Concerns about the risks of unmitigated greenhouse gas emissions are growing. At the same time, confidence that international policy agreements will succeed in considerably lowering anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions is declining. Perhaps as a result, various geoengineering solutions are gaining attention and credibility as a way to manage climate change. Serious consideration is currently being given to proposals to cool the planet through solar-radiation management. Here we analyze how the unique and nontrivial risks of geoengineering strategies pose fundamental questions at (...) the interface between science and ethics. To illustrate the importance of integrated ethical and scientific analysis, we define key open questions and outline a coupled scientific-ethical research agenda to analyze solar-radiation management geoengineering proposals. We identify nine key fields of coupled research including whether solar-radiation management can be tested, how quickly learning could occur, normative decisions embedded in how different climate trajectories are valued, and justice issues regarding distribution of the harms and benefits of geoengineering. To ensure that ethical analyses are coupled with scientific analyses of this form of geoengineering, we advocate that funding agencies recognize the essential nature of this coupled research by establishing an Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications program for solar-radiation management. (shrink)

Samuel Scheffler defends “The Afterlife Conjecture”: the view that the continued existence of humanity after our deaths—“the afterlife”—lies in the background of our valuing; were we to lose confidence in it, many of the projects we engage in would lose their meaning. The Afterlife Conjecture, in his view, also brings out the limits of our egoism, showing that we care more about yet unborn strangers than about personal survival. But why does the afterlife itself matter to us? Examination of Scheffler’s (...) second argument helps answer this question, thereby undermining his argument. Our concern for the afterlife involves bootstrapping: we care more about the afterlife than about personal survival precisely because the latter has such salient limits that our lives are structured by adaptation to mortality, and it is only because the afterlife does provide a measure of personal survival that it can give meaning to our projects. (shrink)

Nauka o středu představuje jeden ze stěžejních pilířů Aristotelovy etiky a je úzce provázána s jeho pojetím etických zdatností. Ty jsou podle Aristotela flexibilní s ohledem na kontext praktické situace. Pojetí statečnosti se však od ostatních etických zdatností liší. Předně je zde problém dvou emocí, které Aristotelés přisuzuje zdatnosti statečnosti. Dále omezuje její oblast výhradně na válečnictví. Toto paradigma válečnictví má pak za následek, že statečnost postrádá flexibilitu etických zdatností a stává se rigidní. Tyto klíčové prvky ohrožují plausibilitu a koherenci (...) Aristotelovy nauky o středu. Chyba ovšem není v nauce o středu jako takové, ale chyby se dopouští sám Aristotelés nesprávnou aplikací nauky o středu na statečnost. (shrink)

Teksty są co najmniej w dwójnasób transcendentne. Z jednej strony poprzez język, tworzywo tekstu, który konstytuując się w diachronii i funkcjonując w synchronii, transcenduje – żeby użyć sformułowania Karla Jaspersa – przeszłą rzeczywistość w postaci powstałych wtedy znaków i ich znaczeń w nieznaną z tamtej perspektywy przyszłość, a więc i w naszą teraźniejszość. Z drugiej zaś istniejące już teksty wchodzą z sobą w interakcję, co powoduje, że tworzą się niejako hiperteksty w czasie i w przestrzeni. Jest jeszcze i trzeci wymiar (...) – to autor tekstu i czytelnik, którym tekst pozwala – jak mówi Gerhard Kurz – wyjść „poza siebie”, bo tylko wtedy odczuwamy potrzebę powrotu do „własnego ja”, odrzucając po drodze kolejną maskę. W artykule pokazano to na przykładzie tekstów Franza Kafki. Spośród wielu poruszonych tam wątków ograniczmy się tutaj jedynie do toposu syren, które zniewalały żeglarzy swym śpiewem. U Kafki syreny już definitywnie nie śpiewają, wobec czego Odyseusz niepotrzebnie kazał zatykać sobie uszy woskiem. Kafka stawia tylko kropkę nad i, bo już i we wcześniejszej literaturze niemieckiej ten śpiew cichł coraz bardziej. I tak w znanej pieśni Heinego Loreley poeta już nie jest pewny skuteczności śpiewu syren – on jedynie chce w to wierzyć: „Wierzę, że fale w końcu pochłoną i żeglarza i łódź”. Bo w czasach nihilizmu śpiew – i sztuka w ogóle – traci swą moc. W balladzie Rybak Goethego syrena wprawdzie jeszcze tryumfuje, ale to nie za sprawą śpiewu. Śpiew bowiem dominuje w drugiej zwrotce, natomiast rybak pogrąża się w odmętach morza dopiero w czwartej zwrotce, gdzie dominuje perswazja słowna. Ta inwersja – notabene brak jej w polskim tłumaczeniu Hanny Januszewskiej w Dziełach wybranych J. W. Goethego – nie mogła być u Goethego przypadkowa: symbolizuje ona typową dla lustrzanego odbicia odwróconą proporcję – rybak tak naprawdę ujrzał własne odbicie w wodzie, biorąc je za postać syreny. Śmierć w odmętach morza była ceną za brak samowiedzy. Nie darmo zatem napis na świątyni Apollina w Delfach głosił: „Γνῶθι σεαυτόν – Poznaj samego siebie”. (shrink)

John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy as Experience.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 6 Seiten: 1001-1021.

Narrative views of agency and identity arise in opposition to reductionism in both domains. While reductionists understand both identity and agency in terms of their components, narrativists respond that life and action are both constituted by narratives, and since the components of a narrative gain their meaning from the whole, life and action not only incorporate their constituent parts but also shape them. I first lay out the difficulties with treating narrative as constitutive of metaphysical identity and turn to its (...) function in practical identity. I then explore the ways narrative shapes our agency—by tapping into our motivational structures, providing an understanding of the social background within which our agency operates, guiding our agency through an understanding of our histories and aspirations, providing the links that structure actions internally, and allowing us to change the meaning of our pasts. I suggest that putting these functions of narrative together may allow us to genuinely shape our past motivational structures through our actions. Finally, if life has the form of a narrative, it may seem as if mortality is necessary for our lives and their contents to be meaningful: a narrative, it might seem, relies on the ending for its meaning. If so, an immortal life would be meaningless. I examine the possibility that even an immortal life may draw meaning from local narratives that constitute projects within such a life, while arguing that, to the contrary, narrative may be a tool exclusively adapted to mortal lives. (shrink)

We find meaning and value in our lives by engaging in everyday projects. But, according to a recent argument by Samuel Scheffler, this value doesn’t depend merely on what the projects are about. In many cases, it depends also on the future generations that will replace us. By imagining the imminent extinction of humanity soon after our own deaths, we can recognize both that much of our current valuing depends on a background confidence in the ongoing survival of humanity and (...) that the survival and flourishing of those future generations matters to us. After presenting Scheffler’s argument, I will explore two twentieth century precursors—Hans Morgenthau and Simone de Beauvoir—before returning to Scheffler to see that his argument can not only show us why future generations matter, but it can also give us hope for immortality and a blueprint for embracing a changing future. (shrink)

The origins of mathematics, a close connection and interpenetration of its parts, and uniform procedures of dealing with the mathematical matter - all of them speak in favour of the integrality of mathematics. It seems that a strong argument for such a view is a fundamental object of contemporary mathematics; namely a real line, which contains real numbers (so arithmetics as well) and constitutes a basis of geometry, mathematical analysis and all derivative branches. From the basic-structures perspective it is clear (...) that the real line is an exceptionally complex structure, for it contains the ordered structure (generated by the less-than relation), the algebraic structure (generated by addition and multiplication), the gemetrical structure (generated by translations and reflections) and the topological structure (generated by open intervals). This example explains, at least to some extent, the integrality and also the vivacity of mathematics. On the other hand, the integrality has not been confirmed by comprising the whole mathematics in one axiomatised, deductive theory. Moreover, the increasing „volume” of mathematics, unwillingness of mathematicians to cross the specialisation-barriers, emphasis on utility (models) and difficulties with axiomatisations of some parts of mathematics cast some doubts on the integrality in question. (shrink)

This textbook is a second edition of the successful, Mathematical Logic: On Numbers, Sets, Structures, and Symmetry. It retains the original two parts found in the first edition, while presenting new material in the form of an added third part to the textbook. The textbook offers a slow introduction to mathematical logic, and several basic concepts of model theory, such as first-order definability, types, symmetries, and elementary extensions. Part I, Logic Sets, and Numbers, shows how mathematical logic is used to (...) develop the number structures of classical mathematics. All necessary concepts are introduced exactly as they would be in a course in mathematical logic; but are accompanied by more extensive introductory remarks and examples to motivate formal developments. The second part, Relations, Structures, Geometry, introduces several basic concepts of model theory, such as first-order definability, types, symmetries, and elementary extensions, and shows how they are used to study and classify mathematical structures. The added Part III to the book is closer to what one finds in standard introductory mathematical textbooks. Definitions, theorems, and proofs that are introduced are still preceded by remarks that motivate the material, but the exposition is more formal, and includes more advanced topics. The focus is on the notion of countable categoricity, which analyzed in detail using examples from the first two parts of the book. This textbook is suitable for graduate students in mathematical logic and set theory and will also be of interest to mathematicians who know the technical aspects of the subject, but are not familiar with its history and philosophical background. (shrink)

This provocative, interdisciplinary, and transnational collection delves deeply into the educational and public intellectual hallmarks of Stuart M. Hall, a core figure in the development of the post-War British New Left, of Cultural Studies at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies and later, of the Open University. It opens new vistas on both critical educational studies and cultural studies through interviews with, and essays by, leading writers, shedding light on the under-appreciated public pedagogical and cultural politics of the New Left, (...) of Thatcherism, and of Rightist, neo-colonial, diasporic, and neo-liberal formations in Jamaica, the UK, Australia, North America, and Brazil. Intimate and moving, the contributors describe Hall’s diasporic formation as a courageous ‘artist’ and educator of cultural politics and social movements, showing both the reach and the relevance of his public pedagogies in the construction of alternatives to essentialist racial politics and the despairing cynicism of neo-liberalism. With contributors and interviewees including Leslie G. Roman, Michael W. Apple, Avtar Brah, John Clarke, Annette Henry, Lawrence Grossberg, Luis Gandin, and Fazal Rizvi, _Hallmarks: The Cultural Politics and Public Pedagogies of Stuart Hall_ reveals that neither cultural politics nor public pedagogies are stable or self-evident constructs. Each legitimates and requires the other as part of a longer radical democratic project for social justice. This book was originally published as a special issue of _Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education. _. (shrink)

Character and the will are rarely discussed together. At most, philosophers working on the one mention the other in an eliminativist vein—if character is represented as something chosen, for example, it can be chalked up to the work of the will; if the will consists merely of a certain arrangement of mental states, it can be seen as little more than a manifestation of character. This mutual neglect appears perfectly justified. If both character and will are determinants of action, to (...) treat them separately would be to overdetermine agency at best, and at worst to fragment it. While defending this reasoning, I argue that things are not so simple, because character and will serve distinct explanatory and normative functions, respectively. The difference in function, however, does not prove that character and will must be ontologically distinct sources of agency; only that our discourse about them must keep them apart. (shrink)

Jan Popiel urodził się dnia 28 I 1914 r. w Brodnicy k. Śremu w Wielkopolsce w głęboko religijnej rodzinie ziemiańskiej. Był synem Michała i Jadwigi z Mańkowskich. Młodość spędził wraz z pięciorgiem rodzeństwa w majątku rodzinnym w Wójczy k. Pacanowa. Dwie jego siostry obrały zakonny stan życia w Zgromadzeniu Sióstr Urszulanek Serca Jezusa Konającego. Pierwszą i drugą klasę gimnazjalną Jan przerabiał prywatnie w latach 1923-1925 i pod koniec roku zdawał egzaminy w Gimnazjum św. Anny w Krakowie. Następne kilka miesięcy wykorzystał (...) na naukę języka niemieckiego. Od 1926 do 1932 r. kształcił się w prowadzonym przez jezuitów zakładzie naukowo-wychowawczym Stella Matutina w Feldkirch, Vorarlberg, w Austrii. Osiem klas gimnazjum klasycznego zakończył egzaminem maturalnym w 1932 r. Maturę nostryfikował przed Komisją Kuratorium Okręgu Szkolnego Krakowskiego. (shrink)

Jan Sieg, Sohn von Marceli und Teresa, geb. Rhunke, wurde am 20. Oktober 1919 in Płocicz, im Kreis Sępólno Krajeńskie in Pommern geboren. In den Jahren 1930 bis 1938 besuchte er die Oberschule in Chojnice und legte dort die Reifeprüfung ab. Am 28. September 1940 ist er dem Jesuitenorden beigetreten, woraufhin er in Stara Wieś bei Krosno ein zweijähriges Noviziat absolvierte. Er studierte Philosophie in Nowy Sącz und Theologie in Stara Wieś und in Krakau. Ordiniert wurde er am 29. Juni (...) in Stara Wieś. (shrink)

Zsfassung der Beitr. in engl. Sprache. - Engl. Zsfassung u.d.T.: On Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy.