productive achievements depend to a large extent on social circumstances and genetic endowment, both of which are brute luck and, from a moral point of view, arbitrary. Finally, the criteria of merit that are usually put forward in the economy can be in conflict with the principle of the free market. (shrink)

In this paper I present an argument for a procedural principle of distribution, which is often called the presumption of equality.

Research on language evolution is an established subject area yet permeated by terminological controversies about which topics should be considered pertinent to the field and which not. By consequence, scholars focusing on language evolution struggle in providing precise demarcations of the discipline, where even the very central notions of evolution and language are elusive. We aimed at providing a data-driven characterisation of language evolution as a field of research by relying on quantitative analysis of data drawn from 697 reviews on (...) 255 submissions from the Joint Conference on Language Evolution 2022 (Kanazawa, Japan). Our results delineate a field characterized by a core of main research topics such as iconicity, sign language, multimodality. Despite being explored within the framework of language evolution research, only very recently these topics became popular in linguistics. As a result, language evolution has the potential to emerge as a forefront of linguistic research, bringing innovation to the study of language. We also see the emergence of more recent topics like rhythm, music, and vocal learning. Furthermore, the community identifies cognitive science, primatology, archaeology, palaeoanthropology, and genetics as key areas, encouraging empirical rather than theoretical work. With new themes, models, and methodologies emerging, our results depict an intrinsically multidisciplinary and evolving research field, likely adapting as language itself. (shrink)

German law is commonly assumed to be strongly influenced by legal scholarship. This was certainly true in the past, and this article explores whether it is still the case today. But what is actually meant by ‘influence’ in the context of law? Who exerts it on whom, and how? These questions are analysed in the first part of the article. It is then shown, by drawing on biographical material, legislative history and case law, how legal scholarship contributes to both the (...) legislative and the judicial lawmaking process in Germany—and where it does not. Finally it is asked how the specific relationship between legal academics and lawmakers in the German legal system can be explained and whether this model can be transferred to other systems. (shrink)

We share the authors' general approach to the study of perception and action, but rather than singling out a particular level of “late perceptual” and “early motor” processing for sensorimotor interactions, we argue that these can arise at multiple levels during action preparation and execution. Recent data on action-perception transfer are used to illustrate this perspective.