The experiactional stream of a person can be seen to be organized. It takes place in situation as a "situated event." Events have a duration through time; they could be called: Time-Gestalten. Events first tend to appear in the stream of experience in imaginary anticipation usually as a result of a social invitation or as a self-initiated project. In anticipatory experience projected events are developed, worked-on, thought about on repeated occasions. The event takes shape in experience as an anticipation before (...) it takes place . This has consequences and is important because strategy-decisions are made which actually create the future event. During the recorded experience I actually decided what I was going to do for the lecture. The meaning of this anticipated event which has personal as well as social-professional horizons sets limits to what is allowed into the imaginary anticipation or the projecting. They could be said to act as "charges" upon my experiaction here and now. It seems that the event in anticipatory elaboration is richer and allows more play in experience. As we approach the actualization proper the range of possibilities narrows. Anticipation has to become embodied: it springs into action and enters the domain of public and shared social reality. We witness the event. Any component of the experiactional stream-particularly in the anticipating phases of event-structures-is built up in complex ways. This may be described as "interwovenness." Whatever we focus on can be seen to arise on a string of previous encounters reaching back into one's at bottom indeterminate biographical stock of experiaction. This stock hovers horizonally around the theme-what I pay attention to at the moment-and codetermines its meaning. This makes for idiosyncratic meanings. But our past experience is also in a good measure shared because it is based on experiences of communication to which I had access through language or images. To some extent, therefore, there is also a public and shared meaning to a perceived theme. Components of the experiactional stream are also gathered up and connected through a higher and unifying intention, the project. We take many steps to actualize a project, and we also seem to have more than one project going on at any one time. This tends to "mix-up" our stream of experiaction in surprising and complex ways. In this study I have taken a small step which turned out to be connected to the larger sequence of being involved in giving a lecture. This event as an over-arching project casts its shadow ahead of itself and colored my anticipatory experience in clearly definable ways. The general structural features uncovered here through reflection were present and at work during my experiaction although I was not explicitly aware of them at the time, while living them out. Nevertheless, my pre-reflective experiaction turned out to have been structured and organized. In what I thought was an unique-private experience there were revealed and operative general-universal structures. The personal-existential and the general-phenomenological components are inextricably intertwined and collaborative in the creation of human experience in a particular situation. They constitute a tension inherent in the flow of experiaction. In living we constantly move between these levels and as researchers in this field we always try to bridge this "gap" that arises in understanding which dichotomizes "lived immediacy" and "theoretical understanding." Either extreme-"just living" or "just thinking"-if emphasized unduly is an aberration. The human way is to experiact and to make sense of it so that mere living-out is humanized into living-with-awareness. This can never be fully accomplished but is always in process, ongoing. Everyone has to unfold his own awareness and understanding, recognizing that the depth or ground of living eludes objectification and final conceptual grasp. We can only tune-in. (shrink)

This article examines the historical representation of the Jinshin Rebellion as a foundational event in the Nihon shoki and other eighth-century Japanese texts. Focusing on the differences between two alternative stories of Tenmu’s departure from the Ōmi capital to Yoshino, I argue that the Nihon shoki contains traces of several competing historical narratives that are the expression of a historical process: the political struggles over the historical record and the representation of Tenmu’s legitimacy in the early eighth century when the (...) Nihon shoki was being compiled. (shrink)

The mystical experiences of the ṛṣis , the spiritual giants of the early Vedic times, led to the creation of the Vedic hymns and eventually to the formation of the whole elaborate structure of the Vedic religion, as upheld by the Indian priesthood. But there were obviously others who pursued mystical experiences without themselves engaging, like the ancient ṛṣis , in attempts to transmit their experiences through mythological poetry and religious leadership. They adopted mystical ecstasy as their way of life. (...) Mysticism as a conscious way of life is, in India, called Yoga. Being outside the trend of Vedic mythological creativity and the Brāhmanic religious orthodoxy, the Yogis of Vedic times left little evidence of their existence, practices and achievements. And such evidence as has survived in the Vedas is scanty and indirect. (shrink)

Allusions to a cosmogony contained in a Vedic hymn present striking analogies to a cosmogony attributed to the Pythagoreans by Aristotle, Simplicius and Stobaeus. The aim of the paper is to evaluate the extent to which they are similar and to which their differences respond to different cultural premises.

Nærværende bog er et forsøg på at skrive en introduktion til viden- skabsteorien. Vi har valgt at lade en ret stor del af bogen bestå af historiske eksempler i tilknytning til de behandlede videnskabsteore- tiske temaer, hermed ønsker vi at understrege vor opfattelse af at videnskabsteorien er uadskilleligt knyttet til videnskabshistorien.

Formålet med nærværende oversigtsartikel er at undersøge den stigende digitalisering og deling af personlige informationer i sundhedsvæsenet, samt hvilke etiske udfordringer denne udvikling har for den enkelte borger. Mere præcis vil vi rammesætte denne diskussion i en dansk kontekst eksemplificeret ved Det Fælles Medicinkort. Det Fælles Medicinkort er en obligatorisk database for danske borgere indeholdende informationer om patienters medicinske historie to år tilbage. Denne database kan tilgås af en bred vifte af sundhedsprofessionelle i Danmark.På trods af lovede sundhedsmæssige fordele, såsom (...) en højere grad af sikkerhed i forbindelse med medicinering, en øget effektivisering af sundhedsvæsenet og dermed besparelser på de offentlige budgetter, plæderer vi i artiklen for, at implementeringen af Det Fælles Medicinkort kompromitterer den enkeltes privathed. Den enkelte borger er ikke i tilstrækkelig grad informeret om brugen af Det Fælles Medicinkort. Ydermere finder vi ikke, at borgerens autonomi i forhold til indholdet af personlige oplysninger i Det Fælles Medicinkort er opretholdt på en tilfredsstillende måde.Artiklens primære perspektiv er deontologisk, men for at nuancere vores diskussion inddrages lejlighedsvist også utilitaristiske argumenter. Endvidere inddrages i artiklen Helen Nissenbaum, Tom L. Beauchamp og James F. Childress samt John Rawls. I artiklen vil tre konkrete problemstillinger blive diskuteret i relation til Det Fælles Medicinkort: Deler vi relevante og passende data? Er distributionen af disse data til en så bred vifte af sundhedsprofessionelle på sin plads? Og slutteligt: Er den enkelte borgers beslutningsdygtighed, og dermed mulighed for autonomi i forhold til personrelaterede informationer, tilstrækkelig.Nøgleord: digitalisering, privathed, Danmark, sundhedsvæsen, Det Fælles MedicinkortEnglish summary: The right to privacy in Danish healthcareThe scope of this paper is to assess the growing digitalization of personal information in healthcare and the ethical challenges this development poses to the citizen. Specifically the paper discusses the right to privacy in a Danish context, namely in relation to the use of The Shared Medical Record. The Shared Medical Record is a default digital health record consisting of every patient’s medical history for the previous two years, accessible to a broad range of health professionals in Denmark.In this paper we discuss three aspects of The Shared Medical Record, primarily from a normative point of view: 1) Are the personal data shared by The Shared Medical Record relevant and appropriate? 2) Is the distribution of this information to the current array of health professionals appropriate? And 3) Does The Shared Medical Record adequately support and account for the quorum and autonomy of the individual citizen with regards to personal information?We argue that, advantages such as heightened security, efficiency and convenience aside, the citizens’ right to privacy is to some extent compromised by the terms and use of this record. The citizen is not extensively informed on the use of the record, and does not hold a sufficient degree of autonomy over the content and distribution of their personal data. The primary ethical perspective of the paper is deontological, but in order to properly nuance our stance we have chosen to include traditionally utilitarian points of view throughout our discussions.In the paper we introduce Helen Nissenbaum’s notion of contextual integrity in order to thoroughly assess the service’s ethical implications for Danish citizens and their future privacy, as well as points from John Rawls, Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress. (shrink)

‘Relational value’ (RV) has intuitive credibility due to the shortcomings of existing axiological categories regarding recognizing the ethical relevance of people’s relations to nature. But RV is justified by arguments and analogies that do not hold up to closer scrutiny, which strengthens the assumption that RV is redundant. While RV may provide reasons for ethically considering some relations, much work remains to show that RV is a concept that does something existing axiological concepts cannot, beyond empirically describing relations people have (...) to environmental areas and places. (shrink)

Trois grandes rv̌olutions sont ici ťudiěs en dťail : la thǒrie de la relativit ̌(restreinte et gňřale); la thǒrie du chaos dťerministe; la mčanique quantique et ses diffřentes interprťations. L'auteur tente, chaque fois, d'en mesurer l'impact sur notre vision du monde et d'esquisser un paysage philosophique nouveau.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the prospects for a neo‐logicist development of set theory based on a restriction of Frege's Basic Law V, which we call (RV): ∀P∀Q[Ext(P) = Ext(Q) ≡ [(BAD(P) & BAD(Q)) ∨ ∀x(Px ≡ Qx)]] BAD is taken as a primitive property of properties. We explore the features it must have for (RV) to sanction the various strong axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. The primary interpretation is where ‘BAD’ is Dummett's ‘indefinitely extensible’.1 Background: what (...) and why?2 Framework3 GOOD candidates, indefinite extensibility4 The framework of (RV) alone, or almost alone5 The axioms6 Brief closing. (shrink)

Prima facie, we make successful decisions as we act on and intervene in the world day-to-day. Epistemologists are often concerned with whether rationality is involved in such decision-making practices, and, if so, to what degree. Some, particularly in the post-structuralist tradition, argue that successful decision-making occurs via an existential leap into the unknown rather than via any determinant or criterion such as rationality. I call this view radical voluntarism (RV). Proponents of RV include those who subscribe to a view they (...) call Critical Complexity (CC). In this paper, I argue that CC presents a false dichotomy when it conceives of rationality in Cartesian – i.e. ideal and transcendental – terms, and then concludes that RV is the proper alternative. I then outline a pragmatist rationality informed by recent work in psychology on bounded rationality, ecological rationality, and specifically embodied rationality. Such a pragmatist rationality seems to be compatible with the tenets of post-structuralism, and can therefore replace RV in CC. (shrink)

We prove that every ultraproduct of p-adics is inp-minimal. More generally, we prove an Ax-Kochen type result on preservation of inp-minimality for Henselian valued fields of equicharacteristic 0 in the RV language.

This paper examines relationships between accountants’ personal values and their moral reasoning. In particular, we hypothesize that there is an inverse relationship between accountants’ “Conformity” values and principled moral reasoning. This investigation is important because the literature suggests that conformity with rule-based standards may be one reason for professional accountants’ relatively lower scores on measures of moral reasoning (Abdolmohammadi et al. J Bus Ethics 16 (1997) 1717). We administered the Rokeach Values Survey (RVS) (Rokeach: 1973, The Nature of Human Values (...) (The Free Press, New York)) and the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest: 1979, Development in Judgment Moral Issues (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN)) to164 graduating accounting students enrolled in capstone courses at two universities in the Northeastern United States. As potential entrants into the accounting profession, these subjects bring their values and moral reasoning to bear on attitudes and behaviors in the workplace. We find a highly significant inverse relationship between “Conformity” values and principled moral reasoning (i.e., those who prefer Conformity values have lower levels of moral reasoning). However, we also find that accounting students as a group do not prefer Conformity values above other values such as Self-actualization and Idealism, and we find positive relationships between Self-actualization and Idealism values and moral reasoning. Implications for values and ethics research are discussed. (shrink)

How might we philosophize about the metaverse? It is traditionally held that the four main branches of philosophy are metaphysics, epistemology, axiology, and logic. In this article, I shall demonstrate how virtual walt-fictionalism, a particular version of virtual irrealism, is able to offer a straightforward, internally consistent, and powerful response about the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics) of the metaverse. I will first characterize the metaverse in terms of a reality-virtuality (RV) continuum and distinguish between virtual realism and virtual irrealism, (...) before elaborating on the explanatory power and potential of virtual walt-fictionalism relative to the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics) of the metaverse. (shrink)

In this thesis, we study transfer principles in the context of certain Henselian valued fields, namely Henselian valued fields of equicharacteristic $0$, algebraically closed valued fields, algebraically maximal Kaplansky valued fields, and unramified mixed characteristic Henselian valued fields with perfect residue field. First, we compute the burden of such a valued field in terms of the burden of its value group and its residue field. The burden is a cardinal related to the model theoretic complexity and a notion of dimension (...) associated to $\text {NTP}_2$ theories. We show, for instance, that the Hahn field $\mathbb {F}_p^{\text {alg}})$ is inp-minimal, and that the ring of Witt vectors $W$ over $\mathbb {F}_p^{\text {alg}}$ is not strong. This result extends previous work by Chernikov and Simon and realizes an important step toward the classification of Henselian valued fields of finite burden. Second, we show a transfer principle for the property that all types realized in a given elementary extension are definable. It can be written as follows: a valued field as above is stably embedded in an elementary extension if and only if its value group is stably embedded in the corresponding extension of value groups, its residue field is stably embedded in the corresponding extension of residue fields, and the extension of valued fields satisfies a certain algebraic condition. We show, for instance, that all types over the power series field $\mathbb {R})$ are definable. Similarly, all types over the quotient field of $W$ are definable. This extends previous work of Cubides and Delon and of Cubides and Ye.These distinct results use a common approach, which has been developed recently. It consists of establishing first a reduction to an intermediate structure called the leading term structure, or $\operatorname {\mathrm {RV}}$ -sort, and then of reducing to the value group and residue field. This leads us to develop similar reduction principles in the context of pure short exact sequences of abelian groups.prepared by Pierre Touchard.E-mail: [email protected]: https://miami.uni-muenster.de/Record/a612cf73-0a2f-42c4-b1e4-7d28934138a9. (shrink)

The Received View on quantum non-individuality is, roughly speaking, the view according to which quantum objects are not individuals. It seems clear that the RV finds its standard expression nowadays through the use of the formal apparatuses of non-reflexive logics, mainly quasi-set theory. In such logics, the relation of identity is restricted, so that it does not apply for terms denoting quantum particles; this “lack of identity” formally characterizes their non-individuality. We face then a dilemma: on the one hand, identity (...) seems too important to be given up, on the other hand the RV seems to require that identity be given up. In this paper we shall discuss how the specific characterization of the RV through non-reflexive logics came to be framed. We examine some of the main objections to this version of the RV and argue that they are misguided under this specific “non-reflexive” understanding of the RV. Finally, we shall also argue that this non-reflexive view is not the only option for a metaphysical articulation of the RV: less radical approaches to identity and logic are open. In particular, some of these alternative approaches to the RV we present may be immune to most of the criticisms presented against the non-reflexive approach. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nāgārjuna's Affective Account of MisknowingRoshni PatelIt is maintained that all beings and (their) qualitiesAre the fuel for the fire of awareness.Having been incinerated by brilliantTrue analysis, they are (all) pacified.—Ratnāvalī (RV)1.971In Nāgārjuna's formulation, ignorance about the nature of existents is scorching and thereby needs the alleviation that true analysis offers. This article explores what ignorance feels like from the subjective side of a knower in the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition (...) through an analysis of epistemic affect. I borrow two affective concepts—"epistemic emotion" and "epistemic feeling"—from theorists in Anglo-American analytic epistemology to discuss affectively charged misknowing.2 In this literature, epistemic emotions are affective experiences that participate in a knower's epistemic activity in positive or negative ways, but are not necessary for that activity to proceed. In contrast, epistemic feelings are affectively qualitative experiences that are integral to a knower's activity. With a focus on texts by Nāgārjuna, I present fear as a paradoxical epistemic emotion that correlates with a similarly pathogenic and instigative function in Buddhist moral psychology. I then present determinacy as a more subtly operating epistemic feeling in reificatory ignorance. In addition to expanding epistemologically oriented discussions within Buddhist philosophy, this article also contributes to scholarly discussion of epistemic affect by introducing determinacy as a new epistemic feeling. [End Page 44]Diffuse and Complex IgnoranceThe central role of ignorance in formulating the problem of suffering and its cessation implies that in many ways all of Buddhism is interested in how we know and understand. This centrality is evident in the Avijja Sutta when the Buddha states:Bhikkhus, ignorance is the forerunner in the entry upon unwholesome states, with shamelessness and fearlessness of wrongdoing following along. For an unwise person immersed in ignorance, wrong view springs up. For one of wrong view, wrong intention springs up. For one of wrong intention, wrong speech springs up. For one of wrong speech, wrong action springs up. For one of wrong action, wrong livelihood springs up. For one of wrong livelihood, wrong effort springs up. For one of wrong effort, wrong mindfulness springs up. For one of wrong mindfulness, wrong concentration springs up.(Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN) 45.1)Here we see that avijjā, or ignorance, impedes the path of removing suffering. Similarly, in the twelve links of dependent origination, ignorance is at the start of the chain conditioning the other links that culminate in suffering (SN 12.2). Nāgārjuna also positions ignorance as a potential gatekeeper when he says that ignorance (ajñāna) causes some people to be intolerant of the wisdom of the Mahāyāna path taught by the Buddhas (RV 4.83).3 While we have ample exposition on the role of ignorance in various causal chains, what remains elusive is how to recognize our own ignorance as such in the experiential folds of seeing, feeling, and knowing. This is especially the case in the early works of the critical project of Madhyamaka ("Middle Way") philosophy by Nāgārjuna. The bulk of these works presents arguments against any ignorant metaphysics that essentializes existents in efforts to claim epistemic access to an objective ultimate reality. This article argues that through a certain way of reading Madhyamaka philosophical texts, we find helpful information for recognizing what ignorance feels like. I develop the phenomenology of epistemic emotions and feelings that coincide with the ignorant practices centrally targeted by Madhyamaka critical analysis.The encompassing scope of ignorance motivates us to conceive of it as entangled with a range of elements, including the affective components of knowing. While the terms avijjā or avidyā, are most often translated as "ignorance" this term can be problematically imprecise in philosophical contexts. In the subfield of ignorance studies within current Western philosophy, ignorance is often classified according to the object of which a subject lacks knowledge. By this paradigm, ignorance can be (1) factual in [End Page 45] the case of not knowing a particular fact, (2) erotetic when a subject does not know the answer to a question, or (3) practical when a subject does... (shrink)