Air temperature prediction can play a significant role in studies related to climate change, radiation and heat flux estimation, and weather forecasting. This study applied and compared the outcomes of three advanced fuzzy inference models, i.e., dynamic evolving neural-fuzzy inference system, hybrid neural-fuzzy inference system, and adaptive neurofuzzy inference system for AT prediction. Modelling was done for three stations in North Dakota, USA, i.e., Robinson, Ada, and Hillsboro. The results reveal that FIS type models are well suited when handling highly (...) variable data, such as AT, which shows a high positive correlation with average daily dew point, total solar radiation, and negative correlation with average wind speed. At the Robinson station, DENFIS performed the best with a coefficient of determination of 0.96 and a modified index of agreement of 0.92, followed by ANFIS with R2 of 0.94 and md of 0.89, and HyFIS with R2 of 0.90 and md of 0.84. A similar result was observed for the other two stations, i.e., Ada and Hillsboro stations where DENFIS performed the best with R2: 0.953/0.960, md: 0.903/0.912, then ANFIS with R2: 0.943/0.942, md: 0.888/0.890, and HyFIS with R2: 0.908/0.905, md: 0.845/0.821, respectively. It can be concluded that all three models are capable of predicting AT with high efficiency by only using DP, TSR, and WS as input variables. This makes the application of these models more reliable for a meteorological variable with the need for the least number of input variables. The study can be valuable for the areas where the climatological and seasonal variations are studied and will allow providing excellent prediction results with the least error margin and without a huge expenditure. (shrink)

Antalya, which is today’s attraction center with its historical and natural beauties, was described as “a city like heaven” since ancient times. This city hosted many civilisations and states until the 13th century and became an important seaport after The Seljuks took over the region. The Seljuks applied civilization and urbanization policy also in Antalya, like other regions they ruled. The mosques, madrasahs (Islamıc theology institutions), schools, baths, caravansearis (hostels), hospices, and water cisterns in this period changed the structure of (...) the city and paved the way for improvements of public life. During the Ottomans some of these social institutions were kept active while the others no longer served to the public. However, with the construction of new social institutions, urbanization was resumed. The madrasas were generally built near or adjacent to the mosques, and had a significant role in developing the society and cultural structure. Although the madrasas in Antalya were mainly the institutions that maintain the education system, the research on these madrasas mostly focuses on their architectural features. The majority of these madrasas that are not comprehensively studied. Therefore, the functioning structures and the problems of Antalya Madrasas (Antalya, Korkuteli and Elmalı), which are reflected in the archive documents between the 17th and 20th centuries and also both individuals and institutions that had influence on these madrasas are going to be investigated in this study. Thus, this paper will shed more light on Antalya Madrasas.Summary: Antalya city, which was completely under the Seljuk sovereignty during the reign of Sultan Alaeddin Keykubat I (1219-1236), was named as Alâiyye dedicated to the Sultan's name and became an important port city of the Seljuk State after then. In the process of the fall of the Seljuk State and the beginning of the Emirates (Beylikler) period, the city became a land of Teke-Oğulları, a part of a Hamid-oğulları, and in 1390 the city became an Ottoman city after the struggle of Yıldırım Bayazid with Teke-oğuları. Antalya was home to the madrasahs, one of the formal education institutions during both the Seljuk and the Ottoman Empire. The madrasahs were built next to the mosque or in a detached area built by sometimes administrators or statesmen, sometimes by members of the dynasty or by the citizens who were wealthy. In Antalya, both single floor and second floor madrasahs were built. This study based on the documents from Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive, the travel books of İbn Bibi and Evliya Çelebi, the works on Antalya Madrasahs to be determine the madrasah in the districts of Antalya as Korkuteli and Elmalı. In addition to the Seljuk madrasahs such as Imaret Madrasah, Atabey Armagan Madrasah and Karatay Madrasah, there are also some madrasahs belonging to the Ottoman period, in Antalya. As a matter of fact, the madrasahs increased in number in the period of the Ottoman. Antalya madrasahs which are reflected in archival documents for any reason are as follows: “Süleyman Madrasah” located in Hatip Süleyman Street, “Madrasah built by Haci Mahmed” located in Elmali Street, “Hacı Abbaszâde Hacı Süleyman Madrasah” in Süleyman Street, “İsmail Efendi Madrasah” in Tahtapazarı Kızılsaray Street, Kasab Hacı Ahmed Madrasah, Hacı Cafer Ağa Madrasah, Murad Ağa Madrasah, Esir Hacı Ali Madrasah, Hacı Hasan Madrasah,“Madrasah built by Hasan Efendi” in Keçiyalar Street, in the Kadılar Street of Gediz County “Madrasah built by Yusuf Efendi”, “Madrasah built by Hızır Efendi” in Cami-i atik Street, Murat Pasha Madrasah, “Sefer Ağa Madrasah” located outside the city wall, “Büyülü Minaret Madrasah, Hatuniye Madrasah, Sheik Sinan Camii Madrasah located outside the city Wall, In addition to these madrasahs mentioned in some studies in Antalya, it is also stated that there are madrasahs such as Müsellim Madrasah, Kesik Minaret Madrasah, Karakas Madrasah, Varsakli Mehmet Efendi Madrasah, Meydan Madrasah, Surmeli Madrasah, Canmülk Madrasah, Ahi Kız Madrasah, Hacı Naim Efendi Madrasah, Susam Madrasah, Çömlekçi Madrasah, Değirmenönü Madrasah, Ak Mescid Madrasah, Âşık Doğan Madrasah and Çukur Madrasah.According to archive documents, in the sub-district of Antalya, which is used as a plateau or plateau area, some madrasahs were recorded as follows: Pınarbaşı Madrasah, Hızır Efendi Madrasah, Mustafa Efendi Madrasah, Emir Sinaneddin Madrasah, Hacı Menlü (Mevlüt) oğlu Ömer Medrese, Abu Bakr Agha Madrasah, Koca Hafız Medrese, Hacı Mollaoğlu El-Hac Ömer Madrasah, Sheikh İsmail Efendi Madrasah. However, Süleyman Fikri Erten, who works on Antalya, stated that the number of madrasahs is eight as: Haci Ahmet Madrasah of Kalkanlı, Sultan Hatun Madrasah, Koparanzade Hacı Hüseyin Madrasah, Karabayırlı Hacı Hüseyin Madrasah, Kaşlı Ali Efendi Madrasah, Hacı Hüseyin Madrasah, Şalaka Ahmet Madrasah and Oyunyeri Madrasah.The madrasahs built in Elmalı, another distict of Antalya, were as follows: Ketenci Ömer Paşa Madrasah, Esbak Mir-i Ahur Hacı Mehmet Bey Madrasah, Haydar Baba Madrasah, Arifî Ahmed Paşa Madrasah, Hüseyin Efendi Madrasah, Debbağ Baba Madrasah, Şeyh Ümmi Sinan Madrasah, Babazade Hacı Abdurrahman Madrasah, Hacı Şeyh Efendi Madrasah, Mustafa Efendi Madrasah, Hasan Efendi Madrasah, Salih Efendi Madrasah, Halil Efendi Madrasah, Çankırlı Madrasah, Osman Efendi Madrasah and “Mehmet Efendi Madrasah in Örtekiz village”. In addition, two madrasahs, except from these, were also found in the archive documents.A madrasah was built almost at every Street of Antalya and the madrasahs were usually named by the name of their builders. Madrasah students were provided with a certain amount of scholarship to continue their education according to the level of the education in the madrasahs and the level of the courses taught, salaries of the scholars, the status of the builder of the madrasah. The scholars who worked in the madrasahs worked with a document called berat-i sharif and in the case of the disappearance of this document a new berat-i sharif would be prepared by the Shaykh al-Islami. Scholars working without this document were also determined. In the scholar appointments foundation, board of trustees, müfti, and the city regents were very influential. There were also some appointments resulted from death, promotion besides leaving job with their own will. There were some problems with the appointments in Antalya and the foundation revenues to which the madrasah was attached were delivered to certain individuals until these problems were resolved.In madrasahs of Antalya, science was given a great importance and all kinds of monetary issues were tired to be eliminated with donations given to both scholars and students. However, it is observed that madrasahs were involved in some events in Antalya. As a matter of fact, among those who participated in the Şah Kulu Rebellion that took place in 1510-1511, there were also madrasah students and education training had therefore been disrupted for a long time. it is known that the state sent orders to the judges (qadi) in the region consecutively in order to prevent the rebellion. Also during this period some madrasahs were used as the activity center of armed students or people who disguised them.One of the issues that negates the education and training in the madrasahs in Antalya is that in 1890 the immigrants started to be hosted in Antalya and the guests visiting were accommodated in madrasahs as there were no other available places. This situation had been continued for a long time and even telegrams have been sent about the students living on the sidewalks.Another important issue that disrupts education was epidemic diseases. It was reported that too many people died in the district of Istanoz because of smallpox, there was no doctor and the health personnel should go to the region urgently. Despite all the problems experienced in madrasahs, they continued their activities in Antalya and while continuing their activities under the control of foundations in 1826, with the establishment of the Ministry of Foundations, they were connected to this institution. (shrink)

What accounts for how we know that certain rules of reasoning, such as reasoning by Modus Ponens, are valid? If our knowledge of validity must be based on some reasoning, then we seem to be committed to the legitimacy of rule-circular arguments for validity. This paper raises a new difficulty for the rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. The source of the problem is that, contrary to traditional wisdom, a universal generalization cannot be inferred just on the basis of (...) reasoning about an arbitrary object. I argue in favor of a more sophisticated constraint on reasoning by universal generalization, one which undermines a rule-circular account of our knowledge of validity. (shrink)

A welcome addition to the Routledge Critical Thinkers series, Judith Butler is the first guidebook on this renowned feminist and queer theory scholar, which will help not only students of literary criticism but also students of law, sociology, philosophy, film and cultural studies. Examining Butler's work through a variety of contexts, including the formation of gender performativity, identity and subjecthood, Sarah Salih address Butler's crucial ideas on the gender agenda, the body, pornography, race, gay self-expression and power and psychoanalysis. (...) Concluding with an annotated bibliography, this book will be the ideal starting point for all new to Butler. (shrink)

The Judith Butler Reader is a collection of writings that span her impressive career and trace her intellectual history. Judith Butler, author of influential books such as Gender Trouble, has built her international reputation as a theorist of power, gender, sexuality and identity Organized in active collaboration between Judith Butler and Sara Salih Collects together writings that span Butler’s impressive career as a critical philosopher, including selections from both well-known and lesser-known works Includes an introduction and editorial material to (...) assist students in their readings of theories that stand at the forefront of contemporary theoretical and political debates. (shrink)

White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument (...) is that the best explanation of the value of promoting rationality is an explanation that entails uniqueness. (shrink)

This paper begins by raising a puzzle about what function our use of the word ‘rational’ could serve. To solve the puzzle, I introduce a view I call Epistemic Communism: we use epistemic evaluations to promote coordination among our basic belief-forming rules, and the function of this is to make the acquisition of knowledge by testimony more efficient.

In this paper, we investigate how the interactions of a robot with its environment can be used to create concepts that are typically represented by verbs in language. Towards this end, we utilize the notion of affordances to argue that verbs typically refer to the generation of a specific type of effect rather than a specific type of action. Then, we show how a robot can form these concepts through interactions with the environment and how humans can use these concepts (...) to ease their communication with the robots. We demonstrate that iCub, a humanoid robot, can use the concepts, which it has developed, to to understand what a human performs, perform multi-step planning for reaching a goal state as well as to specify a goal to the robot using symbolic descriptions. (shrink)

This article focuses on recent discussions about holobionts and evolutionary individuality to evaluate the merits of integrative pluralism. I argue that integrative pluralism is the wrong approach to take when it comes to holobiont research because integrative pluralism is not liberal enough to accommodate both single-species and multispecies individuals. I conclude by suggesting two points. First, a pluralistic view helps us better understand holobiont research. Second, the case of holobionts helps us develop a better account of scientific pluralism.

In this paper, I explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others? I show why the question cannot be answered in the most natural ways of answering it, in particular in Descartes’s way of answering it. I then go on to introduce a new approach to answering the question, an approach inspired by Hume’s view of inductive reasoning.

ABSTRACTPopular culture has many examples of evil characters having vertically pupilled eyes. Humans have a long evolutionary history of rivalry with snakes and their visual systems were evolved to rapidly detect snakes and snake-related cues. Considering such evolutionary background, we hypothesised that humans would perceive vertical pupils, which are characteristics of ambush predators including some of the snakes, as threatening. In seven studies conducted on samples from American and Turkish samples, we found that vertical pupils are perceived as more threatening (...) on both explicit and implicit level and they are associated with physical, rather than social, threat. Findings provided partial support regarding our hypothesis about the relevance of snake detection processes: Snake phobia, and not spider phobia, was found to be related to perceiving vertical pupils as threatening, however an experimental manipulation of saliency of snakes re... (shrink)

Tarımsal üretim pek çok ekonomide olduğu gibi Türkiye’de de önemli bir paya sahiptir. Özellikle fındık, çay ve yaş meyvelerin üretimi yakın tarihe kadar bilinçsizce gerçekleştirilse de günümüzde üretim imkânlarının gelişmesi sayesinde az maliyetle yüksek verim alınabilmektedir. Fakat başta miras yoluyla arazilerin bölünmesi, köyden şehre göç olmak üzere çeşitli nedenlerden dolayı ya tarım arazileri sahipleri tarafından terk edilmekte ya da yarıcılığa verilmek suretiyle işlenmeye devam edilmektedir. Halk arasında yarıcılık olarak bilinen bu ortaklıkların temeli, fıkıhtaki müzâraa ve müsâkāt ortaklıklarına dayanmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın (...) amacı halk arasında yarıcılık olarak bilinen ve uygulanan müsâkāt ortaklıklarının fındık bahçelerinde nasıl yapıldığını tespit etmek ve fıkhi problemlere neden olan uygulamadaki aksaklıkların giderilmesi için öneriler geliştirmektedir. Nitel araştırma yönteminin benimsendiği araştırmada, araştırma deseni olarak fenomenolojik yaklaşım kullanılmıştır. Araştırmamızın veri toplama yöntemi yarı yapılandırılmış görüşme ve doküman incelemesidir. Araştırmanın çalışma grubu kartopu örnekleme yöntemiyle seçilen ve daha önce müsâkāt akdi yapmış fındık bahçesi sahibi veya fındık bahçesinin mahsulüne ortak olmuş 8 kişiden oluşmaktadır. Çalışmanın, klasik fıkıhla irtibatının yanı sıra, halk arasında güncel bir uygulamanın nasıl yapıldığını ayrıntılarıyla ortaya koyması açısından sosyolojik, tarımsal üretimi konu edinmesi açısından ise tarım ekonomisini ilgilendiren boyutları bulunmaktadır. Agricultural production has an important role in the Turkish economy as in many countries. However, the hazelnuts, tea and fresh fruits have been produced through inefficient methods for a long time. With the development of technology and new techniques, farmers have started to produce more efficient agricultural production with low costs. The basis of these partnerships, known as sharecroppers among the farmers, is based on muzara’ah and musaqat partnerships in Islamic Law. However, today it is not known whether these partnerships are made in accordance with the conditions of muzara’ah and musaqat agreements. In this study, we investigate how musaqat partnerships are made over hazelnut production, and we also try to detect problems that appear during the partnership. In addition, we offer suggestions to eliminate the detected problems. When the literature on musaqat is examined, it is seen that this partnership agreement is not the subject of research separately, and that the issue is generally discussed in some fiqh issues that concern partnership agreements. During the literature review, it was seen that today there are no studies on how the partnership contract is fulfilled and what problems emerge in terms of Islamic law. The fact that this study directly focuses on the current practices of musaqat partnership and identifies the emerging fiqh problems will fill a gap in the literature. (shrink)

I object to Markos Valaris’s thesis that reasoning requires a belief that your conclusion follows from your premisses. My counter-examples highlight the important but neglected role of suppositional reasoning in the basis of so much of what we know.

The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...) belief. I give an initial assessment of the view by examining its compatibility with leading theories of introspection. And I identify a challenge for the view, and explain why I'm optimistic that the view can overcome it. (shrink)

Jacques Lacan was a notoriously difficult and idiosyncratic thinker. But is there any value in his hermetically difficult style? By highlighting certain crucial elements of his practice, I show how Lacan enlists the notion of difficulty to press home that he did not want his readers to understand directly. Instead, as Foucault and Althusser explain so well, Lacan wished for his readers and auditors to discover themselves as subjects of desire through reading him. Indeed, in miming the language of the (...) unconscious, Lacan believed he could throw into sharp relief the notion of the unconscious itself and, paradoxically, better express himself. This temporary detour through misunderstanding indicates the programmatic value of difficulty itself. By commenting on the comedic aspect of Lacan's difficult literary dandyism, I also seek to playfully remind the reader that Lacan was a master of comedy and irony and that it is only by adopting a comparative literary approach to his work that we can appreciate how his theory of misunderstanding is at the heart of his conceptualization of madness and psychosis, allowing us to see how, for Lacan, the subject is ontologically sick. (shrink)

True beliefs and truth-preserving inferences are, in some sense, good beliefs and good inferences. When an inference is valid though, it is not merely truth-preserving, but truth-preserving in all cases. This motivates my question: I consider a Modus Ponens inference, and I ask what its validity in particular contributes to the explanation of why the inference is, in any sense, a good inference. I consider the question under three different definitions of ‘case’, and hence of ‘validity’: the orthodox definition given (...) in terms of interpretations or models, a metaphysical definition given in terms of possible worlds, and a substitutional definition defended by Quine. I argue that the orthodox notion is poorly suited to explain what's good about a Modus Ponens inference. I argue that there is something good that is explained by a certain kind of truth across possible worlds, but the explanation is not provided by metaphysical validity in particular; nothing of value is explained by truth across all possible worlds. Finally, I argue that the substitutional notion of validity allows us to correctly explain what is good about a valid inference. (shrink)

In recent years, commentators have begun to re-examine the proximity of Frantz Fanon's and Jacques Lacan's work — a proximity which has traditionally been underappreciated. This article adds to these voices, demonstrating the reciprocal intellectual relationship between these two figures. It develops five interrelated arguments to chart this proximity. First, it emphasizes Lacan's and Fanon's connections through their ontological perspectives on madness. Second, it arbitrates the two theorists’ criticisms of the limits of Western psychoanalysis. Third, it shows the importance placed (...) by both on social structures in determining mental illnesses. Next, it demonstrates the centrality of their common understanding of psychosis. Finally, it argues that Lacan's argument in The Sinthome concerning the colonizer's power is inherited from Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks — itself influenced by Lacan's early theory of language. The article does not attempt to cast Fanon as an apprentice Lacanian but rather to argue that reciprocity helped shape both oeuvres. (shrink)

I critically examine an evolutionary debunking argument against moral realism. The key premise of the argument is that there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability. I search for the strongest version of the argument; this involves exploring how ‘adequate explanation’ could be understood such that the key premise comes out true. Finally, I give a reductio: in the sense in which there is no adequate explanation of our moral reliability, there is equally no adequate explanation of our inductive (...) reliability. Thus, the argument that would debunk our moral views would also, absurdly, debunk all inductive reasoning. (shrink)

Claude Lefort’s theory of democratic indeterminacy has been an influential source among democratic theorists to demonstrate that democratic times lack absolute and determinate grounds on which to b...

The Bozeman scale is the most famous scale of statistical stylistics, and is based on the study of the vocabulary used by the author, and the number of verbs and adjectives in the text. Based on this scale, the ratio of dividing the number of verbs by the number of adjectives indicates its literary or sci-entific style and rationality. Therefore, this study aims to answer the follow-ing questions: How accurate is the Bozeman equation in measuring the lit-erary texts and the (...) emotionality of their authors? How does the style of a sermon differ from the style used in other literary arts? Do the subject and content of the sermon play a role in raising the level of the literary style and emotionality of the preacher? What factors affect the value of the Bozeman scale in political speeches and preaching sermons? What factors affect the value of the Bozeman scale in political speeches and preaching sermons? This study aims to apply this objective scale to sermons and compare the value of the scale in them with the percentages in other literary genres on which similar studies were conducted, such as poetry and letters. It also focuses on the impact of the content of the text on the value of the scale by comparing political speeches and preaching speeches. The study chose a sample of political speeches by Ziyâd b. Ebîh and Al-Hajjaj bin Yusuf Al-Thaqafi, and a sample of preaching sermons by `Omar bin Abdul Aziz and Al-Hassan Al-Basri, adopting the descriptive statistical analytical approach. The results revealed that the style of sermons is the most literary and emo-tional one among all other literary genres. Besides, preaching sermons sur-pass political speeches based on the value of the Bozeman scale, thus imply-ing that their style employs emotion, conscience, and literary images. In con-trast, political speeches are characterized by a rational style that relies on arguments and proofs. (shrink)

Ortodoksluk mezhebi Hıristiyanlığın en kadim geleneklerinden birisi olmasına rağmen günümüzde diğerlerine göre daha az tanınmaktadır. Mezhebin en önemli Kiliselerinden birisi de İstanbul Kilisesi’dir. Bu makalenin amacı Hıristiyan Ortodoks teoloji çalışmalarına dair İstanbul’daki Kilise çevresinde oluşan XIX. ve XX. Yüzyıldaki Yunanca literatür hakkında kısa bilgi vermektir. Bu literatür, süreli yayınlar ve Patrikhanenin kurumsal yapıları olarak iki açıdan ele alınacaktır. Literatür bağlamında bir dönem doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak Patrikhane tarafından yayınlanan dergiler şunlardır: Ekklisiastiki Alithia, Ortodoksia, The Greek Orthodox Theological Review. Bunlara (...) ek olarak Patrikhanenin yıllık yayınladığı Kilise Takvimi ve Ortodoks teoloji çalışmalarında önemli bir kaynak olarak görülen Din ve Ahlak Ansiklopedisi, ve bazı sözlüklerle diğer birkaç dergiden bahsedilecektir. Ayıca İstanbul’daki Patrikhane ile doğrudan veya dolaylı olarak ilgili olan okullar, araştırma merkezleri, enstitüler ve kütüphaneler hakkında bilgi verilecektir. Bu çalışmada ele alınan bu konular, modern dönemde Patrikhane çevresinde şekillenen Ortodoks teolojiye dair yapılacak çalışmalar için doğrudan birincil kaynak olma özelliği taşımaktadır. (shrink)

Ehrenmord ist eine nicht selten vorkommende Tat in der Turkei. Mit fortgesetzter Wanderung in die großen Städte der Türkei und ins Ausland, wird dieses Phänomen auch in andere Regionen getragen. Daher setzt sich auch die Öffentlichkeit in zunehmenden Maße mit dieser Thematik auseinander. In diesem Artikel wird versucht, den Ehrenmord unter philosophischen Gesichtspunkten zu erklären.Hierzu werden Gedanken Engels, Butlers, Foucaults, Levi Strauss’ und auch weitere bedeutende Forschungsarbeiten zum Thema Selbstmord hinzugezogen.

We can make new progress on stalled debates in epistemology if we adopt a new practical approach, an approach concerned with the function served by epistemic evaluations. This paper illustrates how. I apply the practical approach to an important, unsolved problem: the problem of forgotten evidence. Section 1 describes the problem and why it is so challenging. Section 2 outlines and defends a general view about the function of epistemic evaluations. Section 3 then applies that view to solve the problem (...) of forgotten evidence. (shrink)

After briefly expositing some fundamental issues in current debates about apriority, I go on to critically examine meaning-based explanations of how we acquire apriori justification.

Rationalism, my target, says that in order to have perceptual knowledge, such as that your hand is making a fist, you must “antecedently” (or “independently”) know that skeptical scenarios don’t obtain, such as the skeptical scenario that you are in the Matrix. I motivate the specific form of Rationalism shared by, among others, White (Philos Stud 131:525–557, 2006) and Wright (Proc Aristot Soc Suppl Vol 78:167–212, 2004), which credits us with warrant to believe (or “accept”, in Wright’s terms) that our (...) senses are reliably veridical, where that warrant is one we enjoy by default, that is, without relying on any evidence or engaging in any positive argument. The problem with this form of Rationalism is that, even if you have default knowledge that your senses are reliable, this is not adequate to rule out every kind of skeptical scenario. The problem is created by one-off skeptical scenarios, scenarios that involve a highly reliable perceiver who, by a pure fluke, has a one-off, non-veridical experience. I claim you cannot infer that your present perceptual experience is veridical just on the basis of knowledge of your general reliability. More generally, if you infer that the present F is G, just on the basis of your knowledge that most Fs are Gs, this is what I call statistical inference, and, as I argue, statistical inference by itself does not generate knowledge. I defend this view of statistical inference against objections, including the objection that radical skepticism about our ordinary inductive knowledge will follow unless statistical inference generates knowledge. (shrink)

Whereas Bayesians have proposed norms such as probabilism, which requires immediate and permanent certainty in all logical truths, I propose a framework on which credences, including credences in logical truths, are rational because they are based on reasoning that follows plausible rules for the adoption of credences. I argue that my proposed framework has many virtues. In particular, it resolves the problem of logical omniscience.

Der Rassimus-Diskurs hat sich auf die fortschrittlichen kapitalistischen Länder konzentriert. Da der Rassimus kein westliches Phänomen ist, sondern eine aus der kapitalistischen Produktionsweise hervorgehende Idologie, sollte die Rassismus-Diskussion auch in Ländern, in denen sich die kapitalistische Produktionsweise erst spät etablierte, untersucht werden. Untersuchungen zu Rassismus in der Türkei zeigen, dass der Rassismus in der Türkei besonderheit aufzeigt, die nicht mit denen der westlichen Länder vergleichbar sind. Deswegen werde ich in meinem Referat den Rassismus in der Türkei vor dem Hintergrund einer (...) Auseinandersetzung mit Albert Memmi, Robert Miles, Immanuel Wallerstein, Etienne Balibar, etc. erlaütern. (shrink)

In section 1, I develop epistemic communism, my view of the function of epistemically evaluative terms such as ‘rational’. The function is to support the coordination of our belief-forming rules, which in turn supports the reliable acquisition of beliefs through testimony. This view is motivated by the existence of valid inferences that we hesitate to call rational. I defend the view against the worry that it fails to account for a function of evaluations within first-personal deliberation. In the rest of (...) the paper, I then argue, on the basis of epistemic communism, for a view about rationality itself. I set up the argument in section 2 by saying what a theory of rational deduction is supposed to do. I claim that such a theory would provide a necessary, sufficient, and explanatorily unifying condition for being a rational rule for inferring deductive consequences. I argue in section 3 that, given epistemic communism and the conventionality that it entails, there is no such theory. Nothing explains why certain rules for deductive reasoning are rational. (shrink)

Credences are beliefs about evidential probabilities. We give the view an assessment-sensitive formulation, show how it evades the standard objections, and give several arguments in support.

We debate whether permissivism is true. We start off by assuming an accuracy-oriented framework, and then discuss metaepistemological questions about how our epistemic evaluations promote accuracy.

A Boltzmann Brain, haphazardly formed through the unlikely but still possible random assembly of physical particles, is a conscious brain having experiences just like an ordinary person. The skeptical possibility of being a Boltzmann Brain is an especially gripping one: scientific evidence suggests our actual universe’s full history may ultimately contain countless short-lived Boltzmann Brains with experiences just like yours or mine. I propose a solution to the skeptical challenge posed by these countless actual Boltzmann Brains. My key idea is (...) roughly this: the skeptical argument that you’re one of the Boltzmann Brains requires you to make a statistical inference, but the Principle of Total Evidence blocks us from making the inference. I discuss how my solution contrasts with a recent suggestion, made by Sean Carroll and David Chalmers, for how to address the skeptical challenge posed by Boltzmann Brains. And I discuss how my solution handles certain relevant concerns about what to do when we have higher-order evidence indicating that our first-order evidence is misleading. (shrink)

This article gives a Bayesian argument showing that, even if your total empirical evidence confirms that you have zillions of duplicate Boltzmann Brains, that evidence does not confirm that you are a Boltzmann Brain. The article also attempts to explain what goes wrong with several of the sources of the temptation for thinking that such evidence does have skeptical implications.

This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism’s implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it’s okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of ‘ideally rational’. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on the interpretation (...) of this approach that lifts the requirement of certainty in all logical truths, the view becomes vacuous, issuing no requirements on rational believers at all. Finally, I develop and endorse a new solution to the problem. This view proposes dynamic norms for reasoning with credences. The solution is based on an old proposal of Ian Hacking’s that says you’re required to be sensitive to logical facts only when you know they are logical facts. (shrink)