Judgements of the value or likelihood of a focal object or outcome have been shown to vary dramatically as a function of whether judgement is based on selective or comparative processing. This article explores the question of when selective versus comparative processing is likely, and demonstrates that as motivation and opportunity to process information carefully (operationalised as accountability and time pressure, respectively) decrease, the likelihood of selective processing increases. Moreover, we document how individuals manage to render judgements when in selective (...) processing mode by relying on categorical knowledge. (shrink)

Recent research in empirical moral psychology attempts to understand (rather than place judgment on) the salient normative differences that laypeople have when making moral decisions by using survey methodology that is based on the operationalized principles from moral theories. The PPIMT is the first measure designed to assess respondents’ preference for the precepts implied in the three dominant moral theories: virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism. The current study used a latent modeling approach to determine the most theoretically and psychometrically-sound model (...) for the PPIMT using a combined sample of college students from a southeastern university in U.S. and MTurk respondents. The PPIMT model fit was acceptable (χ2 = 84.125, df = 40, p = 0.001; RMSEA = 0.052, 90%CI = 0.037 to 0.068; CFI = 0.980; SRMR = 0.035) with four items for Virtue, four items for Deontology, and three items for Consequentialism. (shrink)

In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a ‘deflationary’ attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in (...) the work of Dodd, Hornsby, Schnieder, Williamson, and others. These philosophers believe that the ambitions of truthmaker theory are easily satisfied, without recourse to ambitious ontological investigation—hence the analogy with deflationary truth. We argue that the deflationists’ agenda fails: there is no coherent deflationary theory of truthmaking. Truthmaking, once deflated, fails to address the questions at the heart of truthmaking investigation. Truthmaking cannot be had on the cheap. (shrink)

According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically grounded by a quiddity that is distinct from the one that actually grounds it. Some argue (...) that Russellian monism entails the contingency thesis and that this makes its consciousness‐constituting quiddities epiphenomenal—a disastrous outcome for a theory that is motivated partly by its prospects for integrating consciousness into physical causation. We consider two versions of that argument, a generic version and an intriguing version developed by Robert J. Howell, which he bases on Jaegwon Kim's well‐known “exclusion argument.” We argue that neither succeeds. (shrink)

We investigate a recently devised polyhedral semantics for intermediate logics, in which formulas are interpreted in n-dimensional polyhedra. An intermediate logic is polyhedrally complete if it is complete with respect to some class of polyhedra. The first main result of this paper is a necessary and sufficient condition for the polyhedral completeness of a logic. This condition, which we call the Nerve Criterion, is expressed in terms of Alexandrov’s notion of the nerve of a poset. It affords a purely combinatorial (...) characterisation of polyhedrally complete logics. Using the Nerve Criterion we show, easily, that there are continuum many intermediate logics that are not polyhedrally complete but which have the finite model property. We also provide, at considerable combinatorial labour, a countably infinite class of logics axiomatised by the Jankov–Fine formulas of ‘starlike trees’ all of which are polyhedrally complete. The polyhedral completeness theorem for these ‘starlike logics’ is the second main result of this paper. (shrink)

According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. On Russellian physicalism, those inscrutables are construed as protophenomenal properties: non-structural properties that both categorically ground dispositional properties and, perhaps when appropriately structured, collectively constitute phenomenal properties. Morris and Brown (Journal of Consciousness Studies 2016, 2017) argue that protophenomenal properties cannot serve this purpose, given assumptions Russellian monists typically make about the modal profile of such properties. Those assumptions, it (...) is argued, entail that protophenomenal properties are ‘experience specific’, that is, they are individuated by their potential to constitute phenomenal properties, and are thus not genuinely physical. However, we argue, that reasoning assumes that physical inscrutables must be individuated in terms of their (actual or possible) grounding roles. Not only is that assumption questionable: it is antithetical to Russellian monism. (shrink)

This paper explores how metaphorical thinking might contribute to an aetiology of florid delusions in psychosis. We argue that this approach helps to account for the path from experience to the delusional assertion, which, though relatively straightforward for monothematic delusions like the Capgras delusion, has always been difficult to account for in florid delusions in psychosis. Our account also helps to account for double book-keeping and the relative agential inertia of the belief.

Summary This article seeks to address the question how the Tetrarchic system of four rulers could be presented as legitimate in a society that had never seen this political constellation before. What were the different modes of presenting Tetrarchic rule and how did they help in making the new system acceptable? The article argues that new power structures needed to be formulated in familiar terms, not only for the rulers to legitimate their position, but also for the ruled to understand (...) such new systems. As a result, imperial messages during the Tetrarchic period were strongly influenced by traditional modes of representation from earlier periods. Traditions which were inherent in specific media and locations were determining factors for the way in which a new political system could be presented. The result was a much less coherent ideological Tetrarchic message than is often assumed. The image of group identity was regularly lost in a more complex and messy mode of formulating power. The new and innovative aspects of a collegiate rule by four emperors was less important than linking the power of those rulers to what was traditionally expected of the portrayal of Roman emperorship. (shrink)

We consider whether given a simple, finite description of a group in the form of an algorithm, it is possible to algorithmically determine if the corresponding group has some specified property or not. When there is such an algorithm, we say the property is recursively recognizable within some class of descriptions. When there is not, we ask how difficult it is to detect the property in an algorithmic sense. We consider descriptions of two sorts: first, recursive presentations in terms of (...) generators and relators, and second, algorithms for computing the group operation. For both classes of descriptions, we show that a large class of natural algebraic properties, Markov properties, are not recursively recognizable, indeed they are \-hard to detect in recursively presented groups and \-hard to detect in computable groups. These theorems suffice to give a sharp complexity measure for the detection problem of a number of typical group properties, for example, being abelian, torsion-free, orderable. Some properties, like being cyclic, nilpotent, or solvable, are much harder to detect, and we give sharp characterizations of the corresponding detection problems from a number of them. We give special attention to orderability properties, as this was a main motivation at the beginning of this project. (shrink)

This paper reports on the long-term effectiveness of a non-formal co-curricular educational program based on a campus ecogarden at a Hong Kong university in developing pro-sustainability awareness, attitudes and behavior among undergraduate students. This service-based, nature-based experiential learning program, termed the Ecogarden Farmer and Biodiversity Surveyor, has been running at the university since 2015. The program is divided into two consecutive phases: a training phase comprising various learning activities and a successive internship phase consisting of the all-round practical tasks involved (...) in managing the garden. A retrospective evaluation of the program using phenomenographic approach and content analysis was adopted to reveal the diversity of students’ learning experience, as the indicators of the success of the program. Of 112 participants from 4 cohorts, 32 completed online questionnaires, and semi-structured interviews were successfully conducted with twelve participants, three from each of the four cohorts. The results indicated that the program’s outcomes could be categorized into five themes. Most outcomes fit into the theme ‘an increase in knowledge and skill level,’ followed by ‘rise in environmental awareness,’‘facilitation of personal growth,’ and ‘enhancement of career development.’ Many structural experiences revealed may suggest the success of the program. The longer the participants had participated in the program, the more in-depth and diversified reflection of the senior participants relating to personal development were mentioned. This study provides critical insights into the validity of retrospective program evaluation for assessing the long-term impact of EfS programs by introducing a cross-sectional study of different cohorts as a serial time-point sampling strategy. (shrink)

This is a paper based on research with the LGBTIQ+ community in South Australia, the likes of which has not been conducted previously in the state. The paper, which utilized both quantitative and qualitative research methods identifies the key issues that the LGBTIQ+ community face with respect to sporting involvement. There were a range of themes that emerged in relation to a variety of topics including homophobia, sexism and gender discrimination, gender roles and gender stereotypes. This paper provides data and (...) discussion around this important part of the research, which has implications pertaining to sporting organizations and the LGBTIQ+ community. (shrink)

Previous research has shown that short-term fasting in healthy individuals is associated with changes in risky decision-making. The current experiment was designed to examine the influence of short-term fasting in healthy individuals on four types of impulsivity: reflection impulsivity, risky decision-making, delay aversion, and action inhibition. Participants were tested twice, once when fasted for 20 hours, and once when satiated. Participants demonstrated impaired action inhibition when fasted; committing significantly more errors of commission during a food-related Affective Shifting Task. Participants also (...) displayed decreased reflection impulsivity when fasted, opening significantly more boxes during the Information Sampling Task (IST). There were no significant differences in performance between fasted and satiated sessions for risky decision-making or delay aversion. These findings may have implications for understanding eating disorders such as Bulimia Nervosa (BN). Although BN has been characterised as a disorder of poor impulse control, inconsistent findings when comparing individuals with BN and healthy individuals on behavioural measures of impulsivity question this characterisation. Since individuals with BN undergo periods of short-term fasting, the inconsistent findings could be due to differences in the levels of satiation of participants. The current results indicate that fasting can affect performance on the IST, a measure of impulsivity previously studied in BN, whilst performance on other impulsivity measures were unaffected. However, the results from the IST were contrary to the original hypothesis and should be replicated before specific conclusions can be made. (shrink)

Current challenges to sustaining public support for health data research have directed attention to the governance of data-intensive health research networks. Accountability is hailed as an important element of trustworthy governance frameworks for data-intensive health research networks. Yet the extent to which adequate accountability regimes in data-intensive health research networks are currently realized is questionable. Current governance of data-intensive health research networks is dominated by the limitations of a drawing board approach. As a way forward, we propose a stronger focus (...) on accountability as learning to achieve accountable governance. As an important step in that direction, we provide two pathways: (1) developing an integrated structure for decision-making and (2) establishing a dialogue in ongoing deliberative processes. Suitable places for learning accountability to thrive are dedicated governing bodies as well as specialized committees, panels or boards which bear and guide the development of governance in data-intensive health research networks. A continuous accountability process which comprises learning and interaction accommodates the diversity of expectations, responsibilities and tasks in data-intensive health research networks to achieve responsible and effective governance. (shrink)

This paper considers the computational complexity of the disjunction and existential properties of intuitionistic logic. We prove that the disjunction property holds feasibly for intuitionistic propositional logic; i.e., from a proof of A v B, a proof either of A or of B can be found in polynomial time. For intuitionistic predicate logic, we prove superexponential lower bounds for the disjunction property, namely, there is a superexponential lower bound on the time required, given a proof of A v B, to (...) produce one of A and B which is true. In addition, there is superexponential lower bound on the size of terms which fulfill the existential property of intuitionistic predicate logic. There are superexponential upper bounds for these problems, so the lower bounds are essentially optimal. (shrink)

Time is woven into the fabric of our lives. Everything we do, we do in and across time. It is not just that our lives are stretched out in time, from the moment of birth to the moment of our death. It is that our lives are stories. We make sense of ourselves, today, by understanding who we were yesterday, and the day before, and the day before that; by understanding what we did and why we did it. Our memories (...) shape our present selves, since we are the product of who we were, and who we remember being. Yet who we are lasts for but a moment. It is who we will be that demands attention. We are forever projecting ourselves into the future. We painstakingly plan for the needs of our future selves, all the while knowing that while what we do will make those future selves who they are, still, our future selves are elusive. So it is not simply that we happen to live our lives in time, the way, say, one might happen to live in Australia, or Singapore. It is hard to fathom how things could be otherwise. What would it be to live a life without time? Yet time itself is intangible. Though we are keenly aware of what has been ‒ of pain and loss, regret and pride ‒ and of what might be ‒ of anticipation, and dread, and longing ‒ time itself seems unaffected by anything we do. Though we can anticipate a future birthday cake, time itself cannot be tasted. Though we can dread a future dentist’s appointment, time itself cannot be touched. Though we remember the crunching of leaves this past autumn, time itself cannot be heard. How can it be that something so central to each of us, to who we are, and what we care about, can be so spectral? What, in the end, is time? Is time real, like a substance in which each of us, like insects in amber, finds ourselves trapped? Is time a dimension through which we can move? Is time not a thing at all, but some connection between events? If time is real, what is it like? Does it flow like a river, taking each of us prisoner in its current, washing us ever closer to the end of our lives? Is time like a cresting wave, coming ever closer to each of us from the future, engulfing us, and then receding into the past? Or is time static? Like a one-way road that each of us might wander, with no chance to turn back? Or perhaps time is like none of these things. Perhaps time is more like space; something we can navigate freely, so that we can visit different times just like we visit different places. Perhaps we can we travel in time the way we can travel in space. These questions, and many more, are the focus of this book. Now, you might wonder what philosophers are doing writing a book about time. Surely that’s a job for physicists! It is true: a great deal of what we know about time stems from our understanding of physics. However, even in physics we find that there are questions about time that go unanswered. Moreover, increasingly, physicists are turning to philosophers for help in understanding the role that time plays in current physical theories. Our goal is to get the reader up to speed on some of the central issues that influence our understanding of time so that they too may play a role in this ongoing discussion between science and philosophy. We hope that in doing so it will become clear what philosophy can bring to the study of time. There is a natural narrative in philosophy regarding the study of time, and we have chosen to organise this book according to that narrative. However, the book may also be approached in a ‘choose-your-own adventure’ spirit. While later chapters build on material introduced in earlier chapters, you can skip around, reading the book in any order you choose. For the instructor, this means that she can design her course around this book in any number of ways, depending on the particular topic she wishes to focus on. (shrink)

Consider the following pair of theses: all fundamental physical objects are spatiotemporal and all non-fundamental physical objects are ultimately composed of fundamental objects. Work on the physics of quantum gravity suggests that spacetime is a non-fundamental, emergent phenomenon and thus that thesis is false. The fundamentals are non-spatiotemporal in nature. This paper will argue against on the grounds that non-fundamental spatiotemporal objects cannot be composed of fundamental non-spatiotemporal objects. So, assuming that spacetime is emergent, new metaphysical resources are needed to (...) explain the relationship between the fundamental objects posited by quantum gravity and spacetime. (shrink)

The idea of forgiveness is omnipresent in the transitional justice literature, yet this body of work, taken as a whole, is marked by conceptual, terminological and argumentative imprecision. Equivocation is common, glossing moral, theological, therapeutic and legal considerations, while arguments proceed from political, apolitical and even antipolitical premises. With forgiveness as a praxis linked to reconciliation processes in at least ten countries, concerns have grown over its negative implications for the relationship between the state and victims of state-authored injustices. Many (...) of these debates reference Hannah Arendt. Drawing from a range of Arendt’s published and unpublished work, this article challenges the academic claim that forgiveness has no place in the politics of reconciliation. Through this ‘returning to the source’, it presents a promising mode of thinking about political forgiveness in contemporary Settler-colonial states. (shrink)

In his philosophy of ethics and time, Emmanuel Levinas highlighted the tension that exists between the "ontological adventure" of immediate experience and the "ethical adventure" of redemptive relationships-associations in which absolute responsibility engenders a transcendence of being and self. In an original commingling of philosophy and cinema study, Sam B. Girgus applies Levinas's ethics to a variety of international films. His efforts point to a transnational pattern he terms the "cinema of redemption" that portrays the struggle to connect to others (...) in redeeming ways. Girgus not only reveals the power of these films to articulate the crisis between ontological identity and ethical subjectivity. He also locates time and ethics within the structure and content of film itself. Drawing on the work of Luce Irigaray, Tina Chanter, Kelly Oliver, and Ewa Ziarek, Girgus reconsiders Levinas and his relationship to film, engaging with a feminist focus on the sexualized female body. Girgus offers fresh readings of films from several decades and cultures, including Frank Capra's _Mr. Smith Goes to Washington_ (1939), Federico Fellini's _La dolce vita_ (1959), Michelangelo Antonioni's _L'avventura_ (1960), John Huston's _The Misfits_ (1961), and Philip Kaufman's _The Unbearable Lightness of Being_ (1988). (shrink)

SAM GREY | : Prevailing connotations of reconciliation orbit concord or harmonious coexistence, meaning that concern for justice is necessarily subordinated to a more casually pragmatic peace. Bringing justice considerations to the fore means focusing on reparations as a key element of reconciliation’s suite of activities—but reparations are necessarily a matter of process, which precludes considering elements of the “package” in isolation from one another, as is the case with traditional evaluative criteria of motivation or proportion. Accordingly, this article proposes (...) that reparations are better framed as a considered reaction to the unjust allocation of burdens, so that subsequent reallocations serve justice by answering the needs and demands of survivors. Taking cues from a variety of sources both within and beyond the transitional justice literature, the work at hand attempts just such a retrospective reframing by looking at a recently completed Canadian reparations process: the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement. | : Les connotations dominantes de la réconciliation gravitent autour de la concorde ou de la coexistence harmonieuse, signifiant que le souci de la justice est nécessairement subordonné à une paix plus pragmatique. Mettre les considérations de justice au premier plan implique de mettre l’accent sur les réparations comme un élément clé de la série d’activités de la réconciliation, mais les réparations sont nécessairement une question de processus, ce qui exclut de considérer ses éléments isolément, comme c’est le cas des critères évaluatifs traditionnels de motivation ou de proportion. En conséquence, cet article propose que les réparations sont mieux conçues comme une réaction réfléchie à l’attribution injuste des charges, de sorte que les réallocations ultérieures servent la justice en répondant aux besoins et aux exigences des survivants. S’inspirant d’une variété de sources à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur de la littérature sur la justice transitionnelle, le présent travail tente un tel recadrage rétrospectif en examinant un processus canadien de réparations récemment terminé : la Convention de règlement relative aux pensionnats indiens. (shrink)

In this enlightening book, Sam Harris argues that free will is an illusion but that this truth should not undermine morality or diminish the importance of social and political freedom; indeed, this truth can and should change the way we think about some of the most important questions in life.

Sam Harris dismantles the most common justification for religious faith--that a moral system cannot be based on science.

In Time, Existential Presence and the Cinematic Image, Sam B. Girgus relates Laura Mulvey's theory of 'delayed cinema' to ideas on time and the relationship to the other in the writings of Jean-Luc Nancy, Emmanuel Levinas and Julia Kristeva, among others. The sustained tension in film between, in Mulvey's phrase, 'stillness and the moving image' enacts a drama of existential emergence. The stillness of the framed image in relation to the moving image opens 'free' cinematic time and space for a (...) fresh engagement with crucial ethical and cultural issues. With close readings of films such as The Bicycle Thieves, Two Days, One Night, The Three Burials of Melquiades Estrada, The Revenant and The Age of Innocence, this book proposes a fresh approach to reading film in the context of emerging existential presence and the ethical imperative. (shrink)

Think of a number, any number, or properties like fragility and humanity. These and other abstract entities are radically different from concrete entities like electrons and elbows. While concrete entities are located in space and time, have causes and effects, and are known through empirical means, abstract entities like meanings and possibilities are remarkably different. They seem to be immutable and imperceptible and to exist "outside" of space and time. This book provides a comprehensive critical assessment of the problems raised (...) by abstract entities and the debates about existence, truth, and knowledge that surround them. It sets out the key issues that inform the metaphysical disagreement between platonists who accept abstract entities and nominalists who deny abstract entities exist. Beginning with the essentials of the platonist–nominalist debate, it explores the key arguments and issues informing the contemporary debate over abstract reality: arguments for platonism and their connections to semantics, science, and metaphysical explanation the abstract–concrete distinction and views about the nature of abstract reality epistemological puzzles surrounding our knowledge of mathematical entities and other abstract entities. arguments for nominalism premised upon concerns about paradox, parsimony, infinite regresses, underdetermination, and causal isolation nominalist options that seek to dispense with abstract entities. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary, _Entities_ is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and authoritative introduction to the problems raised by abstract entities. (shrink)

Psychiatric researchers typically assume that the modelling of psychiatric symptoms is not influenced by psychiatric categories; symptoms are modelled and then grouped into a psychiatric category. I highlight this primarily through analysing research domain criteria. RDoC’s importance makes it worth scrutinizing, and this assessment also serves as a case study with relevance for other areas of psychiatry. RDoC takes inadequacies of existing psychiatric categories as holding back causal investigation. Consequently, RDoC aims to circumnavigate existing psychiatric categories by directly investigating the (...) causal basis of symptoms. The unique methodological approach of RDoC exploits the supposed lack of influence of psychiatric categories on symptom modelling, taking psychiatric symptoms as the same regardless of which psychiatric category is employed or if no psychiatric category is employed. But this supposition is not always true. I will show how psychiatric categories can influence symptom modelling, whereby identical behaviours can be considered as different symptoms based on an individual’s psychiatric diagnosis. If the modelling of symptoms is influenced by psychiatric categories, then psychiatric categories will still play a role, a situation which RDoC researchers explicitly aim to avoid. I discuss four ways RDoC could address this issue. This issue also has important implications for factor analysis, cluster analysis, modifying psychiatric categories, and symptom based approaches. (shrink)

What exactly are comics? Can they be art, literature, or even pornography? How should we understand the characters, stories, and genres that shape them? Thinking about comics raises a bewildering range of questions about representation, narrative, and value. Philosophy of Comics is an introduction to these philosophical questions. In exploring the history and variety of the comics medium, Sam Cowling and Wesley D. Cray chart a path through the emerging field of the philosophy of comics. Drawing from a diverse range (...) of forms and genres and informed by case studies of classic comics such as Watchmen, Tales from the Crypt, and Fun Home, Cowling and Cray explore ethical, aesthetic, and ontological puzzles, including: -/- - What does it take to create-or destroy-a fictional character like Superman? - Can all comics be adapted into films, or are some comics impossible to adapt? - Is there really a genre of “superhero comics”? - When are comics obscene, pornographic, and why does it matter? -/- At a time of rapidly growing interest in graphic storytelling, this is an ideal introduction to the philosophy of comics and some of its most central and puzzling questions. (shrink)

We develop a new version of the causal theory of spacetime. Whereas traditional versions of the theory seek to identify spatiotemporal relations with causal relations, the version we develop takes causal relations to be the grounds for spatiotemporal relations. Causation is thus distinct from, and more basic than, spacetime. We argue that this non-identity theory, suitably developed, avoids the challenges facing the traditional identity theory.

Argues that the normative relation of commitment is routinely overlooked by philosophers, and that investigating it reveals some interesting similarities between the moral and rational domains.

Adam Smith: Systematic Philosopher and Public Thinker. By Schliesser Eric.

The concepts of Fundierung (“foundation” or “founding”) and Stiftung (“institution” or “instituting”) play a prominent role in the work of Edmund Husserl, who employs Fundierung to describe relations of essential necessity in “static” analyses of intentional consciousness, and Stiftung to describe movements of sedimentation and reactivation in “genetic” analyses of the co-advent of consciousness and the world. Martin Heidegger, meanwhile, employs the notion of Stiften (“establishing”) in his ontological questioning of the disclosure of the truth of beings. It is, therefore, (...) surprising that scholars tend to assume, if not explicitly assert, that Merleau-Ponty treats Fundierung and Stiftung as synonyms. I argue, on the contrary, that Fundierung and Stiftung take on increasingly divergent functions over the course of Merleau-Ponty’s writings, with Stiftung ultimately giving voice to the “ontological operations” of individuation through intertwining whereby sensible and sentient beings, qua flesh, give birth to sense. In particular, I take seriously Merleau-Ponty’s account of Stiftung – from Institution and Passivity onward – as a “double relation of Fundierung”; given that Fundierung is already a “double relation” between the founding and the founded term, Stiftung must be conceived as a “fourfold” relation, wherein each term is simultaneously founding and founded, relative to the other. This fourfold structure articulates the relation of “simultaneity” or “existential eternity” between beings and sense in their advent. By tracing the development of the concept of Stiftung in Merleau-Ponty’s work, I attempt to show that interpreting his thinking of la chair as an “ontology of institution” – in the sense of an articulation of the movement of existence as relations of Stiftung – highlights the originality of his ontologization of Husserlian phenomenology, and thereby his status as a “foundational” thinker in his own right, rather than a merely regional thinker of embodiment.Les concepts de Fundierung (fondation) et de Stiftung (institution) jouent un rôle central dans l’oeuvre d’Edmund Husserl, qui emploie Fundierung pour décrire des relations de nécessité essentielle dans les analyses « statiques » de la conscience intentionnelle, et Stiftung pour décrire les mouvements de sédimentation et de réactivation dans les analyses « génétiques » de l’avènement concomitant de la conscience et du monde. Martin Heidegger, de son côté, emploie la notion de Stiften (instituer, établir) dans son questionnement ontologique du dévoilement de la vérité de l’être. C’est pourquoi il est surprenant que les commentateurs tendent à supposer, sinon à affirmer, que Merleau-Ponty traite Fundierung et Stiftung comme des synonymes. Je soutiens au contraire que ces deux notions exercent des fonctions de plus en plus divergentes dans ses écrits, où la Stiftung exprime au fond les « opérations ontologiques » de l’individuation à travers l’entrelacement par lequel les êtres sensibles et sentants (en tant que chair) donnent naissance au sens. En particulier, je prends au sérieux la conception merleau-pontienne de la Stiftung – à partir des cours sur L’Institution et la passivité – comme « une double relation de Fundierung » ; étant donné que la Fundierung est déjà une « double relation » entre le terme fondant et le terme fondé, la Stiftung doit être conçue comme une relation « quadripartite » dans laquelle chaque terme est simultanément fondant et fondé, relatif à l’autre. Cette structure quadripartite articule la relation de « simultanéité » ou d’« éternité existentielle » entre les étants et le sens dans leur avènement. En retraçant le développement du concept de Stiftung dans les travaux de Merleau-Ponty, je tente de montrer que l’interprétation de sa pensée de la chair comme une « ontologie de l’institution » – au sens d’une articulation du mouvement de l’existence comme relations de Stiftung – souligne l’originalité de son ontologisation de la phénoménologie husserlienne, et par là son statut comme penseur « fondationnel » de plein droit, plutôt qu’un penseur simplement régional de l’incarnation.I concetti di Fundierung (fondazione) e di Stiftung (istituzione) ricoprono un ruolo centrale nell’opera di Edmund Husserl, che si serve del termine Fundierung per descrivere le relazioni di necessità nelle analisi “statiche” della coscienza intenzionale, e di Stiftung per descrivere i movimenti di sedimentazione e di riattivazione nelle analisi “genetiche” del co-avvento di coscienza e mondo. Inoltre, Martin Heidegger usa il termine Stiften (istituire, stabilire) nella sua interrogazione ontologica dello svelamento della verità dell’essere. Per questo, risulta sorprendente che i commentatori di Merleau-Ponty tendano a supporre, se non ad affermare, che il filosofo tratti Fundierung e Stiftung come dei sinonimi. Ritengo al contrario che queste due nozioni rivestano funzioni progressivamente divergenti nei suoi scritti, dal momento che la Stiftung viene ad esprimere le “operazioni ontologiche” dell’individuazione attraverso l’intreccio per cui gli esseri sensibili e senzienti (in quanto carne) permettono la nascita del senso. In particolare, prendo in considerazione la concezione merleau-pontiana della Stiftung – a partire dai corsi sull’istituzione e la passività – come una “doppia relazione di Fundierung”. Nella misura in cui la Fundierung è già una “doppia relazione” tra termine fondante e termine fondato, la Stiftung deve essere pensata come una relazione “quadripartita” in cui ogni termine è simultaneamente fondante e fondato, relativamente all’altro. Questa struttura quadripartita articola la relazione di “simultaneità” o d’“eternità esistenziale” tra gli enti e il senso nel loro avvenimento. Ritracciando lo sviluppo del concetto di Stiftung nei testi di Merleau-Ponty, tento dunque di mostrare come un’interpretazione della sua filosofia della carne come “ontologia dell’istituzione” – nel senso di un’articolazione del movimento dell’esistenza come relazione di Stiftung – metta in luce l’originalità della sua ontologizzazione della fenomenologia husserliana. Ne emerge dunque a pieno titolo un pensatore “fondazionale”, piuttosto che un pensatore semplicemente regionale dell’incarnazione. (shrink)