A collection of essays (the first appearing in 2001, the second and third, appearing in expanded form (the form translated here) in 2006), translated into English.

In this essay, I offer an interpretation of J. G. Fichte’s account of human sexuality and its relation to sexual inequality and social justice and apply this interpretation to contemporary questions about gender, equality and justice. According to my interpretation of Fichte, sexual intercourse provides a primary natural relationship—initiated by woman—wherein human beings cultivate their capacities for communication or reciprocal influence by expressing desires guided by both feeling and reason. Thus, the interchange of sexual love and (...) solicitude is the original basis for all other social skills and ultimately for any form of social justice. (shrink)

Some difficulties arise when considering the 1930 encyclical letter of Pope Pius XI, Casti connubii, and the 1997 Vademecum for Confessors in light of the consistent teaching of the magisterium on the intrinsic evil of every contraceptive act. One difficulty is how to reconcile certain teachings of these two documents, which clearly allow for some sort of cooperation with a spouse who voluntarily renders the marital act infecund, with the absolute prohibition against formally acting in a contraceptive manner. The author (...) provides a care­ful reading of the documents that takes into account related magisterial and curial decisions, and shows that the documents reveal a consistent teaching. The teaching permits a certain limited cooperation with a spouse who renders the marital act infecund in a so-called natural way (e.g., natural onanism, or withdrawal) but excludes active material cooperation in sexual acts with a spouse who employs a condom or its equivalent. This teaching has relevance to recent debates about the prophylactic use of condoms among spouses. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.2 (Summer 2011): 301–328. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 126.1 (2005) 138-142 [Access article in PDF] Kathy L. Gaca. The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics, and Political Reformin Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity. Hellenistic Culture and Society 40. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. xviii + 359 pp. Cloth, $60. As the current attention to same-sex marriage attests, religious communities and politicians today are concerned with sexual activity and rules, (...) viewing [End Page 138] them as correlated with particular kinds of social orders and values. Since second-wave feminism and Foucault, classicists and historians of early Christians have given considerable attention to how ancients themselves were concerned with sexual activity and its bearing on social, political, and religious life. Kathy Gaca's study contributes fresh insights about the saliency of religious ideology to understanding the different kinds of "sexual blueprints" produced by Greek philosophers, biblical authors and their interpreters, and early Christians. The Making of Fornication takes as its starting point a challenge to Foucault's argument for fundamental continuity in sexual morality between Greek and early Christian thought. Gaca argues instead that historically successful forms of Christianity are more discontinuous than continuous with Greek philosophy.Porneia exemplifies the break Gaca charts: "the Greek biblical sense of 'fornication' should not be confused with in the non-biblical Greek sense.... as 'fornication' requires biblical monotheism to be intelligible as a sexual rule, insofar as sexual intercourse and procreation are fornicating, and forbidden, by virtue of not being dedicated to the Lord alone. In the non-biblical Greek sense, however, means 'prostitution' and has nothing to do with worshipping God alone" (20). Sexual activity in non-biblical Greek understandings was nonetheless closely linked to piety, and philosophers crafted their moral sexual visions in accordance with their understandings of how sexual desires, practices, and reproduction relate to the gods and cosmic order. Gaca argues that the combination of Greek biblical ideas and non-biblical Greek associations of sex with the gods led to Christian "practices of intense sexual asceticism among converted Greeks and other gentiles.... Since alien gods such as Aphrodite remained so potent a presence in human sexuality, it seemed critical to put an end to exercising her sexual energy rather than to defy God" (304). She sees this ascetic trend differently expressed in the first-century writings of Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus and the second-century writings of the Christians Tatian and Clement of Alexandria.This three-part work unfolds as a study of different views about sexual activity, even as it builds a larger argument about "the motivating philosophical and religious principles behind Christian sexual asceticism" (9). In each part's chapters, Gaca charts the range of visions for how sexual activity does and should correlate with social order held by Greek philosophers (Part 1: Platonic, Stoic, and Pythagorean), biblical texts and their interpreters (Part 2: Septuagint, Paul of Tarsus, and Philo of Alexandria), and three second-century Christians (Part 3: Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, and Epiphanes).For Gaca, Tatian and Clement of Alexandria craft their respective Christian ideals in monogamous heteroerotic, reproductive terms adapted from biblical traditions as well as some aspects of Platonic and Pythagorean thought (notably an emphasis on the regulation of sexual desire and procreative ideal for sex, respectively); their two versions of sexual norms (Tatian rejecting all sexual activity, Clement conceding only non-libidinous procreative marital sex) should be understood as a response to the religious associations of sex and sexual desire [End Page 139] among gentiles, especially Greeks (303-304). Epiphanes represents a historically unsuccessful alternative trajectory for early Christian sexual norms, in its basic presuppositions (of egalitarianism as a norm for community which extends to a rejection of marriage), in its relationship to Greek philosophy (in continuity with many early Stoic ideals about egalitarian communalism), and in its interpretation of Paul (using Gal. 3:28 as an interpretive key over 1 Cor. 6:18).In Part 1 Gaca aims to correct for a lack of attention to early Stoic material among classicists and ancient historians... (shrink)

A man has sexual intercourse with his three-year-old niece. Teenagers standing beside a highway throw large rocks through the windshields of passing cars. A woman intentionally drives her car into a child on a bicycle. Cabdrivers cut off ambulances rushing to hospitals. Are these actions wrong? If we hesitate to say yes, that is only because the word ‘wrong’ is too mild to express our responses to such acts.

In describing and explaining the sexes, medicine and science participated in the delineation of what was "feminine" and what was "masculine" in the Middle Ages. Hildegard of Bingen and Albertus Magnus, among others, writing about gynecology, the human constitution, fetal development, or the naturalistic dimensions of divine Creation, became increasingly interested in issues surrounding reproduction and sexuality. Did women as well as men produce procreative seed? How did the physiology of the sexes influence their healthy states and their susceptibility to (...) disease? Who derived more pleasure from sexual intercourse, men or women? The answers to such questions created a network of flexible concepts which did not endorse a single model of male-female relations, but did affect views on the health consequences of sexual abstinence for women and men and on the allocation of responsibility for infertility - problems with much social and religious significance in the Middle Ages. Sometimes at odds with, and sometimes in accord with other forces in medieval society, medicine and natural philosophy helped to construct a set of notions that divided significant portions of the world - from the behavior of animals to the operations of astrological signs - into "masculine" and "feminine." Even cases that seemed to exist outside the definitions of this duality, for example, hermaphrodite features or homosexual behavior, were brought under control by the application of gendered labels, such as "masculine women.". (shrink)

Written for non-specialists, this concise and accessible work by moral philosopher Kevin L. Flannery engages in a careful reflection of the moral issues of greatest importance in the lives of Christians today. After introductory chapters on the relationship between ethics and church teaching, and on the relevance of action theory--the study of the nature and structure of human actions--Flannery applies Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas's theory of human action to the following topics: sexual morality, reproduction, killing and keeping alive, cooperation (...) in the evil acts of others, and conscience. The book treats a number of controversial issues, not so much because they are controversial, but because they usefully explain the philosophical principles underlying church teaching. Flannery considers, for example, whether it is moral for a spouse who has contracted a disease such as HIV or AIDS to make use of a prophylactic during sexual intercourse. Flannery also addresses whether it is moral for a politician to vote in favor of legislation that permits same-sex marriage, or for a family or doctor to withdraw nutrition and hydration from a patient in a vegetative state. A major theme discussed throughout the book is intention and its effect on the moral character of human acts. ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Kevin L. Flannery, S.J., professor of philosophy at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, is author of many works on ethics and on the history of logic, including Acts Amid Precepts: The Aristotelian Logical Structure of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory (CUA Press). (shrink)

Le sexe est le plus grand des vides de la philosophie. Il est arrivé, dans certains textes notoires, de nous trouver à deux doigts du délit porno-philosophique. Mais les penseurs ont, à ce moment-là, fermé les volets de leur imaginaire. Pourtant, chaque position sexuelle, chaque pratique, chacun des états dans lequel le sexe nous met, correspond à une conception philosophique de la chose. Ainsi, l'ouvrage prend le parti d'étudier sexe et philosophie du point de vue du sujet sexuel : " (...) Je baise donc je suis ", en quelque sorte. De nombreuses questions peuvent ainsi être reprises sous l'angle de l'interrogation philosophique : la levrette ne serait-elle pas l'expression symbolique d'un retour à l'état de nature tel qu'il a été vu par Rousseau et le 69 celle d'un nouveau " contrat social "... sexuel? Si, pour Simone de Beauvoir, " on ne naît pas femme, mais on le devient ", alors la position de l'Andromaque aide-t-elle à devenir femme? Et l'usage du sextoy relève-t-il de ce qu'Heidegger nomme, à propos de l'objet technique, la modification de notre rapport à la nature? Après le succès de Rock'n Philo, Francis Métivier poursuit avec intelligence et pertinence sa réflexion philosophique. Il est accompagné dans cet exercice d'Ovidie, réalisatrice, écrivain et ancienne actrice pornographique, dont il a été le professeur de philosophie. (shrink)

It is important to know as precisely as possible when a human being comes into existence. This can occur in ordinary circumstances after sexual intercourse. It can also occur in a nonsexual manner by various types of cloning and genetic engineering techniques and in naturally occurring monozygotic identical twining in vivo. Many scientists and physicians, in an effort to avoid being accused of abuse of human embryos in their research and in the practice of abortion, have falsified the (...) facts about human conception for many years throughout the world, creating moral confusion and error. This essay is meant to clarify this situation. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 10.2 (Summer 2010): 251–256. (shrink)

Freud and especially Lacan understand the sexual identity of the human subject as an effect of a law. The article emphasizes that this symbolic law is arbitrary and it sketches the consequences of this insight for both a symbolic determination of the sexual difference and of the sexual interaction among different sexual desires. When the sexual difference is reduced to a dual opposition (suspended in sexual intercourse) and when the sexual desire is (...) understood as a conscious straining after the appropriate and attainable object, then the symbolic identity of the desiring subject is misunderstood and replaced by an imaginary presentation of it. Traditional philosophy and contemporary pornography are examples of such a misunderstanding : they both try to overcome the impossibility to fully understand a deferring difference and to avoid the symbolic dependency on a foreign desire that cannot be controlled. (shrink)

According to the contralife argument, because both contraception and natural family planning entail at least a contralife motivation to have marital intercourse but avoid pregnancy, both should be forbidden—a conclusion rejected by the natural law tradition and Church teaching, which forbid contraception but permit NFP. This paper argues that the principle of double effect can be applied to explain why contraception is forbidden but NFP is permissible. This double-effect analysis evaluates the good effect of procreation and unity against the (...) bad effect of lustful sexual pleasure. This paper argues that contraception fails to meet the conditions of the PDE, because it intends sexual pleasure in isolation from procreation and unity and is therefore forbidden. Conversely, NFP meets the conditions of the PDE because, as with all permissible sexual intercourse, it intends sexual pleasure in conjunction with procreation and unity and is therefore itself permissible. (shrink)

In this essay, it is submitted that consent comes in degrees and the wrongfulness and harmfulness of conduct is contingent on the degree of voluntariness underwriting the particular consent decision. A fully free decision to consent changes the normative nature of the act: genuine gift-giving is not theft. Lovemaking is not rape. Partially free decisions to consent can change the nature of the act if it makes the act less harmful and thus less wrongful. Partial consent is not about claiming (...) that the conduct was partially justified, but rather about demonstrating the particular act was less harmful and thus deserving of a less serious crime label than is found in the label rape simpliciter. A second theme picked up in this essay is the issue of conditional consent. It is submitted that breaching a condition (conditions such as D is rich, D is a pacifist, D does not have HIV and so on) of consent to sexual intercourse will not change otherwise consensual nature of the sexual intercourse itself, but it may give rise to criminal liability for the collateral harm caused such as HIV infection. (shrink)

Criminal attempts require intent to commit an offence. But what constitutes such intent? Some cases are fairly straightforward. I act with intent to convert stolen goods if I intend that the goods I purchase be stolen. A man acts with intent to commit rape if he intends that the sexual intercourse be non-consensual. Other cases leave room for reasonable disagreement. Did a man intend to convert criminal property when he purchased goods which he suspected might be stolen? And (...) did a man intend to rape a woman when he tried to have intercourse with her and was reckless about consent? Does recklessness as to the circumstance elements of an offence suffice for intent? Building on the view that attempts are failed attacks (as opposed to acts of endangerment), I argue that recklessness about circumstances is not enough for intent since such recklessness amounts to an act of endangerment. This is not to suggest that a man does nothing wrong in trying to have sex with a woman while being reckless about consent; it is to argue that he should be convicted of an endangerment offence, rather than an attempt. If we take seriously the idea that attempts are failed attacks, and that attacks and endangerments constitute different types of moral wrong, we have good reason to preserve this distinction in our offence labels by insisting that the fault element for attempts should require at least knowledge or belief as to the relevant circumstances of an offence. (shrink)

A distinctive feature of modern capitalist societies is the tendency of the market to take over the production, maintenance, and distribution of goods that were previously produced, maintained, and distributed by nonmarket means. Yet, there is a wide range of disagreement regarding the proper extent of the market in providing many goods. Labor has been treated as a commodity since the advent of capitalism, but not without significant and continuing challenges to this arrangement. Other goods whose production for and distribution (...) on the market are currently the subject of dispute include sexual intercourse, human blood, and human body parts such as kidneys. How can we determine which goods are properly subjects of market transactions and which are not? The purpose of this article is to propose a theory of what makes economic goods differ from other kinds of goods, which can help to answer this question. (shrink)

It is possible to defend the Church’s teaching that contraception is incompatible with God’s plan for sexuality in many different ways. This essay sketches the fundamental views of reality common to all the defenses and the main lines of the most prominent defenses, some based on natural law, on the theology of the body, and on the physical, psychological, and social consequences of the use of contraception. While all the defenses have merit, the argument based on the recognition that (...) class='Hi'>sexual intercourse is meant to be a complete self-gift has a special power of its own. (shrink)

There are two distinct ways for someone to place conditions on their morally valid consent. The first is to place conditions on the moral scope of their consent—whereby they waive some moral claim rights but not others. The second is to conditionally token consent—whereby the condition affects whether they waive any moral claim rights at all. Understanding this distinction helps make progress with debates about so-called “conditional consent” to sexual intercourse in English law, and with understanding how individuals (...) place conditions on their morally valid consent in other contexts. (shrink)

The compilers of the Hippocratic gynaecological treatises often recommend sexual intercourse as part of treatments for women’s diseases. In addition, they often prescribe the use of ingredients that are obvious phallic symbols. This paper argues that the use of sexual therapy in the Hippocratic gynaecological treatises was more extended than previously considered. The Hippocratic sexual therapies involve a series of vegetable ingredients that were sexually connoted in antiquity, but have since lost their sexual connotations. In (...) order to understand the sexual signification of products such as myrtle and barley, one must turn to other ancient texts, and most particularly to Attic comedies. These comedies serve here as a semiotic guide in decoding the Hippocratic gynaecological recipes. However, the sexual connotations attached to animal and vegetable ingredients in these two genres have deeper cultural and religious roots; both genres exploited the cultural material at their disposal. (shrink)

This article compares two versions of a story about a Tibetan Buddhist monk, Sgra tshad pa Rin chen rnam rgyal, who engages in sexual intercourse with a laywoman. The authors of these two narratives, dating from the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, each provide a different rationale for the monk’s behavior. In the earlier telling, Rin chen rnam rgyal is said to have “eased the suffering” of a “lust-crazed” woman, conducting himself virtuously, as a bodhisattva. In the later telling, (...) the monk is forcibly seduced by his patron and he adheres to a provision found in the Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya, which specifies that the usual punishment intended for a Vinaya transgression of sexual intercourse—loss of communion from the order—may be commuted if the act has not been concealed from others. This article focuses on the transformation of the story and proposes that its changes contribute to the author’s wider commentary on strict Vinaya observance as an element of Buddhist monastic exemplarity. (shrink)

We cannot easily condemn in principle a policy where people are non-voluntarily sterilized with their informed consent (where they accept sterilization, if they do, in order to avoid punishment). There are conceivable circumstances where such a policy would be morally acceptable. One such conceivable circumstance is the one (incorrectly, as it were) believed by most decent advocates of eugenics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to exist: to wit, a situation where the human race as such is facing (...) a threat. Perhaps today's Chinese experience with a threat of overpopulation is a more realistic example? Finally, there is some room for a kind of non-voluntary (and coercive) sterilization without informed consent. I think of people who are severely mentally retarded, and who cannot understand how sexual intercourse relates to conception. If some of these persons are fertile and sexually active, it may very well be the morally right thing to do to sterilize these persons, in their own best interest, but without their consent - if necessary even through coercive means. (shrink)

This paper applies models of the onset of adolescent sexual intercourse using national data from Denmark and the USA. The model gave excellent fits to data on Danish Whites and a good fit to American Whites, but the model-fits for American Blacks and Hispanics were not as good. The weakness of the latter model fits may reflect either real processes that the model does not capture or problems in the reliability of adolescent sexuality data.

abstract The so‐called ‘morning‐after pill’ is a drug that prevents pregnancy if taken no later than 72 hours after presumably fertile sexual intercourse. This article argues against a right of conscientious objection for pharmacists with regard to dispensing this drug. Some arguments that might be advanced in support of this right will be considered and rejected. Section 2 argues that from a philosophical point of view, the most relevant question is not whether the morning‐after pill prevents implantation nor (...) is it whether preventing implantation is tantamount to abortion. Section 3 suggests a more general philosophical question as most pertinent, namely whether and to what extent a pharmacist can justifiably be exempted from dispensing the morning‐after pill when to do so would entail participating in something that goes against his or her deepest moral or religious convictions. Section 4 explains why, within liberal institutions, pharmacists should not have the right to conscientious objection to dispensing the morning‐after pill. (shrink)

ABSTRACT‘Rape by deception’ occurs when the victim ‘consents’ to sexual penetration as a result of certain sorts of deception by the perpetrator. The legal and philosophical literature on rape by deception has almost exclusively concentrated on cases wherein victims are brought to ‘consent’ to sexual intercourse by deception. Broadening our focus to consider sexual penetration in other contexts reveals a puzzle: if penetration in the context of sexual intercourse premised on deception is rape, is (...) sexual penetration in the context of masturbation as a result of deception rape? (shrink)

My focus within the topic of abortion is on several models that are used to support the position that a woman has a responsibility to sustain the fetus she carries because she brought about its existence. I consider the following models: a creator, strict liability, fault, and a contract. Although each of these models has been used by opponents of abortion to support the position that women should accept the consequences of engaging in sexual intercourse, I argue that (...) none of the models is adequate. (shrink)

In men and women sexual arousal culminates in orgasm, with female orgasm solely from sexual intercourse often regarded as a unique feature of human sexuality. However, orgasm from sexual intercourse occurs more reliably in men than in women, likely reflecting the different types of physical stimulation men and women require for orgasm. In men, orgasms are under strong selective pressure as orgasms are coupled with ejaculation and thus contribute to male reproductive success. By contrast, women's (...) orgasms in intercourse are highly variable and are under little selective pressure as they are not a reproductive necessity. The proximal mechanisms producing variability in women's orgasms are little understood. In 1924 Marie Bonaparte proposed that a shorter distance between a woman's clitoris and her urethral meatus (CUMD) increased her likelihood of experiencing orgasm in intercourse. She based this on her published data that were never statistically analyzed. In 1940 Landis and colleagues published similar data suggesting the same relationship, but these data too were never fully analyzed. We analyzed raw data from these two studies and found that both demonstrate a strong inverse relationship between CUMD and orgasm during intercourse. Unresolved is whether this increased likelihood of orgasm with shorter CUMD reflects increased penile–clitoral contact during sexual intercourse or increased penile stimulation of internal aspects of the clitoris. CUMD likely reflects prenatal androgen exposure, with higher androgen levels producing larger distances. Thus these results suggest that women exposed to lower levels of prenatal androgens are more likely to experience orgasm during sexual intercourse. . (shrink)

The orgasm gap is the marked difference in the frequency of orgasm between cisgender men and women in heterosexual intercourse that has been documented in research for decades. However, orgasm as a state of intense sexual excitement and gratification is physiologically uncomplicated and readily available for most people regardless of gender. This article undertakes a philosophical study of the processes by which the individual experience of orgasm is invested with meaning and embedded in social and cultural practices that (...) collectively both produce and sustain the orgasm gap. By looking at the experience of orgasm as horizonal, I draw a distinction between the social and the cultural horizons of sexual experiences. I argue that social standards of sexual modesty make sexuality a field where the process through which we make sense of our individual experiences is especially dependent on how these experiences are depicted in cultural representation. The current socially normalised male perspective in cultural representation continues to conflict with the ways orgasm is experienced in female bodies. This is probably one reason why the orgasm gap persists even in countries where sex education and gender equality are highly advanced. (shrink)

The idea that there is a coherent and morally relevant concept of sexual perversions has been increasingly called into question. In what follows, I will be concerned with two recent attacks on the notion of sexual perversion: those of Graham Priest and Igor Primoratz. Priest’s paper is the deeper of the two. Primoratz goes methodically through various accounts of sexual perversion and finds difficulties in them. This is no small task, of course, but unlike Priest he does (...) not attempt to provide any diagnosis of why any attempt to analyse the concept of sexual perversion must fail. Priest argues that sexual perversion is an “inapplicable concept”: the presuppositions that would allow us to make sense of the notion have been rightly rejected. Without the theoretical backdrop of an Aristotelian moral teleology, we cannot provide a satisfactory account of sexual perversion, for only such a teleological world-view allows us to give some sense to the idea that a sexual practice might be morally wrong because it is unnatural. Priest surveys accounts of perversion that don’t appeal to any idea of unnaturalness and rejects them—rightly I believe. But, Priest argues, Aristotle’s own moral teleology is part and parcel of his wider views about purpose in nature. This natural teleology has been shown to be explanatorily superfluous. Though some sciences still talk of functions, this can be understood in terms of contributions to evolutionary survival. Though there is considerable disagreement about the details of the right account of function, all versions of this scientifically respectable teleology are morally neutral: it would not follow from the fact that homosexual intercourse does nothing to propagate the agents’ genetic material to future generations that it is therefore morally wrong. Here too I think Priest is right. He also considers what he calls “Aristotelian revivalism” in Roger Scruton’s account of sexual perversion. I think Priest sells Aristotelianism short. I have no interest in defending Scruton’s own understanding of the Aristotelian moral framework nor his particular account of sexual perversion. I shall, however, argue that Aristotelian moral philosophy provides a more useful framework for thinking about these issues than Priest implies, and attempt to defend an account of sexual perversion within the context of this framework. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Notes and Fragments SARTRE AND SEXISM by Hazel E. Barnes Insofar as is possible, I want to consider here not Sartre the man but Sartre the philosopher—or, more precisely, the philosophy of Sartre. To askwhether Sartre's long association with Simone de Beauvoir was a model of human relations at their best or an example ofbad faith on both sides is not to my present purpose. Nor are his numerous, (...) sometimes rather unsavory affairs with other women. Of course, the man and his work cannot be separated entirely. Sartre himselfadmitted that despite his wholehearted support of women's liberation, there remained in him vestiges of ingrained male chauvinism which he found difficult to eradicate.1 We should expect to find echoes of these in his writing, and we do—not in the ideas but in the imagery and rhetoric, and these not only in the fiction but in the philosophical works. The grossest example is the well-known passage in which Sartre discusses the "existential meanings" ofslime and holes.2 Slime, the great "Antivalue," is "a moist and feminine sucking" and "a sickly-sweet feminine revenge." Moreover—and this is even worse—Sartre allows his meditation on holes to lead by a process of his own associations to the idea ofa woman's sex as "a voracious mouth" evoking the male castration complex. This is not the only place where Sartre links female with notions of a treacherous receptivity. Furthermore, such passages are complemented by others where Sartre employs male sexual imagery to describe the activity of consciousness. Knowledge is portrayed as penetration and conquest. He points out, without objecting, that banal metaphors of everyday language suggest that "knowing" has overtones of carnal knowing and sexual violation: "What is seen is possessed; to see is to deflower.... The unknown object is given as immaculate, as Philosophy and Literature, © 1990, 14: 340-347 Hazel E. Barnes341 virgin, comparable to a whiteness.... Man has not yet 'snatched' its secret away from it.... Figures of speech... like that of the 'unviolated depths of nature' suggest the idea ofsexual intercourse more plainly."3 There can be no doubt that a full investigation ofthe linguistic codes in Sartre's writing would reveal him to be a man comfortably ensconced in a world of male dominance. Yet Collins and Pierce in their excellent article, "Holes and Slime: Sexism in Sartre's Psychoanalysis," even as diey deplore Sartre's sexist language and his failure to depict any fictional female characters as embodiments of existential authenticity, admit that these weaknesses are at variance with the central philosophy ofBeing and Nothingness and not derived logically from it.4 I agree, and diat is why I hold that the sexism is there but is contingent, relevant to our appraisal of die writer but not essential to ourjudgment on the philosophy and its potential value as a support to feminism. In saying this I am partially making the sort of distinction employed by Jean Grimshaw, who points out that a philosophy built on male assumptions may exclude women essentially as with Kant, inconsistendy as with Aristode, or inadvertendy as with Descartes.5 The difference with Sartre is that in spite of the occasional lapse into traditional male linguistic tropes, the work, like its author, is notjust theoretically egalitarian but concerned explicidy with forms of oppression and the problems of disfavored groups. More than that of any other male writer, Sartre's philosophy seems to me to demand feminism as one of its natural consequences. That diis has been historically true is shown, ofcourse, by the fact that Simone de Beauvoir used Sartrean existentialism as the foundation for her own original analysis of women's situation in TL· Second Sex. The irony is diat this book, which played a key role in launching the movement for women's liberation throughout the world, has been adversely criticized by later feminists precisely on the grounds of its Sartrean orientation, along with Beauvoir's emphasis on women's right to share the things men value rather than to challenge those values. Beauvoir herself later recognized that the book did not go far enough, but she never renounced what she had written there. My claim... (shrink)

Eliminating sexual violence requires understanding where it comes from and why it happens. We must learn to detect when the grounds for violence are being built up so that we can promptly take them down. How can we improve our ability to notice the subtle practices of sexism and make them a matter of critical reflection? The aim of this paper is to show how film can enhance critical perception of the social conditions that give rise to sexual (...) violence in particular. We do this by way of a specific example, showing how Joyce Chopra’s 1985 film Smooth Talk serves to display the complex circumstances that make sexual violence possible – thereby illustrating Frye’s philosophical insight about the interconnected mechanisms of oppression.​ -/- . (shrink)

The paper aims to analyze three discussions pertaining to the artificial intelligence project that took place on both sides of the “Iron Curtain” since the 1960s: 1) E.V. Ilyenkov – D.I. Dubrovsky (USSR), 2) H. Dreyfus – computer scientists (USA), 3) H. Dreyfus – H. Collins (USA – UK). The authors observe the originality of the arguments of Soviet philosophers in comparison with the discussions in the US and UK. The basis for a comparative analysis of these discussions is the (...) typology of social intercourse paradigms, which assumes the existence of three fundamentally different views of humans as social beings: the information-instrumental, the existential-phenomenological, and the social-institutional paradigms. These views correlate with the ideas about humans within different theoretical structures examining artificial intelligence. The information-instrumental paradigm poses the problem of social intercourse regarding communication, material, and informational exchange (D.I. Dubrovsky, computer scientists). The social-institutional paradigm considers social intercourse as personification, actualization, and implementation of the structural characteristics of social relations (E.V. Ilyenkov). The existential-phenomenological paradigm characterizes social intercourse as the realization of the internal potency of a self-conscious individual (H. Dreyfus). The paper exposes that the theoretical and methodological foundations of the discussions under consideration are similar to the paradigmatic foundations of the analysis of social intercourse in social philosophy and social sciences. There are “two and a half floors” in the research of problems associated with the entry of artificial intelligence technologies into the everyday life of society: 1) philosophy, computer and cognitive sciences; 2) social sciences; 3) interdisciplinary research. A particular paradigmatic structure and a unique research problem characterize each of them. In conclusion, “new old questions” are highlighted that structure the field of contemporary social analytics for studying artificial intelligence and artificial sociality. (shrink)

1 Philosophers on Sexuality Ancient Philosophy A positive and constructive philosophy of sexuality is largely a product of the twentieth century. ...

In his moral writings, Kant states that moral duty cannot be derived from “the special characteristics of human nature.” This statement is untenable if one takes seriously Kant 's moral views on sexual desire. Instead close study reveals that considerations based on both morality and nature play a role here. The combination of these two elements leads to inconsistencies and difficulties in Kant 's understanding of sexual desire, but they enable us to better understand the importance Kant attributes (...) to marriage within his philosophy of law. (shrink)

The sexual abuse of women and girls, such as sexual harassment, battery, varieties of rape, prostitution, and pornography, is statistically pervasive in late modern society. Yet this fact does not register adequate ethical concern. I explore this gap in moral perception. I argue that sexual abuse is conceptually supported by an ontology of women that considers a lack of bodily integrity as natural and by a sex-specific idea of freedom that considers sexual violations as liberating. This (...) conceptual framework is pernicious because it supports abuse and interferes with our moral perception of harm, encouraging us to see harms as normal and as positive. I argue that Heidegger’s idea of philosophy and the resources of his epistemological and ontological project in Being and Time can help show the pernicious function of this conceptual framework and thus help us better understand this abuse. (shrink)

The adaptive trade-offs between long- and short-term matings may be mediated or at least reflected partially by the trade-offs between the relative reinforcement obtained through a greater frequency of intercourse (typically greater among cohabitants) versus a greater frequency of partner change. The differing correlates of each approach and meshing with the Sexual Strategies Theory of Gangestad & Simpson are discussed.

This encyclopedia article on the philosophy of sexuality discusses the main themes, concepts, and debates in the field, including the metaphysics (or philosophical anthropology) of sex, the morality of sexual behavior, pragmatic and utilitarian evaluations of sexuality, and sexual perversion.

These three papers present a quite diverse and complementary set of answers to the question, “Why Sexuality Matters to Philosophy.” They show the ways in which sexuality as an issue may be of interest to philosophers working on a wide range of questions. The theme of sexuality appears as both subject matter and context for the development of scientific theories of human behavior, as a pervasive dimension of the representation of everyday life, and as a social phenomenon raising important questions (...) bearing on the implications of equal citizenship for persons of different genders and sexualities. Sexuality reveals itself as implicated in epistemology and philosophy of science, aesthetics and ethics, political philosophy and jurisprudence. Sexuality as a subject matter provides rich examples for extending the treatment of quite traditional problems. At the same time, by identifying sexuality as a fundamental human phenomenon, fraught with normative implications and closely linked to emotional and bodily life, these papers show how thinking about sexuality may also act to unsettle and redefine certain important areas of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Starting from Scheler’s claim that eros is the essence of life, this paper examines his theory of sexuality. I firstly consider “sexual love”, taking into account Scheler’s doctrine of value-emotions, particularly his view on “appetite”. Then I consider “sexual instinct”, putting forward Scheler’s criticism of Freud’s ontogenetic theory. Lastly I discuss Scheler’s view on the metaphysical importance of human sexual intercourse.

Women and men are biologically and reproductively dissimilar. This sexual distinctiveness gives rise to a “sexual asymmetry”—the fundamental reality that the potential consequences of sexual intercourse are far more immediate and serious for women than for men. Advocates of contraception and abortion sought to cure sexual asymmetry by decoupling sex from procreation, relieving women from the consequences of sex, and thus equalizing the sexual experiences of men and women. But efforts to suppress or reject (...) biological difference have not relieved women of the consequences of sex and the vulnerabilities of pregnancy, even as they have further relieved men. Although secular feminist responses to biological difference have served to exacerbate sexual asymmetry, Catholic teaching on abortion, sex, and marriage—even contraception—provides an authentically pro-woman cultural response. (shrink)