A new etiological model is proposed for schizophrenia that combines variability‐enhancing nonspecific factors acting during development with more specific risk factors. This model is better suited than the current etiological models of schizophrenia, based on the risk factors paradigm, for predicting and/or explaining several important findings about schizophrenia: high co‐morbidity rates, low specificity of many risk factors, and persistence in the population of the associated genetic polymorphisms. Compared with similar models, e.g., de‐canalization, common psychopathology factor, sexual‐selection, or differential sensitivity to (...) the environment, this proposal is more general and integrative. Recently developed research methods have proven the existence of genetic and environmental factors that enhance developmental variability. Applying such methods to newly collected or already available data can allow for testing the hypotheses upon which this model is built. If validated, this model may change the understanding of the etiology of schizophrenia, the research models, and preventionbrk paradigms. (shrink)

On the face of it, some of our knowledge is of moral facts (for example, that this promise should not be broken in these circumstances), and some of it is of non-moral facts (for example, that the kettle has just boiled). But, some argue, there is reason to believe that we do not, after all, know any moral facts. For example, according to J. L. Mackie, if we had moral knowledge (‘‘if we were aware of [objective values]’’), ‘‘it would have (...) to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else’’(1977,p.38).But wehavenosuchspecialfaculty.So,wehavenomoralknowledge. Following Mackie, let us distinguish two questions: Q1: Assuming that we have moral knowledge, how do we have it? Q2: Do we in fact have any moral knowledge? In response to the first question, I argue that if we have moral knowledge, we have some of it in the same way we have knowledge of our immediate environment: by perception. Many people think that this answer leads to moral skepticism, because they think that we obviously cannot have moral knowledge by perception. But I will argue that this is incorrect. The plan for the paper is as follows. In Sections 2–4, I work up to my answer to Q1 by considering rivals. In Section 5, I explain what marks my answer to Q1 as a distinctive view, and defend it. In Section 6, I briefly discuss how this answer to Q1 affects what we say in response to Q2. (shrink)

How and why people's environmental values change is a topical research issue, with major implications for sustainability policy. However, approaches based on individualistic models have had limited success in explaining the emergence of values, or developing interventions to change them. Work drawing on social practice theory takes an alternative approach, seeing values and practice as co-constructive. This paper examines how personal environmental values evolve through performance of practice, experience within specific contexts and social interaction. Drawing on a narrative-based study of (...) UK climate change campaigners, it aims to contribute to a much-needed dialogue between sociological and psychological approaches to environmental values. (shrink)

In the last 50 years, multiauthored publications have become more prevalent, given the increasing number of collaborative, interdisciplinary, multicenter research studies. The determination of authorship credit and order is a difficult process, especially for graduate students, whose disadvantaged power position in research settings increases their vulnerability to exploitation. The American Psychological Association has published ethical standards for determining authorship credit, but the power difference inherent in the student-faculty relationship may complicate this ethical dilemma. The authors reviewed a number of previously (...) recommended strategies and proposed that determining authorship credit is most effectively facilitated through professional development. (shrink)

Henri Bergson's philosophy, which Sartre studied as a student, had a profound but largely neglected influence on his thinking. In this paper I focus on the new light that recognition of this influence throws on Sartre's central argument about the relationship between negation and nothingness in his Being and Nothingness. Sartre's argument is in part a response to Bergson's dismissive, eliminativist account of nothingness in Creative Evolution (1907): the objections to the concept of nothingness with which Sartre engages are precisely (...) those raised by Bergson. Even if Sartre's account of nothingness in its entirety is found to be flawed, I argue that the points he makes specifically against Bergson are powerful. My discussion concludes with a brief examination of the wider philosophical background to Sartre's and Bergson's discussion of nothingness: here I point to some important aspects of Sartre's early philosophy, including some features of his conception of nothingness, that may testify to Bergson's positive influence on his thought. (shrink)

Most, if not all, psychologists have served as teaching or research assistants during graduate school, been instructed by teaching assistants, or both. As both faculty and students themselves, graduate assistants are faced with several dilemmas for which they typically have little preparation or guidance. These issues are explored in the context of the existing literature on multiple relationships in academic settings. Recommendations are made for graduate assistants, their faculty supervisors or mentors, and administrators to proactively address and confront these challenges (...) in a manner consistent with the profession of psychology's ethics code and to minimize the potential for harm to those we are entrusted to teach. (shrink)

Mit diesem Aufsatz soll ein Beitrag zur Klärung von Nietzsches Humanitätsverständnis in binnenrelationaler Perspektive geleistet werden. Dabei wird in drei Schritten vorgegangen: Der erste Schritt setzt an den kritischen Vorzeichen von Nietzsches Humanitätsverständnis an. Hierbei geht es um die Skizzierung der kritischen Verfahren der genealogischen Kritik und des Perspektivismus. In einem zweiten Schritt soll sodann aufgezeigt werden, worin bei Nietzsche die genealogische Kritik ihren Halt findet, damit nicht jeglicher Wert destruiert wird. Dabei soll die binnenrelationale Perspektive des Individuums in der (...) Dimension der existentiellen Selbstanerkennung freigelegt werden. Trotz aller Emphase des Individuums bei Nietzsche geht es ihm stets um die Verbindung von Partikularem und Allgemeinem im Lebenszusammenhang. Diese Dimensionen kann der Mensch in seiner Binnenrelationalität selbst abwiegen. Nietzsches Verständnis des Selbst kann für ihn vor dem Hintergrund seines Anerkennungsverständnisses keinen essentialistischen Wesenskern beinhalten; das Selbst entwickelt sich für Nietzsche ursprünglich durch die sozialen Bezüge im Lebensvollzug: Es geht somit um die praktische Dimension, die immer schon relational verschränkt ist. In einem dritten Schritt soll Nietzsches Humanitätsverständnis als existentielle Selbstbeschreibung des Menschen herausgearbeitet werden. Indem Nietzsches kritische Vorzeichen berücksichtigt werden, zeigt sich, dass sich seine Kritik zentral auf ein bloß tradiertes Humanitätsverständnis richtet. Worauf es ihm dagegen ankommt, ist sein Verständnis des Individuums als „freier Geist“, der von sich aus in der Lage ist, sein Leben selbst in die Hand zu nehmen. (shrink)

Face-to-face meetings are often preferred over other forms of communication because meeting in person provides the “richest” way to communicate. Face-to-face meetings are so rich because many ways of communicating are available to support mutual understanding. With the progress of digitization and driven by the need to reduce personal contact during the global pandemic, many face-to-face work meetings have been shifted to videoconferences. With webcams turned on, video calls come closest to the richness of face-to-face meetings. However, webcam use often (...) remains voluntary, and some participants choose not to turn their cameras on. In order to find ways to support webcam use—when desired—we analyzed how social norms in groups affect the decision to activate a webcam in a specific meeting. Based on an online survey with N = 333 participants, we found that social norms are related to an individual’s decision to turn on the webcam, even when controlling for group size. If the number of participants with activated webcams in a university meeting increased by 25%, it was 5.92 times more likely that an individual decided to turn their webcam on, too. Furthermore, 81.84% of respondents indicated they would turn on their webcam if participants in a meeting were explicitly asked to do so. The results demonstrate a strong relation between social norms and the decision to activate a webcam in online meetings. They build a basis for enhancing webcam use and enable a greater richness of communication in online meetings. (shrink)

Star Trek is a successful popular cultural endeavor because it allows for exactly different kind of imaginative escapism, the possibility of joining in on an alternative narrative. In “The City on the Edge of Forever”, the Enterprise orbits a mysterious planet, where on its surface someone or something is causing temporal and spatial displacement. This chapter uses Romanticism as a philosophical gateway to the sublime experience that is the Guardian of Forever. The Guardian of Forever is the cause of the (...) spatial displacement and ripples in time that shake the Enterprise at the episode's beginning. Friedrich Nietzsche in his writings on Greek history, adopted the Romantic attitude toward the past by suggesting there are certain meaningful archetypes in the Greek past: in the context of “City on the Edge”, James T. Kirk represents the Tragic Hero, Spock the Apollonian figure, and McCoy the Dionysian figure. (shrink)

Work defines the lives of most people. Many people work overtime, work second jobs, or bring work home with them. It is often difficult to know when work stops and the rest of life begins. In a culture where work is central to our identities, good work is increasingly difficult to find. This article argues that one of the impediments to imagining a future beyond work is the productivist logic that predominates today, which determines labor and production to be key (...) activities and values. To sketch a path beyond work, the author turns to Marx, arguing that Marx provides an important critique of productivism and gestures toward a postwork future in his own writings. To do so, the author defends Marx against critiques of productivism. (shrink)

The present work explores interspecies intersubjectivity, including its content and limitations, through the paradigmatic instances of such relationships that are present among companion species. I aim to defend the claim that meaningful relationships are possible and do in fact occur between humans and nonhuman animals by appealing to both philosophical and empirical literature. I will also begin to delineate the content and limitations of these interspecies relationships.

Much of leftist political philosophy has uncritically accepted the logic of capitalism, which is a logic of conservation that presents itself as a logic of “production.” Many leftist political philosophers subscribe to capitalism’s fundamental myth—that capitalism produces the new. This appearance of proliferation, however, masks an underlying stasis. This article interrogates this trend in the apparently disparate projects of contemporary accelerationism and Jacques Rancière. The accelerationist project of immanence allows for newness only in quantity and not in quality, while Rancière, (...) coming closer to thinking radical newness in his account of politics, forecloses the possibility of a radically emancipatory society. I suggest an open ontology, which Marx offers, provides a better framework for thinking revolutionary newness. (shrink)

Constitution d’un grand corpus d’écrits émergents et novices : principes et méthodes Cette contribution propose une réflexion sur la construction d’un vaste corpus d’écrits qui permet d’approfondir notre compréhension des processus en jeu dans l’accès à la littératie dans sa diversité, au travers de la pluralité des genres et des types discursifs qui la constituent et chez des apprenants de profils divers : enfants/adultes, langue 1 / langue 2, entendants/sourds. La réflexion sur la mise en place de ce corpus s’inscrit (...) dans une perspective fonctionnaliste et énonciative et fait fond sur deux ensembles théoriques complémentaires. Du point de vue de l’acquisition des langues, nous souscrivons à la conception selon laquelle les productions d’apprenants ne constituent pas une déviance par rapport à la norme mais sont des manifestations (idiolectales) de systèmes linguistiques per se dont il s’agit de dégager les normes propres. Du point de vue de la littératie, nous nous inscrivons dans la tradition des travaux, d’inspiration bakhtinienne, qui considèrent l’hétérogénéité comme constitutive de toute production verbale. Ainsi, nous expliquons et justifions nos choix en matière de profils d’apprenants et de tâches rédactionnelles, en relation avec la perspective théorique adoptée, ainsi que les options retenues en matière d’outillage du corpus. (shrink)

This paper considers the justifications for adhering to a principle of confidentiality within medical practice. These are found to derive chiefly from respect for individual autonomy, the doctor/patient contract, and social utility. It is suggested that these will benefit more certainly if secrecy is rejected and the principle of confidentiality is removed from the area of health care.

Well-being advocates state that it provides a more holistic, humanistic focus for public policy. Paradoxically, however, well-being debates tend to be dominated by highly quantitative, de-contextualised statistical methods accessible to only a minority of technical experts. This paper argues the need to reverse this trend. Drawing on original primary mixed method research in Zambia and India it shows the critical contribution of qualitative methods to the development of a quantitative model of subjective perspectives on well-being. Such contributions have a political, (...) ethical and practical urgency if subjective measures of well-being are to be used in policy. (shrink)

To isolate, analyze and explain their most basic commitments, theories of justice typically idealize. They assume for theoretical purposes, for example, that human beings possess far greater knowledge than they do, or that society's members strictly comply with just laws. Yet because it falsifies, idealization undermines the practical applicability of an ideal theory's principles. ;Although ideal theories are unsatisfactory as they stand, their fundamental principles may be invaluable in addressing our problems of justice. From such basic principles we may derive (...) intermediate ones that bridge the gap between ideal world and real, and allow us to determine what ideal theory demands in actual circumstances. ;Going beyond others who recognize the need, but themselves offer only ideal theories, I develop a set of these intermediate principles. I examine Kant's theory of justice as a paradigm, and identify problems it cannot address because they have their source in non-ideal features, including limited knowledge, imperfect will and preexisting social injustice. I then appeal to a modified version of the perspective of the ideal citizen that Kant employs in the Rechtslehre. This modified perspective enables us to articulate principles that give effect to Kant's universal law of justice and categorical imperative in non-ideal circumstances. Illustrating its use in addressing issues such as prison reform and exclusionary zoning, I argue that augmented ideal theory can play a crucial role in our pursuit of social justice. (shrink)

The essays in this volume all ask what it means for human beings to be embodied as desiring creatures—and perhaps still more piercingly, what it means for a philosopher to be embodied. In taking up this challenge via phenomenology, psychoanalysis, hermeneutics, and the philosophy of literature, the volume questions the orthodoxies not only of Western metaphysics but even of the phenomenological tradition itself. We miss much that has philosophical import when we exclude the somatic aspects of human life, and it (...) is therefore the philosopher’s duty now to rediscover the meaning inherent in desire, emotion, and passion—without letting the biases of any tradition determine in advance the meaning that reveals itself in embodied desire. Continental philosophers have already done much to challenge binary oppositions, and this volume sets out a new challenge: we must now also question the dichotomy between being at home and being alienated. Alterity is not simply something out there, separate from myself; rather, it penetrates me through and through, even in my corporeal experience. My body is both my own and other; I am other than myself and therefore other than my body. Additionally, this book is a conversation, not a presentation of a new orthodoxy. Thus, the hope is that these essays will open the way for further dialogue that will continue to radically rethink our understanding of embodied desire. Gathered together here are twelve essays that address these issues from deeply interrelated albeit unique perspectives from within the field. (shrink)

After a brief summary of Mackenzie's major claims, I offer questions to promote ongoing conversation, most especially regarding they‐ and we‐narratives.

In their 1978 paper, psychologists David Premack and Guy Woodruff posed the question, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” They treated this question as interchangeable with the inquiry, “Does a chimpanzee make inferences about another individual, in any degree or kind?” Here, we offer an alternative way of thinking about this issue, positing that while chimpanzees may not possess a theory of mind in the strict sense, we ought to think of them as enactive perceivers of practical and (...) social affordances. As such, we reframe the question: “Are chimpanzees socially enactive?”. (shrink)

Thomas Szasz has wrestled with the following question: Does mental illness even exist? Here, I sketch two provocative papers by Szasz and detail his reasons for criticizing the concept ‘mental illness.’ I will proceed to highlight where I think Szasz’s writing is philosophically dubious, despite its role in forcing us to think critically about ‘mental illness.’ I will conclude that his argument is best left behind as an antiquated take on neurodivergence. Finally, I will propose what I think is a (...) more promising alternative to Szasz’s view that there is a myth around mental illness. There is a myth indeed, and it involves what is often meant by ‘mental.’ With new developments in embodied cognition, I will ask us to revisit the concept of ‘mental illness,’ to correctly diagnose the problematic myth that must be confronted by the psychiatric community, and to explore what the myth of the mental means for neurodivergence. (shrink)

Thomas Szasz has wrestled with the following question: Does mental illness even exist? Here, I sketch two provocative papers by Szasz and detail his reasons for criticizing the concept ‘mental illness.’ I will proceed to highlight where I think Szasz’s writing is philosophically dubious, despite its role in forcing us to think critically about ‘mental illness.’ I will conclude that his argument is best left behind as an antiquated take on neurodivergence. Finally, I will propose what I think is a (...) more promising alternative to Szasz’s view that there is a myth around mental illness. There is a myth indeed, and it involves what is often meant by ‘mental.’ With new developments in embodied cognition, I will ask us to revisit the concept of ‘mental illness,’ to correctly diagnose the problematic myth that must be confronted by the psychiatric community, and to explore what the myth of the mental means for neurodivergence. (shrink)

This article responds to the critique of productivist essentialism, which is the view that the human is the productive animal, made against Marx. The author argues against this view and holds that Marx introduces a dialectical account of human essence with the notion of species being in the 1844 Manuscripts, which he then develops in The German Idology. This account of essence includes a static and dynamic moment, and in capitalism, the dialectic of essence has resulted in the appearance of (...) the human as the productive animal. Finally, the author argues that Marx’s critique of production and dialectical account of human essence allow us to better think the possibilities for a post-work future. (shrink)

In this thesis I determine what is required in an account of money. I compare John’s Searle’s idea of institutions, as ontologically subjective, to Francesco Guala’s idea of an institution as a functional, rule-based equilibrium. I find both, as accounts of money, to be inadequate on their own. In response, I develop a new account of money which has functional components akin to Guala’s but with the addition of intentionality. This adds mind-dependence back into the account of money but, if (...) Khalidi’s theory of social kinds is correct, my account of money is still open to scientific investigation, because it might be kind of natural. (shrink)