The use of super‐resolution imaging techniques in cell biology has yielded a wealth of information regarding cellular elements and processes that were invisible to conventional imaging. Focusing on images obtained by stimulated emission depletion (STED) microscopy, we discuss how the new high‐resolution data influence the ways in which we use and interpret images in cell biology. Super‐resolution images have lent support to some of our current hypotheses. But, more significantly, they have revealed unexpectedly complex processes that cannot be accounted for (...) by the simpler models based on diffraction‐limited imaging. The super‐resolution imaging data challenge cell biologists to change their theoretical framework, by including, for instance, interpretations that describe multiple functions, functional errors or lack of function for cellular elements. In this context, we argue that descriptive research using super‐resolution microscopy is now as necessary as hypothesis‐driven research. (shrink)

Quote marks, I claim, serve to select from the multiple ostensions that are produced whenever any expression is uttered; they act to constrain pragmatic ambiguity or indeterminacy. My argument proceeds by showing that the proffered account fares better than its rivals-the Name, Description, Demonstrative, and Identity Theories. Along the way I shall need to explain and emphasize that quoting is not simply the same thing as mentioning. Quoting, but not mentioning, relies on the use of conventional devices.

Moral philosophers widely believe that it is a part of the MEANING of 'ought' statements that they imply 'can' statements. To this thesis I offer three challenges, and then I conclude on a broader methodological note. (1) Epistemological Modal Argument: for all we know, determinism is true; determinism contradicts “ought implies can”; therefore we don’t know that 'ought' implies 'can'. (2) Metaphysical Modal Argument: determinism is conceptually possible; determinism contradicts “ought implies can”; therefore “ought implies can” is not an analytic (...) truth. (3) Semantic Argument: “You ought to X” is equivalent to “Do X!”; but “Do X!” does not entail that you can X, according to leading analyses of the imperative. (4) My two modal arguments are epistemologically significant, for they illustrate a general method for refuting a whole class of argument. (shrink)

According to truth-conditional semantics, to explain the meaning of a statement is to specify the conditions necessary and sufficient for its truth. This book develops a more radical mentalist semantics by shifting the object of semantic inquiry. Classical semantics analyzes an abstract sentence or utterance such as "Grass is green"; in attitudinal semantics the object of inquiry is a propositional attitude such as "Speaker so-and-so thinks grass is green".

This note concerns the model theoretic properties of logics extending the first-order logic with monadic second-order variables equipped with the stationarity quantifier. The eight variations of the strong downward Löwenheim–Skolem Theorem down to <ℵ2\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$<\aleph _2$$\end{document} for this logic with the interpretation of second-order variables as countable subsets of the structures are classified into four principles. The strongest of these four is shown to be equivalent to the conjunction of CH and the (...) Diagonal Reflection Principle for internally clubness of S. Cox. We show that a further strengthening of this SDLS and its variations follow from the Game Reflection Principle of B. König and its generalizations. (shrink)

The Demonstrative Theory holds that quoted matter is logically external to the quoting sentence, that quotation marks are (demonstratively) referential, and that quotation marks are grammatically required for autonomous mentioning. In contrast, the Identity Theory holds that quoted matter is integral to its quoting sentence, that quotation marks serve merely as disambiguating punctuation, and that mentionings need not be quotation-marked. I support the Identity Theory by pointing out fallacies in the arguments for demonstrative theories and by considering empty quotation, ordinary (...) language as found in casual use and in novels and plays, and historical and developmental facts about quotation. (shrink)

Shame and guilt are negative social emotions that are sensitive to culture, and findings from past research have suggested that shame impairs perspective-taking cognitive ability more than guilt does. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of research that has considered culture and experimentally tested the effect of shame and guilt on perspective-taking. Taking an experimental perspective, this study aimed to examine how shame and guilt states affect perspective-taking performance in two different cultures. Data from German (...) and Turkish female college students provided support for the effect of emotional state and culture on perspective-taking, but there was no interaction between them. We discussed the results and possible explanations for them in light of the literature. (shrink)

Tek dereceden bilinç kuramları (first-order theories of consciousness) ile üst dereceden bilinç kuramları (higher-order theories of consciousness) bilinç çalışmalarını içeren literatürde birbirlerinin rakibi olarak bilinirler ve bilinçli zihin durumlarıyla ilgili sundukları açıklamalarda farklı yaklaşımlar gösterirler. Tek dereceden bilinç kuramları bilinçsizce bilinçli olmanın mümkün olmadığını, üst dereceden kuramlar ise mümkün olduğunu savunur. Bu makaledeki amacım iki kuram arasındaki yaklaşım farklarını ortaya koymak, bu farkların önemli bir ilkesel anlaşmazlıktan mı yoksa sadece sözel bir anlaşmazlıktan mı kaynaklandığını inceleyerek iki kuramın uyumlu olup olmadığını (...) görmek ve bu tartışmanın ışığında bilinçsizce bilinçli olmanın eğer mümkünse ne anlama geldiğinden bahsetmektir. (shrink)

إن هذا المبحث ما هو إلا دراسة لذلك الشيء الغامض الذي دائما ما يناقشنا ويجادلنا ويحاورنا بل أحيانا يخاصمنا, هذا الشعور المتولد في داخلنا هو ما نسميه الإنسان الآخر.. هل ذلك الشعور هو حقيقة ثابتة أم جزء من الخيال نصنعه في محيطنا الذاتي لنجد صيقا نثق به, فنحاوره ونجادله, أعني هل هذا المتكون داخلنا هو جزء من الذات أم جزء من الخيال الذي نخترعه لنجد الصديق الحقيقي الذي كثيرا ما نحتاجه, فلن يوجد أحد صادق كصدق ذلك الآخر المتولد والمتشكل داخلنا (...) في لحظات ما.. إنه الإنسان الآخر فتعالوا ندرسه ونفهمه ولو قليلا..! (shrink)

It is well known that in any nonstandard model of $\mathsf{PA}$ (Peano arithmetic) neither addition nor multiplication is recursive. In this paper we focus on the recursiveness of unary functions and find several pairs of unary functions which cannot be both recursive in the same nonstandard model of $\mathsf{PA}$ (e.g., $\{2x,2x+1\}$, $\{x^2,2x^2\}$, and $\{2^x,3^x\}$). Furthermore, we prove that for any computable injection $f(x)$, there is a nonstandard model of $\mathsf{PA}$ in which $f(x)$ is recursive.

Disgust is a basic emotion that promotes pathogen avoidance and can contaminate nearby neutral stimuli. This study investigates how neutral stimuli, which have acquired disgust value through classical conditioning, are processed in episodic memory. The Category Conditioning paradigm was utilised to assign emotional significance to neutral stimuli, followed by a recognition test conducted immediately or 24 h after conditioning (Experiment 1). The results revealed that neutral stimuli that acquired disgust value were recognised with greater accuracy and higher liberal bias compared (...) to other neutral stimuli in the recognition test conducted after 24 h, but not immediately. Present study also indicates that the memory enhancement observed with disgust did not manifest in the context of fear (Experiment 2). Additionally, the results varied when neutral stimuli associated with disgust were presented with disgusting stimuli in recognition test (Experiment 3). Thus, the present study demonstrates that the memory advantage of disgust extends to associated stimuli when they are presented in a list without disgusting stimuli. (shrink)

We study combinatorial principles known as stick and club. Several variants of these principles and cardinal invariants connected to them are also considered. We introduce a new kind of side by-side product of partial orderings which we call pseudo-product. Using such products, we give several generic extensions where some of these principles hold together with ¬CH and Martin's axiom for countable p.o.-sets. An iterative version of the pseudo-product is used under an inaccessible cardinal to show the consistency of the club (...) principle for every stationary subset of limits of ω1 together with ¬CH and Martin's axiom for countable p.o.-sets. (shrink)

The chapters in this volume address a variety of issues surrounding quotation, such as whether it is a pragmatic or semantic phenomenon, what varieties of quotation exist, and what speech acts are involved in quoting. Quotation poses problems for many prevailing theories of language. One fundamental principle is that for a language to be learnable, speakers must be able to derive the truth-conditions of sentences from the meanings of their parts. Another popular view is that indexical expressions like "I" display (...) a certain fixity -- that they always refer to the speaker using them. Both of these tenets appear to be violated by quotation. This volume is suitable for scholars in philosophy of language, semantics, and pragmatics, and for graduate students in philosophy and linguistics. The book will also be useful for researchers in other fields that study quotation, including psychology and computer science. (shrink)

Understanding quotation is fundamental to understanding the nature of truth and meaning. Quotation, however, is a remarkably complicated phenomenon, and a vigorous literature on the topic has been growing at an increasing rate.§1 To give you a sense of this work, §1 enlarges upon the significance of studying quotation; §2 presents a rudimentary taxonomy of quotation; and §3 critically surveys theories of how quotation works.

We study L∞κ-freeness in the variety of Boolean algebras. It is shown that some of the theorems on L∞κ-free algebras which are known to hold in varieties such as groups, abelian groups etc. are also true for Boolean algebras. But we also investigate properties such as the ccc of L∞κ-free Boolean algebras which have no counterpart in the varieties above.

A Boolean algebra B is said to be openly generated if {A: A ≤rc B, |A| = ℵ0} includes a club subset of [ B]ℵ0 . We show: (V = L). For any cardinal κ there exists an L∞κ-free Boolean algebra which is not openly generated (Proposition 4.1). (MA+(σ-closed)). Every L∞ℵa -free Boolean algebra is openly generated (Theorem 4.2). The last assertion follows from a characterization of openly generated Boolean algebras under MA+(σ-closed) (Theorem 3.1). Using this characterization we also prove (...) the independence of problem 7 in Scepin [15] (Proposition 4.3 and Theorem 4.4). (shrink)

According to orthodox semantics, to know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth-conditions. Against this view I observe that we typically do not know the truth-conditions of the sentences we understand. We do not know the truth-conditions, for instance, of empty definite descriptions, non-declaratives, subjunctive conditionals, causal ascriptions, belief ascriptions, probability statements, figurative language, category mistakes, normative judgments, or vague statements. Appealing to tacit knowledge does not help, for the problem goes beyond our inability to articulate complete (...) truth-conditions: even full knowledge of the world’s condition would leave us unable to say whether an arbitrary sentence was true or false. (shrink)

This paper discusses empty quotation (‘’ is an empty string) and lexical quotation (his praise was, quote, fulsome, unquote), it challenges the minimal theory of quotation (‘ “x” ’ quotes ‘x’) and it defends the identity theory of quotation. In the process it illuminates disciplinary differences between the science of language and the philosophy of language. First, most philosophers assume, without argument, that language includes writing, whereas linguists have reason to identify language with speech (plus sign language). Second, philosophers tend (...) to think of languages as abstract objects whereas linguists tend to think of them as natural objects. These foundational differences help to explain disagreements in grammaticality judgments and consequent disagreements in semantic theory. (shrink)

The principle of charity (“Charity”), in one form or other, is held by many and for various reasons. After cataloging discernible kinds of Charity, I focus on the most familiar versions as found in Davidson, Dennett, Devitt, Lewis, Putnam, Quine, Stich, and others. To begin with, I argue that such versions of Charity are untenable because beliefs cannot be counted, and even if they could be counted there is reason to believe that true beliefs need not outnumber false beliefs. Next (...) I rebut one of the arguments behind Charity, the intelligibility argument. If indeed beliefs are postulated simply as a way to make some system intelligible (predictable and explicable) then a number of theses ensue. First, it would be perfectly intelligible to ascribe mostly false beliefs to an intentional system, or even entirely false beliefs. Second, lower animals would have beliefs. Third, it would sometimes make sense to ascribe beliefs even to inanimate beings. And fourth, the resulting indeterminacy of belief-ascription would suggest a kind of irrealism about belief which may in turn be expressed by the slogan that rejects the container metaphor of the mind. (shrink)

This dissertation formulates, defends, and exemplifies a semantic approach that I call Cognitive Decompositionism. Cognitive Decompositionism is one version of lexical decompositionism, which holds that the meaning of lexical items are decomposable into component parts. Decompositionism comes in different varieties that can be characterized in terms of four binary parameters. First, Natural Decompositionism contrasts with Artful Decompositionism. The former views components as word-like, the latter views components more abstractly. Second, Convenient Decompositionism claims that components are merely convenient fictions, while Real (...) Decompositionism claims that components are psychologically real. Third, Truth-conditional Decompositionism contrasts with various non-truth-conditional theories, in particular with Quantum Semantics. And fourth, Holistic Decompositionism assumes that decompositions are circular, as opposed to Atomistic Decompositionism, which assumes that some primitive basis ultimately underlies semantic components. Cognitive Decompositionism is the conjunction of the following theses: decomposition is Artful , Psychologically Real , Quantum , and Atomistic . As I substantiate these claims, I will be responding to the anti-decompositionist theories of Fodor, Davidson, and Quine. (shrink)

Paradoxes are mind-dependent in a number of ways. First, by definition, paradoxes offer surprises or apparent contradictions. Since surprise and appearance rely on subjective psychological reactions, paradoxes rely on psychological events. Second, propositional versions of the liar paradox must eventually appeal to sentences if they are to achieve traction, yet sentential versions of the liar paradox rely on language and hence on mentality. Third, belief paradoxes such as B, "No one believes B", transparently hinge on the existence of mental states. (...) (Belief paradoxes – extending work by Burge, Buridan, Grim, Sainsbury, and Sorensen – demonstrate a fundamental limitation on all cognitive systems: that none can hold all and only truths.) Finally, it is argued that belief paradoxes, like liar paradoxes, arise from the nature of semantic representation. (shrink)