In her latest book, The End of Progress, Amy Allen embarks on an ambitious and much-needed project: to decolonize contemporary Frankfurt School Critical Theory. As with all of her books, this is an exceptionally well-written and well-argued book. Allen strives to avoid making assertions without backing them up via close and careful textual reading of the thinkers she engages in her book. In this article, I will state why this book makes a central contribution to contemporary critical theory (in the (...) broader sense), after which I pose a few questions. These questions are not meant to prove that there are any serious problems with her argumentation. Instead, they are meant in the spirit of dialogue and allow her to elaborate her work for her audience. (shrink)

In this paper, the results of a pilot interview study with 19 subjects participating in an EEG-based non-invasive brain–computer interface (BCI) research study on stroke rehabilitation and assistive technology and of a survey among 17 BCI professionals are presented and discussed in the light of ethical, legal, and social issues in research with human subjects. Most of the users were content with study participation and felt well informed. Negative aspects reported include the long and cumbersome preparation procedure, discomfort with the (...) cap and the wet electrodes, problems concerning BCI control, and strains during the training sessions. In addition, some users reflected on issues concerning system security. When asked for morally problematic issues in this field of non-invasive BCI research, the BCI professionals stressed the need for correct information transfer, the obligation to avoid unrealistic expectations in study participants, the selection of study participants, benefits and strains of participation, BCI illiteracy, the possibility of detrimental brain modifications induced by BCI use, and problems that may arise at the end of the trials. Furthermore, privacy issues were raised. Based on the results obtained, psychosocial and ethical aspects of EEG-based non-invasive BCI research are discussed and possible implications for future research addressed. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall examine attempts to furnish formal models for deductive scientific explanation. All such attempts have had certain defects. The most serious of these defects is to be found in the fact that the extant models seem to be formally restrictive in ways that do not allow any obvious generalization of their conditions which will encompass the full range of all those scientific explanations which must be considered plausible candidates for translation into deductive models.

The fact that simplicity has been linked with induction by many philosophers of science, some of whom have proposed or supported criteria of “inductive simplicity,” means that the problem must be given some serious attention. I take “inductive simplicity” as a title, however, only by way of concession to these historical treatments, since it is precisely the burden of my paper to show that there is no such thing. So much for the conclusion. I shall spend the remainder of my (...) time arguing for it. (shrink)

Through close textual analysis, Ackermann (philosophy, U. of Massachusetts, Amherst) exposes the underlying unity and consistency in Nietzsche's thought. He challenges the common view that Nietzsche's work can best be understood as a collection of isolated insights and that each of several discrete periods of thought are based on a different set of values. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

This collection of papers (including three completely new ones) by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy--foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as (...) opposed to refuting skepticism. These contrasts are applied not only to rational belief, but to rational action and the rationality of desires and intentions. The overall position is a pluralist, moderately rationalistic, internalist theory of justification and a partly externalist conception of knowledge. However, by virtue of offering a theory of rationality as well as an account of knowledge and justified belief, it will interest philosophers of ethics, science, and the social sciences and teachers and students of epistemology. (shrink)

In this paper I propose to give close attention to two recent discussions of the relation between theism and morality. It will be helpful first to sketch some of the considerations that have emerged from the many discussions of the relation between theism and morality and which form the background to the two recent contributions I shall discuss.

R. Lanier Anderson presents a new account of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and provides it with a clear basis within traditional logic. He reconstructs compelling claims about the syntheticity of elementary mathematics, and re-animates Kant's arguments against traditional metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Many segments of society have systems of values arising from collective beliefs and motivations. For agriculture, and our food system, increasing production to feed the growing human population clearly is a core value. However, a survey we conducted, together with a previously reported survey, showed that the curricula of most U.S. colleges of agriculture do not offer ethics courses that examine the basis of this core value or include discussion of agriculture’s ethical dilemmas such as misuse of pesticides, not progressing (...) rapidly enough toward sustainability goals, relative lack of involvement in addressing diet-related health issues, and lack of commitment to reducing agriculture’s role as a contributor to global climate change. These surveys provide strong evidence that few students have an opportunity to learn ethical concepts and apply them to issues of importance to the agriculture/food system. We suggest that such issues are both growing societal concerns and serious ethical problems that demand attention if our agricultural/food system is not see its relationship with the public further imperiled. Further, we suggest that there is a need for, indeed an obligation of, the faculty of colleges of agriculture to embrace a thorough analysis and discussion of agriculture’s values and their ethical foundation. We offer our thoughts on why curricula of colleges of agriculture do not provide such opportunities and on the importance of agricultural faculties providing leadership in ethical analysis and discussion. (shrink)

Franklin and Pickering agree that scientists in an experimental sequence, like the one to be discussed here, choose to accept certain experiments and their results as crucial, but disagree as to whether such choice can be justified in terms of an on-line estimate of evidential reliability. This paper suggests that it is possible to define a position between Franklin 's Bayesian objectivism and Pickering's social constructivism. This position depends on considering the sequence of improvement in material technique and instrumentation as (...) more important than any measure of reliability determined merely from such factors as evidential spread in relevant sequences, a factor that neither Franklin nor Pickering takes sufficiently into account. (shrink)

Clinicians cannot obtain valid consent to treatment because they cannot guess which treatment option will serve a particular patient's best interests. These guesses could be made more accurately if patients were paired with providers who share their deep values.

This vigorous debate between two distinguished philosophers presents two views on a topic of worldwide importance: the role of religion in politics. Audi argues that citizens in a free democracy should distinguish religious and secular considerations and give them separate though related roles. Wolterstorff argues that religious elements are both appropriate in politics and indispensable to the vitality of a pluralistic democracy. Each philosopher first states his position in detail, then responds to and criticizes the opposing viewpoint.

This book argues that the last eight years in particular have shown us that our democracy has largely evaporated, leaving behind only an exoskeleton that was once its original vertebrae of ends and principles. It is critical to our form of democracy in the U.S. that citizens become active participants.

In Howard Kahane's current reply to my previous discussion of Goodman's elimination rules, he suggests both that the notion of conflict required by the first elimination rule cannot be made clear, and that both proposed revisions of the second elimination rule are too strong [4]. These seem to me to be the points which require settlement, and I would like to discuss them in this paper.

In order to explain the behavior of a human organism, it is necessary to take its environment into consideration. Except for very severe psychotic withdrawal, this has been recognized as a near triviality since Aristotle. But although consideration of the environment may be necessary, it is not sufficient, and it is now generally conceded that a man's behavior cannot be explained solely from a consideration of his present environment and a history of his responses to past environments.

Paternalism has generally been thought of as forcible or coercive interference with a person's liberty of action which is justified because it will prevent harm to that person's welfare interests or the like. Opposition to paternalistic interference with adults, whether it involves the intervention of the state or another adult individual, has usually been based on a concern to preserve human autonomy or self-determination. More strictly it is opposition to so-called ‘strong’ paternalism - interventions to protect or benefit a person (...) despite the person's informed voluntary consent to the contrary- which has been grounded on such a commitment to self-determination. ‘Weak’ paternalism involves interference where there is a defect in the decision-making capacities of the person interfered with. It is claimed to be justifiable insofar asconsentto the interference would be forthcoming were these capacities restored. (shrink)