The key work of the early Johann Gottlieb Fichte is the Grundlage ser gesammten Wissenschaftslehre [Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Science] of 1794-95. The very circumstances of its publication ensure that it is a rather terse and disjointed statement of Fichtean philosophy. It consists of a very short preface, a “famous” section devoted to first principles, the so-called “basic propositions of the entire doctrine of science,” and eight discourses of widely diverging length. The first discourse, devoted to the “theoretical” (...) Wissenschaftslehre is one and a half times the length of the other seven. The third, fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth are barely a few pages long. It is an extremely peculiar work and not merely due to the circumstances of its publication. Its very argumentative structure threatens to trap the reader in forming hasty and preliminary judgements on the exact nature of the philosophical claims being made, and, quite specifically, those philosophical claims which might be ascribed to the author himself. The following contends that lack of attention to the structure of a work that, admittedly, exhibits very little in an overt fashion has led to wholesale confusion about the early system and its philosophical intent. Specifically, that too much attention has been paid to the famous section on grounding principles, and, furthermore, that attention only to these sections will lead to fundamental confusion and misunderstanding. This paper will attempt to examine this peculiar Fichtean text via the readings made by Dieter Henrich and Frederick Neuhouser, respectively. (shrink)

Behavioural evidence suggests that cephalopod molluscs may have a form of primary consciousness. First, the linkage of brain to behaviour seen in lateralization, sleep and through a developmental context is similar to that of mammals and birds. Second, cephalopods, especially octopuses, are heavily dependent on learning in response to both visual and tactile cues, and may have domain generality and form simple concepts. Third, these animals are aware of their position, both within themselves and in larger space, including having a (...) working memory of foraging areas in the recent past. Thus if using a ‘global workspace’ which evaluates memory input and focuses attention is the criterion, cephalopods appear to have primary consciousness. (shrink)

This accessible introduction to formal, and especially Montague, semantics within a linguistic framework, presupposes no previous background in logic, but takes students step-by-step from simple predicate/argument structures and their interpretation to Montague's intentional logic.

The Liezi is the forgotten classic of Daoism. Along with the Laozi (Daodejing) and the Zhuangzi, it's been considered a Daoist masterwork since the mid-eighth century, yet unlike those well-read works, the Liezi is little known and receives scant scholarly attention. Nevertheless, the Liezi is an important text that sheds valuable light on the early history of Daoism, particularly the formative period of sectarian Daoism. We do not know exactly what shape the original text took, but what remains is replete (...) with fantastic characters, whimsical tales, paradoxical aphorisms, and philosophically sophisticated reflection on the nature of the world and humanity's place within it. Ultimately, the Liezi sees the world as one of change and indeterminacy. Arguing for the Liezi's historical, philosophical, and literary significance, the contributors to this volume offer a fresh look at this text, using contemporary approaches and providing novel insights. The volume is unique in its attention to both philosophical and religious perspectives. (shrink)

The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been a problem since its founding days. A large contribution to the discussion of possible interpretations of quantum mechanics is given by the so-called impossibility proofs for hidden variable models; models that allow a realist interpretation. In this thesis some of these proofs are discussed, like von Neumann’s Theorem, the Kochen-Specker Theorem and the Bell-inequalities. Some more recent developments are also investigated, like Meyer’s nullification of the Kochen-Specker Theorem, the MKC-models and Conway and Kochen’s (...) Free Will Theorem. This last one is taken to suggest that the problems that arise for certain interpretations of quantum mechanics are not limited to realist interpretations only, but also affect certain instrumentalist interpretations. It is argued that one may arrive at a more satisfying interpretation of quantum mechanics if one adopts a logic that seems more compatible with the instrumentalist viewpoint namely, intuitionistic logic. The motivations for adopting this form of logic rather than classical logic or quantum logic are linked to some of the philosophical ideas of Bohr. In particular a new interpretation of Bohr’s notion of complementarity is proposed. Finally some possibilities are explored for linking the intuitionistic interpretation of quantum mechanics to the mathematical formalism of the theory. (shrink)

In response to an accusation of having said something inappropriate, the accused may exploit the difference between the explicit contents of their utterance and its implicatures. Widely discussed in the pragmatics literature are those cases in which arguers accept accountability only for the explicit contents of what they said while denying commitment to the implicature. In this paper, we sketch a fuller picture of commitment denial. We do so, first, by including in our discussion not just denial of implicatures, but (...) also the mirror strategy of denying commitment to literal meaning and, second, by classifying strategies for commitment denial in terms of classical rhetorical status theory. In addition to providing a systematic categorization of our data, this approach offers some clues to determine when such a defence strategy is a reasonable one and when it is not. (shrink)

Sethi (2020) attempts to show that even if we keep Price’s intuition: the claim that having an experience as of an F make us aware of an instance of Fness, we can still block the Argument from Hallucination, and so reject the conclusion that we are aware of mind-dependent rather than mind-independent items when we undergo successful perceptions. In an attempt to demonstrate this, she formulates the Argument from Hallucination so that it relies on the principle that if the existence (...) of a neural state is sufficient for the existence of a property-instance, that property-instance is mind-dependent. I show how to reformulate the argument to avoid reliance on this, thus demonstrating against Sethi that it is possible to argue from acceptance of Price’s intuition to the claim that the items we’re directly aware of in the successful perceptual case are mind-dependent. (shrink)

Kensinger (2009) and Mather (2007) both argue that intrinsic features of emotional items are remembered better than intrinsic features of non-emotional items. However, Kensinger attributes these effects to negative valence whereas Mather attributes them to arousal. In this paper, we note several reasons why arousal may be the driving factor even when a study reveals more detailed memory for negative items than for positive items. We also reanalyze previous data (Mather & Nesmith, 2008) to show that although (...) both arousal and negative valence were correlated with memory accuracy, enhanced memory accuracy was accounted for by arousal rather than valence. (shrink)

Kammerer and Frankish (this issue) suggest we evaluate introspection of mental states to examine consciousness, but in cephalopods we can only judge internal actions by behaviour output. We can look for mental states — perceptions, beliefs, and intentions — where the tight input–action linkage that is true for reflexes, instincts, and well-learned actions is discontinuous. Here the animal is internally evaluating the sensory input from previous information and making a decision before acting. Perceptions: the octopus motion parallax head bob and (...) wound tending. Beliefs: the cuttlefish delay of gratification. Intentions: use of previous information for future strategies in octopus win-switch foraging and carrying a coconut for future shelter. Intentions are also used in skin displays, their widespread directional lateralization, the octopus 'passing cloud' to startle an immobile prey, the cuttlefish eyespot dot production to repel only visual predators, and the cuttlefish males' deceptive use of the female skin display. These examples allow us to assume in what situations introspection might be used but tell us little about the process of these actions. However, the quantitative variation, laterality, and combination of different displays suggest that cephalopod sexual skin displays are a special case of linkage of internal evaluation to external output that needs further behavioural and neurophysiological assessment. (shrink)

This paper was read at the First Conference of the ISSEI, ‘Turning Points in History’, 26–30 September 1988, Amsterdam. It pertains to theme 2, ‘popular and Elite Culture’.

This paper queries why we are more reluctant to perform stem cell research on human than on nonhuman embryos, given their remarkable similarities together with the former's greater promise for addressing human illnesses. I begin by examining two leading arguments for prohibiting stem cell research on human embryos. The first type of argument suggests that we should not interfere with the potential for human life. This argument, advanced in different ways by both utilitarians and religious believers, inadequately grapples with the (...) moral complexities raised by current technologies, such as IVF and cloning. Moreover, it fails to address the significant adverse effects of human overpopulation to both human and nonhuman well-being. The second line of argument addressed here suggests that we are morally prohibited from "playing God." This argument overlooks the various ways in which we do—indeed, we must—make life and death decisions. Further, the argument rests on an undefended assumption that we are only prohibited from making such decisions with regard to human life, while remaining free to make such decisions with regard to animals without apparent moral qualms. On the contrary, I argue that, from a fully ethical Darwinian standpoint, we must treat both human and nonhuman life with respect. Far from requiring us to abstain from difficult moral decision making, an attitude of respect toward all life requires human willingness to take responsibility for making difficult—indeed, sometimes excruciating—moral decisions. (shrink)

The use of probability theory is widespread in our daily life as well as in scientific theories. In virtually all cases, calculations can be carried out within the framework of classical probability theory. A special exception is given by quantum mechanics, which gives rise to a new probability theory: quantum probability theory. This dissertation deals with the question of how this formalism can be understood from a philosophical and physical perspective. The dissertation is divided into three parts. In the first (...) part, the formalism of quantum probability theory and its relation to quantum mechanics is presented. The second part considers the possibility of reformulating quantum probability theory to embed it within classical probability. Mathematically, this possibility overlaps with the possibility of the existence of hidden variables theories of quantum mechanics: theories that attempt to solve fundamental problems in quantum mechanics by introducing additional physical properties of systems. The conclusion of this part is that, although classical reformulations of quantum probability theory are formally possible, they offer little insight into the formalism of quantum probability theory itself. The third part regards a more direct investigation of quantum probability theory. A reformulation of quantum probability theory is obtained by constructing a quantum logic on the basis of empirical non-probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics. In this reformulation quantum probability functions are conditional probability functions on an algebra of propositions about measurements and measurement outcomes. (shrink)

This essay is an overview of the role of Heaven in Daoist religious thought prior to the Tang Dynasty. Lao-Zhuang teachings portray Heaven as helper of the perfected person, who has parted with the human and thereby evinces a heavenly light. The Huainanzi compares possessing Heaven’s Heart to leaning on an unbudgeable pillar and drawing on an inexhaustible storehouse, enabling one to shed mere humanity as a snake discards its skin. The Heguanzi homologizes Heaven and Taiyi and by the Six (...) Dynasties period some Daoist canonical sources give the face of Laojun to Heaven/Taiyi, increasing the anthropomorphization of Heaven. (shrink)

The recent turn to discursive psychology has prompted an increasing interest in the work of Michel Foucault, particularly with relation to debates on the possibility and nature of ‘discourse analysis’. This variant of discourse analysis has generally emphasized the utility of Foucauldian insights in critiquing existent psychological practices as a manifestation of the proliferation of disciplinary forms in Western society. This utility may have been dramatically over-stated. Key concepts such as discursive practices and power are inextricably linked to theoretical frameworks (...) that radically resist any ad hoc importation into critical practice. Furthermore, they may be antithetical to the kind of reflexive critique promulgated by critical psychology itself. However, the later Foucault’s partial retreat from the disciplinary containment of subjectivity only promises to trap critical psychology in the agency/structure hiatus that has so bedevilled 20th-century sociological theory. Foucauldian critical psychology may be a dead end. (shrink)

In two papers, Ned Block has argued that representationalists have trouble with the empirical discovery that differences in the degree of visual attention to an object can lead to a difference in h...

A well known logical loophole for Bell’s theorem is that it relies on setting independence: the assumption that the state of a system is independent of the settings of a measurement apparatus probing the system. In this paper the implications of rejecting this assumption are studied from an operationalist perspective. To this end a generalization of the ontic models framework is proposed that allows setting dependence. It is shown that within this framework Bell’s theorem reduces to the conclusion that no-signaling (...) requires randomness at the epistemic level even if the underlying ontology is taken to be deterministic. The ideas underlying the framework are further used to defend setting dependence against the charges of being incompatible with free will and scientific methodology. The paper ends however with the sketch of a new problem for setting dependence: a necessary gap between the ontic and the epistemic level that may prevent the formulation of a successful setting dependent theory. (shrink)

The dualistic structures permeating western culture emphasize radical discontinuity between humans and nonhumans, but receptive attention to nonhuman others discloses both continuity and difference prevailing between other forms of life and our own. Recognizing that agency and subjectivity abound within nature alerts us to our potential for dominating and oppressing nonhuman others, as individuals and as groups. Reciprocally, seeing ourselves as biological beings may facilitate reconstructing our social reality to undo such destructive relationships.

With increasing appreciation that the Y2K problem may turn out to have unpredictable and potentially far-reaching effects, we are faced with what in some ways resembles the looming global ecological crisis, only this time what is at stake are not vital ecosystem services but rather the vital structures of our highly complex socially constructed reality—and this time we have a date-certain deadline for the onset of the crisis. Regardless of what actually happens when the calendar turns from 1999 to 2000, (...) this period of waiting for the millennium bug can be a productive one if it induces some of us to contemplate what things we actually depend upon to sustain our lives and, utilizing John Searle's analysis, in what ways we might reconstruct our social reality if faced with the opportunity—and why we haven't begun to do so sooner. (shrink)

In this article von Neumann’s proposal that in quantum mechanics projections can be seen as propositions is followed. However, the quantum logic derived by Birkhoff and von Neumann is rejected due to the failure of the law of distributivity. The options for constructing a distributive logic while adhering to von Neumann’s proposal are investigated. This is done by rejecting the converse of the proposal, namely, that propositions can always be seen as projections. The result is a weakly Heyting algebra for (...) describing the language of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In recent years, academic research in many fields in the humanities has focused on the various cultural strategies by which knowledge is produced. Such strategies, ranging from epistemic to aesthetic practices, may be designed to validate and reinforce such knowledge, or, on the contrary, to discredit it. Thus, the production of knowledge is always part of a series of complex dynamics, evolving from the varying attempts to affirm or reject it. Within an interdisciplinary scope, the present volume brings together twelve (...) case studies, ranging from the medieval to the early modern period, which focus precisely on these dynamics. (shrink)

This collection will appeal to scholars and students of social and legal theory, visual culture, justice and governance studies, media studies, and criminology.

Of all the memorable, and influential, passages of the Phänomenologie des Geistes none are more famous or enjoyed greater attention than those sections devoted to the master-slave dialectic. It would seem almost inconceivable then that anything would be left to say concerning Hegel's martial struggle, the sheer number of illustrious scholars who have commented on this text bearing ample testimony to the probable redundancy of further comment. However, in actual fact, this is not the case. Indeed, it is probable that (...) Hegel is addressing and utilising not a theory of recognition but rather two quite distinct concepts of recognition. The appropriate passages are of course the master-slave section itself and the rather oblique references to the »confession« of one consciousness to another at the end of chapter six. Commentators have generally been in agreement that the master-slave section marks the beginning of Hegel's theory of recognition; that is, that the continuation of the treatment of recognition in chapter six marks a further development of the concept formulated in chapter four - a further development seemingly promised by Hegel himself - »With this, we already have before us the notion of spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what spirit is«. However the preceding is interpreted, the reader is surely right to recognize that something has been »won«, the triumphalist language being repeated in the following »[it is] in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present«. However, this triumph may have been misunderstood. The theory of recognition referred to in the master-slave dialectic may have been a »turning-point«, a new beginning, but it was a new beginning that was soon realised to be a dead-end. The following will attempt to demonstrate that there is a quite radical discontinuity at the heart of the concept of recognition itself, a discontinuity that can be traced to its origins in the Fichtean system itself. For the master-slave dialectic is »Fichte's wake« - it is at once a celebration and a mourning for the first concept of recognition, the unworkability of which heralded a truly new beginning. That is, the concept of recognition outlined in the Einige Vorlesungen uber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten. The second concept of recognition, that of the Grundlage des Naturrechts cannot be reckoned a further development or emendation of the first concept, its quite peculiar status, and philosophical importance as a »spiritual concept«, precluding any such treatment. The latter concept may mark the birth of Hegelian or speculative idealism itself. It is the contention of the following that understanding this quite radical discontinuity will fashion a better understanding of the connection between transcendental and speculative philosophy, the point of transition or sublation. (shrink)

1. Lying -- 2. The problem of what is said -- 3. What is said -- 4. Is lying worse than merely misleading? -- 5. Some interesting cases.