What I’m calling “Subjective Logic” is a new approach to logic. Fundamentally it is a theory about what sentences mean, i.e. a theory of the proposition, but it includes an account of logical consequence, the propositional connectives, probability, and the nature of truth.

This distinction between something that is really real and something that is seemingly real is of great moment. It cannot be dismissed, even though the Platonic scheme in its historical form might be abandoned. There are degrees of reality in the contents of our experience. Fleeting impressions or emotions are less real than the eternal nature of things. Errors, falsities, illusions and deceptions are less real than truth. And yet it cannot be denied that the fleeting impressions and emotions, that (...) even erroneous statements, illusions and deceptions have their own mode of reality, though on a lower level. (shrink)

" The Derrida Archive is divided into Critical and Supporting Receptions. This is an analysis of the Functions that the monograph finds working.

Richard Creel shares a practical gem of wisdom he discovered in the work of Hegel.

This chapter contains sections titled: Socrates among the Pyrrhonists Socrates among the Academics.

Through constructive arguments covering the principal topics and controversies in epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, Autonomy and Normativity demonstrates how truth, right and beauty can retain universal validity without succumbing to the mistaken Enlightenment strategy of seeking foundations for rational autonomy. Presenting a compact, yet comprehensive statement of a powerful and provocative alternative to the reigning orthodoxies of current philosophical debate, Richard Winfield employs Hegelian techniques and presents a radical and systematic critique of the work of mainstream thinkers including: Kant, (...) Rawls, Husserl and Habermas. This book offers an invaluable resource for students of both analytic and continental philosophical traditions, and related areas of law, social theory and aesthetics. (shrink)

A relatively healthy forty-six-year-old woman with mild hypertension receives a prescription for an antihypertensive medication. One of the medication's adverse effects is its potential to cause severe depression. Four months later, she is diagnosed with anxiety, an early manifestation of depression. An antianxiety drug is prescribed, but her anxiety worsens. Her physician then diagnoses her as having a depressive disorder, and prescribes a new antidepressant medication. She is still on the same antihypertensive.A seventy-two-year-old man is given furosemide and digoxin to (...) control a mild case of congestive heart failure and hypertension. Because furosemide deletes potassium from the body, his physician also places him on a potassium supplement. Six months later, the physician tells the patient to stop taking the furosemide and prescribes an angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor. An effect of ACE inhibitors is to reduce the body's excretion of potassium thereby reducing the digoxin's effectiveness. (shrink)

Political choices favoring one''s country or one''s nationality are wrong if they conflict with a principle of universal free acceptability, prohibiting choices that violate every set of rules to which any willing cooperator would want all to conform. Despite its universalism, this principle requires patriotic favoritism in political choices and permits individuals to assert nationalist interests in claims for state aid. But it deprives patriotism and nationalism of any distinctive role in establishing the legitimacy of wars and uprisings. These restrictions (...) are appropriate even if stronger forms of patriotism and nationalism are psychologically indispensable for achieving social goals required for universal free acceptability. (shrink)

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1963, given by Richard B. Brandt (1910-1997), an American philosopher.

Arthur Danto's philosophical writing is replete with literary references. Philosophy is purely a conceptual enterprise, aimed at solving problems about the natures of things precisely where no empirical information is available to settle what they are. Danto chose the philosophy of literature, and in particular the relations between literature and philosophy, as the topic of his 1983 APA Presidential Address. Danto describes “the bottom‐line view of philosophy” that undertakes to develop only via impersonal theses and arguments, and that requires “the (...) suppression of voice” as “abstract, distorted, and surrealistic” in being too severed from our actual experiences as historical and embodied beings. Philosophy, at least as a matter of its defining ambitions and at the highest reach of its achievements, is, in Danto's perception, essentially written for the sake of transfiguration; its very life is lost when its texts are “flattened into papers”. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The manifest image is 'a sophistication and refinement of the image in terms of which man first came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world' and in its methodology 'limits itself to what correlational techniques can tell us about perceptible and introspectible events'. The scientific image, on the other hand, 'postulates imperceptible objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations among perceptibles'. This thesis is centred on a (...) consideration of two difficulties facing anyone who takes the manifest image seriously as an autonomous image of man. In chapter 1 I consider the connection between perception and its objects, and argue that there is a disharmony between the manifest and scientific accounts of this connection. But I also suggest that the manifest image, which incorporates a certain Cartesianism or internalism, cannot lightly be dispensed with in our understanding of the nature of experience. In chapter 2 I argue that the manifest view of experience accords a certain metaphysical priority to secondary over primary qualities in the constitution of any world capable of being experienced; I also suggest that the scientific image is dependent on the manifest image, and so cannot subvert it. In chapter 3 I argue that free will as the incompatibilist contrues it is constitutive of the time-order; but that it carries with it implicit internal contradictions. The conflict here lies within the manifest image; the scientific image discerns no such freedom, and so incurs no such problems. I also argue that there is a relation of mutual dependence between freedom, incompatibilistically construed, and internalism. Chapter 4 shows how no parallel difficulties attend the constitution of experiential space, because space is not transcendental. In chapter 5 I examine the commitments of the notion of the transcendental self, whose existence was deduced in chapter 3 as a condition of freedom. (shrink)