This book explains the notational system NUSAP (Numeral, Unit, Spread, Assessment, Pedigree) and applies it to several examples from the environmental sciences.

This book is much in the tradition of Paul Goodman and Edgar Friedenberg in that it accepts their critique of what is wrong with American education. But then it goes on to share a utopian vision of how it could and should be--a vision featuring a Summerhill-like, multi-media, "total environment" approach where life from birth to death is dedicated to the joys of learning. Leonard is currently vice-president of Esalen Institute and a veteran magazine journalist on education. He has written (...) with considerable skill and passion a book that is as engrossing as a good novel. The book is intoxicating in its suggestion that perhaps there is some way to preserve and kindle the creative zest which all children are born with, without killing it as we do now by regimentation. Leonard not only spins out his own vision of the future, but does some first class reporting on current experiments which point the way to it and on current policies which block it. No educator, could fail to enjoy or benefit from this book.--S. O. H. (shrink)

In a style that is as straight-forward as it is dry, Banner introduces philosophy's fundamental and recurring ethical questions. As the subtitle might imply, he makes no distinction between ethics and morality. The opening chapter explores the context of ethical inquiry, or "The Realm of Morals," discussing questions of virtue and responsibility, reflection and choice, as distinct dimensions of human experience. The author's existentialist bias is evident in what he chooses to discuss in the introductory chapters, but he keeps it (...) in check in the exposition which follows them. The second chapter is methodological, showing the problems preliminary to systematic ethical inquiry and to individual moral reflection. The rest of the book is taken up with summaries of the ethical positions of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Reinhold Niebuhr, Bentham, Mill, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Camus. In a short epilogue, Banner makes an effort to recapitulate the main themes that run through these thinkers. These concern the distinction between the good and the right, and deal with the relation of the individual to the community and its regulative officials. Greater effort is made to contrast the thinkers here in the epilogue than in the exposition. As an introduction the book does the job, but it is not inspired.--S. O. H. (shrink)

In an effort to give a "personal account of the impact of Whitehead on one reader" and to promote the enthusiasm of others who have not yet discovered Whitehead, Jordan takes off to give his readers an aerial view of the Whiteheadian panorama, flying high enough to avoid becoming entangled in the Whiteheadian word thicket below. This is not to say that Jordan ignores Whiteheadian terminology. On the contrary he has enhanced Whitehead's famous mute appeal for an imaginative leap with (...) a string of ingenious metaphors which serve well to explicate Whitehead's key technical terms and concepts. The result is actually more of a commentary and exposition than is advertised in the introduction. The final chapters come closer to the autobiographical emphasis promised in the introduction. There Jordan makes some general observations on Whitehead's language, his method, and the place of reason in his thought. He affirms the importance and modern relevance of Whitehead as a whole in spite of some misgivings about Whitehead's theism in an age of justifiable skepticism. The importance of the book is its metaphors and images. At last someone has made a responsible effort to explicate Whitehead in everyday terms. Obviously this involves distortions, but the book has no pretensions about its authority and is coupled with an invitation to read Whitehead himself and his more technical commentators. There are no footnotes.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This is primarily a sociological study of the impact on the viewer of television coverage of particular key events. Singled out especially are: MacArthur day in Chicago in 1951, the 1952 political conventions, and the Kennedy-Nixon debates of 1960. The impact of television on political opinion and the effect of nationally televised voting returns on late voters are also explored. Relying on the method of questionnaires and interviews with strategically placed eye-witnesses and television watchers, the Langs discovered: that there is (...) a difference between being there in person and "being there" via T.V., that the major networks differ, often markedly, with respect to the impression of the event conveyed, and that in spite of seeming to be a "see for yourself" news medium, T.V. can't help but introduce some "refraction," some inadvertent bias, into the actuality it conveys. Although there is occasional passing reference to McLuhan, there is little discussion of T.V. as medium. Rather, content, and content of news coverage specifically, is the primary focus. However, in the last chapter, and here and there throughout the book, there are more speculative reflections on what the authors have discovered. For example, they speculate on the way television coverage becomes an event in its own right and on the way television "manufactures" actuality, transforming the viewers' quest for truth into a quest for trust. The book is a helpful, feet-on-the-ground reference point for the exploration of the problems of media and messages.--S. O. H. (shrink)

As "dialogue" tends to suggest an implicit dispute between the parties involved, this book is mistitled. What we see here is the co-operation of the resources of psychology and theology in the common quest for a unified theory of man. However, although they are co-operative, the two fields do maintain their identity throughout the studies. Very often the attempt is made to find the differences and to show the relation between theological and psychological theories of man. As with the other (...) volumes of this series, all the contributors are associated with the Chicago Divinity School, either as alumni or as faculty. The entries cover such topics as sin, Freud and Tillich, various aspects of the dynamics of knowing and of faith, dream and myth, Jung, Pastoral counseling, group therapy.--S. O. H. (shrink)

The book begins with four case studies and works its way through various manifestations, descriptions, and explanations of those new cultural attitudes toward sex called the sexual revolution. Much of the emphasis is on co-marital sex because the author feels that this area has been largely ignored in the recent literature on the subject. The book is well written and adequately researched; its subject matter obviates any need for it to struggle for the reader's attention. The final chapters cover "The (...) Playboy Philosophy," a report by some British Friends entitled Towards a Quaker View of Sex, and ethical pragmatism. The author's conclusions grope toward a "morality beyond morality" and an ethical pluralism.--S. O. H. (shrink)

The bulk of this work is a responsible and well documented exposition of Whitehead's major themes with emphasis on how they contribute to his theory of perception and how his developing theory of perception contributes to them. Although Schmidt divides Whitehead's development into three parts, the important part of the project, and obviously his favorite, is the elucidation of Whitehead's "mature theory of perception" and the demonstration that it provides a foundation for the cosmological system and his philosophy of science. (...) Throughout, Whitehead is presented as an empiricist, although not in the usual sense. Perception and immediate experience are his starting point, but "perception" is used in a more basic, generic sense than is customary. It includes conception as well as sense-presentation. Schmidt pays prolonged and welcome attention to presentational immediacy, causal efficacy, and symbolic reference. The book contains some useful expansions of underdeveloped Whiteheadian doctrines, elucidations of Whiteheadian obscurities, and a number of interpretive distinctions, all of which serve to make it a useful new commentary as well as a proposal of an important thesis.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This is the third volume of Weiss' philosophical journal. The first two volumes, published in 1966, cover 1955 to 1964. The philosophy on these pages is only "in process" in the sense that it is the kind of thinking-out-loud that is not afraid to go back and amend itself in the light of something just considered. Other than that, it reads more like the rich harvest of a ripe mind setting out to reflect on what it thinks to be important (...) at the moment. Each entry is a freely flowing but usually unified essay whose topic is revealed in the first few sentences. Often one day's entry will pick up on a theme touched upon the previous day. The topics range from complex and technical philosophical and metaphysical ones to occasional issues of broader concern like education, employment, welfare, civil rights, mental illness, and even jokes. There is frequent comment and sometimes second thoughts about Weiss' previous books. The language and categories of Modes of Being run through many of the entries as they deal with traditional metaphysical problems concerning being, God, substance, existence, actuality, the one and the many, etc. The index is painstakingly prepared, and each pair of pages has a heading indicating the general topic being discussed there.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Where is the old Marcuse? Is he too tired to be explicit, to reason, to give a rationale for what he is contending? Why has he written this?--this which is just another protest lost in the shouting and the printing scattered all over stop signs, subway walls, placards, newspapers, magazines, and in books. Perhaps the importance of the book is its perseverance at a time when we are exhausted, worn out by protest's apparent sterility on the one hand and its (...) kiss-of-death fashionability on the other. Many places in this book are obscure because they are poorly written and poorly edited. Marcuse walks the line between being original enough to be provocative and irresponsible enough to be dismissed. The book is a fascinating interplay between sense and nonsense, penetrating insight and polemical overstatement, between creative originality and banal sloganism, between brilliant interpretive social commentary and abject confusion. Marcuse does succeed in letting the reader know that there is something wrong with our society and that many of the values that we have taken for granted must be rethought, but this is not Marcuse at his best, and the net force of the book is to leave the reader bewildered with this, another indication that these are bewildering times.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This study originally appeared in German in 1963. It was revised for the English edition and the translation is smooth. It is an introduction aimed at the layman. The language is simple and, except for the most important of Teilhard's terms, technical terms are scrupulously avoided. The book is organized around what Wildiers feels are Teilhard's major motivating concerns: God and the universe, or love of God vs. love of world. Wildiers explains how Teilhard sees the universe evolving from the (...) geosphere through the biosphere and noosphere and converging toward a specific end, the omega point, which Teilhard identifies with the parousia. Man has a unique position in this scheme. He represents the noosphere and is, in a sense, evolution in charge of itself. Wildiers shows how Teilhard's original concern was scientific and how he tenaciously made use of a phenomenological scientific methodology even in his most speculative theological reflections. Teilhard's christology, philosophy of history, and concept of evil are also discussed. The book does perhaps leave the reader "introduced," but there is no substitute for discovering Teilhard for oneself.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This book first appeared in 1950 with a second edition in 1956. Kaufmann devotes much time to discussing secondary sources, "rival interpretations," as well as Nietzsche himself and the context of his thought. This third edition represents an expansion as well as a revision of the second. The third edition takes into account work published on Nietzsche since 1956 including new editions and translations of Nietzsche's own work. The impact of these new translations and editions is also discussed. Previously unpublished (...) letters are discussed, with one letter actually reproduced in facsimile. In the expansion Kaufmann did not include anything that would duplicate his own recent publications with the exception that he has substituted his own recent translations of Nietzsche. The bibliography, which did not appear in the second edition, and the index are expanded. There is a new twenty-eight page appendix on the "supressed" [[sic]] manuscripts in which Kaufmann discusses and pans some recent German editions of Nietzsche's works. Finally, there are numerous small additions and revisions in this third edition of a standard work.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This book is a preliminary treatment investigating how quantum physics' view of the world is related to the central concepts and doctrines of the western philosophical tradition. Recognizing the analogy between the subject-object distinction in philosophy and the instrument-system distinction in physics, Petersen sees that the problems of description in quantum theory and in philosophy have a profound kinship and suggests that quantal description and the concept of complementarity might play an important role in the solution of those problems. A (...) principal focus in this study thus becomes the idea of correspondence, through which physicists sought to establish the relation between quantum and classical physics. Petersen's approach is largely historical, beginning with an account of the development of ontological philosophy that dwells largely on Berkeley, Locke, Hume, and Kant in order to get at the point of contact between epistemology and ontology. Then comes a short history of atomism and an account of the correspondence idea in quantum physics. Finally he uses his historical accounts in a discussion of the relation of quantum physics to traditional philosophy. There is a summary in Danish at the end.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This is not a book on religious language, not an analysis or suggestion about the "logic" of God-talk. It is one of those homiletical efforts to make God relevant. But, as such it is a notch above most. Its images are fairly vivid, and its language is urbane and fresh, although occasionally new phrases are coined without sufficient development or rationale to reveal what they mean. Its approach, then, is theological not philosophical, compelled as it is to cover Christian motifs--sin, (...) salvation, resurrection, eternal life, etc. One of the frequent themes is the rejection of the medieval propositional approach to God and the rejection of the "half-baked existentialist" conceptual approach. Rather, Moore sees the discovery and understanding of God in terms of a radically loving, Christ-powered life-style.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Parker obviously has a warm fondness and a deep empathetic understanding of this period of history, and they are offered to the reader in every carefully worked sentence. In a narrative style that presents the human dimension as well as the central ideas of the Presocratics, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Parker imaginatively reconstructs the phenomenological, empirical, and the homely rationale for their theories. He depicts the Presocratics as organized around the question "What is the universe made of?" and Socrates around (...) "What is Truth, Justice, Goodness?" There is a chapter giving a profile of Athens and Sparta. The three chapters on Plato cover the theory of forms, the Republic, and the Laws. The four chapters on Aristotle, besides the biographical inclusions, cover a scheme of his works, his view of nature, The Ethics, The Politics, and his lasting impact on the rest of intellectual history. The book ends with a brief treatment of Hellenism and a conclusion that takes its cue from the awe and excitement of Keats in On First Looking into Chapman's Homer. Altogether it is a simplified yet sympathetic, thoughtful, and sensitive introduction.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Each contributor to this volume, collected in conjunction with St. Louis University's sesquicentennial celebrations, addresses himself to the title topic in terms of his own field. The first part of the book contains essays grouped loosely under the theme "The Environment of Learning." This section is introduced by Ong with a thumbnail portrait of the knowledge explosion, its history, its technological apparatus, its social implications, and its undergirding presupposition: a faith in the intelligibility of the universe. Other essays in the (...) section cover university education, education in Africa, international politics, urban problems, and architecture. In his essay, McLuhan moves from a discussion of architecture to an explanation of a certain art form which integrates separate environmental fragments into a gestalt fusion of artist, art form, and art work. This art form, this "happening," for post-mechanical man is the environment itself plus the programmed structuring of its elements. John Macquarrie builds a doctrine of human responsibility using the creation myth and a little Heidegger to portray man not as the sovereign over creation but as its steward and guardian. The second section deals with specific areas of knowledge. J. R. Zacharias leads off with a superficial account of how scientific training, with its emphasis on objectivity, can lead to moral sureness and of how scientists make moral decisions. This ethical emphasis is maintained as other contributors in biology, law, and business discuss the impact of technology in their area and the "way out" possibilities of the future. The final three essays are moderate by comparison. J. D. Collins, speaking for philosophy, points out that philosophers are characteristically more concerned with their past than with their future, that they delay in order to reflect when others barge ahead, and that consequently for them the knowledge explosion has also been a knowledge implosion. However, he does manage a discussion of philosophy's new "developing patterns," the most significant for him being the convergence of phenomenology and language analysis. M. Eliade gives a short account of the history of religions, and Karl Rahner ends the book with a crisp essay relating Christian eschatology to secular ideologies of the future.--S. O. H. (shrink)

These lectures, given at the University of Chicago and slated to be the Nobel lectures at Harvard before Tillich's death, are a compromise between the technical style of the Systematic Theology and the sermon style of his more popular books, although they are closer to the latter. They are eminently readable and filled with those rich insights that only the reflection of a mature mind can produce. The first chapter is a narrative, autobiographical account of Tillich's years as a young (...) man in which he acknowledges his intellectual debts and influences. The last three chapters are suggestions for absolutes found in his search--absolutes in knowledge, ethics, and religion respectively. These include the logical structure of the mind, categories, and polarities; the unconditional character of the moral imperative, agape; being-itself, and the holy. The book contains an inspired introduction to the Credo Perspectives series by Ruth Anshen as well as her short prologue to this particular volume. The twenty-six full-page drawings by Saul Steinberg are a significant bonus. They parallel and often interpret the text, and the text, in its turn, often reveals the drawings in a clearer light.--S. O. H. (shrink)

As a whole these essays take their cue from the later Wittgenstein in an effort to get beyond the verifiability/falsifiability cul-de-sac and to "get clear" on some religious concepts by exploring religious language at work. The opening two essays, by E. Heller and P. Holmer, are the only two that deal directly with Wittgenstein. Heller shows some interesting parallels between Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, but largely these essays are for introductory purposes. Although Wittgenstein's presence is felt in the remaining essays, his (...) name is seldom mentioned. Ian Ramsey has two contributions, one on paradox and one on religion and science. He is up to his usual method of making plausible suggestions by means of careful distinctions, always with a careful eye on the phenomenology of the religious universe of discourse. F. Ferré explores the notion of "models" as it works in science and sees how this concept can work in the examination of religious language. T. McPherson uses a distinction between literal, semiotic, and symbolic meaning to explore religious assertions and analogy. R. C. Coburn suggests that a neglected use of theological statements is to answer the limiting questions of religion in a manner that is logically complete. B. Mitchell talks about justifying religious belief in answer to MacIntyre's charge that such a project reveals a basic misunderstanding of religious discourse. There are two intriguing essays by Wm. Poteat, one of which draws an analogy between birth and suicide to build a doctrine of creation. C. B. Daly writes on metaphysics and the limits of language. Although there is same familiar wrangling over tired issues, the book does manage to collect some refreshing although not strikingly original essays.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Unless the title is a McLuhanesque play on words--which Finkelstein would never allow himself--the book is mistitled, for Finkelstein dwells almost exclusively on what he considers to be the nonsense of McLuhan. Writing with all the venom of an anti-smut campaigner whose moral principles are threatened because they are too weak and too inflexible, Finkelstein wages his polemics against McLuhan in an effort to discredit him and expose him as a false prophet. What nettles Finkelstein most is that McLuhan, a (...) professor--a guardian of truth and goodness--should be so irresponsible as to fail to denunciate T.V. commercials, Madison avenue mind-manipulators, T.V.'s causing the atrophy of the ability to read and think, and the other bogeymen of humanist dogma. How dare McLuhan, the Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities at a great University, challenge the foundations of the humanities themselves? Finkelstein is at least thorough in his refusal to come to grips with what is valid in McLuhan: he does us the service of pointing out the errors in McLuhan's reading of history, in his dictum that the medium is the message, in his suggestion that media are extensions of man, and in his advocacy of media involvement. The final and the least weak chapter draws a parallel between McLuhan and Marx, showing how McLuhanism can lead to a world totalitarian monolith. We should pay Finkelstein the courtesy, however, of pointing out that there is a sense in which his criticisms, if not always valid, are at least important to keep in mind while seeking to understand McLuhan without being seduced by him.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Wicker's concern is to build a philosophical and justificational foundation for a "Christian radicalism" which can serve to synthesize the two modern secular themes of self-determination and communalism. He explores particular secular theories of perception, language, and society and rejects them as irrelevant to modern realities. He then constructs in their place three sacred theories, where "sacred" is to be understood not as a sheltered corner of our experience but rather as the basis of the more general intersubjectivity which defines (...) man-in-society. He draws on Merleau-Ponty for a theory of perception, Wittgenstein for a theory of language, and Marx for a theory of society. All three theories find man in a closer participating relation with his world environment than do their rejected alternatives. These three theories suggest three modes of being-in-the-world: the bodily, the linguistic, and the economic, all of which are expressive—the latter in the sense that it involves the transformation of environment into expressiveness. The conjunction of the three modes, then, defines our community life. Wicker uses George Eliot, Dickens, Orwell, and William Golding to show how various human attitudes toward environment are manifest in literature. These attitudes are classifiable into the secular—environment as passive context for human life—and the sacred—environment as fraught with primordial significance which man shares and of which he is part. Wicker further justifies his vision of Christianity with the aid of Levy-Bruhl, van der Leeuw, and Eliade whose studies in primitive religions fructify Wicker's notion of the sacred. The book ends with a theological formulation of its main themes involving new translations of old doctrines. The book is a brave effort to revitalize with secular insights a moribund Christianity and to point it to its own roots in the foundations of man.—S. O. H. (shrink)

Pranger directs his attention to the everyday experience of citizens, including their Angst, their estrangement, and other existential phenomena, and extrapolates from them a political theory which will integrate the private and public dimensions of individual lives, and which will take into account the multiple political settings and allegiances within the overall national community. First, he explores the institutional setting of the citizen in which the citizen is seen as the player of a particular status role. Next he looks at (...) the category of action where citizen action is seen as basically anonymous, with its outcome ever unpredictable, a fact which Pranger feels any philosophy of government must take into account. By far the strongest chapter is the one on Symbolism and Attitude in which Pranger forges a theory of the relation between public and private and of the citizens' individual and collective symbolic construction of reality. The final chapter explores modern man's anomie, his Wendung, and his uprootedness, as a dimension of political reality. Pranger insists that modern striving for order must take seriously the disorder, confusion, and ambiguity in the daily lives of each individual citizen. Unfortunately Pranger's erudition and insistence on alluding to the work of others renders the book diffuse, his thesis elusive. This is especially unfortunate in light of the fact that he is at his best when he puts his note cards aside and speculates on his own.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Cobb's stated purpose in this book is to inquire into what is distinctive about Christianity and into its claim to finality. Hence half the book is taken up with the explication of other "structures of existence" which antedated or which have paralleled "Christian Existence." For Cobb, the term existence refers to how a subject relates itself to itself and what it is in and for itself. Cobb traces the move from the primitive self, which is not yet conscious of itself (...) as a self, across the threshold to "axial" man who breaks with the primitive mythic age by exhibiting a "seat of existence" or center of consciousness which involves a new role for rationality and which for the first time subordinates the unconscious to the conscious. The particular structures of axial existence which Cobb explores are Buddhist Existence, Homeric Existence, Socratic Existence, and Prophetic Existence. In contradistinction to these, Christian existence emerges as the crossing of a new threshold: it is spiritual existence expressing itself in love. Cobb's efforts to fulfill the second purpose of the book are half-hearted and unconvincing, a fact perhaps consistent with the book's objectivity: it is not Christian apologetics. Cobb's well known Whiteheadianism is only subtly and incidentally evident in this work, although occasionally it is used directly to expand and enrich certain explanations. The print in the book is annoyingly small.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Jonathan and Paul Weiss, obviously enjoying themselves, spar with one another over everyday problems of ethical decisions and principles--problems which they have obviously discussed before and which they now air for our benefit, taking advantage of their prolonged and special relationship to avoid haggling over banalities and to present the fruits of dialogue without its heavy stalks. Although the two men are enjoying their talk, their tone is not frivolous. They reveal a deep and human concern with the issues they (...) are discussing. They are aware of their presuppositions but conscientiously avoid any philosophically compulsive examination of them. The result is that the lay reader is rewarded with strong substantive positions that deal squarely, even if not definitively, with the practical issues at hand. The format of the book is what appears to be a transcription of actual conversations about the individual, his obligations, the family, the state, society, and the universe. The conversations often seemed to be "staged," however, with one of them playing devil's advocate. They stick to the agenda and leave each issue when the time is up or when the discussion becomes unfruitful.--S. O. H. (shrink)

This collection of essays, sketches, talks, and poems is hardly a must, even for Buber fans. It is not his best writing or his deepest thinking. However, each selection is short enough not to waste the reader's time and suggestive enough to lure him on to the next one in the hope that the real gems will be there. Buber seldom published his poems, and the reason is clear. With a few memorable exceptions the poems collected here are not strong--at (...) least not in the translations given; fortunately the German is printed alongside. Buber made these selections himself from writings between 1902 and 1964. The criterion of selection was to collect a valid and "survival-worthy expression of an experience, a feeling, a decision, yes even a dream." The ten sections of the book are not titled but some of the topics covered are: words and language, discussions of various thinkers, the idea of community, education, religion, psychology, and politics. Many of the pieces were prepared for particular occasions. Friedman explains those occasions in the back of the book and gives other bits of information that aid the translation and clear up some obscure references. Some of the themes that pervade the selections are: the togetherness of body and spirit, dialogue, the importance of existential trust, and the sacredness of the concrete world and of everyday encounters. Ruth Anshen's inspired introduction to the Credo Perspectives Series is worthy of its repetition in all the volumes.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Extended antipaternalism means the use of antipaternalist arguments to defend activities that harm (consenting) others. As an example, a smoker’s right to smoke is often invoked in defence of the activities of tobacco companies. It can, however, be shown that antipaternalism in the proper sense does not imply such extended antipaternalism. We may therefore approve of Mill’s antipaternalist principle (namely, that the only reason to interfere with someone’s behaviour is to protect others from harm) without accepting activities that harm (consenting) (...) others. This has immediate consequences for the ethics of public health. An antipaternalist need not refrain from interfering with activities such as the marketing of tobacco or heroin, boxing promotion, driving with unbelted passengers, or buying sex from “voluntary” prostitutes. (shrink)

In sound, clear, and relentless argumentation Neville makes the case for God as being-itself. God as being-itself is indeterminate. Neville explores several theories that opt for the determinacy of being-itself and exposes the weaknesses of each. As indeterminate, being-itself is the ontological unity of the various determinations of being, and as such transcends them. This transcendent, indeterminate being-itself effects the unity of the determinations of being by creating them ex nihilo. The book spends some time exploring the structure of the (...) distinction between God and the created world, concluding that that distinction is itself determinate and created. God is not only transcendent for Neville, he is also present. He has some conditional features. However, the emphasis is overwhelmingly on transcendence. Neville rejects Hartshorne and insists that God is not conditioned by the determinations of being. Part II of the book is largely methodological, showing the move from "methodological dialectic" to "constitutive dialectic" in order to demonstrate how knowledge of this God is possible. The third part is an effort to connect religious experience with the constructs of Part I. Neville has one of those welcome styles in which the book offers a running commentary on itself: where it has been, where it is, where it is going, and how its success or failure might be judged. This is an important book, but more for its thoroughness and clarity than for its originality.--S. O. H. (shrink)

The Pegram Lectures at Brookhaven National Laboratory are designed to provide a forum to consider the question of the interaction among science, the humanities, and society at large. Just before Maurois was to deliver these lectures in 1967 he became fatally ill. However, the manuscript had been prepared and was delivered by Jacques Barzun. These lectures along with prefatory remarks by Barzun and E. Morot-Sir of the French Embassy comprise Illusions. There are three lectures by Maurois. The first begins by (...) cataloguing various everyday illusions, mostly optical. It discusses dreams, the difference between illusion and hallucination, the role of interpretation of reality in the creation of illusion, and the distinction between who we are as opposed to whom we play. In short it reminds us that, for various reasons, we do not see the world as it is. The second lecture shows how science tries to correct our distorted pictures of reality. Science is largely successful in this effort, says Maurois, although inasmuch as men need to interpret what science discovers, the door is still open for illusion. Moreover, inasmuch as scientists are men, science is not above producing some illusions of its own. The third and perhaps the most contrived lecture explores the world of willful illusions: the fine arts. Here Maurois suggests some differences and similarities between art and science, and explores the technological interaction between the two. He concludes that illusion will always be with us and that in fact it is "the stuff of which our life is made."-S. O. H. (shrink)

This is a remarkably crisp and lucid comparison between Bultmann and Jaspers organized around the former's concept of Christian faith and the latter's notion of philosophical faith. Many of the issues arise from an actual dialogue between the two men over a period of years. Long's book develops some of the two men's difficulties with and misunderstandings of each other. The two men display similarities in their rejection of positivism and system-building and in their recognition of risk and commitment in (...) man's coming to know himself and his relation to the transcendent. But they also have important differences, the most significant and representative of which concerns whether or not to accept any one tradition as being central, authoritative, or exclusively helpful in the quest for self-understanding. For Jaspers, who rejects the centrality of Jesus, every tradition, whether authoritative or kerygmatic, is relative and ambiguous with no particular claim on man. In accepting one particular manifestation of truth as definitive, says Jaspers, theology has turned what is by nature incomprehensible into an object of understanding. Long traces these similarities and differences through chapters on revelation, language, science, and reason. Long's thorough grasp of the issues and the clarity and simplicity of his presentation place the usefulness and importance of this book beyond the topic of Bultmann and Jaspers. With a meta-critical perspective, Long opens up the border between Philosophy and Theology on the Existentialist front in perhaps a more promising way than similar attempts to open it up on the front of linguistic analysis.--S. O. H. (shrink)

The history of the Russian Old Believers who lived in Ukraine, as well as the question of the main methods and features of the power struggle with representatives of this peculiar ethno-confessional group and the ways of their adaptation to the conditions that existed in the Russian Empire in the middle of the XIX century remain a little researched topic. So, we can talk about the scientific relevance of a particular problem.

"What is most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking." Thus Heidegger sets the tone for these 1951 lectures indicating that he has in mind a special and lofty notion of thinking--a notion that can be understood only by following the master as he demonstrates how to think by showing what it is, after all, that calls for thinking. Heidegger sees thinking and Being as inextricably related, each the key to the other. Thinking is "relatedness (...) to Being." Furthermore, "only when man speaks does he think." Thus we must learn to listen, really listen, if we are to know what thinking is. Nietzsche looms as an important figure in this discussion, and the key to the understanding of Nietzsche, says Heidegger, is the concept of revenge. For Nietzsche, the bridge to the highest hope for man is his deliverance from revenge. Heidegger interprets this to mean that because revenge tries to affect the past and thus cannot understand time as a passing away, it is only through deliverance from revenge that man can be in proper orientation to time and thus to Being. The awkward translation of the title, Was Heisst Denken?, is justified by the text because Heidegger closely examines the German wording of the question--an examination which involves philosophical discussion of the notions of calling and naming. The latter sections of the book are an exhaustive--or should I say exhausting--exegesis of Parmenides' fragment 6: χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ'ἒον ἔμμεναι. The translation starts out as the traditional "One should both say and think that Being is," and ends up through Heidegger's characteristic brand of creative etymology, as "useful is the letting-lie-before-us, so taking-to-heart, too: beings in being." That is, in order to think, we should allow things to be as they are, pay attention to what they are, and know that we are related to them.--S. O. H. (shrink)