"Ludvig Holberg was the foremost representative of the Danish-Norwegian Enlightenment and also a European figure of note. He was an Enlightenment thinker in the conventional sense, with significant works in natural law and history, but also a very important body of moral essays and epistles. He authored several engaging autobiographies and European travelogues; and - not least - a major utopian novel that was a European bestseller, a couple of interesting satires, and a large number of plays, mainly comedies. These (...) comedies have secured Holberg's status as the most significant playwright in Scandinavia before Ibsen and Strindberg; his plays remain hugely popular and have hardly been off the stage since he died. Through his extensive oeuvre, but especially through his plays, Holberg had a decisive influence on the formation of modern Danish as a literary language, something that was a self-conscious effort on the part of a man who saw himself as an educator of the public. Despite all these accomplishments Holberg is most often remembered outside of the Nordic countries for Edvard Grieg's Holberg Suite and in the title of one of the most prestigious prizes in the humanities. It is the aim of the contributors to this volume to revive Holberg as a very major figure from a very minor corner of the Enlightenment world, presenting the latest scholarship from Scandinavia on the main areas of Holberg's work with serious emphasis on the wider European Enlightenment context and perspectives. It will appeal to all those researching intellectual history, history of philosophy, literary history/studies, theatre studies, church historiography, Scandinavian studies and Enlightenment Europe."--. (shrink)

Ludvig Holberg is best known in eighteenth-century studies for his utopian novel Nicolai Klimii iter subterraneum (1741), which was translated into at least half a dozen languages (Niels Klim in En...

Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms `encroach' on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed `moral encroachment views'. This paper distinguishes between variants of the moral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment views compare to classical pragmatic encroachment accounts.

I argue that inferences from highly probabilifying racial generalizations are not solely objectionable because acting on such inferences would be problematic, or they violate a moral norm, but because they violate a distinctively epistemic norm. They involve accepting a proposition when, given the costs of a mistake, one is not adequately justified in doing so. First I sketch an account of the nature of adequate justification—practical adequacy with respect to eliminating the ~p possibilities from one’s epistemic statespace. Second, I argue (...) that inferences based on demographic generalizations tend to disproportionately expose group members to the risks associated with mistakenly assuming stereotypical propositions, and so magnify the wrong involved in relying on such inferences without adequate justification. (shrink)

Some, but not all, of the mistakes a person makes when acting in apparently necessary self-defense are reasonable: we take them not to violate the rights of the apparent aggressor. I argue that this is explained by duties grounded in agents' entitlements to a fair distribution of the risk of suffering unjust harm. I suggest that the content of these duties is filled in by a social signaling norm, and offer some moral constraints on the form such a norm can (...) take. (shrink)

Sometimes speakers within a linguistic community use a term that they do not conceptualize as a slur, but which other members of that community do. Sometimes these speakers are ignorant or naïve, but not always. This article explores a puzzle raised when some speakers stubbornly maintain that a contested term t is not derogatory. Because the semantic content of a term depends on the language, to say that their use of t is semantically derogatory despite their claims and intentions, we (...) must individuate languages in a way that counts them as speaking our language L, assigns t a determinately derogatory content in L, and still accommodates the other features of slurs’ linguistic profile. Given the difficulty of doing this, there is some reason to give a non-semantic analysis of the derogatory aspect of slurs. The author suggests that rather than dismissing the stubborn as semantically incompetent, we would do better to appeal to expected uptake as moral reasons for the stubborn to adjust their linguistic practices. (shrink)

Kant's influence on the history of philosophy is vast and protean. The transcendental turn denotes one of its most important forms, defined by the notion that Kant's deepest insight should not be identified with any specific epistemological or metaphysical doctrine, but rather concerns the fundamental standpoint and terms of reference of philosophical enquiry. To take the transcendental turn is not to endorse any of Kant's specific teachings, but to accept that the Copernican revolution announced in the Preface of the Critique (...) of Pure Reason sets philosophy on a new footing and constitutes the proper starting point of philosophical reflection.In this volume a team of leading philosophers explore the concept of the transcendental as it developed through history, focusing on approaches to the transcendental project by Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Bernard Williams. By giving systematic shape to historical material, the volume provides a unique resource for systematic reflection on transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's 'Philosophy of Nature' has often been accused of promoting a view of nature fundamentally at odds with the modern scientific understanding of nature. I show this accusation to be false by pointing to two aspects of Hegel's treatment of nature: its rejection of the 'a priori/a posteriori' distinction, and its connection to Hegel's conception of autonomy as freedom from givenness. I give a reading of Hegel's treatment of the laws of motion along these lines, and I (...) close with some points connecting this reading of Hegel to contemporary philosophy (specifically John McDowell and Catherine Malabou). (shrink)

Carnap’s search for a criterion of empirical significance is usually considered a failure. I argue that the results from two out of his three different approaches are at the very least problematic, but that one approach led to success. Carnap’s criterion of translatability into logical syntax is too vague to allow for definite results. His criteria for terms—introducibility by chains of reduction sentences and his criterion from “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”—are almost trivial and have no clear relation to (...) the empirical significance of sentences. However, his criteria for sentences—translatability, verifiability, falsifiability, confirmability—are usable, and under the assumptions needed for the Carnap sentence approach, verifiability, falsifiability, and translatability become equivalent. As a result of the Carnap sentence approach, metaphysics is rendered analytic. (shrink)

The sheer multitude of criteria of empirical significance has been taken as evidence that the pre-analytic notion being explicated is too vague to be useful. I show instead that a significant number of these criteria—by Ayer, Popper, Przełęcki, Suppes, and David Lewis, among others—not only form a coherent whole, but also connect directly to the theory of definition, the notion of empirical content as explicated by Ramsey sentences, and the theory of measurement; two criteria by Carnap and Sober are trivial, (...) but can be saved and connected to the other criteria by slight modifications. A corollary is that the ordinary language defense of Lewis, the conceptual arguments by Ayer and Popper, the theoretical considerations by Przełęcki, and the practical considerations by Suppes all apply to the same criterion or closely related criteria. Furthermore, the equivalence of some criteria allows for their individual justifications to be taken cumulatively and, together with the entailment relations between nonequivalent criteria, suggest criteria for general auxiliary assumptions, comparative criteria, and more liberal conceptions of observation. (shrink)

Since the late 18th century, philosophy has suffered from a «crisis of identity» and other disciplines have menaced philosophy on her own territory. Literature, in particular, deals increasingly with genuinely philosophical questions. There seems to be a close interconnection between the crisis of metaphysics and the epistemological revalorisation of the Arts, particularly of literature. Literature, one might think, is defying philosophy’s competency on issues of knowledge and meaning. If a closer look reveals that, indeed, new literary styles of writing such (...) as Friedrich Schlegel’s or Søren Kierkegaard’s fi nd their roots in the crisis of philosophy, it simultaneously reveals that this does not necessarily mean that one has to speak of a «rivalry» between philosophy and literature. Rather one could ask if philosophy, confronted with the problem of the «ineffable», would not have to evolve into literature in order to remain philosophy. (shrink)

The shift from state-led import-substitution industrialization to more market-oriented economic models often has the result of shrinking and demobilizing the labor movement. Yet, evidence from Argentina suggests that a subsequent resurgence of even a downsized labor movement may occur and furthermore that a type of “segmented neocorporatism” may be established in the new economic context. We argue that the establishment of this new form of interest intermediation is driven by economic and political factors that are both immediate and longer term. (...) In addition to the short-term condition of the labor market and the political strategy of the government in power, of longer-term importance are structural and institutional conditions that derive from the earlier process of market reform, specifically the nature of sectoral shifts in the economy and the degree of labor law deregulation affecting the “associational power” of unions. (shrink)

Review of Nicola Möβner’s 'Visual Representations in Science. Concept and Epistemology'. Forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien.

The book offers an up-to-date introduction to the essential phenomena, issues, and theoretical approaches of linguistic semantics. It covers the key aspects of word and sentence semantics. In his step-by-step development of the theme, the author puts great stock in the consistency, coherence, and understandability of the scientific approach. The new edition has been extensively revised, expanded, and updated.

This thesis is about the viability of meta-normative expressivism. On what I take to be the dominant conception of the view, it subscribes to two theses. First, that the meaning of sentences is to be explained in terms of the mental states these sentences conventionally express. Second, that there is a fundamental difference in the roles of the states expressed by normative sentences and the states expressed by descriptive sentences: descriptive sentences, according to expressivists, express mental states which are representational (...) and non-motivational, while normative sentences express non-representational and motivational states. Expressivism has attracted many naturalistically inclined philosophers for its ability to explain many of the distinctive features of normative discourse and thought, without adding entities to our ontology that are metaphysically and epistemologically problematic. In this way, expressivism promises to preserve the legitimacy of our ordinary normative practice within a naturalistic world-view, without giving up on any of its distinctive features. Despite it’s benefits, expressivism also faces significant problems. While one of these problems, the Frege-Geach Problem, has attracted a lot of attention, there are several other problems that have not been sufficiently addressed by. But, given that the reasonable assumption that the plausibility of philosophical theories needs to be assessed holistically, it seems that one should pay attention to these problems to be able to assess expressivism’s overall plausibility. In this thesis I explain how expressivists can solve two of these problems. The first problem the dissertation is concerned with is the normative attitude problem. This is a dilemma based on the challenge that expressivists need to give an account of the nature of the attitude that normative thinking consists in. The dilemma is then that expressivists could either do this by holding that normative thinking consists in sui generis attitudes, which is uninformative and potentially in conflict with naturalism, or by holding that normative thinking reduces to attitudes fully describable in non-normative terms, which is in conflict with our intuitions about normative thinking. I argue that this dilemma is structurally identical to a dilemma which meta-normative representationalism faces and that expressivists can use the same theoretical resources to address the normative attitude problem meta-normative representationalists have used to address their version of the dilemma. I also argue that these resources will not only help more traditional versions of expressivism, according to which normative thinking reduces to familiar kinds of attitudes fully describable in non-normative terms, but opens up the possibility of an expressivist view according to which normative thinking consists in sui generis attitudes. The second problem I consider is a challenge to a particular expressivist project: quasi-realism. Part of this project is to show that expressivism is compatible with a web of closely connected assumptions, namely, that normative thought and discourse are truth-apt and normative judgements are beliefs. While quasi-realists have made some progress in this direction, there is one relevant phenomenon that has so far been neglected, namely, those uses of that-clauses that are associated with propositional content. This is a problematic neglect, because that-clauses figure prominently in platitudes characterizing our ordinary notions of “truth-aptitude” and “belief ”, and so expressivists need to provide a plausible account of these uses of that-clauses which fits with their allowing that normative thought and discourse are truth-apt and normative judgements are beliefs. I address this challenge as follows: I first remove any worries that one might have that a plausible account of that-clauses that helps the quasi-realist could be given, by introducing the distinction between semantics and meta-semantics and locating expressivism at the level of metasemantics. I then develop a deflationist view of that-clauses which suits the quasi-realist’s purposes. I start by giving such a view for the use of that-clauses in meaning-attributions by expanding on the work of Wilfried Sellars. I then go on to explain how the account can be generalized to the use of that-clauses in belief-attributions and propositional attitude ascriptions more generally, in a way that allows expressivists to say that normative judgements are beliefs. (shrink)

_The implementation of the German energy transition is unclearly framed. The future of the transition depends on more than just technological development or economic feasibility. Rather, a positive attitude and an understanding by the general public are critical to its success. Therefore, communicating the complex, polarized and long-term process in an objective way is essential. We show that despite the alleged clarity of goals, German stakeholders have very diverse reasons for their support of the energy transition. One key reason mentioned (...) is climate protection. Another important goal is the desired independence from energy imports. This diversity is at the heart of the communication challenges. We see a wide variety of goals triggering trade-offs and challenges in understanding the process. Therefore, we suggest an infographic as an approach to communicating the energy transition to the general public with a focus on goals and related future challenges of the transition. We conclude that communication tools should promote an inclusive discussion and debate regarding the goals and challenges of a process, such as the energy transition, to help answer the question: How do we want to live in the future?_ _Keywords_: climate change, energy transition, communication, framing, media. (shrink)

Traducción de los texto encontrados en Leibniz, G. W. (1890). Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Vol. VII (C. Gerhardt, ed.). Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. Sobre el uso de la meditación: pp. 77-80. Sobre la vida feliz: p. 81. Sobre la generosidad: pp. 104-108. Traductor: Marvin Sebastián Estrada López. Revisado por: Andrés Botero Bernal.

Para este trabajo, seleccionamos los programas Bailando por un sueño, Intratables y El show de la mañana, y retomamos algunas expresiones de los sujetos que participaron en grupos de discusión durante los meses de octubre, noviembre y diciembre de 2016 en Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Rosario y Córdoba.Estos programas televisivos, en tiempos de una “democracia mediatizada”, son centrales en la modelización de lo político en un sentido muy distinto a lo que definía el concepto de “videopolítica” en los 90. (...) Uno de los cambios a considerar remite al impacto del desarrollo de internet y a los dispositivos asociados para un tipo de “participación mediatizada” en vivo, que transforma sustantivamente el lugar y la posición que tenía el espectador de los viejos medios masivos de comunicación. Con relación al “objeto” de estos programas, es posible identificar y reconstruir una modelización recurrente en el qué se dice y cómo; construcción ideológica que encuentra en la macro forma compartida del panel, por ejemplo, una manera de presentar “diversidad de voces”, en tanto expresión resultante del proceso de trabajo que vincula estética y política en la construcción de una “verdad” sobre el contexto político actual.La estrategia expositiva y argumentativa es la siguiente: 1) Presentamos y caracterizamos estructuralmente a los programas seleccionados y los vinculamos con expresiones rescatadas de los grupos de discusión. 2) Seleccionamos ejes de comparación que posibilitan la precisión de recurrencias entre ellos. 3) Finalmente, con los resultados del recorrido descriptivo y analítico, exponemos rasgos y dinámicas de las novedosas formas de estetización de lo político —en el sentido benjaminiano— como proceso orientado a que las masas —en nuestro caso, los individuos— expresen sus demandas. (shrink)

El presente artículo dialoga con la perspectiva del profesor de la Universidad de Stanford, John Searle en su perspectiva acerca de la conciencia, los actos de habla en lo que tiene que ver con la creación de hechos institucionales y su tesis emergentista. Esto con la idea de proponer la lectura del filósofo estadounidense en base a una pragmática de la expresión, que identifica al agente como centro de la creación y transformación social, y por tanto de movilización política, al (...) ser el reconocimiento colectivo quien mantiene el orden institucional. Por lo tanto, esa pragmática de la expresión identifica a los agentes como puntos esenciales de la creación del mundo social, desde el punto de vista del libre albedrio y la creación de mundos sociales posibles. (shrink)

Anhand der Mechanismen „Filterblase“ und „ Echokammer“ in digitalen Medien beleuchtet der Artikel, inwiefern Deweys funktionaler Öffentlichkeitsbegriff für die aktuelle Demokratiekrise mögliche Lösungsperspektiven erschließen lässt. Eine Rekonstruktion von Deweys Begriffen der Öffentlichkeit und der geteilten Erfahrung legt offen, dass der Aspekt der situativ-leiblich eingebundenen Erfahrung in der Forschungsdebatte zu digitalen Öffentlichkeiten nicht adäquat berücksichtigt wird. Darauf aufbauend lässt sich im Widerspruch zu einigen Debatten-Beiträgen zeigen, dass eine stärkere Rückbindung an lokale Lebenskontexte eine Voraussetzung dafür ist, diesen problematischen Mechanismen digitalisierter Medien (...) zu begegnen. (shrink)

Motives of espionage against ones own country in the light of idiographic studies The money is perceived as the common denominator among people who have spied against their own country. This assumption is common sense and appears to be self-evident truth. But do we have any hard evidences to prove the validity of such a statement? What method could be applied to determine it? This article is a review of the motives behind one's resorting to spying activity which is a (...) complex and multifarious process. I decided to present only the phenomenon of spying for another country. The studies on the motives behind taking up spying activity are idiographic in character. One of the basic methodological problems to be faced by the researchers of this problem is an inaccessibility of a control group. (shrink)

The subject of this article are two fundamental concepts of Hobbes’ political philosophy: “war of all against all” and political power. The analysis of anthropological basis of Hobbes’ political theory is of crucial importance for these considerations. It shows that the state of nature and the political state create dialectical relationship, not an insurmountable opposition. The further exploration leads to the conclusion that the sovereign power is identical with the rights and brutal actions of the individual living in the state (...) of nature. In other words, political state is merely a continuation of conflicts taking place in the “war of all against all”. In order to conceal this fact Hobbes provides the sovereign power with the ideological effect of objectivity. The power based in sheer violence is masked as Leviathan who exists in the minds of its subject, creating an illusion of a cohesive social order devoid of any antagonisms and, therefore, objective. (shrink)

Although the “frame problem” in philosophy has been raised in the context of the artificial intelligence, it is only an exemplification of broader problem. It seems that contemporary ethical debates are not so much about conclusions, decisions, norms, but rather about what we might call a “frame”. Metaethics has always been the bridge between purely ethical principles (“this is good and it should be done”, “this is wrong and it should be avoided”) and broader (ontological, epistemic, anthropological etc.) assumptions. One (...) of the most interesting meta-ethical debates concerns the “frame problem”: whether the ethical frame is objective and self-evident, or is it objective but not self-evident? In classical philosophy, this problem takes the form of a debate on the first principles: nonprovable but necessary starting points for any practical reasoning. They constitute the invisible but essential frame of every moral judgment, decision and action. The role of philosophy is not only to expose these principles, but also to understand the nature of the moral frame. (shrink)