The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological claims. However, ToM supports (...) the psychological UA as a claim about cognitive processes responsible for mindreading. The latter can be interpreted as a claim that (a) neither the other's ‘mindedness’ in general nor the other's particular mental states are observable (i.e. apprehended perceptually); (b) particular mental states are unobservable, whereas some aspects indicative of ‘mindedness’ are observable; (c) some mental states are unobservable but some are also observable. Whereas the critics tend to attribute (a) to ToM, most ToM accounts actually take positions (b) or (c). We conclude that the allegations against ToM for positing UA are seriously misdirected. We further bring out an important stipulation of any account of observability of mental states: mental states are not observable in the same way as the sensory properties of physical objects. (shrink)

Mindreading is often considered to be the most important human social cognitive skill, and over the past three decades, several theories of the cognitive mechanisms for mindreading have been proposed. But why do we read minds? According to the standard view, we attribute mental states to individuals to predict and explain their behavior. I argue that the standard view is too general to capture the distinctive function of mindreading, and that it does not explain what motivates people to read minds. (...) In order to understand why mindreading is evolutionarily adaptive, individually beneficial, and motivationally compelling, we need to include another level of explanation: the level of social relationships. I introduce a theory of the cognitive underpinnings of social relationships—the relational models theory of Alan Fiske. I outline the hypothesis that the function of mindreading is to shape social relations. I further hypothesize that mindreading is often motivated by social emotions. If mindreading serves r.. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to contribute to a more robust theory of leadership that shifts the frame of reference from leadership as exclusively facilitated through a single inspired leader to one that includes the view of leadership as an emergent and complex social phenomenon. The article begins with a review of the leader-centric approaches that dominated much of twentieth century leadership studies then moves on to present contemporary critiques of leader-centric approaches leading to an alternative perspective of leadership (...) as an emergent and complex social phenomenon. Viewing leadership as an emergent and complex social phenomenon changes our attitude regarding the roles that leaders and others play in the creation of leadership. A central theme of this article is the impact that the concept of emergence has on leadership theory. In response to this changing attitude, the article then moves to return to and reassess the ontological, epistemological and ethical grounds of leadership and concludes that there is an underlying philosophy that supports viewing leadership as an emergent social phenomenon and further suggests that recent work in virtue epistemology along with Calvin Schrag’s theory of communicative praxis and transversal rationality, can facilitate a better understanding of leadership as an emergent social phenomenon. (shrink)

The increasing use of computer-cont rolled automation systems has brought with it a bias towards a purely scientific approach to work. This tends to undermine the significance of experiential knowledge and sensory perception when working with highly automated processes. This paper argues for a recognition of the importance of subjectifying action in carrying out work practices. Without it, complex technical systems cannot be effectively operated. Moreover, the contradictory demands that arise for workers could have negative consequences in terms of work (...) burdens and health risks. (shrink)

Traditional theory of mind (ToM) accounts for social cognition have been at the basis of most studies in the social cognitive neurosciences. However, in recent years, the need to go beyond traditional ToM accounts for understanding real life social interactions has become all the more pressing. At the same time it remains unclear whether alternative accounts, such as interactionism, can yield a sufficient description and explanation of social interactions. We argue that instead of considering ToM and interactionism as mutually exclusive (...) opponents, they should be integrated into a more comprehensive account of social cognition. We draw on dual process models of social cognition that contrast two different types of social cognitive processing. The first type (labeled Type 1) refers to process es that are fast, efficient, stimulus-driven, and relatively inflexible. The second type (labeled Type 2) refers to processes that are relatively slow, cognitively laborious, flexible, and may involve conscious control. We argue that while interactionism captures aspects of social cognition mostly related to Type 1 processes, ToM is more focused on those based on Type 2 processes. We suggest that real life social interactions are rarely based on either Type 1 or Type 2 processes alone. On the contrary, we propose that in most cases both types of processes are simultaneously involved and that social behavior may be sustained by the interplay between these two types of processes. Finally, we discuss how the new integrative framework can guide experimental research on social interaction. (shrink)

There is a tension or even contradiction between mental causation - the belief that some mental events or properties are causally relevant for some physical events or properties - and the irreducibility of mental features to physical ones, the causal closure of the physical, and the assumption that there is no overdetermination of the physical. To reconcile these premises was a promise of nonreductive physicalism, but a closer inspection shows that it is, on the contrary, a source of the problem (...) - namely, the unintelligibility of mental causation. This has to do with the widely-held assumption that the mental supervenes on the physical. How can the mental be causally relevant, then? And what is the relationship of the mental and the physical? There are many options, including identity, realizationism, emergence, or some kind of reducibility. But they all have their own problems, e.g. they threaten mental reality, the causal closure of the physical, or scientific explanations. All these aspects are covered in Jaegwon Kim's book Mind in a Physical World. This paper is a detailed introduction to it, discussing and critically commenting it and those still intriguing, but also confusing and complicated issues of the mind-body problem, especially the ontology of mental causation. (shrink)

Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) hat in "De jure naturae et gentium", dem wichtigsten Lehrbuch des Naturrechts seiner Epoche, seine Doktrinen von der persona moralis und von der Soziabilität des Menschen ausführlich dargestellt und sie philosophisch, theologisch und historisch begründet. Diese Theorien, die für die Sittlichkeit der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in der Frühaufklärung grundlegend sind, werden - nicht ohne Spannung - eingebaut in eine Staatslehre, die am Konzept der Souveränität ausgerichtet ist. Es gab vor Immanuel Kant in Deutschland keinen Juristen und Philosophen, der (...) politisch zentrale Begriffe wie Natur- und Menschenrecht, moralische Person und Toleranz so gründlich und so wirkmächtig bestimmt hat. An Pufendorf zu erinnern, stärkt die eigenen Traditionen. Rechtsstaatlichkeit muss so nicht als Belehrung von außen, sondern kann als autochthone, und somit als natürliche Rechtsform aufgefasst werden - es gibt keine stärkeren Argumente für die Stabilität des Rechts, als wenn Naturrecht, regionales Recht und geschichtliches Recht zusammenfallen. Frank Böhling legt in seinem Materialienband neben detailreichen Beiträgen zu Pufendorfs Biographie nun den Stellenkommentar zu den von ihm edierten acht Büchern dieses Werkes (Bände 4.1 und 4.2 unserer Ausgabe) vor. Ergänzt durch ausführliche Indizees. (shrink)

Among the numerous conceptions of autonomy, three are particularly important: Kant's notion of humans' being subject, and subject only, to moral laws they gave themselves, Frankfurt's idea of persons' willing and acting deriving from the essential character of their wills, and the popular conception of persons' being master over whether others do or do not certain things to them. Kant's moral conception of autonomy, it is argued, is untenable because the moral character of a law and its self-givenness are incompatible. (...) Frankfurt's idea suffers from the fact that we cannot give substance to talk of the essential character of one's will. The third conception is practically irrelevant: there is no principle requiring people to be master over what others do to them. Thus autonomy may have to be dropped from our self-conception. To some this will appear a grave loss. In fact it is not. (shrink)

Collaborative consumption is proposed as a potential step beyond unsustainable linear consumption patterns toward more sustainable consumption practices. Despite mounting interest in the topic, little is known about the determinants of this consumer behavior. We use an extended theory of planned behavior to examine the relative influence of consumers’ personal norms and the theory’s basic sociopsychological variables attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control on collaborative consumption. Moreover, we use this framework to examine consumers’ underlying value and belief structure regarding (...) collaborative consumption. We measure these aspects for 224 consumers in a survey and then assess their self-reported collaborative consumption behavior in a second survey. Our structural model fits the data well. Collaborative consumption is more strongly—through intentions—influenced by personal norms and attitudes than by subjective norms. Personal norms to consume collaboratively are determined by consumers’ altruistic, biospheric, and egoistic value orientations. Cost savings, efficient use of resources, and community with others are found to be consumers’ attitudinal beliefs underlying collaborative consumption. We conclude that collaborative consumption can be pin-pointed neither as a mere form of economic exchange nor as a primarily normative form of sharing resources. Instead, collaborative consumption is determined by economic/egoistic (e.g., cost savings) and normative (e.g., altruistic and biospheric value orientations) motives. Implications for collaborative consumption research, the theory of planned behavior, and practitioners are discussed. (shrink)

This commentary argues that Gallagher's account of direct social perception has remained underdeveloped in several respects. Gallagher has not provided convincing evidence to support his claim that mindreading is rare in social situations. He and other direct perception theorists have not offered a substantive critique of standard theories of mindreading because they have attacked a much stronger claim about the putative unobservability of mental states than most theories of mindreading imply. To provide a genuine alternative to standard theories of mindreading, (...) the direct perception theorist needs to provide more detailed answers to the following questions: What are the criteria for distinguishing perceptual processes from non-perceptual processes? How exactly does direct social perception function on the subpersonal level? What is the content of direct social perception? How does direct perception theory relate to more recent developments in the mindreading literature? (shrink)

The influence of the Platonic theory of forms is to be found in nearly all periods in the history of Western philosophy. Much less well known is the fact that in all ages Arabic philosophers also discussed Platonic forms in their written works, although they had no access to Plato s Dialogues. This study analyses how this conception was given doctrinal content without recourse to Plato s works, and presents the relevant Arabic works in German translation for the first time. (...) They offer a first insight into a branch of the reception of Platonism that has not yet been researched, but which is often clearly influenced by Islam.". (shrink)

There are cases of emotion that we readily describe as 'sharing emotions with other people.' How should we understand such cases? Joel Krueger has proposed the Joint Ownership Thesis : the view that two or more people can literally share the same emotional episode. His view is partly inspired by his reading of Merleau-Ponty -- arguably Merleau-Ponty advocates a version of JOT in his "The child's relations with others." My critical analysis demonstrates that JOT is flawed in several respects: 1) (...) It involves a vague account of joint subjects; 2) It relies on a confusion between phenomenological and ontological levels of analysis. When these are clearly distinguished, Krueger's phenomenological analysis contradicts JOT understood as an ontological claim; 3) It relies on a highly problematic coupling-constitution inference; 4) It relies on a shift from the claim that the child and the caregiver jointly _realize_ an emotion, to the claim about joint _ownership_, which is a _non sequitur_. I argue that we can reach a better understanding of the phenomenon of shared emotions by bringing in another level of analysis: that of _social relationships_. I propose that shared emotions are a special case of _social-relational emotions_, typically arising within and/or giving rise to communal relationships. (shrink)

ExcerptIEven after they met in 1992 in order to discuss The Ending (Das Ende), the members of the Poetics and Hermeneutics group convened once again in 1994. The theme that they chose for what was to become their true last gathering was contingency (Kontingenz). That which can be or not, which can take place or not take place—the contingent event—came after the end.1 The group had arguably been the single most important forum of debate in the humanities in West Germany (...) between the first conference in 1963 and the last one in 1994.2 Those three decades coincide with what…. (shrink)

One of the century's greatest philosophers, without whom there would be no Sartre, no Foucault, no Frankfurt School, Martin Heidegger was also a man of great failures and flaws, a Faustus who made a pact with the devil of his time, Adolf Hitler. The story of Heidegger's life and philosophy, a quintessentially German story in which good and evil, brilliance and blindness are inextricably entwined and the passions and disasters of a whole century come into play, is told in this (...) brilliant biography. Heidegger grew up in Catholic Germany where, for a chance at pursuing a life of learning, he pledged himself to the priesthood. Soon he turned apostate and sought a university position, which set him on the path to becoming the star of German philosophy in the 1920s. Rüdiger Safranski chronicles Heidegger's rise along with the thought he honed on the way, with its debt to Heraclitus, Plato, and Kant, and its tragic susceptibility to the conservatism that emerged out of the nightmare of Germany's loss in World War I. A chronicle of ideas and of personal commitments and betrayals, Safranski's biography combines clear accounts of the philosophy that won Heidegger eternal renown with the fascinating details of the loves and lapses that tripped up this powerful intellectual. The best intellectual biography of Heidegger ever written and a best-seller in Germany, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil does not shy away from full coverage of Heidegger's shameful transformation into a propagandist for the National Socialist regime; nor does it allow this aspect of his career to obscure his accomplishments. Written by a master of Heidegger's philosophy, the book is one of the best introductions to the thought and to the life and times of the greatest German philosopher of the century. (shrink)

In recent years, a considerable amount of research on adapted business for developing countries focused on the impact such endeavours have on the respective companies as well as on the affected people. However, the main emphasis within management sciences was on the economic outcomes or (even more distinct and often) on the question of how to integrate the poor into business models and value chains. Until now, further aspects of a dignified human existence were merely covered as a side note. (...) The article focuses on the influence of inclusive business approaches on various aspects of human dignity and provides explorative insights as a basis for future theory building. The aim is to uncover how human dignity is affected by different business approaches for the poor including and beyond economic outcomes. After giving an insight into the essence and meaning of human dignity in connection to various human rights, the articles refers to a number of illustrative cases of inclusive business. The analysis culminates in the insight that dignity can be (and sometimes already is) assured and promoted by deliberately including the poor into relevant value-added business processes. If this is the case, an enhanced dignity is not merely the result of increased incomes but stems from a variety of effects. However, such positive effects are not an inevitable outcome of any inclusive business initiative. (shrink)

What exactly are the reasons we do things, and how are they related to the resulting actions? Bittner explores this question and proposes an answer: a reason is a response to that state of affairs. Elegantly written, this work is a substantial contribution to the fields of rationality, ethics, and action theory.

In this compelling new book, the philosopher Rudiger Safranski grapples with the pressing problems of the global age: 'Big Brother' states, terrorism, ...

Kosmologie im weiten Sinn von Naturwissenschaft und -philosophie hat Karl Popper am meisten fasziniert. Auch die physikalische Kosmologie im engeren Sinn verfolgte er kritisch. In der aktuellen Kosmologie sind seine wissenschafts- und erkenntnistheoretischen Einsichten weiterhin wichtig … oder sollten es sein – besonders im Kontext spekulativer Hypothesen, etwa zu anderen Universen.

Spinoza holds that we can become free by recognizing that everything happens with necessity. His own reasons for this claim do not stand scrutiny. More promising appears the idea that he who considers things necessary is not subject to affects that deprive him of his freedom. On this line, however, recognizing necessity also destroys joy, contrary to Spinoza’s maxim ”Do good and be joyful”. More importantly, what is necessary may in fact be a reasonable object of affective reactions. Thus, Spinoza (...) fails to support the enlightenment’s hope that knowledge brings freedom. (shrink)

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat das Gesetz, das die geschäftsmäßige Förderung der Selbsttötung unter Strafe stellte, für nichtig erklärt. Hatte es dafür gute verfassungsrechtliche Gründe? Nein. Die Freiheitsgarantie von Art. 2 GG und der Menschenwürde-Satz von Art. 1 GG stützen die Entscheidung nicht. Doch politisch, nicht verfassungsrechtlich gefragt, sollte geschäftsmäßig betriebene Sterbehilfe zugelassen werden? Ja. Menschen, die sterben wollen, sollten nicht durch die Strafbarkeit solcher Sterbehilfe an der Ausführung ihres Entschlusses gehindert werden.

The purpose of this essay is to explain human religiosity as a phenomenon resulting from biological evolution and a neurological set of equipment which can help human beings reduce existential anxiety by offering them metaphysical security and meaning. Thereby, a form of philosophy in the tradition of European Enlightenment would be able to clarify religious issues and prevent both religious and ideological intolerance.

In der Erkenntnistheorie führt das von Hans Albert so genannte Münchhausen-Trilemma an die Grenzen von Begründungen und Rechtfertigungen. Da diese immer in einen infiniten Regress, Zirkel oder Abbruch münden, ist absolut sicheres, letztbegründetes Wissen nicht möglich. Neuere Entwicklungen in der Erkenntnistheorie zeigen jedoch, dass sich die Rechtfertigungen unserer Überzeugungen vielleicht doch tiefer fundieren lassen als bislang gedacht, und dass die Erkenntnisgrenzen erweitert und im Hinblick auf skeptische Argumente genauer bestimmt werden können, wenn der epistemologische Internalismus eingeschränkt werden muss. Die Kosmologie (...) und Metaphysik stoßen aufgrund des Münchhausen-Trilemmas ebenfalls an Grenzen. Dies lässt sich an zwei besonders brisanten Fragen kritisch illustrieren (auch wenn die zahlreichen Antwortversuche und Argumente hier nicht im Detail dargestellt werden können): Wie kam es zum Urknall? Und warum ist etwas und nicht vielmehr nichts? Dabei markiert das Münchhausen-Trilemma nicht nur die explanatorischen Probleme, sondern auch die physikalischen und metaphysischen Möglichkeiten: Der infinite Regress entspricht einem ewigen Kosmos (mit womöglich unendlich vielen Urknall-Ereignissen ohne einen allerersten) beziehungsweise einer unaufhörlichen Kontingenz; der Abbruch entspricht einem absoluten Anfang beziehungsweise einem fundamentalen, unhintergehbaren, womöglich metaphysisch notwendigen Prinzip oder einem unerklärlichen Zufall; und der Zirkel entspricht einem kosmologischen Zeitschleifen-Modell beziehungsweise spekulativen metaphysischen Selbstfundierungsprinzipien. Einerseits sind diese Alternativen letztlich alle unbefriedigend, andererseits stellt die undogmatische epistemische Bescheidenheit, die daraus resultieren sollte, zugleich eine wichtige Einsicht dar, die die beste Voraussetzung ist für weitere Forschungen und somit für einen Fortschritt in der wissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Erkundung unserer Welt und unserer Wissensgrenzen. (shrink)

Human beings are masters of deception if they want to appear superior to others and to suggest that they have everything under control (see, e.g., Fingarette 2000, Mele 2000). Such self-delusions might be advantageous, because those are the most successful liars who believe their own lies. Although it seems paradoxical at first (for he who does not tell the untruth intentionally is, strictly speaking, not a liar at all), it rests upon a much more radical self-deception which is quite useful (...) – a systematic and continuous illusion regarding ourselves. Higher-order forms of self-consciousness, namely I-consciousness, are based on a feature which is called a self-model. This is an episodically active representational entity (e.g. a complex activation pattern in a human brain), the contents of which are properties of the system itself. It is embedded and constantly updated in a global model of the world, based on perceptions, memories, innate information etc. (Metzinger 1993). But because self-models cannot represent their own representations as their own representations as their own representations and so on ad infinitum, they are semantically transparent, i.e. on the level of their content they do not contain the information that they are models. Thus, such systems are not able to recognize their self-model as a self-model (Van Gulick 1988). The result is an ego-illusion, which is stable, coherent, and cannot be transcended on the level of conscious experience itself. (shrink)

Im Zentrum der Reihe Staatsverstandnisse steht die Frage: Was lasst sich den Ideen fruherer und heutiger Staatsdenker fur ein zeitgemaaes Verstandnis des Staates entnehmen? Carl Schmitt gehort zu den wichtigsten Staatsdenkern des 20. Jahrhunderts. Schon zu Lebzeiten wurden seine staats- und volkerrechtlichen, politikwissenschaftlichen und geschichtsphilosophischen Publikationen leidenschaftlich diskutiert. Er hat begeisterte Zustimmung und erbitterte Ablehnung erfahren. Sein Tod hat geradezu zu einer Renaissance des Schmittschen Denkens im In- und Ausland gefuhrt. Die Frage nach den Ursachen beantwortet Jan-Werner Muller in diesem (...) Buch so: "Carl Schmitt war ein Denker des Ubergangs, und er war ein Theoretiker der Grenzziehung. Er kehrt wieder in Zeiten sich verwischender Grenzen und bruchig gewordener Begriffe". In dem vorliegenden Band analysieren argentinische, brasilianische, deutsche, franzosische, japanische, koreanische und spanische WissenschaftlerInnen die aktuelle Bedeutung Carl Schmitts in der internationalen Debatte. Der Band gliedert sich in funf Teile: Parlamentarische Demokratie und Liberalismus, Die Schmitt-Rezeption in Sudeuropa, Die Schmitt-Rezeption in Lateinamerika, Die Schmitt-Rezeption in USA, Die Schmitt-Rezeption in Ostasien. (shrink)