The first part of this work addresses the current state of critical theory, and questions the post-ness of the epistemological space after the event of theory as an institutional practice. The second part contains examples of the type of work theory has made possible, demonstrating the new directions opening up both within theory itself and in cross-disciplinary study as a result of theory. In this sense, post can be understood to be in dialogue with issues relating to postmodernism, post-Marxism and (...) post-feminism. (shrink)

them. Though Aristotle does not say so, presumably the questioner who conceals in this way must be prepared, when challenged, to show that the conclusion...

Nietzsche is usually presumed to be an atheist because of his proclaimation that God is dead. This dissertation argues, however, that the death of God is not atheistic but theistic, for Nietzsche's concept of Dionysus, Will to Power itself, entails an implicit commitment to theism. ;Chapter One indicates the enigmatic and nuanced quality of Nietzsche's style. Nietzsche wears masks. In order to decipher these masks with respect to the problem of God, six criteria of the traditional theistic understanding of God (...) are established. These six criteria are: Dionysus is eternal. He is the creative source of the world and man. The world and man exemplify the presence of Dionysus and yet they are not exhaustive of Him. Therefore Dionysus, as more than the world, can be spoken of as "other" than man and the world. This "otherness" entails a relationship between Dionysus and man/world. This relationship is not determinative of Dionysus. Man and world are an experiment on Dionysus' behalf; one that may "terminate," although Dionysus himself will not. ;Chapter Two sets out to formulate and expound upon the first four criteria of theism. This sets down the basic ontology. ;Chapter Three sets forth the problem of nihilism. Nihilism is the result of the death of God. ;Chapter Four discusses the relation of nihilism to morality. For Nietzsche, the moralization of life, and in particular the moralization of God, has led to God's death. Thus this chapter indicates the fifth criterion of theism, i.e., man's relation to God. ;Chapter Five sets out to decode hermeneutically the various masks that Nietzsche wears in reference to the problem of atheism. This chapter demonstrates how Nietzsche's own overt atheistic statements are proclaimations of iconotrophy, not godlessness. ;Chapter Six explicates Nietzsche's positive philosophy of God. This philosophy of God is formulated in terms of The Text of the Divine, God as Non-evaluatable, God and Eschatology, God and the Problem of Causality. Accordingly, this chapter deliniates the sixth criterion of theism, i.e., God's relationship to man. (shrink)

Processed pseudogenes may serve as a genetic reservoir for evolutionary innovation. Here, we argue that through the activity of long interspersed element‐1 retrotransposons, processed pseudogenes disperse coding and noncoding sequences rich with regulatory potential throughout the human genome. While these sequences may appear to be non‐functional, a lack of contemporary function does not prohibit future development of biological activity. Here, we discuss the dynamic evolution of certain processed pseudogenes into coding and noncoding genes and regulatory elements, and their implication in (...) wide‐ranging biological and pathological processes. Also see the video abstract here: https://youtu.be/iUY_mteVoPI. (shrink)

A work in progress, where our two friends exemplify logical fallacies, types of causation and other cool stuff. Quotations are from memory, and so may not be entirely accurate, e.g. I may have substituted "buttmunch" for "buttknocker"...

What does it mean to be truly human? And, relatedly, what does it mean to be treated as truly human, and with dignity, by the state, or community, of which one is a part? To be fully human, Martha Nussbaum has argued for the better part of two decades, and argues in greater detail in “Women and Human Development”, is not only to be rational, and not only to be happy, but also to be capable - capable, for example, of (...) loving others, of thinking rationally about one's own life, of engaging in dignified labor, of interacting with the natural and political environment, of participating in a society's cultural life. A truly human life is defined by, or perhaps constituted by, these capabilities; to lack anyone of them is in some way to lack a fundamental pillar of one's humanity. Therefore, she continues, a citizen in a constitutional government is treated as fully human by the state when that person's fundamental capabilities - the capabilities which define her humanity - are, at least minimally, protected, promoted or nurtured by the state's governing authorities. Constitutional governments, then, whatever else they do, must protect, promote, or create whatever conditions are necessary for citizens to possess these fundamental capabilities... I will highlight and then amplify what I think is missing or underplayed in Nussbaum's treatment of capabilities and women, and that is the role that authority plays - and the role it should and should not play - in guiding states toward a recognition of their obligation to nurture, promote, or protect women's - and men's and children's - human capabilities. (shrink)

This chapter investigates the varying stances of the great religions on climate change, their historical backgrounds, and reasons for the diversity to be found among their recent statements. It responds to criticisms of the stewardship interpretation of Christianity and considers the contrasting view that the roots of contemporary ecological problems including that of climate change lie in religious acquiescence in early modern economic individualism. The degree of lasting impact of these stances is held to depend on the attitudes of the (...) different religions to structural change and reform. (shrink)

Im vierten Brief an Clarke behauptet Leibniz, dass Newtons Vorstellung von der Gravitation okkulte Kräfte in die Physik einführe und so ins Übernatürliche münde. Clarke wies diese Behauptung zurück und stellte in seiner fünften Antwort die gleichsam offizielle, positivistische Haltung Newtons heraus. Gleichwohl glaubten Newton und Clarke wahrscheinlich an eine der ihnen durch Leibniz zugeschriebenen durchaus vergleichbare Theorie: dass nämlich dem sonst mysteriösen Phänomen der Fernwirkung Gottes Allgegenwart zugrunde liege. Erst im Jahre 1717, nach Leibniz' Tod, verwarf Newton diese Position. (...) In meinem Aufsatz versuche ich, die Fäden der Kontroverse zu entwirren, ihre Relevanz für Physik wie Theologie einzuschätzen und zu beurteilen, ob Leibniz, wie Austin Farrer es andeutet, eine Art ,physikalischer Theologie' unterlaufen ist. (shrink)

Granted the far-flung impacts of humanity on the future and the biosphere, Hans Jonas has rightly called for our responsibilities to be reconceptualised, and where responsibilities are non-reciprocal Chris Groves has put forward a model of the ethics of care to underpin them. In view, however, of Derek Parfit's work on responsibilities with regard to the possible but unidentifiable people of alternative possible futures, the author suggests that an ethical model grounded in relations, while helpful, is insufficient with regard to (...) these impersonal responsibilities, and is not sufficiently strengthened by resorting to 'constitutive value'. To meet the need for further models, he first presents two familiar ones (those of bequests or legacies and of stewardship or trusteeship), and then a new model appropriate for responsibilities towards unidentifiable parties, based on hospitality and generosity, and Jesus' parable of the great banquet as in Luke 14. This model also has its shortcomings, but could, alongside the others, assist people to take non-reciprocal responsibilities seriously. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 10, Issue 1, pp 29 - 50 This essay discusses progress and directionality, both in nature, in science and in society, treating as its starting-point the reflections, parallelisms and comparisons of Ruse’s essay, ‘A Threefold Parallelism for Our Time? Progressive Development in Society, Science and the Organic World’, but reaching substantially different conclusions. The essay thus ranges over progress and directionality in the world of natural evolution, in the sciences and the humanities, and in history and society. (...) It defends non-relative progress in science and the humanities, criticising here both the approach to these disciplines of the strongly evolutionary epistemology of Hull and the more moderate evolutionary epistemology of Ruse. It further defends the possibility of progress and directionality in history and society, and also, following Rolston, in the course of evolution within the world of nature, where the kind of directionality to be found has multiple directions rather than being unilinear. Subsequently it relates conclusions about these fields to theological reflections about the creation of nature and society by a value-loving intelligence. (shrink)

Die folgenden miteinander zusammenhängenden Themen werden erörtert : der Essentialismus, die Trans-Welt-Identität, der ontologische Gottesbeweis und der Glaube, Gott könne jede beliebige Welt erschaffen. Plantingas Einschätzung der De-re-Modalität stellt sich als fehlerhaft heraus, wenn seine Überzeugung, Menschen dürften nicht mit ihren Körpern gleichgesetzt werden, auch überzeugender ist. Leibniz würde jedoch mit guten Gründen der Behauptung Plantingas nicht vorbehaltlos zustimmen, daß Menschen ihrem Wesen nach immateriell sind. Plantinga hat Recht, wenn er — z. B. im Gegensatz zu Leibniz — die Auffassung (...) vertritt, daß dasselbe Individuum in mehr als einer möglichen Welt existieren kann und daß — trotz Tooley — die Rede von möglichen Welten kohärent ist. Van Invagen hat gezeigt, daß Plantingas Version des ontologischen Gottesbeweises nicht sicherer ist als die von Leibniz und daß sie verwundbar bleibt durch eine Kritik Jerome Shaffers. Aber Plantinga hat Recht, wenn er Leibniz' Ansicht, Gott könne jede beliebige Welt schaffen, zurückweist und als „Leibniz' Fehler" abstempelt. (shrink)

Can nature be reconstituted, recreated or rehabilitated? And would the goal of doing so be a desirable one? There again, is wild nature intrinsically valuable, or are parks, gardens and farms sometimes preferable or of greater value? This cluster of questions arises from recent debates about preservation, restoration, wilderness and sustainable development. In discussing them I hope to throw some light on both the concept and the value of nature, and in due course on the attitudes which people should have (...) towards it, the policies which should guide their practice, and thus on the proper role of humanity with regard to the natural world. (shrink)

An interdisciplinary reappraisal of Lynn White, Jr.’s “The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis” reopens several issues, including the suggestion by Peter Harrison that White’s thesis was historical and that it is a mistake to regard it as theological. It also facilitates a comparison between “Roots” and White’s earlier book Medieval Technology and Social Change. In “Roots,” White discarded or de-emphasized numerous qualifications and nuances present in his earlier work so as to heighten the effect of certain rhetorical aphorisms and (...) to generalize their scope and bearing well beyond what the evidence could bear. The meaning of Genesis and other biblical books proves to be just as important in White’s thesis as their historical reception. In “Roots,” White presents, alongside other contentions, the claims that Christian doctrines have all along been both anthropocentric and despotic, especially in the West, and that this is where the real roots of the problems are to be found. These claims, however, conflict with most of the relevant evidence. An adequate reappraisal of White’s work needs to recognize that there is a cultural determinism parallel to the technological determinisms alleged by R. H. Hilton and P. H. Sawyer, to endorse Elspeth Whitney’s “single-cause” critique of links between religion and technological change in the Middle Ages, and to treat sympathetically Whitney’s claim that White and some of his eco-theological critics (despite their disagreements) have in common both their valorizing of individual beliefs and values and their neglect of economic and institutional factors. Nevertheless, our ecological problems need to be understood through explanations turning on beliefs and values as well as on economics and institutions. (shrink)

While climate change mitigation remains indispensable, together with adaptation to such climate change as cannot be prevented, current slowness of progress towards attaining an international agreement on these matters has fostered suggestions about climate engineering, originally proposed as supplementary to adaptation and mitigation. These suggestions take the forms of Solar Radiation Management and Carbon Dioxide Removal. This paper discusses the ethics of researching and of deploying them. Solar Radiation Management ranges from harmless but inadequate measures such as making roofs reflect (...) sunlight to ambitious ones such as projecting sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere to reduce incoming radiation. Some favor this measure as a quick and inexpensive replacement for mitigation; but its possible side-effects and lack of an exit-strategy mean that its deployment would be misguided, and that researching it might undermine determination to reach a mitigation agreement. Some forms of Carbon Dioxide Removal face similar objections, but others, like afforestation and Carbon Capture and Storage, comprise acceptable enhancements of current technology. Even if they do not buy time, these measures could beneficially supplement a global Climate Change agreement. (shrink)

This book brings together over thirty leading contributions to environmental ethics, from pioneering papers to recent work at the cutting edge of thought in this field. The introduction links together these articles and also appraises their strengths and weaknesses and presents a distinctive overview of the subject.

What confers their value on genuine virtues, it is argued, consists in the intrinsic value that instantiating them in thought and action standardly brings about. This granted, virtue theory is argued to be capable of plugging a gap in consequentialist theories of the kind that make actions right which either exemplify optimific practices or are directly optimific. Compliance with optimific practices like truth-telling makes the relevant actions right, subject to certain exceptions. But even if such compliance is combined with the (...) optimificity of beneficent actions, considered singly, that do not exemplify these practices, the resulting theory of rightness remains gap-ridden. The gap can be filled if it is granted that virtuous actions are generally optimific, and this knowledge is incorporated into consequentialist theories of rightness. Thus where no optimific practices are relevant, and no actions are manifestly directly optimific, dispositions of a generally optimific character (virtues) can rightly be adopted. (shrink)

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