This book offers a comprehensive philosophical investigation of ignorance. Using a set of cognitive tools and models, it discusses features that can describe a state of ignorance if linked to a particular type of cognition affecting the agent’s social behavior, belief system, and inferential capacity. The author defines ignorance as a cognitive condition that can be either passively borne by an agent or actively nurtured by him or her, and a condition that entails epistemic limitations that affect the agent’s behavior, (...) belief system, and inferential capacity. The author subsequently describes the ephemeral nature of ignorance, its tenacity in the development of human inferential and cognitive performance, and the possibility of sharing ignorance among human agents within the social dimension. By combining previous frameworks such as the naturalization of logic, the eco-cognitive perspective in philosophy and concepts from Peircean epistemology, and adding original ideas derived from the author’s own research and reflections, the book develops a new cognitive framework to help understand the nature of ignorance and its influence on the human condition. (shrink)

"This unique text develops an original theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between trauma and time by combining phenomenological and psychoanalytical traditions. Moving beyond Western psychoanalytical and phenomenological traditions, this volume presents new perspectives on the assessment and treatment of trauma patients. Powerfully illustrating how the temporal dimension of a patient's symptoms has until now been overlooked, the text presents a wealth of research literature to deepen our understanding of how trauma disrupts individual temporal experience. Ultimately, the resulting phenomena that (...) occur, positions time as a transdiagnostic psychological dimension, closely connected to the subject's sense of self. This text will benefit researchers, academics, and educators with an interest in psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and trauma and dissociation studies more broadly. Those specifically interested in the philosophy of the mind, Freud, and psychotherapy will also benefit from this book. Selene Mezzalira has completed PhDs in Philosophy and Clinical Psychology at the University of Padova, Italy, and Ryokan College, USA respectively. She has been a visiting scholar at Columbia University in the city of New York and at the University of California, Irvine, USA"--. (shrink)

In this paper we aim at discussing cognitive and epistemic features of online communities, by the use of cognitive niche constructions theories, presenting them as virtual cognitive niches. Virtual cognitive niches can be considered as digitally-encoded collaborative distributions of diverse types of information into an environment performed by agents to aid thinking and reasoning about some target domain. Discussing this definition, we will also consider how online communities, as networks displaying a social bias, can both foster civic awareness and promote (...) problematic group-led behaviors in the virtually aggregated crowds. To support this affirmation, we will take into account the use of online communication networks during crises and we will argue that it can lead to ethically dubious consequences. (shrink)

O presente ensaio visa apresentar de forma breve e modesta uma introdução à filosofia da mente, deste modo, abordaremos os seguintes tópicos: I) a relevância e a contribuição do dualismo para a filosofia da mente, posteriormente surgindo a reflexão sobre mente-cérebro; e, finalmente, II) o argumento do zumbi filosófico. A partir desta apresentação conclui-se que os tópicos levantados sobre a relevância do dualismo para a filosofia da mente e debate em torno do argumento do zumbi filosófico contribua para a inquietação (...) e investigação sobre a mente. (shrink)

During the second half of the last century, the importance of serendipitous events in scientific frameworks has been progressively recognized, fueling hard debates about their role, nature, and structure in philosophy and sociology of science. Alas, while discussing the relevance of the topic for the comprehension of the nature of scientific discovery, the philosophical literature has hardly paid attention to the cognitive significance of serendipity, accepting rather than examining some of its most specific features, such as its game-changing effect, the (...) unexpectedness of its occurrence, and its affinity with the concept of “luck”. Thus, in this paper we aim at analyzing these characteristics in the light of their cognitive implications in the recognition, performance, and possible stimulation of serendipitous events in relation to scientific discoveries. (shrink)

In this paper, we aim at explaining the relevance of thought experiments in philosophy and the history of science by describing them as particular instances of two categories of creative thinking: metaphorical reasoning and abductive cognition. As a result of this definition, we will claim that TEs hold an ignorance-preserving trait that is evidenced in both TEs inferential structure and in the process of scenario creation they presuppose. Elaborating this thesis will allow us to explain the wonder that philosophers of (...) science have consistently shown for TEs, as well as the high functionality of TEs in the creative aspects of scientific and philosophical praxis. (shrink)

An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via the original article.

Visual perspective during autobiographical memory (AM) retrieval influences how people remember the emotional aspects of memories. Prior research in emotion regulation has also shown that shifting from an own eyes to an observer-like perspective is an efficient way of regulating the affect elicited by emotional AMs. However, the impact of shifting visual perspective is also dependent on the nature of the emotion associated with the event. The current review synthesizes behavioral and functional neuroimaging findings from the event memory and emotion (...) regulation literature that examine how adopting particular visual perspectives and actively shifting across them during retrieval alters emotional experience, by primarily focusing on emotional intensity. We review current theories explaining why shifts in perspectives may or may not change the emotional characteristics of memories, then propose a new theory, suggesting that the own eyes and observer-like perspectives are two different retrieval orientations supported by differential neural activations that lead episodic details to be reconstructed in specific ways. (shrink)

At the neuronal level, the visual experience is continually interrupted by moments of blindness due to the saccades, the rapid ocular movements that accompany the dynamic exploration of the visual scene. Unlike what happens during ocular stasis, in which the salient information about the surrounding space is collected and processed in the visual system, the saccadic movements are instead associated with an inhibition mechanism, through which the conscious processing of the stimuli is systematically interrupted. How is it possible that the (...) information gathered in the course of the saccades is integrated into a unique and coherent experience? A ‘remapping’ mechanism of inputs at their meeting with the neuronal fields of sensory receptors has been assumed as a fundamental factor in the explanation of the maintenance of visual continuity through the constant change of the retinal coordinates of perceived objects. Subjective time is elusive if we assume that the clock time is the only ‘real’ and ‘objective’ time. In contrast, subjectivity shows modes of timing that are irreducible at the time of clocks – modes, which refer to unconscious modalities of experiencing an ‘extended present’ that is not made of instant points, but of processes qualitatively different from the experimentally measured time. (shrink)

Prism adaptation is a form of visuomotor training that produces both sensorimotor and cognitive aftereffects depending on the direction of the visual displacement. Recently, a neural framework explaining both types of PA-induced aftereffects has been proposed, but direct evidence for it is lacking. We employed Structural Equation Modeling, a form of effective connectivity analysis, to establish directionality among connected nodes of the brain network thought to subserve PA. The findings reveal two distinct network branches: a loop involving connections from the (...) parietal cortices to the right parahippocampal gyrus, and a branch linking the lateral premotor cortex to the parahippocampal gyrus via the cerebellum. Like the sensorimotor aftereffects, the first branch exhibited qualitatively different modulations for left versus right PA, and critically, changes in these connections were correlated with the magnitude of the sensorimotor aftereffects. Like the cognitive aftereffects, changes in the second branch were qualitatively similar for left and right PA, with greater change for left PA and a trend correlation with cognitive aftereffects. These results provide direct evidence that PA is supported by two functionally distinct subnetworks, a parietal–temporal network responsible for sensorimotor aftereffects and a fronto-cerebellar network responsible for cognitive aftereffects. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno claims that a philosophy that tried to imitate art would defeat itself, yet he seems to have based his own model for philosophical interpretation, which he compares to changing constellations, on Gustav Mahler’s musical montage The paper first examines two aspects of montage that Adorno mentions in his reading of the Ländler: its reified working material and its combinatory procedure. Next, these aspects are located within the interpretive model advanced in the inaugural lecture of 1931. The latter (...) part of the paper makes a case for the philosophically binding force of constellations by drawing on the concepts of aesthetic semblance [ästhetischer Schein] and praxis. (shrink)

RESUMEN: La libertad de expresión es un derecho aún pendiente por garantizar por parte del Estado mexicano si éste se considera comprometido con el resguardo de los derechos humanos. Prueba de lo anterior, son las numerosas violaciones de sus derechos a periodistas y personas defensoras de derechos humanos, lo que se traduce en un Estado en el que ejercer la libertad de expresión, se puede estar firmando una sentencia de muerte. ABSTRACT: Freedom of expression is a still pending right to (...) be guaranteed by the Mexican State if he considers itself committed with the safeguarding human rights. Proof of the previous text, are the numerous violations to journalist rights and human right defenders, which it translates into a state in which to exercise freedom of expression, could be a death sentence.PALABRAS CLAVE: libertad de expresión, derechos humanos, estado constitucional, México.KEYWORDS: freedom of expression, human rights, constitutional state, Mexico. (shrink)

Selene Arfini seeks to resolve a long-standing paradoxParadox and the seemingly exclusive dichotomy between knowledgeKnowledgeand ignoranceIgnorance (also Aching Ignorance) through the concept of serendipity. How can we find new knowledgeKnowledge when we do not know what are we looking for? This question is a brief version of Meno’s or the Learner’s ParadoxParadox, which still manages to be upsetting in contemporary philosophy, despite having been discussed since Plato’s times. Arfini believes that the paradoxParadox still upsets because we strongly connect the (...) explicit act of searching to the event of finding, in the same way as we describe the ideas of knowledgeKnowledge and ignorance as opposite and unrelated. Arfini argues that these assumptions live on, thanks to a cluster of misconceptions that still envelop the ideas of discoveryDiscovery (also, Scientific Discovery), which could be overcome by utilizing insights from recent studies in serendipity, and by reframing ignoranceIgnorance (also Aching Ignorance)from a cognitiveCognition, Cognitive (-offloading) (-trajectory) (-probatonics) perspective. (shrink)

In this paper we address the classical but still pending question regarding Thought Experiments: how can an imagined scenario bring new information or insight about the actual world? Our claim is that this general problem actually embraces two distinct questions: how can the creation of a just imagined scenario become functional to either a scientific or a philosophical research? and how can Thought Experiments hold a strong inferential power if their structures “do not seem to translate easily into standard forms (...) of deduction or induction”? :534–541, 1999). We contend that, in order to answer both questions, we should consider the relation between the creation of the imagined scenario and the inferential power of Thought Experiments. Specifically, we will analyze Thought Experiments from an eco-cognitive point of view as goal-oriented objects, explaining their inferential power considering their generation as the result of abductive cognition and the construction of an imagined scenario as a process of scientific modeling. This will lead us to consider the creation of a Thought Experiment as a case of sophisticated model-based abduction. (shrink)

Ignorance is easily representable as a cognitive property of more than just individual subjects: groups, crowds, and even populations can share the same ignorance regarding particular concepts and ideas. Nevertheless, according to some theories that refer to the extension, distribution, and situatedness of human cognition, ignorance is hardly a state that can be extended, distributed, and situated in the same way in which knowledge is in our eco-cognitive environment. In order to understand how these contradictory takes can come across in (...) a coherent description of ignorance, in this paper I aim at analyzing the impact of the agent’s ignorance in her ecological and cognitive environment, as well as the effect that the surrounding context has on the agent’s epistemological successes and downfalls. To this end I will adopt the cognitive and empirically sensitive perspectives of the distributed cognition, the extended mind and cognitive niches construction theories, which will help me address and answer three topical questions: (a) adopting the theories about the extended mind, the distributed cognition, and the cognitive significance of affordances can we describe ignorance as extended and distributed in spaces, artifacts, and other people? (b) extending or distributing ignorance in one’s eco-cognitive environment has the same cognitive and ecological impact of extending or distributing knowledge? (c) can we recognize instantiations of externalized or distributed ignorance? I will argue that by acknowledging the extended, distributed, and situated dimension of ignorance in cognitive niches we could recognize the impact that our ignorance and uncertainty has on how we manipulate and organize our environment and also how our eco-cognitive frameworks affect the perception of our epistemological states. (shrink)

The potential development of self-driving cars (also known as autonomous vehicles or AVs – particularly Level 5 AVs) has called the attention of different interested parties. Yet, there are still only a few relevant international regulations on them, no emergency patterns accepted by communities and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), and no publicly accepted solutions to some of their pending ethical problems. Thus, this paper aims to provide some possible answers to these moral and practical dilemmas. In particular, we focus on (...) what AVs should do in no-win scenarios and on who should be held responsible for these types of decisions. A naturalistic perspective on ethics informs our proposal, which, we argue, could represent a pragmatic and realistic solution to the regulation of AVs. We discuss the proposals already set out in the current literature regarding both policy-making strategies and theoretical accounts. In fact, we consider and reject descriptive approaches to the problem as well as the option of using either a strict deontological view or a solely utilitarian one to set AVs’ ethical choices. Instead, to provide concrete answers to AVs’ ethical problems, we examine three hierarchical levels of decision-making processes: country-wide regulations, OEM policies, and buyers’ moral attitudes. By appropriately distributing ethical decisions and considering their practical implications, we maintain that our proposal based on ethical naturalism recognizes the importance of all stakeholders and allows the most able of them to take actions (the OEMs and buyers) to reflect on the moral leeway and weight of their options. (shrink)

In corvids and apes, cognition evolved convergently instead of being inherited by a shared ancestor. In biology, natural kinds are classified according to common ancestry. So, if we were to apply the same strategy to psychology, cognition among corvids and apes would not be the same natural kind. However, Cameron Buckner claims that cognition is a natural kind. I suggest that by using Ladyman and Ross’s strategy of taking natural kinds as real patterns, we can support that cognition is a (...) natural kind. Cognition seems to have the properties of predictability and compressibility, which are necessary conditions for real patternhood. Thus, convergent evolution examples of cognition, such as that found in corvids and apes, can be the same natural kind. (shrink)

Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full (...) resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character. (shrink)

Intense interspecies engagements are central to the work of ecologists, as they seek to understand our rapidly changing world. To explore researcher-bird engagements in ecological fieldwork, we use a lens of care. Taking as a starting point the widely shared photos of bird-in-the-hand that portray situations where individual birds become sources of data about populations, we show the significance of complex care work in ethically and epistemically loaded moments. Crucial knowledge about survival, biodiversity loss and animal welfare emerges at the (...) intersection of multispecies care for individuals, for populations and for knowledge infrastructures. We put forth the concept of intermittent care to explain the changing concerns for individual birds here-and-now or for populations of the future. Attention to care therefore helps unravel how ecological knowing depends on entanglements between humans, nature, and technologies that take shape through a constant negotiation of different strands and matters of multispecies care. (shrink)

Cicero’sTimaeuslegitimately stands as the first Latin exegesis of the Platonic dialogue. I shall deal with the interpretation of §§19–21, a passage that departs significantly from the Greek text in several respects. The aim of this paper is to explore the role Aristotelianism might have played in Cicero’sTimaeus. Among the points that support such an analysis is the mention of the Peripatetic Cratippus in the prologue. The interpretative scenario I suggest considers both Cratippus’ role and Antiochus’s philosophical system with its agreement (...) between Platonism and Aristotelianism. (shrink)

O transtorno obsessivo-compulsivo submete o portador a um ciclo de pensamentos e comportamentos em busca de uma satisfação momentânea. Os sintomas são semelhantes, independente da faixa etária, e as repercussões se dão nos principais setores da vida dos acometidos por transtorno. Por isso, o tratame..

Riassunto: Le “distorsioni” temporali paiono riguardare l’agentività umana in tutte le proprie manifestazioni. Da una prospettiva strutturale, l’azione si manifesta come un intreccio di processi che fondamentalmente comprende la formulazione di un’intenzione, l’esecuzione di un movimento e infine il processamento di un feedback che include gli effetti dell’azione. Lo studio dell’agentività umana ha incontrato molti ostacoli dovuti principalmente alla complessità dei processi mentali che accompagnano azioni specifiche. E tuttavia studi recenti hanno gettato luce sui processi mentali sottostanti l’azione. In questo (...) articolo intendo sostenere che, lungi dall’essere “distorsioni” temporali, le discrepanze tra tempo soggettivo e tempo oggettivo mostrano più profonde modalità soggettive inconsce di costituzione del tempo, che aggirano l’indagine scientifica e puntano direttamente alla costituzione fenomenologica di una rappresentazione del mondo coerente e dotata di significato, che non può essere ulteriormente ridotta mediante il riferimento al tempo oggettivo. Parole chiave: Soggettività; Tempo; Agentività; Distorsioni temporali; Esperienza Temporal Distorsions and Consciousness of Intentional Action: Temporal “distortions” seem to affect human agency in all its manifestations. From a structural point of view, action manifests itself as a plot of processes that essentially include the formulation of an intention, the execution of a motion, and, finally, processing feedback including the effects of the action. The study of human agency has encountered several obstacles which are mainly due to the complexity of mental processes that accompany specific actions. Yet recent studies have shed light on the mental processes underlying action. In my paper I argue that, far from being temporal “distortions”, mismatches between subjective time and objective time indicate deeper unconscious subjective modes of in-forming time, which bypass scientific exploration and point directly to the phenomenological constitution of a consistent and meaningful representation of the world, which cannot be further reduced by referring to clock time. Keywords: Subjectivity; Time; Agency; Temporal Distorsions; Experience. (shrink)

Theodor W. Adorno claims that a philosophy that tried to imitate art would defeat itself, yet he seems to have based his own model for philosophical interpretation, which he compares to changing constellations, on Gustav Mahler’s musical montage (the first Ländler from the second movement of the Ninth Symphony.) The paper first examines two aspects of montage that Adorno mentions in his reading of the Ländler: (1) its reified working material and (2) its combinatory procedure. Next, these aspects are located (...) within the interpretive model advanced in the inaugural lecture of 1931. The latter part of the paper makes a case for the philosophically binding force of constellations by drawing on the concepts of aesthetic semblance [ästhetischer Schein] and praxis. (shrink)

Este ensaio aborda o conceito de amizade em Kant, e procura relacioná-lo com amoral, o direito e a política kantianos. Como forma de introduzir a temática, começa otexto com uma abordagem do conceito e dos tipos de amizade apresentados por Aristóteles.Após isso, aborda o conceito e os tipos de amizade apresentados por Kant, tanto naDoutrina da Virtude (A Metafísica dos Costumes) quanto nas Preleções sobre Ética. O textotrata então dos problemas e das vantagens que o conceito kantiano de amizade representa,para, (...) por fim, procurar, sob inspiração de Aristóteles, aproximar a temática da amizadeem Kant de suas filosofias moral, jurídica e política. (shrink)

In the first part of this chapter, I summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings. In the second part, I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind and identify some of the themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind.

How have online communities affected the ways their users construct, view, and define their identity? In this paper, we will approach this issue by considering two philosophical sets of problems related to personal identity: the “Characterization Question” and the “Self-Other Relations Question.” Since these queries have traditionally brought out different problems around the concept of identity, here we aim at rethinking them in the framework of online communities. To do so, we will adopt an externalist and cognitive point of view (...) on online communities, describing them as virtual cognitive niches. We will evaluate and agree with the Attachment Theory of Identity, arguing that there is continuity between offline and online identity and that usually the latter contributes to the alteration of the former. Finally, we will discuss ways users can enact self-reflection on online frameworks, considering the impact of the Filter Bubble and the condition of Bad Faith. (shrink)

Introduction: Despite being considered as a contravention under some countries’ legislation, the therapeutic use of Cannabis sativa has been growing in Brazil, due to the promising results observed in many pathologies. Such a scenario has fostered the need to deepen discussions on the subject and possibly revise legislation governing the substance use and access. Objectives: Identify the types of stigma related to the therapeutic use of Cannabis and describe the strategies people use to overcome stigma. Methods: This integrative review was (...) carried out in the databases PubMed, Scopus, CINAHL, MEDLINE, PsycINFO, Web of Science, and Cochrane Library, with 565 articles being retrieved. Triads’ cross-check were done, first maintaining the “cannabis” and “therapeutic use” pair, added by “stigma,” “bioethics,” “ethics,” “social consequences,” and “legal consequences.” The final selection resulted in six articles. Ethical Consideration: However, the ethical issues that pervade and regulate decisions on this subject must be considered. Results: Different dimensions and types of stigma related to the therapeutic use of Cannabis have been identified. The bioethical principle of autonomy was an expression of citizenship and human rights, mitigating internal conflicts related to self-stigma and the effects of external stigma on the person’s life. Conclusion: It was possible to identify the types of stigma related to the therapeutic use of Cannabis is an internal dimension represented (self-stigma) and an external dimension, represented (social and structural stigmas) and to identify strategies adopted to face this stigma: skills training group for users, elaboration of laws and specific programs to clarify the therapeutic use of Cannabis with a greater social scope, and support for family members. Thus, contributing to the building of people’s autonomy in a broader context of decision-making autonomy and executive autonomy will provide the development of people’s capacity to perform complex tasks of self-management and, consequently, to continue promoting and preserving their decision-making process and their capacity to plan and perform tasks associated with managing their lives and their treatments. (shrink)

In the essays which make up The Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch gives us a picture of moral life in which ‘the metaphor of vision [is] almost irresistibly suggested’. This chapter aims to clarify the role played by the metaphor of vision in Murdoch’s philosophical thinking. I’ll examine two different things which might be meant by the term ‘moral vision’: vision of moral things or vision which is itself moral. The suggestion will be that whilst both capture something important about (...) Murdoch’s work, each may mislead about what is distinctive in her views. For Murdoch, I shall suggest, there is no distinctively moral vision. There is only vision: a loving gaze directed upon the reality of others. (shrink)

We review three broadly geometrodynamical---and in part, Machian or relational---projects, from the perspective of spacetime functionalism. We show how all three are examples of functionalist reduction of the type that was advocated by D. Lewis, and nowadays goes by the label `the Canberra Plan’. The projects are: the recovery of geometrodynamics by Hojman et al. ; the programme of Schuller and collaborators to deduce a metric from the physics of matter fields; the deduction of the ADM Hamiltonian by Gomes (...) and Shyam. We end by drawing a positive corollary about shape dynamics: namely, it has a good rationale for the Hamiltonian it postulates. (shrink)

Why is gauge symmetry so important in modern physics, given that one must eliminate it when interpreting what the theory represents? In this paper we discuss the sense in which gauge symmetry can be fruitfully applied to constrain the space of possible dynamical models in such a way that forces and charges are appropriately coupled. We review the most well-known application of this kind, known as the 'gauge argument' or 'gauge principle', discuss its difficulties, and then reconstruct the gauge argument (...) as a valid theorem in quantum theory. We then present what we take to be a better and more general gauge argument, based on Noether's second theorem in classical Lagrangian field theory, and argue that this provides a more appropriate framework for understanding how gauge symmetry helps to constrain the dynamics of physical theories. (shrink)

For Kant, the human cognitive faculty has two sub-faculties: sensibility and the understanding. Each has pure forms which are necessary to us as humans: space and time for sensibility; the categories for the understanding. But Kant is careful to leave open the possibility of there being creatures like us, with both sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have different pure forms of sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and discursive cognizers. But they would not be human. And this raises a (...) question about the pure forms of the understanding. Does Kant leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers who have different categories? Even if other discursive cognizers might not sense like us, must they at least think like us? We argue that textual and systematic considerations do not determine the answers to these questions and examine whether Kant thinks that the issue cannot be decided. Consideration of his wider views on the nature and limits of our knowledge of mind shows that Kant could indeed remain neutral on the issue but that the exact form his neutrality can take is subject to unexpected constraints. The result would be an important difference between what Kant says about discursive cognizers with other forms of sensibility and what he is in a position to say about discursive cognizers with other forms of understanding. Kantian humility here takes on a distinctive character. (shrink)

Une trité d'argent portant au droit la scène de l'enlèvement de la Nymphe et au revers la légende ΒΕΡΓΑΙΟΥ fait partie d'un trésor de monnaies d'argent provenant du cimetière classique de Gazôros (Serrés). D'après le contexte archéologique, sa date d'enfouissement doit être située au milieu du IVe siècle. Deux imitations des tritai d'argent de Thasos, cinq hemiécta thasiens, un hemi- écton d'Eiôn et un hémidrachme de Néapolis faisaient également partie du trésor. Les hemiécta thasiens, qui datent des dernières décennies du (...) Ve siècle, ont eu un rôle particulièrement important dans la circulation monétaire de la région. La présence de la monnaie à la légende ΒΕΡΓΑΙΟΥ dans ce trésor nous a obligée à faire une étude approfondie de cette série, qui date des premières décennies du IVe siècle. La question de l'autorité émettrice de ces monnaies ainsi que des bronzes à la légende ΒΕΡΓ, attribués par O. Picard à la cité de Berge, est discutée. Les monnaies d'argent sont également attribuées à cette cité ; la légende avec l'ethnique au génitif neutre est interprétée comme signifiant la dénomination, selon un usage attesté par les inscriptions. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether 'even if A, B' is pragmatically polysemic, so that a nonconcessive conditional may have 'even if', and whether concessive conditionals, pragmatically defined, can fail to have 'even if' or a non-temporal 'still'. Different paraphrases are used to help elucidate pragmatic meanings. A theory of the pragmatic meanings of concessive and implicative conditionals is presented. The semantic meaning of 'even if' and the question of whether concessive conditionals imply the truth of their consequents are also discussed.

Chapter 4 of Dennis Schulting’s book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism targets those commentators who take there to be a gap in the transcendental deduction of the categories, arguing instead that there is no gap between the necessary application of the categories and their exemplification in the object of experience. In these comments on the chapter, I suggest a minimal sense in which the fact that there is a gap is non-negotiable. The interesting question is not whether there is a gap which (...) needs to be bridged, but how and why Kant makes the step from subjectivity to objectivity. (shrink)

It is argued that contraposition is valid for a class of natural language conditionals, if some modifications are allowed to preserve the meaning of the original conditional. In many cases, implicit temporal indices must be considered, making a change in verb tense necessary. A suitable contrapositive for implicative counterfactual conditionals can also usually be found. In some cases, the addition of certain words is necessary to preserve meaning that is present in the original sentence and would be lost or changed (...) in the contrapositive without them. A distinction is made between adding new meaning and adding new words to preserve existing meaning. For concessive conditionals and relevance conditionals, however, no valid contrapositive can be found. They do not belong to the class of contraposable conditionals, which can be independently defined. Difficult cases are also discussed in which the contradictory of the consequent semantically entails the truth of the antecedent. In such cases the content of the antecedent is implicit in the meaning of the consequent. Contraposition becomes possible if what is implicit in the original consequent is made explicit in the contrapositive antecedent. (shrink)

In this paper, we will re-elaborate the notions of filter bubble and of echo chamber by considering human cognitive systems’ limitations in everyday interactions and how they experience digital technologies. Researchers who applied the concept of filter bubble and echo chambers in empirical investigations see them as forms of algorithmically-caused systems that seclude the users of digital technologies from viewpoints and opinions that oppose theirs. However, a significant majority of empirical research has shown that users do find and interact with (...) opposing views. Furthermore, we argue that the notion of filter bubble overestimates the social impact of digital technologies in explaining social and political developments without considering the not-only-technological circumstances of online behavior and interaction. This provides us with motivation to reconsider this notion’s validity and re-elaborate it in light of existing epistemological theories that deal with the discomfort people experience when dealing with what they do not know. Therefore, we will survey a series of philosophical reflections regarding the epistemic limitations of human cognitive systems. In particular, we will discuss how knowledge and mere belief are phenomenologically indistinguishable and how people’s experience of having their beliefs challenged is cause of epistemic discomfort. We will then go on to argue, in contrast with Pariser’s assumptions, that digital media users might tend to conform to their held viewpoints because of the “immediate” way they experience opposing viewpoints. Since online people experience others and their viewpoints as material features of digital environments, we maintain that this modality of confronting oneself with contrasting opinions prompts users to reinforce their preexisting beliefs and attitudes. (shrink)

What method should we use to determine the nature of perceptual experience? My focus here is the Kantian thought that transcendental arguments can be used to determine the nature of perceptual experience. I set out a dilemma for the use of transcendental arguments in the philosophy of perception, one which turns on a comparison ofthe transcendental method with the first-personal method of early analytic philosophy, and with the empirical methods of much contemporary philosophy of mind. The transcendental method can avoid (...) this dilemma only if it commits to our possessing a capacity for imaginative reflection, one which is capable of identifying certain formal properties of experience.This result indicates some of the commitments which must be made if transcendental arguments are to be used in the philosophy of perception, and it has implications for those views that take the philosophy of perception to be autonomous of the empirical science of perception. (shrink)