Treatise on the Yogācāra school of Buddhist philosophy.

"The Treatise on the Origin of Humanity (Yuanren lun) by the Huayan patriarch Zongmi classifies various teachings of Buddhism on a scale of relative profundity, and specifically critiques the weaknesses of the teachings of Confucianism and Daoism, which he regards as inferior to Buddhism. This work formed the basis for some of the arguments in later East Asian history on the relationship of the three teachings." --.

In classical South Asia, most philosophers thought that the self (if it exists at all) is what the first-person pronoun ‘I’ stands for. It is something that persists through time, undergoes conscious thoughts and experiences, and exercises control over actions. The Buddhists accepted the ‘no self’ thesis: they denied that such a self is substantially real. This gave rise to a puzzle for these Buddhists. If there is nothing substantially real that ‘I’ stands for, what are we talking about when (...) we speak of ourselves? In this paper, I present one Buddhist answer to this question, an answer that emerges from the work of the Abhidharma thinker Vasubandhu (4th to 5th century CE). (shrink)

The Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu is known for his critical contribution to Buddhist Abhidharma thought, his turn to the Mahayana tradition, and his concise, influential Yogacara-Vijñanavada texts. _Paving the Great Way_ reveals another dimension of his legacy: his integration of several seemingly incompatible intellectual and scriptural traditions, with far-ranging consequences for the development of Buddhist epistemology and the theorization of tantra. Most scholars read Vasubandhu's texts in isolation and separate his intellectual development into distinct phases. Featuring close studies (...) of Vasubandhu's _Abhidharmakosabhasya_, _Vyakhyayukti_, _Vimsatika_, and _Trisvabhavanirdesa_, among other works, this book identifies recurrent treatments of causality and scriptural interpretation that unify distinct strands of thought under a single, coherent Buddhist philosophy. In Vasubandhu's hands, the Buddha's rejection of the self as a false construction provides a framework through which to clarify problematic philosophical issues, such as the nature of moral agency and subjectivity under a broadly causal worldview. Recognizing this continuity of purpose across Vasubandhu's diverse corpus recasts the interests of the philosopher and his truly innovative vision, which influenced Buddhist thought for a millennium and continues to resonate with today's philosophical issues. An appendix includes extensive English-language translations of the major texts discussed. (shrink)

: Vasubandhu, an advocate of the idealist Yogācāra school of Buddhism, argues that the nonexistence of external objects can be inferred from the appearance of nonexistent things in perceptual illusion. The idealist view and the argument from illusion are criticized by proponents of the realist Nyāya school on the grounds that illusory experience is parasitic upon veridical experience. The parasitism objection successfully defeats Vasubandhu's argument from illusion but fails to decisively disprove the idealist view because it remains possible (...) that each illusory experience gets its content from a previous illusory experience in an infinite chain. (shrink)

A practical, down-to-earth guide to Vasubandhu's classic work "Thirty Verses of Consciousness Only" that can transform modern life and change how you see the world. In this down-to-earth book, Ben Connelly sure-handedly guides us through the intricacies of Yogacara and the richness of the "Thirty Verses." Dedicating a chapter of the book to each line of the poem, he lets us thoroughly lose ourselves in its depths. His warm and wise voice unpacks and contextualizes its wisdom, showing us how (...) we can apply its ancient insights to our own modern lives, to create a life of engaged peace, harmony, compassion, and joy. In fourth-century India one of the great geniuses of Buddhism, Vasubandhu, sought to reconcile the diverse ideas and forms of Buddhism practiced at the time and demonstrate how they could be effectively integrated into a single system. This was the Yogacara movement, and it continues to have great influence in modern Tibetan and Zen Buddhism. "Thirty Verses on Consciousness Only," or "Trimshika," is the most concise, comprehensive, and accessible work by this revered figure. Vasubandhu's "Thirty Verses" lay out a path of practice that integrates the most powerful of Buddhism's psychological and mystical possibilities: Early Buddhism's practices for shedding afflictive emotional habit and the Mahayana emphasis on shedding divisive concepts, the path of individual liberation and the path of freeing all beings, the path to nirvana and the path of enlightenment as the very ground of being right now. Although Yogacara has a reputation for being extremely complex, the "Thirty Verses" distills the principles of these traditions to their most practical forms, and this book follows that sense of focus; it goes to the heart of the matter--how do we alleviate suffering through shedding our emotional knots and our sense of alienation? This is a great introduction to a philosophy, a master, and a work whose influence reverberates throughout modern Buddhism. (shrink)

Vasubandhu’s arguments against atomism in Viṃśikā stanzas 12–13 are not strong enough to disprove that atoms are simple partless substances. However, if we take the special composition question into consideration, Viṃśikā stanza 13ab can be regarded as an objection to so-called series-style answers, which results in an undesirable conclusion for the opponents, i.e. the Vaibhāṣikas. A step back to a simple bonding answer is not a good choice for the Vaibhāṣikas in responding to this objection because the simple bonding (...) answer leads to other difficulties and because some notions in Vaibhāṣika atomic theory entail multigrade relations in the material aggregates of atoms. Hence, the objection to series-style answers still makes sense in the refutation of Buddhist atomism through the claim that atoms are not proper parts of a material aggregate. (shrink)

U članku se istražuje osnovna linija argumentacije buddhističke škole sarvāstivādavaibhāṣika u prilog obrani njihove osnovne ontološke teze o egzistentnosti dharmi kroz sva tri vremenska razdoblja onako kako ju je izložio Vasubandhu u svome djelu Abhidharmakośabhāṣya . U uvodnome dijelu daje se kratki prikaz nekih prijepora u pogledu podrijetla te buddhističke škole kao i njihovog tekstovnoga korpusa. Nakon toga slijedi istraživanje Vasubandhuova izvješća o specifičnostima dharmičke ontologije te škole kao što su problemi dharmičke »funkcionalnosti« , njihove kauzalne djelotvornosti i problema (...) »prijelaza« atemporalnih dharmi u područje realnog oblikovanja iskustva . U završnom osvrtu se pokušava pokazati da se opća promjena filozofijske perspektive u razdoblju postkanonske abhidharme najradikalnije ostvarila u buddhističkoj školi sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika koja je bila prisiljena raznovrsnim teorijskim konstruktima pomiriti svoje shvaćanje dharmi kao »atemporalnih« konstituensa iskustva s općom buddhističkom postavkom o netrajnosti i nesupstancijalnosti svih fenomena .The article deals with the main line of argumentation of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Buddhist school of thought in defence of their basic ontological thesis of the existence of dharmas through all three-time period as it is exposed in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya . Introductorily some observations are given with regard to major controversies connected with the origin and textual corpus of that Buddhist school. Then follows investigation of Vasubandhu’s exposition of the particularity of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Dharmic ontology – e.g. functionality of dharmas, their causal efficiency and the problem of "transition" of temporal dharmas into the domain of a real experience . In the concluding philosophical assessment an attempt is made to show that the general shift of the philosophical perspective in the period of the so-called postcanonical Abhidharma was the most radical reflected in the Sarvāstivāda- Vaibhāṣika school which was forced to harmonize through various theoretical constructs their basic notion of dharmas as »atemporal« constituens of experience with the general Buddhist understanding of all phenomena as impermanent and devoid of substance of any kind. (shrink)

Trisvabh vanirdeśa (Treatise on the Three Natures) is Vasubandhu's most mature and explicit exposition of the Yogc c ra doctrine of the three natures and their relation to the Buddhist idealism Vasubandhu articulates. Nonetheless there are no extent commentaries on this important short test. The present work provides an introduction to the text, its context and principal philosophical theses; a new translation of the text itself; and a close, verse-by-verse commentary on the text explaining the structure of Yogacara/Cittamatra (...) idealism and comparing it to Western versions of transcendental idealism. In particular, I show how the doctrine of the three natures is used to make idealism coherent in a Buddhist context and how it sheds light on the structure and evolution of transcendental idealism in Europe. (shrink)

Abstract According to idealism the world, as we perceive it, is in effect a creation of the mind. There are many different forms of idealism and this paper investigates one form of idealism that was advocated by the 4th century Buddhist Yog?c?rin Vasubandhu and one not unfamiliar in the west, especially in the works of George Berkeley. This paper suggests that when idealism, as a metaphysical theory, is set within a soteriological framework, as is the case with Vasubandhu, (...) it serves to bridge the philosophical endeavour with the religious quest as outlined in Buddhist thought. Idealism is a theory about the borders between mind and matter, and specifically about the demolition of matter. This demolition, in the hands of Vasubandhu, manages to redefine the framework of speculation by incorporating the soteriological within it and thus constructing a viable bridge between philosophy and religion. (shrink)

A plain-English commentary on Vasubandhu's classic "Treatise on the Three Natures" that shows us how we can bring wisdom from fourth-century India into our day-to-day lives and activities. The three natures provide an empowering model for understanding how we can practice freedom from harmful personal and family patterns, addiction, trauma, and systems of oppression; they show a path to personal and communal healing. They affirm agency, experience, and interdependence while relentlessly challenging tendencies to become fixated, prejudiced, or stagnant. By (...) radically affirming experience, constantly challenging our fixations, and emphasizing that each moment contributes to the well-being or suffering of the whole, each one of us can find our own role in the path of liberation. They remind us of the root of Buddhist teachings: there is suffering in the world and we can do something about it. (shrink)

This article aims to draw attention to the way in which a subset of reactive attitudes make us less free. Vasubandhu’s explanation of reactive attitudes shows us how they make us less free...

In philosophy of mind, the arguments about phenomenal experience are related to ontological points of view in which the alternatives are physicalist monism and dualism. Both involve problems and the choice is difficult in order to describe the experience into scientific knowledge. I accost Carnap and Vasubandhu philosophies to show an epistemic position, that involves an ontological deconstruction, from the phenomenal experience starting point. In this view, the way to address the psico-physical problem changes: it is not concerned any (...) problem about a dualism of substances. Experience and evidence are two points of convergence, and lead to the question of subjectivity: the consciousness it is not an object however it keeps its relevance. (shrink)

Vasubandhu is perhaps the most influential figure in the history of Buddhist philosophy, yet the very breadth of his contribution across many schools and traditions has led to a fragmentation of his works, as interpreters have tended to read them through the lens of narrow scholastic perspectives, finding little continuity or coherence. Some modern scholars, doubtful that anyone could have held such varied views, have gone so far as to divide Vasubandhu himself into two distinct philosophers, with two (...) different and irreconcilable views. In his recent book, Paving the Great Way: Vasubandhu’s Unifying Buddhist Philosophy, Jonathan Gold offers for the first time a unified picture of Vasubandhu, extracting the driving... (shrink)

Self is central to our ordinary understanding of the mind and ourselves. The fifth-century Abhidharma Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu presents a radical no-self metaphysics in his Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya. Selfless Minds offers a new reading of this no-self view as defending not only eliminativism about self but also about persons, and illusionism about the sense of self and all kinds of self-representation. This radical no-self thesis presents several challenges for Abhidharma Buddhist philosophy of mind. Even if we then grant that there is (...) no self, we are left with deeper questions about the sense of self or self-representations implicated in our ordinary everyday experience and thought about the world and ourselves. This sense of self is involved in all kinds of experiential phenomena: episodic memories, unity of consciousness, sense of ownership, sense of agency, etc. And if we grant that there are no persons, questions remain about the status of our person-related concerns and interpersonal practices. Selfless Minds answers these questions on behalf of the Abhidharma Buddhist. The first part (Chapters 3–7) of the book defends the hypothesis that we can salvage much of our experience and thought without implicating self-representations. The second part (Chapters 8–9) of the book examines the normative implications of the revisionary no-person metaphysics. Some of these seem unpalatable, if not downright absurd. These revisionary implications for our normative commitments give us reason to re-evaluate both the Abhidharma metaphysics and our ordinary person-related practices and concerns in light of each other by using some sort of wide reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

In this book, Vasubandhu's classic work Refutation of the Theory of a Self is translated and provided with an introduction and commentary. The translation, the first into a modern Western language from the Sanskrit text, is intended for use by those who wish to begin a careful philosophical study of Indian Buddhist theories of persons. Special features of the introduction and commentary are their extensive explanations of the arguments for the theories of persons of Vasubandhu and the Pudgalavâdines, (...) the Buddhist philosophers whose theory is the central target of Vasubandhu's refutation of the theory of a self. (shrink)

슈미트하우젠(Schmithausen 1992)은 『능가경』의 편찬자가 세친의 『유식삼십론』을 인용한다고 말함으로써 경과 논의 관계에 대한 기존의 통념을 뛰어넘는 획기적인 주장을 한다. 그런데 세친의 『석궤론』에는 『능가경』으로 추정되는 익명의 대승경이 인용되는데, 이것이 만일 『능가경』임이 판명된다면 슈미트하우젠이 주장하는 것과는 반대로 오히려 세친이 『능가경』을 학습하였으며 대승 전환 이후의 그의 유식사상의 전개 과정에 『능가경』의 영향력이 있었음을 추정할 수 있게 된다. 따라서 본고는 세친과 『능가경』의 연대적 선후문제를 확정할 수 있는 문헌적 전거로 세친 『석궤론』의 『능가경』 관련 구절을 지목하고 그 인용 원칙과 내용을 기존의 『능가경』판본들과 비교·분석한다. 그리고 세친이 「게송품」(Sagāthakam)을 포함한 위역(魏譯) (...) 이래의 판본과 유사한 『능가경』을 활용했을 것이라는 결론에 도달한다. (shrink)

El artículo analiza la figura del filósofo indio Vasubandhu , uno de los representantes más influyentes de la escuela vijñānavāda del budismo mahāyāna. Tras una breve reseña sobre su legendaria biografía y de otros miembros de su escuela filosófica, el artículo se centra en el análisis de dos de sus trabajos más importantes: Trimśikā y Trisvabhāvakārikā , mediante los conceptos de vijñāna , ālayavijñāna , vāsanā , parikalpa y trisvabāva : parikalpita , paratantra y parinispanna . Finalmente se establecen (...) las relaciones entre la filosofía de la conciencia de Vasubandhu y la doctrina de la vacuidad de nāgārjuna, así como sus conexiones con prácticas religiosas habituales en el mahāyāna como la dedicación de mérito y el pensamiento del despertar , mostrando, de un modo coherente, las consecuencias para la práctica budista de esta filosofía de la mente. (shrink)

Canonical defenders of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR), such as Leibniz and Spinoza, are metaphysical foundationalists of one stripe or another. This is curious since the PSR—which says that everything has a ground, cause, or explanation—in effect, denies fundamental entities. In this paper, I explore the apparent inconsistency between metaphysical foundationalism and approaches to metaphysical system building that are driven by a commitment to the PSR. I do so by analyzing how Indian Buddhist philosophers arrive at foundationalist and anti-foundationalist (...) positions motivated by implicit commitments to different versions of the PSR. I begin by introducing the Buddhist principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) as a proto-PSR that is restricted to causal explanation. Next, I show how Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika Abhidharma metaphysics is shaped by a qualified commitment to both causal and metaphysical grounding versions of the PSR. I then reveal how Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka metaphysics is driven by an unrestricted and exceptionless commitment to causal and metaphysical grounding versions of the PSR. Finally, I consider how Nāgārjuna’s account may put him in a unique position to respond to a common contemporary objection to the PSR from necessitarianism. I conclude by addressing a competing interpretation on which Nāgārjuna is best understood as an anti-rationalist rather than an uber-rationalist, as I characterize him. (shrink)

The main body of this article presents Vasubandhu’s and Candrakīrti’s discussion on the etymology of pratītyasamutpāda and its meaning as it appears in the Bhāṣya to Abhidharmakośa 3.28ab and Prasannapadā 4.5–9.27, respectively. Both authors put forward and critically examine various Buddhist grammatical analyses and interpretations of the term. Many passages in the indicated sections parallel or nearly parallel to each other suggest that Buddhist discussions on pratītyasamutpāda were held in a very specified manner during the mature phase of Buddhist (...) philosophy in India. In the conclusion of the article, an attempt is made to discern the reason for Buddhists’ mutually competing analyses of the term, showing that their seemingly objectively conducted discussions regarding pratītyasamutpāda are actually rooted in their ontological presumptions. Thus, for example, the nearly identical etymological analyses of the term provided by Va.. (shrink)

My aim in this book is to propose a comparativist, Buddhist-Neoplatonic interpretation of the idea of “logos” in the Prologue to the Gospel according to John. To do so, I proceed in three steps. I begin with Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness. Nāgārjuna thinks that that all things are empty because they depend on causes and conditions in a way that makes it impossible for them to genuinely exist. Nevertheless, they are not completely non-existent, for they possess the appearance of something (...) that exists. This corresponds, in turn, to Vasubandhu’s response to Nāgārjuna. Emptiness is not ultimate because there is the appearance of empty things. The place where this appearance unfolds is the mind, which, in an absolute sense, exists, but which, in the sense of external, objectifiable reality does not exist. Vasubandhu thus thinks of the mind as an entity that does not conform to the categories of ordinary existence. This, then, corresponds to what Meister Eckhart says about God. God is a Mind ("intellectus"). But due to his fundamental ontological role, God transcends ordinary existence and cannot be compared to any specific being. God is the mind of which Vasubandhu states that it is non-dual, transcendent knowledge. To conclude, I use this triadic constellation of Buddhist and Neoplatonic concepts to read John’s Prologue. The Prologue describes the generation of a foundational concept, “logos,” by a primordial, divine Mind. Since this Mind is, in a Buddhist sense, “empty,” the concept that it generates can be said to be absolute. It has no beginning and no cause. Against this background of Buddhist and Neoplatonic ideas, John’s Prologue can thus be interpreted as a narrative describing the foundation of reality as an intellectual process. (shrink)

ABSTRACTGaneri [2018] explores three Buddhist approaches to episodic memory and concludes in favor of Buddhaghosa's attentional account. When comparing it to Vasubandhu's, Ganeri argues that Buddhaghosa's is preferable because it does not over-intellectualize episodic memory. In my commentary, I argue that the intellectualism of Vasubandhu's approach makes it both a more plausible account of episodic memory and a more successful strategy for addressing the precarious role of the self in this form of memory.

Democritus’ atomism aims to respond to threats of Parmenidean monism. In so doing, it deploys a familiar epistemological distinction between what is known by the senses and what is known by the mind. This turns out to be a risky strategy, however, leading to inadvertent skepticism with only diffuse and contrary ethical implications. Vasubandhu’s more explicitly metaphysical atomism, by contrast, relies on a different principle to get to its results, and aims to address different concerns. It leaves us with (...) a view that positively implies a concrete mode of practical engagement, and resources for a critical stance. Even if certain atoms end up proven incoherent, there is no danger of slipping into the morally fatal indifference of inadvertent skepticism. For the ethical implications, it matters how one arrives at one’s atomism. (shrink)

It is a common view in modern scholarship on Buddhist ethics, that attachment to the self constitutes a hindrance to ethics, whereas rejecting this type of attachment is a necessary condition for acting morally. The present article argues that in Vasubandhu's theory of agency, as formulated in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Treasury of Metaphysics with Self-Commentary), a cognitive and psychological identification with a conventional, persisting self is a requisite for exercising moral agency. As such, this identification is essential for embracing the (...) ethics of Buddhism and its way of life. The article delineates the method that Vasubandhu employs to account for the notion of a selfless moral agent, with particular emphasis on his strategies for dealing with one central aspect of agency, self-interested concern for the future. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 147 - 172 The Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu has seldom been considered in conjunction with the problem of external-world skepticism despite the fact that his text, _Twenty Verses_, presents arguments from ignorance based on dreams. In this article, an epistemological phenomenalist interpretation of Vasubandhu is supported in opposition to a metaphysical idealist interpretation. On either interpretation, Vasubandhu gives an invitation to the problem of external-world skepticism, although his final conclusion is (...) closer to skepticism on the epistemological phenomenalist interpretation. The article ends with reflections on what light Vasubandhu might shed on the issue of whether skepticism is a natural problem in epistemology as well as why, despite Vasubandhu, the skeptical problem was not a central issue in the later Indian tradition. (shrink)

The present chapter examines the philosophical problem of how it is possible, metaphysically and practically speaking, to develop a good moral character when one adheres to the view that a persisting self does not exist. It extracts answers from two thinkers who reject the concept of enduring identity, the Indian philosopher Vasubandhu (4th to 5th centuries CE) and the Western philosopher Derek Parfit (1942–2017). The first section of the chapter outlines some of Vasubandhu’s and Parfit’s shared assumptions concerning (...) the nature of the self and that of personal identity. In section 2, the focus shifts to the distinct ways in which each philosopher advances his understanding of the moral agent. Section 3 suggests that besides formulating different accounts of selfless agency, the ways in which Vasubandhu and Parfit grappled with the problem of agency reveal different approaches to addressing the question of human nature, and consequently, different ways of resolving the difficulties involved in becoming a good person. These differences become apparent in two practices that are relevant to crafting a moral character and that the two thinkers treat, moral commitment and the cultivation of virtue, which are discussed in the final part of the chapter. (shrink)