What are mental states? When we talk about people’s beliefs or desires, are we talking about what is happening inside their heads? If so, might cognitive science show that we are wrong? Might it turn out that mental states do not exist? Mental fictionalism offers a new approach to these longstanding questions about the mind. Its core idea is that mental states are useful fictions. When we talk about mental states, we are not formulating hypotheses about people’s inner machinery. Instead, (...) we simply talk "as if" people had certain inner states, such as beliefs or desires, in order to make sense of their behaviour. This is the first book dedicated to exploring mental fictionalism. Featuring contributions from established authors as well as up-and-coming scholars in this burgeoning field, the book reveals the exciting potential of a fictionalist approach to the mind, as well as the challenges it faces. In doing so, it offers a fresh perspective on foundational debates in the philosophy of mind, such as the nature of mental states and folk psychology, as well as hot topics in the field, such as embodied cognition and mental representation. Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations essential reading for advanced undergraduates, postgraduates and professionals alike. (shrink)

Gyorgy Tamas works in the philosophy of logic, that difficult interdisciplin ary region wherein the notion of categories is both basic and subtle. To understand ways of thinking, to understand patterns of whatever is real, to recognize what is possible and to reject the nonsensical and the impossible is to comprehend the categories. This was a in thought and in fact, recurring motive of European thought from the earliest self-aware beginnings, and Tamas knows that history well, as his critical respect (...) demonstrates. Ancient, medieval, and modern thinkers appear in this book, set forth in their own words; and likewise we see that Tamas has built upon the historians and commentators, upon the pioneering historical investigation of the categories by Trendelenburg a century ago and by Bochenski in our days. Tamas has two principal goals here: to investigate the logic, which is to say the structure and the relations, of the philosophical categories; and to set forth the logic of thought which may then be based upon the critically established system of categories obtained by that investigation. Ancillary but of striking value is his style of historical relevance which enables the reader to engage in a discussion that is both analytically sharp and developmentally insightful. Furthermore, Tamas draws upon his contem porary colleagues with similar critical respect: Lukasiewicz, Quine, Patzig, Menne, Tavanets and others. (shrink)

A piliscsabai Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem oktatója, Hankovszky Tamás (két kivételtől eltekintve) az utóbbi évtizedben megjelent publikációiból állította össze tanulmánykötetét. A filozófiai, teológiai és irodalmi ihletésű írásokat mindenekelőtt "az Istennel való találkozás" keresztény hite fűzi egybe, és persze a filozófiatörténész szerző preferenciái (Pilinszky, Camus, Mauriacimon Weil, Dosztojevszkij). "Minden találkozás olyan partnereket követel, akik szabadon megnyílnak egymásnak, de nem oldódnak fel egymásban, akik a másik közelségére vágynak, mégis megőrzik a köztük lévő távolságot, mert a dialógust keresik, és a dialógus lételeme a (...) különbözőség. Ám az ember csak azért különbözik a másik embertől és Istentől, hogy kapcsolatba léphessenek" - olvasható az ismertetőben. Mivel Hankovszky professzor a találkozásban és a párbeszédben látja az élet értelmét és végső célját, a kötet kívül áll azon a misztikát is felölelő monista hagyományon, amely az Istennel való minél teljesebb egyesülésre, Isten és ember egységére törekszik, és a vele való párbeszédet, a kölcsönös megszólítást pusztán a cél felé vezető út első lépésének tekinti. Azonban éppen azért áll kívül ezen az ősi és tiszteletreméltó hagyományon, hogy dialógust folytasson vele, és így teljesebben érthesse meg Isten és ember viszonyát, valamint megtalálja benne a földi lét, a művészet és a kultúra igazi helyét. A szakkönyvtárak anyagába ajánlható kötetet rövidítés- és irodalomjegyzék, valamint az esszék és tanulmányok első megjelenési helyeinek listája teszi teljessé. (shrink)

filozofiatortenet vallasfilozofia filozofiai antropologia Franciaorszag 17. szazad.

Conflicting Values of Inquiry explores how certain non-epistemic values had been turned into epistemic ones, how they had an effect on epistemic content, and how they became ideologies of knowledge playing various roles in inquiry and application throughout early modern Europe.

In this article I attempt to reconstruct David Hume's use of the label ?experimental? to characterise his method in the Treatise. Although its meaning may strike the present-day reader as unusual, such a reconstruction is possible from the background of eighteenth-century practices and concepts of natural inquiry. As I argue, Hume's inquiries into human nature are experimental not primarily because of the way the empirical data he uses are produced, but because of the way those data are theoretically processed. He (...) seems to follow a method of analysis and synthesis quite similar to the one advertised in Newton's Opticks, which profoundly influenced eighteenth-century natural and moral philosophy. This method brings him much closer to the methods of qualitative, chemical investigations than to mechanical approaches to both nature and human nature. (shrink)

For Jerry Fodor, Hume’sTreatise of Human Natureis “the foundational document of cognitive science” whose significance transcends mere historical interest: it is a source of theoretical inspiration in cognitive psychology. Here I am going to argue that those reading Hume along Fodor’s lines rely on a problematic, albeit inspiring, construction of Hume’s science of mind. My strategy in this paper is to contrast Fodor’s understanding of the Humean mind (consonant with the widely received view of Hume in both cognitive science and (...) much of Hume scholarship) with an alternative understanding that I propose. I thereby intend to show that the received view of Hume’s science of mind can be fruitfully revised while critically engaging with Fodor’s contemporary appropriation. Consequently, I use this occasion to put forward a rather unorthodox interpretation of Hume’s theory in dialogue with Fodor as my guide. (shrink)

This paper sketches a recently emerging divide between two interpretations of Hume's methodology and philosophy of science. On the first interpretation Hume relies on an inductive methodology and provides a (Newtonian) dynamic theory of the mind, and his philosophy of science reflects this methodology. On the second, Hume relies on inferences to the best explanation via comparative analysis of instances, and offers an anatomy of the mind relying on a chemical and organic imagery. The paper also aspires to lean the (...) reader's sympathies toward the latter interpretation while outlining some of its potential consequences for the character of Hume's psychology, the limits of associationism, and his empiricism. (shrink)