This Element is a study of how the power of imagination is, according to Kant, supposed to contribute to cognition. It is meant to be an immanent and a reconstructive endeavor, relying solely on Kant's own resources when he tries to determine what material, faculties, and operations are necessary for cognition of objects. The main discourse is divided into two sections. The first deals with Kant's views concerning the power of imagination as outlined in the A- and B- edition of (...) the Critique of Pure Reason. The second focuses on the power of imagination in the first part of the Critique of Judgment. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

In order to be successful in philosophy, you must have the right kind of followers. Ideally, they should be able to perform either or both of these tasks: to translate your teachings into an idiom that is accessible to an audience coming from different intellectual backgrounds, and/or to integrate your philosophical message into a contemporary discourse in such a way that it proves to be productively connectable to what is discussed there. Kant was lucky enough to have had such ideal (...) followers in abundance, both as exegetical interpreters and as modernizers of his ideas. They stretch from the post-Kantian idealists via the Neo-Kantians to twentieth-century epistemologists, moral philosophers, and... (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present an attempt to reconcile the results of some of the main positions with respect to the I or self-consciousness put forward so far in the modern history of Western philosophy. They range from the conviction that self-consciousness is a systematically elusive phenomenon to the claim that the I is of supreme reality. Though these assertions seem to contradict each other in various ways, I hope to show that nevertheless one can learn from (...) these accounts quite a lot about the nature and the function of self- consciousness or the I which might help to determine its status and its significance within the wider framework of human attitudes and accomplishments. In particular, I want to point out that elusiveness and supreme reality of the I or self-consciousness are not that much opposed as one might believe at first, as can be learned especially well from Kant and some of his German idealistic followers and their insistence on propositional contexts as a necessary condition for a self-conscious I. (shrink)

Beyond Good and Evil is one of the most scathing and powerful critiques of philosophy, religion, science, politics and ethics ever written. In it, Nietzsche presents a set of problems, criticisms and philosophical challenges that continue both to inspire and to trouble contemporary thought. In addition, he offers his most subtle, detailed and sophisticated account of the virtues, ideas, and practices which will characterize philosophy and philosophers of the future. With his relentlessly energetic style and tirelessly probing manner, Nietzsche embodies (...) the type of thought he wants to foster, while defining its historical role and determining its agenda. This edition offers a new and readable translation, by Judith Norman, of one of the most influential texts in the history of philosophy, together with an introduction by Rolf-Peter Horstmann that sets it in its historical and philosophical context. (shrink)

This paper tries to show that one of the main objectives of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is to give an epistemological argument for his monistic metaphysics. In its first part, it outlines a traditional, Kant-oriented approach to the question of how we can make sense of our ability to cognize objects. It focuses on the distinction between subjective and objective conditions of cognition and argues that this distinction, understood in the traditional (Kantian) way, is much too poor to do justice (...) to our very elaborated conception of kinds of objects. The second part deals with the Phenomenology. Here it is claimed that Hegel reacts in a sophisticated way to the shortcomings of the traditional epistemological view in presenting a theory which allows us to understand why we have to distinguish between different kinds of objects and how these kinds are related to conditions of cognition. This epistemological doctrine, however, is not developed by Hegel for its own sake. Rather, it has the function of a "transcendentalistic" (not "transcendental") argument for a monistic ontology. Thus, one can make sense of Hegel's claim that the Phenomenology is to be understood as an introduction into his (monistic) System. (shrink)