ABSTRACT Background: The doctrine of informed consent (IC) exists to protect individuals from exploitation or harm. This study into IC was carried out to investigate how different researchers perceived the process whereby researchers obtained consent. It also examined researchers’ perspectives on what constituted IC, and how different settings influenced the process. Methods: The study recorded in‐depth interviews with 12 lecturers and five doctoral students, who had carried out research in developing countries, at a leading school of public health in the (...) United Kingdom. A purposive, snowballing approach was used to identify interviewees. Results: Although the concept and application of the doctrine of IC should have been the same, irrespective of where the research was carried out, the process of obtaining it had to be different. The setting had to be taken into consideration and the autonomy of the subject had to be respected at all times. In areas of high illiteracy, and where understanding of the subject was likely to be a problem, there was an added responsibility placed on the researcher to devise innovative ways of carrying out the study, taking into consideration the peculiarities of the environment. Conclusion: The ethical issues for IC were the same, irrespective of where the research was conducted. However, because the backgrounds, setting, and knowledge of populations differed, there was the need to be similarly sensitive in obtaining consent. The problems of obtaining genuine IC were not limited to developing countries. (shrink)

Background: Explaining technical terms in consent forms prior to seeking informed consent to recruit into trials can be challenging in developing countries, and more so when the studies are randomized controlled trials. This study was carried out to examine the opinions of researchers on ways of dealing with these challenges in developing countries.Methods: Recorded in‐depth interviews with 12 lecturers and five doctoral students, who had carried out research in developing countries, at a leading school of public health in the United (...) Kingdom. A purposive, snowballing approach was used to identify interviewees.Results: Researchers were divided on the feasibility of explaining technical trials in illiterate populations; the majority of them held the view that local analogies could be used to explain these technical terms. Others were of the opinion that this could not be done since it was too difficult to explain technical trials, such as randomized controlled trials, even to people in developed countries.Conclusion: Researchers acknowledged the difficulty in explaining randomized controlled trials but it was also their perception that this was an important part of the ethics of the work of scientific research involving human subjects. These difficulties notwithstanding, efforts should be made to ensure that subjects have sufficient understanding to consent, taking into account the fact that peculiar situations in developing countries might compound this difficulty. (shrink)

Background: Both the Council for International Organization of Medical Sciences and the Helsinki Declaration emphasize that the potential benefits of research should outweigh potential harms; consequently, some work has been conducted on participants' perception of benefits in therapeutic research. However, there appears to be very little work conducted with participants who have joined non-therapeutic research. This work was done to evaluate participants' perception of benefits in a genetic epidemiological study by examining their perception of the potential benefits of enrollment.Methods: In-depth (...) interviews lasting between 45 and 60 minutes were conducted with a convenient sample of 25 ill patients and 25 healthy accompanying relatives enrolled in a genetic epidemiological study of tuberculosis. Recorded interviews were transcribed and analyzed using content analysis.Results: Participants perceived that research was beneficial and some of the benefits included the generation of new knowledge, finding the cause of diseases, as well as the control, eradication and prevention of disease. Some thought that research was risky whilst others thought that the benefits outweighed the risks.Conclusion: Participants perceived research to be beneficial and most of them thought that, though it was risky, the benefits outweighed the risks. It is our view that researchers need to give serious consideration to participant's perception of benefits in designing their consent forms, to see to the fulfillment of achievable goals. (shrink)

In 1986 Ephraim Fischbach, Sam Aronson, and Carrick Talmadge proposed a modification of Newton’s law of universal gravitation. This modification changed the gravitational potential from V = −Gm1m2∕r to V = [1 + αe−r∕λ] where α, the strength of the interaction, was approximately one percent and the range of the force λ was approximately 100 meters. This additional term was known as the Fifth Force. This suggestion was based on tantalizing evidence provided by a reanalysis of the Eötvös experiment, (...) an early test of the equivalence principle, a difference between the measured value of G, the gravitational constant, as determined by laboratory measurements and those performed in mineshafts, and a small energy dependence in the CP-violating parameters in K0-meson decay. The two initial measurements of the Fifth Force disagreed. One supported its existence and the other did not. How this discrepancy was resolved and the subsequent history of experiments on the Fifth Force will be discussed. By 1990 the consensus was that such a Fifth Force did not exist. Despite that judgment, work continued, and the more recent history of the Fifth Force is also discussed. The consensus remains that there is no Fifth Force. (shrink)

In non‐literal uses of language, the content an utterance communicates differs from its literal truth conditions. Loose talk is one example of non‐literal language use (amongst many others). For example, what a loose utterance of (1) communicates differs from what it literally expresses: (1) Lena arrived at 9 o'clock. Loose talk is interesting (or so I will argue). It has certain distinctive features which raise important questions about the connection between literal and non‐literal language use. This paper aims to (i.) (...) introduce a range of novel data demonstrating certain overlooked features of loose talk, and (ii.) develop a new theory of the phenomenon which accounts for these data. In particular, this theory is motivated by the need to explain minimal pairs such as (2)-(3): (2) Lena arrived at 9 o'clock, but she did not arrive at 9 o'clock exactly. (3) ?? Lena did not arrive at 9 o'clock exactly, but she arrived at 9 o'clock. (2) and (3) agree in their truth conditions. Yet they differ in felicity. As such, they constitute a problem for any account which hopes to predict the acceptability of the loose use of a sentence from its truth conditions and the context of utterance alone. Instead, it will be argued, to explain loose talk phenomena we must posit an additional layer of meaning outstripping truth conditions. This layer of meaning is shown to exhibit a range of properties, all of which point to its being semantically encoded. Thus, if correct, the theory provides a new example of how semantic meaning must extend beyond literal, truth‐conditional content. (shrink)

This paper offers a new account of metaphysical explanation. The account is modelled on Kitcher’s unificationist approach to scientific explanation. We begin, in Sect. 2, by briefly introducing the notion of metaphysical explanation and outlining the target of analysis. After that, we introduce a unificationist account of metaphysical explanation before arguing that such an account is capable of capturing four core features of metaphysical explanations: irreflexivity, non-monotonicity, asymmetry and relevance. Since the unificationist theory of metaphysical explanation inherits irreflexivity and non-monotonicity (...) directly from the unificationist theory of scientific explanation that underwrites it, we focus on demonstrating how the account can secure asymmetry and relevance. (shrink)

This paper refines a controversial proposal: that core systems belong to a perceptual kind, marked out by the format of its representational outputs. Following Susan Carey, this proposal has been understood in terms of core representations having an iconic format, like certain paradigmatically perceptual outputs. I argue that they don’t, but suggest that the proposal may be better formulated in terms of a broader analogue format type. Formulated in this way, the proposal accommodates the existence of genuine icons in perception, (...) and avoids otherwise troubling objections. (shrink)

Call an explanation in which a non-mathematical fact is explained—in part or in whole—by mathematical facts: an extra-mathematical explanation. Such explanations have attracted a great deal of interest recently in arguments over mathematical realism. In this article, a theory of extra-mathematical explanation is developed. The theory is modelled on a deductive-nomological theory of scientific explanation. A basic DN account of extra-mathematical explanation is proposed and then redeveloped in the light of two difficulties that the basic theory faces. The final view (...) appeals to relevance logic and uses resources in information theory to understand the explanatory relationship between mathematical and physical facts. 1Introduction2Anchoring3The Basic Deductive-Mathematical Account4The Genuineness Problem5Irrelevance6Relevance and Information7Objections and Replies 7.1Against relevance logic7.2Too epistemic7.3Informational containment8Conclusion. (shrink)

It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterises the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn’t make (...) phenomenological predictions of the required sort. So, as a result, opponents must resign themselves to attacking specific incarnations of naïve realism, or approach matters quite differently. (shrink)

According to the KK-principle, knowledge iterates freely. It has been argued, notably in Greco, that accounts of knowledge which involve essential appeal to normality are particularly conducive to defence of the KK-principle. The present article evaluates the prospects for employing normality in this role. First, it is argued that the defence of the KK-principle depends upon an implausible assumption about the logical principles governing iterated normality claims. Once this assumption is dropped, counter-instances to the principle can be expected to arise. (...) Second, it is argued that even if the assumption is maintained, there are other logical properties of normality which can be expected to lead to failures of KK. Such failures are noteworthy, since they do not depend on either a margins-for-error principle or safety condition of the kinds Williamson appeals to in motivating rejection KK. “Introduction: KK and Being in a Position to Know” Section formulates two versions of the KK-Principle; “Inexact Knowledge and Margins for Error” Section presents a version of Williamson’s margins-for-error argument against it; “Knowledge and Normality” and “Iterated Normality” Sections discuss the defence of the KK-Principle due to Greco and show that it is dependent upon the implausible assumption that the logic of normality ascriptions is at least as strong as K4; finally, “Knowledge in Abnormal Conditions” and “Higher-Order Ignorance Inside the Margins” Sections argue that a weakened version of Greco’s constraint on knowledge is plausible and demonstrate that this weakened constraint will, given uncontentious assumptions, systematically generate counter-instances to the KK-principle of a novel kind. (shrink)

Joint actions often require agents to track others’ actions while planning and executing physically incongruent actions of their own. Previous research has indicated that this can lead to visuomotor interference effects when it occurs outside of joint action. How is this avoided or overcome in joint actions? We hypothesized that when joint action partners represent their actions as interrelated components of a plan to bring about a joint action goal, each partner’s movements need not be represented in relation to distinct, (...) incongruent proximal goals. Instead they can be represented in relation to a single proximal goal – especially if the movements are, or appear to be, mechanically linked to a more distal joint action goal. To test this, we implemented a paradigm in which participants produced finger movements that were either congruent or incongruent with those of a virtual partner, and either with or without a joint action goal (the joint flipping of a switch, which turned on two light bulbs). Our findings provide partial support for the hypothesis that visuomotor interference effects can be reduced when two physically incongruent actions are represented as mechanically interdependent contributions to a joint action goal. (shrink)

What distinguishes causation from grounding? One suggestion is that causation, but not grounding, occurs over time. Recently, however, counterexamples to this simple temporal criterion have been offered. In this paper, we situate the temporal criterion within a broader framework that focuses on two aspects: locational overlapping in space and time and the presence of intermediaries in space and time. We consider, and reject, the idea that the difference between grounding and causation is that grounding can occur without intermediaries. We go (...) on to use the fact that grounding and causation both involve intermediaries to develop a better temporal criterion for distinguishing causation from grounding. The criterion is this: when a cause and effect are spatially disjoint, there is always a chain of causal intermediaries between the cause and the effect that are extended in time. By contrast, when the grounds and the grounded are spatially disjoint, there is always a chain of grounding intermediaries, but the chain need not be extended in time, it can be purely spatial. The difference between grounding and causation, then, is that causation requires time for chaining in a way that grounding does not. (shrink)

I give a new argument for the moral difference between lying and misleading. First, following David Lewis, I hold that conventions of truthfulness and trust fix the meanings of our language. These conventions generate fair play obligations. Thus, to fail to conform to the conventions of truthfulness and trust is unfair. Second, I argue that the liar, but not the misleader, fails to conform to truthfulness. So the liar, but not the misleader, does something unfair. This account entails that bald-faced (...) lies are wrong, that we can lie nonlinguistically, and that linguistic innovation is morally significant. (shrink)

Time is woven into the fabric of our lives. Everything we do, we do in and across time. It is not just that our lives are stretched out in time, from the moment of birth to the moment of our death. It is that our lives are stories. We make sense of ourselves, today, by understanding who we were yesterday, and the day before, and the day before that; by understanding what we did and why we did it. Our memories (...) shape our present selves, since we are the product of who we were, and who we remember being. Yet who we are lasts for but a moment. It is who we will be that demands attention. We are forever projecting ourselves into the future. We painstakingly plan for the needs of our future selves, all the while knowing that while what we do will make those future selves who they are, still, our future selves are elusive. So it is not simply that we happen to live our lives in time, the way, say, one might happen to live in Australia, or Singapore. It is hard to fathom how things could be otherwise. What would it be to live a life without time? Yet time itself is intangible. Though we are keenly aware of what has been ‒ of pain and loss, regret and pride ‒ and of what might be ‒ of anticipation, and dread, and longing ‒ time itself seems unaffected by anything we do. Though we can anticipate a future birthday cake, time itself cannot be tasted. Though we can dread a future dentist’s appointment, time itself cannot be touched. Though we remember the crunching of leaves this past autumn, time itself cannot be heard. How can it be that something so central to each of us, to who we are, and what we care about, can be so spectral? What, in the end, is time? Is time real, like a substance in which each of us, like insects in amber, finds ourselves trapped? Is time a dimension through which we can move? Is time not a thing at all, but some connection between events? If time is real, what is it like? Does it flow like a river, taking each of us prisoner in its current, washing us ever closer to the end of our lives? Is time like a cresting wave, coming ever closer to each of us from the future, engulfing us, and then receding into the past? Or is time static? Like a one-way road that each of us might wander, with no chance to turn back? Or perhaps time is like none of these things. Perhaps time is more like space; something we can navigate freely, so that we can visit different times just like we visit different places. Perhaps we can we travel in time the way we can travel in space. These questions, and many more, are the focus of this book. Now, you might wonder what philosophers are doing writing a book about time. Surely that’s a job for physicists! It is true: a great deal of what we know about time stems from our understanding of physics. However, even in physics we find that there are questions about time that go unanswered. Moreover, increasingly, physicists are turning to philosophers for help in understanding the role that time plays in current physical theories. Our goal is to get the reader up to speed on some of the central issues that influence our understanding of time so that they too may play a role in this ongoing discussion between science and philosophy. We hope that in doing so it will become clear what philosophy can bring to the study of time. There is a natural narrative in philosophy regarding the study of time, and we have chosen to organise this book according to that narrative. However, the book may also be approached in a ‘choose-your-own adventure’ spirit. While later chapters build on material introduced in earlier chapters, you can skip around, reading the book in any order you choose. For the instructor, this means that she can design her course around this book in any number of ways, depending on the particular topic she wishes to focus on. (shrink)

Originally published in 1980. What is time? How is its structure determined? The enduring controversy about the nature and structure of time has traditionally been a diametrical argument between those who see time as a container into which events are placed, and those for whom time cannot exist without events. This controversy between the absolutist and the relativist theories of time is a central theme of this study. The author's impressive arguments provide grounds for rejecting both these theories, firstly by (...) establishing that 'empty' time is possible, and secondly by showing, through a discussion of the structure of time which involves considering whether time might be cyclical, branching, beginning or non-beginning, that the absolutist theory of time is untenable. This book then advances two new theories, and succeeds in shifting the traditional debate about time to a consideration of time as a theoretical structure and as a theoretical framework. (shrink)

Predictive processing accounts of neural function view the brain as a kind of prediction machine that forms models of its environment in order to anticipate the upcoming stream of sensory stimulation. These models are then continuously updated in light of incoming error signals. Predictive processing has offered a powerful new perspective on cognition, action, and perception. In this chapter we apply the insights from predictive processing to the study of emotions. The upshot is a picture of emotion as inseparable from (...) perception and cognition, and a key feature of the embodied mind. (shrink)

Strong non-maximalism holds that some truths require no ontological ground of any sort. Strong non-maximalism allows one to accept that some propositions are true without being forced to endorse any corresponding ontological commitments. We show that there is a version of truthmaker theory available—anti-aboutness truthmaking—that enjoys the dialectical benefits of the strong non-maximalist’s position. According to anti-aboutness truthmaking, all truths require grounds, but a proposition need not be grounded in the very thing(s) that the proposition is about. We argue that (...) if strong non-maximalism can be defended, then so can anti-aboutness truthmaking on the very same basis; one can enjoy the benefits of strong non-maximalism without giving up on the idea that truth is always grounded in being. (shrink)

Many prominent critiques of philosophical methods proceed by suggesting that some method is unreliable, especially in comparison to some alternative method. In light of this, it may seem natural to conclude that these (comparatively) unreliable methods should be abandoned. Drawing upon work on the division of cognitive labour in science, we argue things are not so straightforward. Rather, whether an unreliable method should be abandoned depends heavily on the crucial question of how we should divide philosophers’ time and effort between (...) different methods, in order to maximise our prospects of achieving epistemic success. We show that, in a range of cases, even a (comparatively) unreliable method deserves to be allocated some of these resources. (shrink)

A great deal has been written about 'would' counterfactuals of causal dependence. Comparatively little has been said regarding 'would' counterfactuals of ontological dependence. The standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics is inadequate for handling such counterfactuals. That's because some of these counterfactuals are counterpossibles, and the standard Lewis-Stalnaker semantics trivializes for counterpossibles. Fortunately, there is a straightforward extension of the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics available that handles counterpossibles: simply take Lewis's closeness relation that orders possible worlds and unleash it across impossible worlds. To apply the (...) extended semantics, an account of the closeness relation for counterpossibles is needed. In this paper I offer a strategy for evaluating 'would' counterfactuals of ontological dependence that understands closeness between worlds in terms of the metaphysical concept of grounding. (shrink)

This book provides the reader with a detailed and captivating account of the story where, for the first time, physicists ventured into proposing a new force of nature beyond the four known ones - the electromagnetic, weak and strong forces, and gravitation - based entirely on the reanalysis of existing experimental data. Back in 1986, Ephraim Fischbach, Sam Aronson, Carrick Talmadge and their collaborators proposed a modification of Newton’s Law of universal gravitation. Underlying this proposal were three tantalizing pieces (...) of evidence: 1) an energy dependence of the CP (particle-antiparticle and reflection symmetry) parameters, 2) differences between the measurements of G, the universal gravitational constant, in laboratories and in mineshafts, and 3) a reanalysis of the Eötvos experiment, which had previously been used to show that the gravitational mass of an object and its inertia mass were equal to approximately one part in a billion. The reanalysis revealed that, contrary to Galileo’s position, the force of gravity was in fact very slightly different for different substances. The resulting Fifth Force hypothesis included this composition dependence and also added a small distance dependence to the inverse-square gravitational force. Over the next four years numerous experiments were performed to test the hypothesis. By 1990 there was overwhelming evidence that the Fifth Force, as initially proposed, did not exist. This book discusses how the Fifth Force hypothesis came to be proposed and how it went on to become a showcase of discovery, pursuit and justification in modern physics, prior to its demise. In this new and significantly expanded edition, the material from the first edition is complemented by two essays, one containing Fischbach’s personal reminiscences of the proposal, and a second on the ongoing history and impact of the Fifth Force hypothesis from 1990 to the present. (shrink)

Frank Jackson's knowledge argument imagines a super-smart scientist, Mary, forced to investigate the mysteries of human colour vision using only black and white resources. Can she work out what it is like to see red from brain-science and physics alone? The argument says no: Mary will only really learn what red looks like when she actually sees it. Something is therefore missing from the science of the mind, and from the 'physicalist' picture of the world based on science. This powerful (...) and controversial argument remains as pivotal as when it was first created in 1982, and this volume provides a thorough and incisive examination of its relevance in philosophy of mind today. The cutting-edge essays featured here break new ground in the debate, and also comprehensively set out the developments in the story of the knowledge argument so far, tracing its impact, past, present, and future. (shrink)

Current debate in the metaphysics of time ordinarily assumes that we should be realists about time. Recently, however, a number of physicists and philosophers of physics have proposed that time will play no role in a completed theory of quantum gravity. This paper defends fictionalism about temporal thought, on the supposition that our world is timeless. We argue that, in the face of timeless physical theories, realism about temporal thought is unsustainable: some kind of anti-realism must be adopted. We go (...) on to provide an argument against eliminativism about temporal thought. While it doesn't follow from this argument that fictionalism about temporal thought is true, we suggest that this nonetheless shows that fictionalism should be regarded as the preferred view. (shrink)

As central as the method of forcing is within set theory, it has yet to be incorporated into the philosopher's toolbox. That strikes me as a shame, since it may well have important applications within philosophy. One barrier is that typical presentations of forcing are overly dry and technical and make it seem inherently bound up with its applications within set theory. The purpose of this note is to try to rectify this. In particular, I will explain how the method (...) of forcing can be seen as a way of constructing a certain kind of intensional model that philosophers are already interested in: namely, possibility models. (shrink)

Tim travels back in time and tries to kill his grandfather before his father was born. Tim fails. But why? Lewis's response was to cite "coincidences": Tim is the unlucky subject of gun jammings, banana peels, sudden changes of heart, and so on. A number of challenges have been raised against Lewis's response. The latest of these focuses on explanation. This paper diagnoses the source of this new disgruntlement and offers an alternative explanation for Tim's failure, one that Lewis would (...) not have liked. The explanation is an obvious one but controversial, so it is defended against all the objections that can be mustered. (shrink)

I introduce an argument for Platonism based on intra-mathematical explanation: the explanation of one mathematical fact by another. The argument is important for two reasons. First, if the argument succeeds then it provides a basis for Platonism that does not proceed via standard indispensability considerations. Second, if the argument fails it can only do so for one of three reasons: either because there are no intra-mathematical explanations, or because not all explanations are backed by dependence relations, or because some form (...) of noneism-the view according to which non-existent entities possess properties and stand in relations-is true. The argument thus forces a choice between nominalism without noneism, intra-mathematical explanation and a backing conception of explanation. You can have any two, but not all three. (shrink)

ABSTRACTPresentism and endurantism are natural bedfellows: arguments have been mounted from endurantism to presentism and vice versa. I generalise an argument against the compatibility between presentism and endurantism offered recently by Tallant. I then show how to reformulate endurantism so that it is compatible with presentism. I demonstrate that this reformulated version of endurantism can do the same work with respect to the problem of temporary intrinsics as can standard definitions.

According to dialetheism, there are some true contradictions. According to the A-theory, the passage of time is a mind-independent feature of reality. On some A-theories, the passage of time involves the movement of the present. I show that by appealing to dialetheism one can explain why the present moves. I then argue that A-theorists should adopt this explanation. To do this, I defend two claims. First, that the dialetheic explanation is an improvement on the only other explanation available for why (...) the present moves and, second, that adopting the explanation is better than leaving the motion of the present unexplained. Assuming that A- theorists should adopt the best available version of their view, it follows that they should adopt a dialetheic explanation of why time passes. (shrink)

The sensorimotor theory of cognition holds that human cognition, along with that of other animals, is determined by sensorimotor structures rather than by uniquely human linguistic structures. The theory has been offered to explain the use of bodily terminology in nonphysical contexts, and to recognize the role of experienced embodiment in cognition. This paper defends a version of the theory which specifies that reasoning makes use of mental models constructed by means of action-planning mechanisms. Evidence is offered from cognitive psychology, (...) the neurosciences, and work in primatology and evolutionary theory. Further scientific and philosophical advantages of the theory are discussed: the theory is more parsimonious than its rival, and it offers better accounts of intrinsic intentionality and consciousness. The paper concludes with observations concerning the role of language in thought. (shrink)

According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. On Russellian physicalism, those inscrutables are construed as protophenomenal properties: non-structural properties that both categorically ground dispositional properties and, perhaps when appropriately structured, collectively constitute phenomenal properties. Morris and Brown (Journal of Consciousness Studies 2016, 2017) argue that protophenomenal properties cannot serve this purpose, given assumptions Russellian monists typically make about the modal profile of such properties. Those assumptions, it (...) is argued, entail that protophenomenal properties are ‘experience specific’, that is, they are individuated by their potential to constitute phenomenal properties, and are thus not genuinely physical. However, we argue, that reasoning assumes that physical inscrutables must be individuated in terms of their (actual or possible) grounding roles. Not only is that assumption questionable: it is antithetical to Russellian monism. (shrink)

Hume notoriously pursues a constructive science of human nature in the Treatise while raising serious skeptical doubts about that project and leaving them apparently unanswered. On the perspectivalist reading, Hume endorses multiple incommensurable epistemic perspectives in the Treatise. This reading faces two significant objections: that it renders Hume’s epistemology inconsistent (or at least highly incoherent) and that it is ad hoc. In this paper, I propose a perspectivalist account of epistemic justification in the Treatise that addresses, to a significant degree, (...) these concerns. Hume has available to him an account—what I will call epistemic dispositionalism—that is internally consistent, allows for epistemic continuity between perspectives, and is thoroughly grounded in his naturalism. (shrink)

The argument that nurses should be Marxists is made by looking at the primary areas of nursing activity in turn, giving an example of how capitalist economic relations negatively impact upon that activity, and providing a Marxist explanation of the reasons why it has that impact. In relation to the nursing activity of health promotion, it is argued that capitalism's generation of social inequality undermines the health of the population. In relation to curative activities, the focus is on how capitalism's (...) reckless pursuit of profit has subverted the sustainability of bactericidal interventions. The argument in relation to comforting and assistive care is that the ownership and control of health services by capitalist corporations undermines therapeutic relationships. Finally, in relation to supportive care, it is contended that capitalism's requirement for a disciplined workforce can compromise healthcare professionals’ support of employees. It is concluded that if nurses aspire to have some control over their activities, then it is a good idea for them to avail of Marxism's capacity to identify the socio‐economic mechanisms by which capitalism affects nursing care. (shrink)

This paper analyses how the discursive construction, valuation and subjective experience of human capital is evolving in parallel with crises of capital as a world-system. Ideology critique provides tools for analysing policy ‘fictions’ that aim to sustain investment in human capital through education. Foucauldian analytical tools enable analysis of how human capital has become a project of self-appreciation and cultivation of positive psychological traits. We argue that the work of Lauren Berlant provides an important complement to these approaches and enables (...) us to analyse how crises of capital are being lived as the cruelling of optimism about social mobility through investment in oneself as human capital. The paper points to an educational politics and pedagogy for living through infrastructural breakdown in darkly uncertain historical times. (shrink)

This paper investigates the interaction of phenomena associated with loose talk with embedded contexts. §1. introduces core features associated with the loose interpretation of an utterance and presents a sketch of how to theorise about such utterances in terms of a relation of ‘pragmatic equivalence’. §2. discusses further features of loose talk arising from interaction with ‘loose talk regulators’, negation and conjunction. §§3-4. introduce a hybrid static/dynamic framework and show how it can be employed in developing a fragment which accounts (...) for the data surveyed in §§1-2. (shrink)

In this commentary we would like to question (a) Clark and Fischer's characterization of the “social artifact puzzle” – which we consider less puzzling than the authors, and (b) their account of social robots as depictions involving three physical scenes – which to us seems unnecessarily complex. We contrast the authors' model with a more parsimonious account based on attributions.

scholars often use letter correspondences to uncover missing historical information. For example, while searching for the influential but unacknowledged women in the history of pragmatism, Charlene Haddock Seigfried discovered John Dewey’s letters to Elsie Ripley Clapp. Using these letters, Seigfried defended Clapp’s name as an early pragmatist. Similarly, Joan Smith cited Dewey’s letter to John T. McManis to show that Ella Flagg Young likewise influenced Dewey’s work. More recently, Eduardo Mendieta has defended a different approach to letters, and argues that (...) we should take the letters, diaries, and notebooks of certain philosophers more seriously—not just for the historical or... (shrink)

Haecceitism and Hume’s Dictum are each controversial theses about necessity and possibility. According to haecceitism, there are qualitatively indiscernible possible worlds that differ only with respect to which individuals occupy which qualitative roles. According to Hume’s Dictum, there are no necessary connections between distinct entities or, as Humeans sometimes put it, reality admits of “free recombination” so any entities can co-exist or fail to co-exist. This paper introduces a puzzle that results from the combination of haecceitism and Hume’s Dictum. This (...) puzzle revolves around the free recombination of non-qualitative properties like being Socrates. After considering several responses to this puzzle, I defend an ideology-driven solution, which dispenses with non-qualitative properties like being Socrates in favour of primitive theoretical ideology while, at the same time, preserving a commitment to both haecceitism and Hume’s Dictum. (shrink)

Rad se bavi umiješanošću promatrača kao ograničenjem u racionalnom spoznavanju svijeta i otvaranjem prostora za druge oblike spoznaje. U velikoj mjeri ta se problematika tiče odnosa znanosti i vjere, pa se u uvodnom dijelu rada polazi od odnosa vjere i znanosti, a koji je kroz povijest prolazio kroz različite faze. U prvom poglavlju analiziraju se upravo etape kroz koje je prolazio odnos vjere, odnosno religije i znanosti: jedinstvo u srednjovjekovnoj sintezi, razilaženje i sukob, dijalog i komplementarnost. Za ostvarenje dijaloga između (...) vjere i znanosti ponajprije je zaslužan papa Pio XII. svojom enciklikom Humani generis . Ipak, najveći doprinos dijaloškom odnosu vjere i znanosti dao je papa Ivan Pavao II. koji je smatrao da jedna drugoj može biti od velike koristi te da samo dinamički odnos između teologije i znanosti može otkriti granice koje čuvaju cjelovitost obiju disciplina. Na jednak način, veliki doprinos uspostavi dijaloga vjere i znanosti dali su i znanstvenici, kako sa strane teološko-filozofske misli, tako i sa strane prirodoslovnih znanosti, osobito fizičari.U ovom radu se čini jedan iskorak u pogledu određenosti i konkretnog sadržaja granice koju znanosti ne mogu prijeći i preko koje se nalazi prostor za druge oblike spoznaje i za vjeru. Polazi se od stava da je za proučavanje bilo koga predmeta taj predmet potrebno odvojiti od promatrača, kako bi ga ovaj mogao podvrgnuti objektivnom proučavanju. Sam po sebi, taj je stav opće prihvaćen u svim znanostima i filozofiji, ali je suviše uopćen da bi eliminirao sve oblike umiješanosti i rafinirane pogreške pri zaključivanju.Pokazuje se da se u termodinamici i u Newtonovoj mehanici može točno definirati takvo stajalište promatrača, kojim je on potpuno odvojen od pojave koju promatra i iz kojega je u stanju da promatranu pojavu objektivno ispita. Takvo se stajalište onda količinski razlikuje od drugih stajališta s kojima bi bio »umiješan« u pojavu koju proučava. U znanostima u kojima se to može učiniti eksperimentalno se osnivaju, nalaze i koriste zakoni koji se mogu zvati »objektivnima«. No i u takvim znanostima ima oblika umiješanosti koji mogu ostati skriveni desetljećima i duže. U radu se ukazuje na tri takva oblika diskretne umiješanosti u termodinamici i mehanici. Za znanosti u kojima se točno količinsko razdvajanje objektivnih i umiješanih stajališta promatrača nije moglo učiniti, ili se načelno ne može učiniti, ne može biti ni sigurnosti od umiješanosti i time od rafiniranih pogrešaka u racionalnom zaključivanju. Odatle se sa znatnom heurističkom snagom izvodi zaključak da se u područjima spoznaje kojima se bave znanosti i filozofija racionalnim zaključivanjem može učiniti rafinirana pogreška i da postoji prostor za druge oblike spoznaje i vjeru.The introductory part of the work deals with the relation between science and other forms of cognition which has undergone various phases throughout history. The first chapter analyses the stages through which the relation between faith, i.e. religion, and science has passed: unity in medieval synthesis, divergence and conflict, dialogue and complementarity. Much credit goes to Pope Pius XII with his encyclical Humani Generis for the development of dialogue between religion and science. However, Pope John Paul II made the greatest contribution to the dialogical relation between faith and science. He believed that their relation could be of great value and that only the dynamic relation between religion and science could discover the limits that hold the integrity of both disciplines. In the same way, scientists, those of the theological-philosophical thought as well as those of natural sciences, especially physicists, have made a great contribution to setting up a dialogue between religion and science.This work is a step forward regarding the determinateness and concrete content of the limit that sciences cannot cross and beyond which is a space for other forms of cognition and for faith. The starting point is a standpoint that if one wants to study a subject, that subject has to be set apart from the observer, so that it can be objectively studied. In itself, that standpoint has been universally accepted in all sciences and in philosophy too, but it is too generalized to eliminate all the forms of interference and refined errors when drawing conclusions.It is established that in thermodynamics and in Newton’s mechanics one can precisely define such a standpoint of the observer, by which he/she is completely detached from the phenomenon he/she is observing and from which he/she is able to research the observed phenomenon objectively. Such a standpoint quantitatively differs from other standpoints, by which he/she would be “involved” with the phenomenon he/she is investigating. In the sciences in which it is possible to do that, laws that can be called “objective” are experimentally passed and adopted. But even in such sciences there are forms of involvement that may remain hidden for decades and longer. This work points at such three forms of discrete involvement in thermodynamics and mechanics. For the sciences in which a precise quantitative separation between the observer’s objective and involved standpoints was not possible, or is not principally possible, there cannot be safety of involvement and consequently of refined errors in rational concluding. Hence, with considerable heuristic strength, the following conclusion is drawn: All sciences, including philosophy, should explicitly take and put forward a view that, by rational conclusions, it is possible to make a refined mistake in their areas of cognition and that there is room for other forms of cognition and for religion. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage n'est autre qu'une étude a-méthodique sur l'essence phénoménologique humaine appuyée sur la philosophie de Michel Henry. Elle gravite autour de la notion de douleur basée sur la passivité précoce de l'être par rapport à lui-même et dans le cadre révélateur de l'affectivité. En d'autres termes, la révélation de l'être tel qu'il est dépeint dans sa passion. Une nouvelle conception de la corporéité, du temps et du langage vient de la tonalité affective de base de la douleur. Comprendre ces (...) thèmes en les reliant à l'être masculin est crucial pour ne pas le scinder en champs ou dimensions inconciliables qui ne le laisseraient pas comprendre dans ce qu'il fait, dit ou vit, c'est-à-dire sur ce que l'être est vécu -- Contracubierta. (shrink)

We investigate a novel use of the English temporal modifier ‘now’, in which it combines with a subordinate clause. We argue for a univocal treatment of the expression, on which the subordinating use is taken as basic and the non-subordinating uses are derived. We start by surveying central features of the latter uses which have been discussed in previous work, before introducing key observations regarding the subordinating use of ‘now’ and its relation to deictic and anaphoric uses. All of these (...) data, it is argued, can be accounted for on our proposed analysis. We conclude by comparing ‘now’ to a range of other expressions which exhibit similar behavior. (shrink)