Adorno unquestionably loved opera music as much as he hated opera as a cultural institution. His take on opera in the twentieth century led him to write its socio‐political obituary, while recognizing at the same time that opera continued to attract a steady stream of would‐be onlooker‐auditors. Paradoxically for Adorno, opera continued to appeal to audiences, and – from his dialectical reckoning – characteristically for precisely the wrong reasons. His opera analyses address the sociology of musical theater, performance hermeneutics, and (...) the direct consideration of music itself (though given his typical writing mode this writing is perhaps best characterized as criticism rather than analysis, as the latter term is commonly employed within musicology). Adorno's interests principally revolve around modern opera (Schoenberg, Berg, Strauss, Weill, especially) but also, if to a lesser extent, canonic works from Mozart to Verdi. Wagner, Wagnerian music drama, and cultural Wagnerism more generally were special cases for Adorno, and subjects he returned to repeatedly throughout his adult life, coinciding with the rise and fall of National Socialism and the Wagner cult, which in the 1930s and 1940s war years comfortably accommodated fascist proclivities. Adorno recognized the socio‐cultural agency of opera as a still‐prestigious cultural leftover of nineteenth‐century bourgeois triumphalism, which he vigorously opposed. In its place, he labored to promote what he regarded as a more socially responsible musico‐operatic practice to supplant the aesthetic and social complacency of the established order, ideas that after his death have found considerable currency, nowhere more evident than in late‐modern opera productions throughout the world. (shrink)

Richard Creel shares a practical gem of wisdom he discovered in the work of Hegel.

This chapter contains sections titled: Socrates among the Pyrrhonists Socrates among the Academics.

Very few scholars discuss the moral basis of the right of persons accused of crimes to be supplied with attorneys if they cannot afford them. More discussion of the topic is needed, in particular because political theorists who prefer a minimal state deny that indigent persons have such a moral right. This article addresses their contentions by developing three arguments for supplying poor persons accused of crimes with defense attorneys. First, doing so will prevent state officials from becoming emboldened in (...) their dealings with the poor, such that they might come to pose a threat to the non-poor. Second, poor persons who believe that the state does not treat them fairly will have reduced incentives to abide by the law, which will, in turn, increase the cost of the minimal state. Third, the better off should show solidarity with the poor in demanding that the minimal state honor all citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and property. Crucial to these arguments is the claim that a right of indigent defense is unlike other welfare rights in that securing it protects other basic moral rights that minimal statists acknowledge. (shrink)

Launched in 1971, _Adolescent Psychiatry_, in the words of founding coeditors Sherman C. Feinstein, Peter L. Giovacchini, and Arthur A. Miller, promised "to explore adolescence as a process...to enter challenging and exciting areas that may have profound effects on our basic concepts." Further, they promised "a series that will provide a forum for the expression of ideas and problems that plague and excite so many of us working in this enigmatic but fascinating field." For over two decades, _Adolescent Psychiatry_ has (...) fulfilled this promise. The repository of a wealth of original studies by preeminent clinicians, developmental researchers, and social scientists specializing in this stage of life, the series has become an essential resource for all mental health professionals working with youth. Volume 20 of the series serves as a tribute to editor emeritus Sherman C. Feinstein. In addition to an appreciation of, and contributions by, Dr. Feinstein, it contains heretofore unpublished papers by two other major figures in adolescent psychiatry, founding father William Schonfeld and a Viennese colleague transplanted to America, Siegfried Bernfeld. With sections on general considerations of adolescence, specific syndromes, and treatment modalities, volume 20 presents the work of many of today's preeminent minds in adolescent psychiatry. (shrink)

A relatively healthy forty-six-year-old woman with mild hypertension receives a prescription for an antihypertensive medication. One of the medication's adverse effects is its potential to cause severe depression. Four months later, she is diagnosed with anxiety, an early manifestation of depression. An antianxiety drug is prescribed, but her anxiety worsens. Her physician then diagnoses her as having a depressive disorder, and prescribes a new antidepressant medication. She is still on the same antihypertensive.A seventy-two-year-old man is given furosemide and digoxin to (...) control a mild case of congestive heart failure and hypertension. Because furosemide deletes potassium from the body, his physician also places him on a potassium supplement. Six months later, the physician tells the patient to stop taking the furosemide and prescribes an angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitor. An effect of ACE inhibitors is to reduce the body's excretion of potassium thereby reducing the digoxin's effectiveness. (shrink)

Political choices favoring one''s country or one''s nationality are wrong if they conflict with a principle of universal free acceptability, prohibiting choices that violate every set of rules to which any willing cooperator would want all to conform. Despite its universalism, this principle requires patriotic favoritism in political choices and permits individuals to assert nationalist interests in claims for state aid. But it deprives patriotism and nationalism of any distinctive role in establishing the legitimacy of wars and uprisings. These restrictions (...) are appropriate even if stronger forms of patriotism and nationalism are psychologically indispensable for achieving social goals required for universal free acceptability. (shrink)

Through constructive arguments covering the principal topics and controversies in epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics, Autonomy and Normativity demonstrates how truth, right and beauty can retain universal validity without succumbing to the mistaken Enlightenment strategy of seeking foundations for rational autonomy. Presenting a compact, yet comprehensive statement of a powerful and provocative alternative to the reigning orthodoxies of current philosophical debate, Richard Winfield employs Hegelian techniques and presents a radical and systematic critique of the work of mainstream thinkers including: Kant, (...) Rawls, Husserl and Habermas. This book offers an invaluable resource for students of both analytic and continental philosophical traditions, and related areas of law, social theory and aesthetics. (shrink)

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1963, given by Richard B. Brandt (1910-1997), an American philosopher.

Arthur Danto's philosophical writing is replete with literary references. Philosophy is purely a conceptual enterprise, aimed at solving problems about the natures of things precisely where no empirical information is available to settle what they are. Danto chose the philosophy of literature, and in particular the relations between literature and philosophy, as the topic of his 1983 APA Presidential Address. Danto describes “the bottom‐line view of philosophy” that undertakes to develop only via impersonal theses and arguments, and that requires “the (...) suppression of voice” as “abstract, distorted, and surrealistic” in being too severed from our actual experiences as historical and embodied beings. Philosophy, at least as a matter of its defining ambitions and at the highest reach of its achievements, is, in Danto's perception, essentially written for the sake of transfiguration; its very life is lost when its texts are “flattened into papers”. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The manifest image is 'a sophistication and refinement of the image in terms of which man first came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world' and in its methodology 'limits itself to what correlational techniques can tell us about perceptible and introspectible events'. The scientific image, on the other hand, 'postulates imperceptible objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations among perceptibles'. This thesis is centred on a (...) consideration of two difficulties facing anyone who takes the manifest image seriously as an autonomous image of man. In chapter 1 I consider the connection between perception and its objects, and argue that there is a disharmony between the manifest and scientific accounts of this connection. But I also suggest that the manifest image, which incorporates a certain Cartesianism or internalism, cannot lightly be dispensed with in our understanding of the nature of experience. In chapter 2 I argue that the manifest view of experience accords a certain metaphysical priority to secondary over primary qualities in the constitution of any world capable of being experienced; I also suggest that the scientific image is dependent on the manifest image, and so cannot subvert it. In chapter 3 I argue that free will as the incompatibilist contrues it is constitutive of the time-order; but that it carries with it implicit internal contradictions. The conflict here lies within the manifest image; the scientific image discerns no such freedom, and so incurs no such problems. I also argue that there is a relation of mutual dependence between freedom, incompatibilistically construed, and internalism. Chapter 4 shows how no parallel difficulties attend the constitution of experiential space, because space is not transcendental. In chapter 5 I examine the commitments of the notion of the transcendental self, whose existence was deduced in chapter 3 as a condition of freedom. (shrink)

Clark and Fischer (C&F) discuss how people interact with social robots in the context of a general analysis of interaction with characters. I suggest that a consideration of aesthetic illusion would add nuance to this analysis. In addition, I illustrate how people's experiences with other depictions of characters require adjustments to C&F's claims.

"Australian legislation and military doctrine stipulate that soldiers ‘subjugate their will’ to" "government, and fight in any war the government declares. Neither legislation nor doctrine enables the conscience of soldiers. Together, provisions of legislation and doctrine seem to take soldiers for granted. And, rather than strengthening the military instrument, the convention of legislation and doctrine seems to weaken the democratic foundations upon which the military may be shaped as a force for justice. Denied liberty of their conscience, soldiers are denied (...) the foundational right of democratic citizenship and construed as utensils of the State. This article critiques the idea of moral agency in Australian legislation and military doctrine and is concerned with the obligation of the State to safeguard the moral integrity of individual soldiers, so soldiers might serve with a fully formed moral assurance to advance justice in the world. Beyond its explicit focus on the convention of Australian thought, this article raises questions of far-reaching relevance. The provisos of Australian legislation and doctrine are an analogue of western thinking. Thus, this discussion challenges many assumptions concerning military duty and effectiveness. Discussion will additionally provoke some reassessment of the expectations democratic societies" "hold of their soldiers.". (shrink)