In Defense of Vasubandhu's Approach to Episodic Phenomenology

Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4):416-419 (2017)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTGaneri [2018] explores three Buddhist approaches to episodic memory and concludes in favor of Buddhaghosa's attentional account. When comparing it to Vasubandhu's, Ganeri argues that Buddhaghosa's is preferable because it does not over-intellectualize episodic memory. In my commentary, I argue that the intellectualism of Vasubandhu's approach makes it both a more plausible account of episodic memory and a more successful strategy for addressing the precarious role of the self in this form of memory.

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Sarah Robins
Purdue University

Citations of this work

Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.
Mental Time Travel and Attention: Replies to Commentators.Jonardon Ganeri - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4):450-455.

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References found in this work

Personhood and personal identity.Marya Schechtman - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):71-92.
Mental Time Travel and Attention.Jonardon Ganeri - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4):353-373.

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