The theory of mind (ToM) framework has been criticised by emerging alternative accounts. Each alternative begins with the accusation that ToM's validity as a research paradigm rests on the assumption of the ‘unobservability’ of other minds. We argue that the critics' discussion of the unobservability assumption (UA) targets a straw man. We discuss metaphysical, phenomenological, epistemological, and psychological readings of UA and demonstrate that it is not the case that ToM assumes the metaphysical, phenomenological, or epistemological claims. However, ToM supports (...) the psychological UA as a claim about cognitive processes responsible for mindreading. The latter can be interpreted as a claim that (a) neither the other's ‘mindedness’ in general nor the other's particular mental states are observable (i.e. apprehended perceptually); (b) particular mental states are unobservable, whereas some aspects indicative of ‘mindedness’ are observable; (c) some mental states are unobservable but some are also observable. Whereas the critics tend to attribute (a) to ToM, most ToM accounts actually take positions (b) or (c). We conclude that the allegations against ToM for positing UA are seriously misdirected. We further bring out an important stipulation of any account of observability of mental states: mental states are not observable in the same way as the sensory properties of physical objects. (shrink)

The increasing use of computer-cont rolled automation systems has brought with it a bias towards a purely scientific approach to work. This tends to undermine the significance of experiential knowledge and sensory perception when working with highly automated processes. This paper argues for a recognition of the importance of subjectifying action in carrying out work practices. Without it, complex technical systems cannot be effectively operated. Moreover, the contradictory demands that arise for workers could have negative consequences in terms of work (...) burdens and health risks. (shrink)

The book moves from descriptive through to more interpretative phenomenological methods to enable the reader to learn to use the main approaches to ...

Mindreading is often considered to be the most important human social cognitive skill, and over the past three decades, several theories of the cognitive mechanisms for mindreading have been proposed. But why do we read minds? According to the standard view, we attribute mental states to individuals to predict and explain their behavior. I argue that the standard view is too general to capture the distinctive function of mindreading, and that it does not explain what motivates people to read minds. (...) In order to understand why mindreading is evolutionarily adaptive, individually beneficial, and motivationally compelling, we need to include another level of explanation: the level of social relationships. I introduce a theory of the cognitive underpinnings of social relationships—the relational models theory of Alan Fiske. I outline the hypothesis that the function of mindreading is to shape social relations. I further hypothesize that mindreading is often motivated by social emotions. If mindreading serves r.. (shrink)

This commentary examines several key points in David Horan’s paper “The Argu­mentative Unity of Plato’s Parmenides.” First, I discuss the general view of the paper, which engages with the first two hypotheses and in particular, the thought experiment passage in hypothesis 2 that is seen as a key to resolving the dilemma of participation. I consider the proposed view that hypothesis 1 takes up from its premise a strictly unitary, or non-multiple “one,” and hypothesis 2 takes up from its premise (...) a one that admits of multiplicity, not a non-multiple “one.” I argue for an alternative reading whereby the premise of hypothesis 1 is not “if one is one” and hypothesis 2 is “if one is not one,” but rather that both hypotheses fall under the premise “if one is.”. (shrink)

The orientation of public space is either logocentric or eclectic. The surface of a Philippine jeepney is an example of a successful inversion of American militaristic individualism into a place for the celebration of idiosyncrasies. Using Walter Benjamin’s differentiation between allegory and symbolism – and photographs of Philippine jeepney art – this essay problematizes the collapse of contemporary spirituality into a political demographic.

In this title the author explores the time-tested practice and philosophy using modern examples from more than a decade of experience with this ancient practice. He brings the principles of yoga into focus and makes them user-friendly for yogis living in the post modern era.

The doctrine of the communication of natures has played a primarily descriptive role in the history of Christology, and so it is perhaps unsurprising that it has largely gone missing from contemporary theology. This is a serious oversight. But Karl Barth is a noteworthy exception to the reductionist trend, and he provides the Reformed tradition's most complete and substantive engagement with the communication of natures and its implications for dogmatic theology. Through a close reading of volume IV/2 of the Church (...) Dogmatics , this essay considers Karl Barth's vital emphasis upon the communicatio naturarum and the role it plays in his actualist Christology. Barth demonstrates that the traditional threefold communication (of attributes, graces, and operations) has material as well as formal importance. According to Barth, we see in Christ not the mere coincidence of two natures, nor an interpenetration, nor the transformation of one into the other – but mutual operation and interpretation, where divinity and humanity each acquires and has its determination in the other. (shrink)

Sometimes we learn what the world is like, and sometimes we learn where in the world we are. Are there any interesting differences between the two kinds of cases? The main aim of this article is to argue that learning where we are in the world brings into view the same kind of observation selection effects that operate when sampling from a population. I will first explain what observation selection effects are ( Section 1 ) and how they are relevant (...) to learning where we are in the world ( Section 2 ). I will show how measurements in the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics can be understood as learning where you are in the world via some observation selection effect ( Section 3 ). I will apply a similar argument to the Sleeping Beauty Problem ( Section 4 ) and explain what I take the significance of the analogy to be ( Section 5 ). Finally, I will defend the Restricted Principle of Indifference on which some of my arguments depend ( Section 6 ). (shrink)

How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and (...) draw some general conclusions about their impact on eternal beliefs. (shrink)

This book shows that cyberculture has been a long time coming.In Prefiguring Cyberculture, media critics and theorists, philosophers, and historians of science ...

If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...) Hitchcock argues that this credence follows from calculating her fair betting odds, plus the assumption that Sleeping Beauty’s credences should track her fair betting odds. We will show that this last assumption is false. Sleeping Beauty’s credences should not follow her fair betting odds due to a peculiar feature of her epistemic situation. (shrink)

Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694) hat in "De jure naturae et gentium", dem wichtigsten Lehrbuch des Naturrechts seiner Epoche, seine Doktrinen von der persona moralis und von der Soziabilität des Menschen ausführlich dargestellt und sie philosophisch, theologisch und historisch begründet. Diese Theorien, die für die Sittlichkeit der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft in der Frühaufklärung grundlegend sind, werden - nicht ohne Spannung - eingebaut in eine Staatslehre, die am Konzept der Souveränität ausgerichtet ist. Es gab vor Immanuel Kant in Deutschland keinen Juristen und Philosophen, der (...) politisch zentrale Begriffe wie Natur- und Menschenrecht, moralische Person und Toleranz so gründlich und so wirkmächtig bestimmt hat. An Pufendorf zu erinnern, stärkt die eigenen Traditionen. Rechtsstaatlichkeit muss so nicht als Belehrung von außen, sondern kann als autochthone, und somit als natürliche Rechtsform aufgefasst werden - es gibt keine stärkeren Argumente für die Stabilität des Rechts, als wenn Naturrecht, regionales Recht und geschichtliches Recht zusammenfallen. Frank Böhling legt in seinem Materialienband neben detailreichen Beiträgen zu Pufendorfs Biographie nun den Stellenkommentar zu den von ihm edierten acht Büchern dieses Werkes (Bände 4.1 und 4.2 unserer Ausgabe) vor. Ergänzt durch ausführliche Indizees. (shrink)

The fine-tuning argument can be used to support the Many Universe hypothesis. The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy objection seeks to undercut the support for the Many Universe hypothesis. The objection is that although the evidence that there is life somewhere confirms Many Universes, the specific evidence that there is life in this universe does not. I will argue that the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy is not committed by the fine-tuning argument. The key issue is the procedure by which the universe with life (...) is selected for observation. Once we take account of the procedure, we find that the support for the Many Universe hypothesis remains. (shrink)

Many epistemological problems can be solved by the objective Bayesian view that there are rationality constraints on priors, that is, inductive probabilities. But attempts to work out these constraints have run into such serious problems that many have rejected objective Bayesianism altogether. I argue that the epistemologist should borrow the metaphysician’s concept of naturalness and assign higher priors to more natural hypotheses.

This article defends the Doomsday Argument, the Halfer Position in Sleeping Beauty, the Fine-Tuning Argument, and the applicability of Bayesian confirmation theory to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. It will argue that all four problems have the same structure, and it gives a unified treatment that uses simple models of the cases and no controversial assumptions about confirmation or self-locating evidence. The article will argue that the troublesome feature of all these cases is not self-location but selection effects.

The parallel drawn by Norman between the dorsal and ventral systems and direct and indirect approaches is based on two misrepresentations of the direct approach – that it is concerned only with the unconscious control of action, and that it cannot explain learning. We propose a way of understanding the visual system differences from within the direct approach.

If humans subject animals to painful, damaging, or frightening procedures to achieve scientific progress, then the very least that humankind can do is to insist that regulations be put in place to protect animals and that they be properly implemented and enforced. However, recent practice in the United Kingdom suggests that this is not the case. Europe’s new regime on the protection of animals used for scientific purposes—Directive 2010/63—must act as a catalyst for significant change and is a significant recognition (...) of the intrinsic value of animals. Before this Directive, the cost/benefit analysis undertaken in the United Kingdom allowed for a large margin of error so that animal welfare was an aggregated concept, and any aggregated finding of “adequate” animal welfare was not militated by individual cases of exacerbated animal detriment. The recognition that each animal has value as an individual means that the levels of animal welfare or protection expected of scientific establishments can no longer simply be those that are, in generic terms, appropriate for the aggregated mass of animals. Instead, the welfare standards applied are appropriate and rendered effectual for all individual animals. (shrink)

Nurses practising in mental health are faced with challenging decisions concerning confidentiality if a patient is deemed a potential risk to self or others, because releasing pertinent information pertaining to the patient may be necessary to circumvent harm. However, decisions to withhold or disclose confidential information that are inappropriately made may lead to adverse outcomes for stakeholders, including nurses and their patients. Nonetheless, there is a dearth of contemporary research literature to advise nurses in these circumstances. Cognitive Continuum Theory presents (...) a single‐system intuitive‐analytical approach to examining and understanding nurse cognition, analogous to the recommended single‐system approach to decision‐making in mental health known as structured clinical judgement. Both approaches incorporate cognitive poles of wholly intuition and analysis and a dynamic continuum characterised by a ‘common sense’ blending of intuitive and analytical cognition, whereby cues presented to a decision‐maker for judgement tasks are weighed and assessed for relevance. Furthermore, Cognitive Continuum Theory promotes the importance of determining pattern recognition and functional relations strategies, which can be used to understand the operationalisation of nurse cognition. (shrink)

The best way to divide control over children’s education between private and state authorities is unclear. This task has ethical implications that this thesis explores—in the context of a pluralist liberal democracy. In cases where authority over children’s education is granted to private groups, like ethnic or religious minorities, rights are often part of the default vocabulary adopted by politically liberal commentaries. These rights are often viewed as a shield that offers the group immunity from state interference. Some illiberal minority (...) groups argue that they need to be shielded from state interference because the persistence of their cultural or religious identity depends on it. For example, the Amish community in Wisconsin argued in Wisconsin v. Yoder that the future of their community would be jeopardized if they were forced to send their children to school beyond the age of fourteen. While a rights-based approach does explain many of the variables connected with cases like these, the explanation is incomplete. I will offer two clarifications to the rights-based view. First, in the event that a minority group is shielded from state interference, it is not clear that it would be morally legitimate for the group to take over the authority of the state. I will, then, offer a plausible theory that could justify the self-governing authority of minority groups in these situations. My second clarification is that the concept of individual autonomy, often the central liberal value protected by rights, is too broad to support a zero-tolerance approach toward illiberal groups. This indicates that illiberal minority groups might still have a claim to self-governing authority even though they arguably interfere with the autonomy of their children. Some interference with minor elements of individual autonomy should arguably be tolerated in cases where the ruination or assimilation of the group’s unique culture or religion is at stake. (shrink)

This study aims to highlight how an existential-humanistic perspective can inform athlete support and in doing so, emphasize the importance of explicating the philosophical underpinnings of athlete lifestyle support. Drawing on applied experience with elite youth cricketers over a 12-month period, ethnographic data were collected through the observation, maintenance of case notes, and a practitioner reflective diary. Based on thematic analysis, we created three nonfictional vignettes that we use to illustrate how existential-humanistic theorizing can inform lifestyle support. We discuss the (...) implications of this professional philosophy in terms of considerations for performance and talent development programs, and how holistic support for athletes is positioned. We also discuss implications for athlete lifestyle and performance psychology practitioners, with regard to training, underpinning theoretical grounding of support and the strategic positioning of their practitioner roles. (shrink)

People who suffer survivor’s guilt reason that, if they survived while others didn’t, then this must be because of the choices that they made, and that others did not make. People with survivor’s guilt feel just the way they would feel if they did not really believe in luck.

J. Baird Callicott defends a communitarian environmental ethic that grounds moral standing in shared kinship and community. This normative theory is unacceptable because it is out of synch with our considered moral judgments as environmental philosophers. Ecological communitarianism excludes in advance entities that would obviously qualify for moral standing, and scuttles itself in the process.

An eighty‐six–year‐old woman has had lifelong obsessive‐compulsive disorder. At times, it has been so severe that she has lost touch with reality and been psychotic. She is actively followed by a community mental health nurse. Since she is physically frail, the nurse visits her at home and liaises with the attending psychiatrist, who adjusts medications as needed. Currently, the patient is stable, and there is no evidence of psychosis.The patient's home deteriorates, and several repairs are needed. The nurse questions the (...) patient about this, and the patient agrees to have her nephew arrange for the repairs and pay for them out of her bank account. The nurse asks how the nephew has access to the account. The patient mentions that he has power of attorney, but when asked to supply the document giving him this authority, she becomes confused and supplies a number of bank statements instead. The nurse is surprised to see several withdrawals for over ten thousand dollars each. When she questions the patient about these, the patient simply suggests that her nephew must have “needed the money” for something. The nurse questions her repeatedly about this matter, but she refuses to give further details. The patient becomes quite upset whenever the nurse brings it up and states, “This is my money, and he wouldn't take it unless he needed it to help me.”Should the nurse challenge the patient's right to make her own financial decisions in order to avoid a risk of exploitation by her family members? Does the patient have the right to refuse a capacity assessment, which could determine her decision‐making abilities in this area? (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article investigates the moral wrongness of joke theft. Working through a trove of real-world cases, and using the sitcom The Marvelous Mrs. Maisel as a touchstone, I argue, ultimately, for a pluralist approach, contending that there are several wrongs that may be present in any case of joke theft, but which cannot be reduced to each other and which are collectively irreducible to any sort of “superwrong.”.

In this paper I examine how many of Kierkegaard’s major claims made about love, when taken together, lead to incongruencies and in some cases, complete paradoxes. I rely primarily on eight statements that are presented above and are often repeated throughout Works of Love. I argue that there are three main paradoxes which unfold as Kierkegaard builds his argument about the true meaning of Christian love.

There is currently a lively debate about whether there are practical reasons for belief, epistemic reasons for belief, or both. I will argue that the intuitions on all sides can be fully accounted for by applying an independently motivated contextualist semantics for normative terms. Specifically, normative terms must be relativized to a goal. One possible goal is epistemic, such as believing truly and not believing falsely, while another possible goal is practical, such as satisfying desires, or maximizing value. I will (...) argue that we have practical reasons given the practical goal and epistemic reasons given the epistemic goal. Disagreement disappears when we make the context explicit. The result is an independently motivated version ofpluralism. (shrink)

Daniel Bensaïd’s theoretical and political framework deserves to be habitually known in the English-speaking world. His philosophical work has a universal dimension, but because it was also the product of particular political upsurges and downturns, it is necessary to understand these particular political moments to thoroughly understand the universal scope and significance of his work. This paper will look at these political developments and pay particular attention to the crisis of the workers’ movement, strategy and Marxism.

What should we believe? One plausible view is that we should believe what is true. Another is that we should believe what is rational to believe. I will argue that both these theses can be accounted for once we add an independently motivated contextualism about normative terms. According to contextualism, the content of ‘ought’ depends on two parameters – a goal and a modal base (or set of possible worlds). It follows that there is a sense in which we should (...) believe truths and a sense in which we should believe what is rational to believe. (shrink)

Cian Dorr (2002) gives an argument for the 1/3 position in Sleeping Beauty. I argue this is based on a mistake about Sleeping Beauty's epistemic position.

The Protein Ontology (PRO) provides a formal, logically-based classification of specific protein classes including structured representations of protein isoforms, variants and modified forms. Initially focused on proteins found in human, mouse and Escherichia coli, PRO now includes representations of protein complexes. The PRO Consortium works in concert with the developers of other biomedical ontologies and protein knowledge bases to provide the ability to formally organize and integrate representations of precise protein forms so as to enhance accessibility to results of protein (...) research. PRO (http://pir.georgetown.edu/pro) is part of the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry. (shrink)

Theological interpretation of the Bible is one of the most significant debates within theology today. Yet what exactly is theological reading? Darren Sarisky proposes that it requires identification of the reader via a theological anthropology; an understanding of the text as a collection of signs; and reading the text with a view toward engaging with what it says of transcendence. Accounts of theological reading do not often give explicit focus to the place of the reader, but this work seeks (...) to redress this neglect. Sarisky examines Augustine's approach to the Bible and how his theological insights into the reader and the text generate an aim for interpretation, which is fulfilled by fitting reading strategies. He also engages with Spinoza, showing that theological exegesis contrasts not with approaches that take history seriously, but with naturalistic approaches to reading. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the notion of ‘reasonableness’ that is, for many, at the heart of the Philosophy for Children approach particularly and education for democratic citizenship more broadly, is constituted within the epistemology of ‘white ignorance’ and operates in such a way that it is unlikely to transgress the boundaries of white ignorance so as to view it from without. Drawing on scholarship in critical legal studies and social epistemology, I highlight how notions of reasonableness often include (...) consensus, ‘racialised common sense’ and the ‘typical’ view. In addition the promotion of particular dispositions on the grounds of ‘reasonableness’ both promotes stability and limits how one may think otherwise. Thus, P4C practices that fail to historicise, examine and challenge prevailing notions of reasonableness establish an epistemically ‘gated’ community of inquiry. (shrink)