The leadership of the Russian Federation made visible organization and invested significant financial resources in support of the Russian Orthodox Church, making the latter a cementing ideological component of the Moscow government, its various aggressive policy. So, since 2012, the state support for the 2016 year celebration of the "1000th anniversary of the Russian presence on Athos" has begun. On this occasion, a special order of Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 16, 2012 for №468-rp (...) "On creation of working groups...". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine appealed to the Specialized Department of the Department of Religious Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine with a request to comment on the next aspiration of the Russian Federation to steal Ukrainian history, attributing to itself what the Muscovites do not have any direct relation to. (shrink)

The Russian Orthodox Church, the biggest centralized religious institution in the post-Soviet space, has been going through major changes in the 2000s. These are connected to qualitative changes in the composition of believers and clergy as well as legal registration of rights on church property obtained from the government in the 1990s. This has led to substantial changes in internal policies, particularly a sharp decrease in the influence of fundamentalists, which had been rising over the previous decade. (...) Moreover, the years of Putin's rule were years of failure in the church's relations with the government, which consistently denied the ROC's most important requests. In this paper we will examine the principal social developments that have been taking place within the Church in the first years of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

Besides other changes that have taken place in the Russian Federation in our times, the process of constitution of an ideology, which is accompanied by different competing value-systems, is one of the crucial tendencies. This process also occurs in the area of the development and construction of religious institutions and religious consciousness. Historically, the Russian Orthodox Church has had a dominant position among the other religious institutions in the country. Unfortunately, it has not and does not serve (...) the role of promoting a democratic change, but is rather an “echo” of the authoritarian and totalitarian past of the Russian history. In my paper I will analyze different factors that contribute to these characteristics of the Orthodox Church, and their influence on the political culture of Russia. (shrink)

This article assesses the role of an important Russian public institution, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), in shaping the religious discourse on bioethics in Russia. An important step in this process was the approval of ‘The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church’ (2000), one chapter of which is devoted to bioethics. However, certain inadequacies in the creation of this document resulted in the absence of a clear position of the Russian (...) Orthodox Church on some end-of-life issues, reproductive technologies, embryo stem cells, and other topics.Using the example of reproductive dilemmas, the author researches how the ROC clarifies its teaching on issues relating to bioethics. In the 2010s the ROC introduced a new method of taking into account the views of believers and the articulation of the church’s position. This article examines the extensive public discussion of a new document, ‘Ethical issues Associated with In Vitro Fertilization’. (shrink)

In the Ukrainian-Russian relations, especially in pre-revolutionary times, the religious component played an important role. The attitude of the Russian authorities toward Southwest Russia was shaped by the influence of several conceptions made in the church circles, which also significantly influenced the formation of Russian national identity.

One of the most interesting phenomena of our religious-political life is the considerable difference in attitude toward religion between the popular masses and the political elite. In our survey of public opinion, the respondents had to express their attitude to two alternative statements: "There are national, traditional religions in our country. They should have more rights than representatives of religions that are new to our country "; and "All religions should have absolutely equal rights." Only 9 percent agreed with the (...) first statement, while the vast majority agreed with the second. Even among the Orthodox, adherents of the Moscow patriarchy, only 13 percent were supporters of special patronage by the state for the traditional religions, while those who advocated an equality of religion made up 69 percent. Thus, the idea of a state church is alien to the contemporary popular consciousness. The evolution of mass consciousness is toward an even greater amorphousness and indefiniteness with regard to religion and further away from the idea of a national, state church. The data confirming this have already been presented. Let me just recall that the percentage of persons who approved of the church's participation in political life decreased from 74 percent to 48 percent from 1990 to 1991. (shrink)

Fake news is created as ordinary news stylistically but it consists of deliberate disinformation or hoaxes. The text is generally constructed to cause negative emotions and feelings in readers: fear, panic, distrust, and paranoia. It is done to manipulate the opinion and consciousness of a large number of people and eventually leads to changes in the values, ideas and attitudes that already exist in the public awareness. The result is a schism that has already gone beyond the usual spiritual strife. (...) Moreover, its expansion has weakened the defining feature of Russian Orthodoxy which lies in trust and support of the state and authorities. The Russian Orthodox Church has to deal not only with public health crisis but also with profound differences within its ranks over the churchgoers’ behavior in the conditions of a pandemic. The article analyzes legal regulations and mechanisms for countering fake news about the Russian Orthodox Church, and provides examples from the judicial practice. It also determines the mechanisms of the worshippers’ reaction to the fake news involving the Russian Orthodox Church. Using semiotic methodology, the author reveals re-encoding of the symbolic meaning of such signs as “Russian Orthodox cross” and “red cross”. The connotative meaning of these signs leads to contradictions in the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic. (shrink)

This in-depth case study examines the Russian Orthodox Church's influence on federal-level policy in the Russian Federation since the fall of communism. By far more comprehensive than competing works, The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics is based on interviews, close readings of documents--including official state and ecclesiastical publications--and survey work conducted by the author.

In a span of twenty years, two of the autocephalous churches of the Orthodox Christian world released documents addressing the social realities of contemporary life: the Russian Orthodox Church's Basis of the Social Concept (2000) and the Ecumenical Patriarch's For the Life of the World: Toward a Social Ethos of the Orthodox Church (2020). This article offers a side-by-side comparison and analysis of the documents’ treatments of matters of birth and death, including childbirth, abortion, miscarriage, end-of-life care, (...) euthanasia, suicide, and a vision of a good death. Detailed comparison demonstrates remarkable accord between the two churches on many of these matters. Differences of omission and emphasis appear to be indicative of contrasting demographic and historical situations, with the exception of one, notable divergence between the churches, all of which are discussed. The striking degree and depth of consonance between the documents offers potential for cooperation and unity as the two churches negotiate their conflicts while also seeking to guide their flocks and offer Orthodox Christian witness in an increasingly desacralized world. (shrink)

Статья посвящена анализу богословского ландшафта в современной социальной и церковной сферах. Эволюционирующая социальная динамика требует переоценки обоснования и дискурса, используемых для поддержки теологических взглядов, по сравнению с более ранними периодами. Уникальные характеристики современного российского культурного и исторического контекста вносят изменения в роль богословия и придают его природе более неопределенный и спорный характер, влияя на его статус и место в общественной сфере. В рамках данной работы я попытаюсь сформулировать перспективу, направленную на раскрытие богословской стратегии в форме аналогического и мирного видения.

The study of the cultural activity of the Spiritual missions of the Russian Orthodox Church in various regions of Russia is one of the urgent tasks in the context of the problematic field of the theory of regionalism, cultural studies and socio-philosophical knowledge. Russian settlements on the territory of the Yenisei River basin and the entry of ethnic groups and territories of Yakutia and Buryatia into the Russian Empire has become one of the most important stages (...) of the integration of the ethnic groups of Siberia into a single statehood. The Irkutsk Spiritual Mission received a more perfect organization, institutionalized by increasing the number of missionary camps, which for successful Christian activities carried out among pagans allowed the formation of school educational institutions for the education and upbringing of a new Buryat generation of children in the doctrinal Orthodox canons, and Russian cultural traditions. In this regard, one of the key tasks of the missionaries was to establish a rational view of further life in new Christian-type formations, which was realized in socio-cultural activities: providing medical care to sick representatives of other ethnic groups, a friendly attitude to people of a different faith and a sincere desire to guide them on the path of righteousness, etc. It should be noted that the largest share of foreigners in this territory belonged to Buddhists, which was reflected in the influence of lamas on doctrinal issues, including economic ones. Since Buddhism in the Russian Empire belonged to the section of tolerant religions, direct (administrative) pressure on it was impossible. There remained funds of an exclusively spiritual nature, to which Orthodox missionary work was directed. Today in the Russian Federation, Buddhism, as well as Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, as well as some other faiths belong to the category of traditional religions, which organizationally operate within the framework of the modern Russian Constitution. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the mission and education of the Korean Orthodox Church in the process of migration and settlement of Koreans in the Primorsky Krai from the 1860s to the 1910s and to discuss the historical background and sociocultural significance of it. This study summarizes the history of Korean maritime migrants in chronological order in the late 19th century. In this study, Russian, Russian-Korean bilingual and Korean translation used by the Russian (...) Orthodox Church were discussed. At the time of the 19th century, the Russian Orthodox Church was the ideological background of the ruling Russian emigration. The Russian orthodox education that Koreans received was the first Western-style education acceptance of Koreans. The Orthodox Church conducted missions and education for Koreans through Russian language education, Korean-Russian bilingual education, and Korean-speaking Korean missions. Koreans accepted sophistication for survival and adjustment in Russia, or spiritual influence, and expressed enthusiasm for education. Russian Orthodox was bilingual, reflecting the dialect used by Koreans in Russia, and standard Korean of Seoul area. Although the educational environment was poor and the political situation was always changing rapidly, the role of the Orthodox Church was great in that it provided opportunities for Koreans to play an active role in the Primorsky Krai by finding out the talents of Koreans through education and by knowing their potentials themselves. (shrink)

It has been said that the Second World War saved the Russian Orthodox Church from extermination. Ever since the Revolution of 1917, the religious peoples of Russia were constantly persecuted by Soviet ideologists and politicians. Prior to Operation Barbarossa, in 1941, it seemed that the days of the Russian Orthodox Church, the largest religious institution in the Soviet Union, were numbered. However, the unique climate of the Second World War forced the Soviet government to end its (...) war against the church. The Kremlin soon saw the Church as a useful tool to help aid in the re- occupation of Eastern Europe. (shrink)

Svitlana Shkil’s article «Reception of meeting Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis in the information space of the Russian Orthodox Church» examined reaction to a meeting of religious leaders in Havana speakers of the three trends in Russian Orthodoxy - conservatives, fundamentalists, liberals. This unprecedented event caused a wide resonance in the Russian information space of the church, caused a broad discussion on the future of Russian Orthodoxy.

The article reveals the peculiarities of the functioning of the canonical structures of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad in the USSR during the era of the collapse of the totalitarian system - 1970-1980.

The author focuses on the topic of “Lipovean-Russian” from Romania, a denomination that he proposes as an alternative to the mainstream one, “Russian- Lipovean”. The author of the paper documents on the history of this ethnic minority, which is also a religious one. In his analysis, the role of the Church is carefully examined, as it shaped the political context in which the Lipovean-Russians lived and their respective cultural life. The author also analyses the differences among different (...) religious branches of this community. (shrink)

Modern Ukrainian society is stratified not only economically, socially, professionally, informally, territorially, politically, historically, but ideologically and experiencedly. Is there something that unites Ukraine today? E. This - the present as a set of cultural and civilization factors and reality as a set of fateful events. The number and intensity of the fateful events for Ukraine in the last 3 years - from November 22, 2013, that is, the first protest against the non-signing of the association with the EU - (...) is abundant. It is not time to sum up, there is a permanent crisis, there is a war, we have a lot of losses, but we have already made our choice. (shrink)

Religion has an essential effect on the development of any society since it impacts religious norms and models of behaviour, establishes priorities and values, influences gender relations, predetermines gender roles, and influences the establishing of certain traditions, laws, and customs. This article is a review of the historic position of the Russian Orthodox Church – the dominant religion in Russia – its past and current status in Russia, and the issues relating to women in Russian socio-cultural and (...) religious community. While there is a lack of research on the Russian Orthodox Church and its influence on Russians and, particularly, Russian women, the increased religiosity in Russia within the last decade requires us to study the Russian Orthodoxy and its impact on people’s lives and its attitude to gender. This article provides a deep analysis of the impact of the Russian Orthodox Church on the image of women in Russia. It has been argued that Russian national character and heritage was formed by the Russian Orthodox Church and the existing gender stereotypes in Russia have been significantly impacted by the Russian Orthodox Church and have mainly been derived from the interpretation of the New Testament by the Russian Orthodoxy and its clergy. Particularly, gender roles and the perception of family, and marriage are understood to be in compliance with the values of the Russian Orthodox faith. For the faith the most important purpose of marriage is the birth and raising of children and the chief responsibility and duty of a woman is to care for her husband and children as these are considered as a way of the woman’s service to society and to God. (shrink)

Since the late 1990s, the Russian Orthodox Church and several mainline Western Protestant churches have been at odds over homosexuality to such an extent that it has turned into a church-dividing issue. This article aims to find new openings for the ecumenical dialogue by examining how the ROC’s negative attitude toward same-sex relations has been influenced by cultural and historic factors. The analysis focuses on the affective dimension of the ROC’s discourse on homosexuality in important social documents (...) and public speeches. The methodology applied is taken from affect studies. The rhetoric of the ecclesial texts recalls ‘shadows from the gulag’ and frightening memories of the chaos of the 1990s, and functions to create an imagined national, moral and religious community – the ‘Russian Christian civilization’ – which is characterized by masculine heterosexuality. Religious concepts tend to become subordinate to the affective politics of the discourse. In conclusion, the author proposes that ecumenical partners continue with a profound theological discussion on human sexuality in all its diversity and complexity, and clarify to each other how understandings of basic theological notions such as human dignity and freedom have also been shaped by formative historic experiences. Furthermore, ecclesiological debates should address, at a fundamental level, the relationship between Christian community and the freedom ‘to be different.’. (shrink)

The article highlights the causes and consequences of the transformations cult-ritual practices of the Greek Uniate Church on the territory of the Right-Bank Ukraine on the eve of its accession to the Russian Orthodox Church.

The task of this article is to clarify the appropriateness and adequacy of peace-making (confessional) rhetoric in the situation of the war of aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, in particular, the meaningful correspondence of the concept of «peace» in its application or reading by the bearers of different worldview paradigms. The «russkii mir» cannot be translated either as «Russian peace» or as «Russian world». This is because the scope and content of these concepts are different. (...) Rus (Kyiv`s Rus) — a thousand-year-old princely state with its center in Kyiv, where the ancestors of modern Ukrainians lived, baptized by Prince Volodymyr in 988. Rus is not Russia. But Muscovy adopted the name Russia to derive its historiography from Rus. «Russkii mir» actually refutes the axiological principles laid down by ancient Rus’s civilization (freedom, dignity, partnership, co-creation, mutual responsibility). «Russkii mir» destroys peace in global or any local images, trying to grab the territory it decided to own. «Russkii mir» encroaches on world domination and therefore tries to impose its rules of the game on the world, which would reshape the world structure according to the wishes of the Russian dictators. For this, «russkii mir» uses any means and institutions as a tool: the army, weapons of mass destruction, atrocities, terror, lies, propaganda, the church and peace-making rhetoric. The goal is not to restore peace, but to establish the world domination of the Russian Empire in any of its variants (Muscovy, Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation or Orthodox Civilization). Russian Orthodox Church plays a leading role in this — it uses religious rhetoric to formu- late a worldview model of the «russkii mir», consolidates the Russian population for a war of aggression, and justifies the atrocities of the Russian military with the sacred mission of restoring the Holy Rus’. Russian Orthodox Church justifies the «civilizing mission» of the Russian troops, actually calls to protect «our Common Russian Fatherland» by killing Ukrainians on the territo- ry of Ukraine. False messianism, manichaeism, paternalism, hatred of the civilized world that lives by democratic standards and respects the dignity and freedom of the individual, Russian arrogance, conceit, supremacy and egomania — this is what Russian Orthodoxy promotes with its religious rhetoric. Therefore, if we hear calls for «peace» from the bearer of the «russkii mir»’s worldview, it actually means a demand to come to terms with all their whims, to give up one’s own identity, one’s own world, one’s own life, if they do not fit into the concept of «russkii mir». (shrink)

The trial of Galileo remains a representative example of the alleged incompatibility between science and religion as well as a suggestive case study of the relationship between them from the Western historical and methodological perspective. However, the Eastern Christian view has not been explored to a significant extent. In this article, the author considers relevant aspects of the reception of the teaching of Copernicus and Galileo in Russian culture, especially in the works of scientists. Whereas in prerevolutionary Russia Galileo (...) was considered a symbol of the unity of science and religion, in the Soviet period his name and especially his trial was largely used for atheistic propaganda purposes. The author discusses the most recent debate in the Russian Orthodox milieu. The second part is dedicated to the presence of Galileo in Russian religious philosophy, especially in the thought of Gregory Skovoroda, Ivan Kireyevsky, and Sergey Glagolev. Finally, the relation of the Russian Orthodox Church to the teaching of Galileo is considered. (shrink)

Professor Zenkovsky's work is a history in the grand manner --and a grand history it is. We are much indebted to Dr. George Kline for his lucid, readable translation. Our historian takes the basic theme of Russian thought to have been the relations of Christianity and secularism. This does not mean that there has been a dearth of studies in logic, philosophy of science, and so on; or that Zenkovsky neglects these or treats them unfairly or unintelligently. But his (...) belief is that "the genuinely vital creative problems of philosophic reflection derive from the Christian gospel and hence cannot be resolved apart from it." In the West, however, it has, he thinks, been difficult to see this because freedom of investigation has there become identified with opposition to the Church, while in Russia it has been possible to defend such freedom "from the religious point of view, taking the ecclesiastical tradition as point of departure, and giving oneself up fully to the 'free spontaneous force of theological investigation,' in Karsavin's familiar expression." The Russian view of the Church, as set forth by Khomyakov and Kireyevski, a hundred years ago, is not that of an "authority" wielded by officials or even councils, but of a community of members forming a spiritual organism in which they reach a level of life involving integral experience of the nature of reality. Ecclesiastical coercion, as in the West, is viewed as a heresy. Faith calls us to a life of freedom, rather than of "obedience." Zenkovsky regards as "romantic" the notion of a generally diffused spiritual insight which would make all important truths perfectly evident, but he seems to agree with the rejection of coercion. (shrink)

The polemical literature of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, comprehensively covering the issue of unification, had already outlined most of the important issues surrounding the transition of part of the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy to the union with Rome. However, their resolution raises a lot of controversy and ambiguous estimates of this controversial event. Therefore, actualization of this problem in modern science is a natural phenomenon. Today, as V. Shevchenko rightly points out, “the passionate relevance of the unified issue (...) has already acquired the importance of historical urgency”. In addition, the role of the two most influential dioceses of the Kyiv Metropolitanate, Lviv and Peremyshka, which actually defined the fate of both Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Ukrainian Greek Catholicism, has not yet been properly considered and objectively assessed in these processes. (shrink)

The modern theory of computability is based on the works of Church, Markov and Turing who, starting from quite different models of computation, arrived at the same class of computable functions. The purpose of this paper is the show how the main results of the Church-Markov-Turing theory of computable functions may quickly be derived and understood without recourse to the largely irrelevant theories of recursive functions, Markov algorithms, or Turing machines. We do this by ignoring the problem of (...) what constitutes a computable function and concentrating on the central feature of the Church-Markov-Turing theory: that the set of computable partial functions can be effectively enumerated. In this manner we are led directly to the heart of the theory of computability without having to fuss about what a computable function is.The spirit of this approach is similar to that of [RGRS]. A major difference is that we operate in the context of constructive mathematics in the sense of Bishop [BSH1], so all functions are computable by definition, and the phrase “you can find” implies “by a finite calculation.” In particular ifPis some property, then the statement “for eachmthere isnsuch thatP” means that we can construct a functionθsuch thatP)for allm. Church's thesis has a different flavor in an environment like this where the notion of a computable function is primitive.One point of such a treatment of Church's thesis is to make available to Bishopstyle constructivists the Markovian counterexamples of Russian constructivism and recursive function theory. The lack of serious candidates for computable functions other than recursive functions makes it quite implausible that a Bishopstyle constructivist could refute Church's thesis, or any consequence of Church's thesis. Hence counterexamples such as Specker's bounded increasing sequence of rational numbers that is eventually bounded away from any given real number [SPEC] may be used, as Brouwerian counterexamples are, as evidence of the unprovability of certain assertions. (shrink)

Eastern Churches in Russia and Ukraine are facing the fratricidal war caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. These Churches maintain closeness in faith and liturgy. The similarities of these Churches’ teachings on war are juxtaposed with actual manifestations of their hierarchs’ hostility. The analysis will be carried out from the perspective of the Roman Catholic Church, which is in close unity with the Eastern Churches and understands the context of faith but is not a party to the conflict, which (...) makes it easier to remain objective in examining the phenomenon of fratricide. The first part of the article analyses the doctrinal and historical context. It helps to isolate the factors influencing the existence of enmity between doctrinally close Churches. The second part presents the biblical inspiration of Cain and Abel's story in a search for new ways to counteract this phenomenon. (shrink)

The status of the Greek Uniate Church on the eve of the division of the Commonwealth was characterized by the institutional design and ordering of the internal church mechanism, centralized management and the integrity of the hierarchical structure, the presence of a multimillion parochial flock and a powerful network of monastic cells, the acquisition of significant economic potential, in particular, the church monastic land tenure, for the conclusion that the entire church body is quite stable. Created (...) by the efforts of the intellectual core of the Greco-Uniate Church - the Order of St. Basil the Great - a multicomponent system of educational institutions, as well as publishing centers have made a significant contribution to the cultivation of national culture. Thus, for a long time, this Church not only played the role of a kind of ethnoconservant of the culture of the autochthonous population of the Right-Bank Ukraine, retained the dominant elements of its ethnic attributes, but also joined and united its elite with the European spiritual and cultural space. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the revision of the classical thesis concerning secularism the progressive domination of the discussion around the issue of the civil society. These two poles facilitated the development of a series of historiographic approaches that particularly touched on the areas of Eastern and Southeastern Europeís history. Here we are concerned with three central cases of historiographic discourseís production, as indicators of the dominant ìparadigmîís change: the first concerns the role of the Russian church in the (...) pre-Revolutionary period; the second, the issue of secularization and its relations with Islam in the Ottoman Empire; and finally the third, the problem of internal fragmentation of the Orthodox millet with the establishment of Greek autocephalus Church in 1833 and (self-sufficiency) and later the Bulgarian Exarchate. These new approaches were intended to solve various long-standing problems and for the most part resulted in solutions within existing opposites of historiographic schools of thought. (shrink)

One of the interesting aspects of Russian self‐definition in opposition to the West is its attitude toward Western science. Russian distrust of scientific and technological progress in the West is an important force shaping contemporary Russian identity. This article touches on these issues in four parts. The first section characterizes two main conservative circles that are active in today's disputes over the significance of scientific development for Russian identity. The second demonstrates certain Russian contemporary concerns (...) related to scientific and technological progress, which will enable us to explain the position of the Russian Orthodox Church. The third section presents the political, religious, and identity context for the suspicion toward science expressed by Russian conservatives. The final section, on the other hand, discusses the way in which Russian Orthodox neoconservatism uses Orthodox anthropology to raise suspicion toward scientific and technological achievements. (shrink)

In today's conditions, the heavy resistance of Ukrainians to Russian aggression, which is carried out, with the exception of the military, by way of information and economic methods, and now also through a non-gossip "hybrid" confrontation, it is very important to properly evaluate and play an appropriate role in this religious and religious factor. "Russian World" is no less effective weapon of the Moscow Church in the war with Ukraine than the military aid of the Russian (...) state to the separatists.. Religious communities have their potential in educating citizens - patriots of their homeland, or else. Different aspects of the problem of the role of religious-church factors in patriotic education of Ukrainians have long been in the zone of justified attention of domestic secular scholars and representatives of the Churches, among them: A. Kolodny, L. Filippovich, V. Shevchenko, P. Pavlenko, O. Sagan, C. Zdioruk, M. Cherenkov, O. Tuyeshin and others. Particular attention of the RCC and Protestant Churches in this regard was given by P. L. Yarotsky. (shrink)

Known today mostly as an author of Romantic short stories and fairy tales for children, Prince Vladimir Odoyevskiy was a distinguished thinker of his time, philosopher and bibliophile. The scope of his interests includes also history of magic arts and alchemy, German Romanticism, Church music. An attempt to understand the peculiarity of eight specific modes used in chants of Russian Orthodox Church led him to his own musical theory based upon well-known writings by Zarlino, Leibniz, Euler, Prony. (...) He realized his theoretical ideas in an enharmonical piano with nineteen notes for every octave. His call for a different musical scale remained largely ignored in the nineteenth century, until the topic was raised anew by twentieth-century composers and musicians. (shrink)

Path dependency is a most valuable tool for understanding Russian history since 1480, which coincides with the ending of the “Mongol yoke,” Moscow’s annexation of northwest Russia, formerly controlled by Novgorod, and the introduction of a new method for financing the cavalry—the core of a new service class. The cavalry had to hold off formidable adversaries for Muscovy to retain its independence. Russia in 1480 was a poor country lacking subsurface mineral resources and with a very poor climate and (...) soil for the support of agriculture. These basic problems inspired autocratic power and by 1515 an ideology was in place justifying it. Religion, literature, and law were employed to support the autocracy. A variant of a caste society was created to support the army. This made up the substance of the first service-class revolution in which all resources were mobilized to support a garrison state. After 1667 the external threats to Muscovy diminished, but the service class kept its privileges, especially the land fund and the peasant-serfs. Russia faced major foreign threats again in 1700 and in the 1920s and 1930s. Those threats precipitated the second and third service-class revolutions. The second and third service-class revolutions broadly paralleled the first. Reinvigorated service classes were created with state institutions to support them. As society became more complex, so did the service classes and their privileges. Ideologies were converted into devices to support the infallible autocratic ruler and his elites. Almost the entire population was bound to state service, either directly, working to support the service state, or paying taxes. The church and clergy were harnessed first by Peter’s Holy Synod and then Stalin’s Department 5 of the Secret Police after he revived the church during World War II. Writers and artists were also put into uniform, until they finally rebelled—but the arts retained their civic functions, first supporting the regime, and then criticizing it. Finally, law retained its traditional programmatic functions in regimes themselves beholden to no law. As the foreign threats diminished, the service classes lost their function, but the elite servicemen kept their privileges as the service states disintegrated and the service classes lost their collective élan. Both the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Empire collapsed almost without a whimper. (shrink)

Many Slavists will be familiar with Pål Kolstø as a scholar of nation-building and ethnic conflict in the post-Soviet space. Heretical Orthodoxy represents a return to his early, doctoral research...

Vladimir Solov’ëv, Sergej Bulgakov, Nikolaj Berdjaev, and Semën Frank shared the conviction that Creation is incomplete: humanity must arrive at organizing social life on an “eighth day.” Thus they prophesied the Universal Church, “social Christianity,” “personalist socialism,” and “spiritual democracy.” Their attempt to avoid any illegitimate confusion between independent rational thought and Christian faith prompted Bulgakov to become an ordained theologian, Berdjaev a “philosophical poet,” and Frank a “Christian realist.” Solov’ëv’s theosophical attempt to philosophically substantiate faith and consequently eschatological (...) prophecy finds itself in the same tragic predicament as Christian faith in general when amalgamated on a one to one basis with the world. I am to show that this is not the case for any of the three other authors discussed, however, much they did adhere to some of Solov’ëv’s major lines of thought. (shrink)

A rather variegated palette of modern functionalities of denominations both in the world as a whole, and in Ukraine, in particular, is determined by the urgent needs of society. Along with purely traditional religious and religious organizations, such functions that are called in time in one or another community are appearing or reviving. In Ukraine, today the actualization of such functions of the Churches that are most invited in the difficult conditions of external aggression and internal internal problems are being (...) observed. Among them, almost the first place was the function of patriotic education, which prompted scholars to pay special attention to this. The urgency of studying the role of the religious-church factor in patriotic education does not require long proof in the face of the heavy resistance of Ukraine to the bulk of the "Russian world", now not only information, spiritual and cultural, but also in the form of military aggression that has gained insidious forms of undeclared "hybrid warfare" ». (shrink)

In Modern Standard Russian, the prefix/preposition pair u-/u is peculiar with respect to other similar pairs, due to the meaning mismatch between the two. While the prefix u- has an ablative meaning, as shown when it is prefixed to motion verbs, the prepositional phrase u+gen occurs in locative constructions, and other related constructions, such as predicative possession that is expressed via the cross-linguistically common Locative Schema. Etymological considerations show that the meaning preserved by the prefix is older. The only (...) type of occurrence which, according to the literature, preserves the ablative meaning for the u+gen construction is found with verbs of requesting, removing, and buying. Notably, however, in other Slavic languages putative ablative contexts are limited to verbs of requesting. Data from MSR, Old Church Slavic, Polish and Czech lead to the conclusion that the extension of the u+gen construction to verbs of removing in MSR is based on its use for the encoding of predicative possession. Extension to verbs of buying is better explained through the locative meaning of the construction. As a result of different developments, the u+gen construction has become part of the argument structure of a group of verbs including verbs of asking and requesting, verbs of removing, and verbs of buying, which are characterized by the common feature of taking human non-recipient third arguments. We argue that the different usages of the u+gen construction in MSR constitute an instance of constructionalization based on the merger of originally different constructions. We further argue that accounting for this development in constructional terms offers better insights in the relation among the various different usages of u+gen than simply focusing on the meaning of the preposition and its polysemy pattern. (shrink)