Some claim that a commitment to egalitarianism is in tension with support for reparations for historical injustice. This tension appears to arise insofar as egalitarianism is a forward-looking approach to justice: an approach that tells us what kind of world we should aim to build, where that world is not defined in terms of the decisions or actions of previous generations. Some have claimed that egalitarianism thereby renders reparations redundant. One popular option for egalitarians who aim to reject this thesis (...) is to insist that historical injustices demand reparations when they have caused present-day inequality. A promising alternative, skilfully defended by Alasia Nuti in Injustice and the Reproduction of History, is to argue that historical injustices stand in need of repair when they are reproduced into the present-day, such that some past and present injustices are in fact the same injustice. In this paper, I assess these egalitarian responses to the redundancy thesis. I find that Nuti’s account is equipped to reject this thesis, but that the same lines of reply can be adopted by proponents of the causal approach. I suggest that both approaches therefore be viewed as potential ways to conceptualise the relationship between historical injustice and our present normative circumstances; and that in choosing between them, we should understand ourselves to be engaged in an ameliorative project – a project that is guided by, and designed to help us to achieve, our legitimate purposes. (shrink)

Positive law and problems with identifying beneficiaries confine reparations for U.S. slavery to the level of discourse. Within the discourse, the broader topic of rectification can be addressed. The rectification of slavery includes restoring full humanity to our ideas of the slaves and their descendants and it requires disabuse of the false biological idea of race. This is not racial eliminativism, because biological race never existed, but more importantly because African American racial identities and redress of present racism are based (...) on lifeworlds of race in contrast with which the biological idea has been an external imposition. (shrink)

This paper provide the first extended discussion in the philosophical literature of the epistemic significance of the phenomenon of “being known” and the relationship it has to reparations that are distinctively epistemic. Drawing on a framework provided by the United Nations of the “right to know,” it is argued that victims of gross violations and injustices not only have the right to know what happened, but also the right to be known—to be a giver of knowledge to others about their (...) own experiences. It is shown that such victims can suffer epistemic wrongs by being rendered invisible, vilified or demonized, or systematically distorted, and that these ways of not being known demand epistemic reparations. While there are traditional reparations that are epistemic in nature, such as memorialization and education, it is argued that there is a prior and arguably more important epistemic reparation—knowing victims of gross violations and injustices in the sense of bearing witness. The paper concludes with a sketch of an epistemological picture to underwrite this notion of epistemic reparations, one that significantly expands the traditional picture by including epistemic duties that are imperfect in nature and concern actions in addition to beliefs. (shrink)

"Christopher Columbus' voyage changed the world forever because the era of racial slavery and colonialism that it started built the world in the first place. The irreversible environmental damage of history's first planet-sized political and economic system is responsible for our present climate crisis. Reparations calls for us to make the world over again: this time, justly. The project of reparations and racial justice in the 21st century must take climate justice head on. The book develops arguments about the role (...) of racial capitalism in global politics, addresses other views of reparations, and summarizes perspectives on environmental racism"--. (shrink)

This introduction to our special section of Human Rights Review on Reparations and Peacebuilding gives an overview of the challenges currently confronting both peacebuilding and reparations. The special section aims to explore the relationship between these two mechanisms and examines the role that reparations schemes can play in salving or exacerbating conflict.

The paper addresses the question of the appropriateness of a Congressional apology for American slavery. After offering an account of what an apology entails, I consider the claim that today's Congress fails to stand in the right relation to the guilt of American slavery to apologize for it. I argue that, while the current Congress and the constituency it represents do not bear a guilt that would permit it to apologize FOR slavery, it has inherited a guilt RELATED TO slavery (...) for which it is appropriate for it to apologize. (shrink)

Positive law and problems with identifyingbeneficiaries confine reparations for U.S.slavery to the level of discourse. Within thediscourse, the broader topic of rectificationcan be addressed. The rectification of slaveryincludes restoring full humanity to our ideasof the slaves and their descendants and itrequires disabuse of the false biological ideaof race. This is not racial eliminativism,because biological race never existed, but moreimportantly because African American racialidentities and redress of present racism arebased on lifeworlds of race in contrast withwhich the biological idea has been (...) an externalimposition. (shrink)

This chapter examines two basic philosophical challenges for the idea of reparations for past injustices (using colonialism as the focal point). The first challenge is that requiring people today to make reparations for an injustice they themselves did not commit is unfair. The second is that if reparative claims are invoked because of lingering injustices, then recalling the past is in fact normatively redundant if lingering present injustices can be handled by forward-looking principles. In response to the first challenge, I (...) argue that the unfairness worry is deflected if we adopt a collectivist-model of responsibility, ie, one that holds states instead of individuals to be the responsible actor. Against the redundancy objection, I suggest that reparative arguments can supplement and reinforce forward-looking distributive principles. (shrink)

S’agissant de la réparation des préjudices résultant d’un accident de la circulation, le droit prospectif de la responsabilité civile oscille entre rafistolage déceptif et procrastination pusillanime, alors qu’un véritable chamboulement eût été le bienvenu.

This essay argues that reparations for wrongs by one's ancestors can be justified. Differential benefits to those descended from victims of one's ancestors is discrimination which can be justified by one's right to be partial to one's ancestors, doing what they, with clearer thinking, would have done--namely compensating their victims. So, while there is no obligation to discriminate, one has a right to, in virtue of one's partiality towards one's ancestors.

Jeremy Waldron argues that claims to reparation for historic injustices can be superseded by the demands of justice in the present. For example, justified Maori claims to reparation resulting from the wrongful appropriation of their land by European settlers may be superseded by the claim to a just distribution of resources possessed by the world’s existing inhabitants. However, if we distinguish between reparative and restitutive claims, we see that while claims to restitution may be superseded by changes in (...) circumstance, this does not entail that claims to reparation are. In contrast, claims to reparation are robust to changes in circumstance. (shrink)

The end of the twentieth century witnessed a resurgence of demands for reparations for slavery and segregation in the United States. At the same time, a chorus of prominent political theorists warned against the threat "identity politics" poses for democratic politics. This essay considers whether it is possible to construct an argument for reparations that responds to these concerns, particularly as they are articulated by Wendy Brown. To do so, I explore how Brown's analysis of the dangers of political organizing (...) around "wounded identities" and of appealing to the state for redress might inform and be informed by arguments for black reparations. (shrink)

Reparations whether to blacks for slavery, or to Indians for land theft, or to settle any number of other conflicts, has an interesting political background. Analysts on the left, who are usually no friend of private property rights, nevertheless rely on this doctrine to support their case for reparations. Those on the right, in contrast, who supposedly defend the institution of property rights, jettison them when it comes to reparations. It is only libertarians, such as the present authors, who both (...) favor private property rights in general, and, also, apply them to the issue of reparations, who are logically consistent. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Thomas Carnes develops a novel argument for reparations for historical injustices. This Reply shows that Carnes succeeds only at the cost of invoking an implausible formalism. The Reply also presents in brief a simpler argument for reparations.

Reparations is an idea whose time has come. From civilian victims of war in Iraq and South America to descendents of slaves in the US to citizens of colonized nations in Africa and south Asia to indigenous peoples around the world--these groups and their advocates are increasingly arguing for the importance of addressing historical injustices that have long been either ignored or denied. This volume contributes to these debates by focusing the attention of a group of highly distinguished international experts (...) on the ways that reparations claims figure in contemporary political and social justice movements. Four broad types of reparations claims are examined, those involving indigenous peoples, the legacy of slavery in the United States, victims of war and conflict, and colonialism. In each instance, scholars and activists argue about the character of the injustice for which reparations are owed, why it is important to take these demands seriously, and what form redress should take. The aim is not consensus but to exhibit better the complexity of the issues involved--a goal which the interdisciplinary nature of the volume furthers--as well as the importance of taking seriously both conceptual issues and the actual politics of reparations. (shrink)

Reparative Environmental Justice in a World of Wounds examines how we can repair human and biotic relationships damaged by environmental injustice, climate change, animal exploitation, and ecological destruction by arguing for the merits of a reparative approach to environmental justice and critically assessing challenges that come with it.

The polluter pays principle (PPP) has the form of a reparative principle. It holds that since some countries have historically contributed more to global warming than others, these countries have the follow-up responsibility now to do more to address climate change. Yet in the climate justice debate, PPP is often rejected for two reasons. First, so the objection goes, it wrongly burdens present-day individuals because the actions of their predecessors. This is the unfairness objection. The second objection is that early (...) polluters were not aware of the harm that they were doing, and so ought not to be held culpable. This is the objection from excusable ignorance. In this commentary, I defend PPP against these two objections. The aim of this short reflection is not to provide a full justification of PPP, or to respond to all objections that have been made against it. My more limited but, I hope, important goal is to show that PPP is neither immediately unfair (in making innocent parties pay) nor immediately unreasonable (in making excusably ignorant parties pay) as is commonly noted, and is therefore worthy of further consideration as a principle of climate justice. (shrink)

While anthropogenic species extinctions can be considered morally problematic for a range of reasons, they can also be described as a problem of interspecies justice. That is the focus of this paper in which we argue that human-caused species extinctions can be integrated within a non-anthropocentric account of reparative justice that is significantly similar to how reparation is understood within political theory at large. An account such as this faces a series of difficulties, such as how to make right (...) past injustices against victims that do not exist any longer and which belonged to species now extinct. For that purpose, we offer an argument in favour of symbolic forms of reparation in the form of, amongst other things, the preservation and restoration of habitat to materially repair the interspecies justice relationship; as well as monuments and education to honour the nonhuman dead. (shrink)

Réédition d'une importante inscription publiée en 1965 par A. Orlandos : souscriptions d'une trentaine de notables locaux, Grecs et Romains, en vue de rafraîchir plusieurs édifices publics. Ces réparations, modestes si l'on considère les sommes recueillies, étaient peut-être liées à l'introduction du culte d'Auguste à Messène, à la fin du Ier siècle av. J.-C. ou au début de notre ère. A noter la présence des Romains, naturelle dans la région à cette époque, et l'usage du denier comme monnaie de compte. (...) Plusieurs des monuments mentionnés le sont aussi par Pausanias ou peuvent être identifiés sur le site de l'Asclépieion. L'embarras financier de la cité, à ce moment, doit probablement s'expliquer par un manque de fonds disponibles plutôt que par des problèmes économiques ou sociaux. 3) il amorce enfin une redistribution chronologique des inscriptions financières de la dernière décennie de l'Indépendance en fixant plusieurs jalons sûrs ou probables, notamment la date d'une stèle de 174 avant J.-G. dont les deux sections, ID 440 et ID 456, ont été rapprochées et raccordées matériellement. (shrink)

This paper argues that Leif Wenar's theory of reparations is not purely forward-looking and that backward-looking considerations play an important role: if there had never been a past injustice, then reparations for the future cannot be acceptable. Past injustice compose the first part of a two-tiered theory of reparations. We must first discover a past injustice has taken place: reparations are for the repair of previous damage. However, for Wenar, not all past injustices warrant reparations. Once we have first passed (...) the initial test of demonstrating a past injustice has taken place, we then determine whether or not to finally accept reparations based upon forward-looking considerations. What is important to note is that this decision to award reparations is based upon forward-looking considerations, but only after first satisfying the test of a past injustice. Thus, backward-looking considerations make up an important first part of Wenar's two-tiered theory of reparations. It is not my argument that this theory is unsafe and I find Wenar's arguments both novel and highly compelling. However, the view that this theory is forward-looking -- and not backward-looking -- is not entirely accurate. My brief reply corrects this part of an important new theory of reparations in the hope of strengthening its persuasive power. (shrink)

This article proposes a normative theory of reparations for political violence from the standpoint of contemporary critical theory debates on recognition and redistribution. I argue that any satisfactory reparations theory should aspire to ‘status parity’, a term coined by Nancy Fraser, and should include symbolic and material components for both individuals and groups. The essay argues that reparations can promote a number of worthy goals, including the reaffirmation of moral respect and dignity of victims.

Machine learning algorithms pervade contemporary society. They are integral to social institutions, inform processes of governance, and animate the mundane technologies of daily life. Consistently, the outcomes of machine learning reflect, reproduce, and amplify structural inequalities. The field of fair machine learning has emerged in response, developing mathematical techniques that increase fairness based on anti-classification, classification parity, and calibration standards. In practice, these computational correctives invariably fall short, operating from an algorithmic idealism that does not, and cannot, address systemic, Intersectional (...) stratifications. Taking present fair machine learning methods as our point of departure, we suggest instead the notion and practice of algorithmic reparation. Rooted in theories of Intersectionality, reparative algorithms name, unmask, and undo allocative and representational harms as they materialize in sociotechnical form. We propose algorithmic reparation as a foundation for building, evaluating, adjusting, and when necessary, omitting and eradicating machine learning systems. (shrink)

This paper describes the reparations programs implemented in Chile from 1990 to 2004. These programs target the victims of human rights violations committed during the military regime. These include the relatives of the missing and executed persons; people who were dismissed from their jobs for political motives; peasants who participated in land reform and were expelled from the land for political reasons; and Chilean exiles returning to the country. Political prisoners and torture victims were considered only in 2003. The creation (...) of the Commission for Political Imprisonment and Torture was followed by a law which provides pensions to political prisoners and torture victims identified by the Commission. Created with different kinds of victims in mind, these programs were based on pensions, social services, educational benefits, and public recognition of the violations of the victims’ rights, monuments, sites of memory, and health assistance, mainly in the form of mental health services. The Program for Reparation and Integral Health Assistance for Victims of Human Rights Violations, created in 1991 and reinforced by a law at the end of 2004, has been the reparation measure for all kinds of victims of human rights violations, including third-generation relatives. (shrink)

A recent development in philosophical scholarship on reparations for black chattel slavery and Jim Crow segregation is reliance upon social science in normative arguments for reparations. Although there are certainly positive things to be said in favor of an empirically informed normative argument for black reparations, given the depth of empirical disagreement about the causes of persistent racial inequalities, and the ethos of 'post-racial' America, the strongest normative argument for reparations may be one that goes through irrespective of how we (...) ultimately explain the causes of racial inequalities. By illuminating the interplay between normative political philosophy and social scientific explanations of racial inequality in the prevailing corrective justice argument for black reparations, I shall explain why an alternative normative argument, which is not tethered to a particular empirical explanation of racial inequality, may be more appealing. (shrink)

In spite of some revisionist attempts to rationalise slavery as just another form of trade between interested parties, there is an overwhelming conviction that it represented an age of man’s highest inhumanity to fellow man. Accordingly, calls have been loud and persistent as to the need for reparation which though will never compensate for actual loss, nevertheless has the possibility of symbolising penitence and serve as cushion for some of the debilitating damages done. This paper examines the moral basis (...) of the call for reparation. In agreeing with the moral validity of the claims, the paper probes further in a realistic manner and argue that African states in their present situation cannot make a serious case for reparation. The paper argues further that for African states to position themselves for genuine reparation struggles in this age of political realism, urgent steps must be taken to ensure the useful and productive deployment of available resources in Africa and remove the continent from its appendage status with the west. The paper concludes that only when African states are able to break the cycle of poverty and underdevelopment, freeing themselves from external manipulations can a credible and rewarding case for reparation be made. Keywords : Reparation, Slavery, Realism, Africa, Leadership. (shrink)

A number of authors make a seemingly compelling case for holding the victim of a wrong morally obliged to accept the genuine apology of the wrongdoer. This is a crucial issue in questions of reparative justice, since reparation typically requires not just the giving but also the acceptance of an apology. Yet it is a case that we should ultimately reject. If it is credible to think that the victim might suffer anew in exercising any duty of this kind, (...) that suffering must be factored into the moral reckoning from the outset. It is only if we can be sure that the victim will not suffer again by attending to, and ultimately accepting, the wrongdoer’s apology that it would be right to impose upon her any duty of this kind. Yet, in all non-trivial cases, the victim’s burden is unknowable in advance and has the potential to be considerable. In such situations, I argue, the victim has no duty to accept the wrongdoer’s apology. There are limits, too, to the utility of the bipartite victim-wrongdoer account of reparation on which such arguments are typically predicated. For the harm the wrongdoer causes is not exclusively suffered by the immediate victim but also by the community of all potential victims. Genuine reparative justice requires more than a recalibration of the relative moral standing of the wrongdoer and the victim through the giving and receiving of an apology. I consider how this might be achieved without imposing upon the victim a burden that fails to achieve the moral reckoning anticipated. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Prelude -- Introduction -- Part I: A Cabinet of Diversity -- 1. Object 1: Diversity Doesn't Work? -- 2. Object 2: Dominance -- 3. Object 3: From Wunderkammner to the Majors -- 4. Object 4: Patrol/Willy -- 5. Object 5: Accumulation/Difference that Makes No Difference -- 6. Object 6: Colorblindness/Federalist Paper no.6 -- 7. Object 7: Partition/No. 76-811: A Grievance Not of Their Making -- 8. Object 8: The Morrill Acts: "The Land Grab University" -- 9. (...) Afterthoughts -- Part II: The Constellation of Reparation -- 10. Star 1: Attempted Remedies -- 11. Star 2: Outlines of Epistemic Reparation -- 12. Star 3: How is a University like a Light Switch? -- 13. Afterthoughts -- Part III: Reparative Endeavors -- 14. Thread 1: Why Poetics? -- 15. Thread 2: Breath-Taking Landscapes: Place based interventions -- 16. Thread 3: Counter-space as the dramatization of a poetics of refusal -- 17. Thread 4: Gates/Gatekeeping -- 18. Thread 5: Unraveling Patrol -- 19. Thread 6: From Rank to Rhizome -- 20. Afterthoughts -- Acknowledgements -- Bibliography -- Notes -- Index. (shrink)

An analysis of the case for reparations for American chattel slavery.

Le projet de réforme de la Chancellerie du 13 mars 2017 consacre pour l’essentiel les solutions dégagées depuis plusieurs décennies par la jurisprudence en matière de réparation des dommages résultant d’une atteinte à un bien corporel dont la finalité est de trouver un juste équilibre entre le droit de la victime à obtenir la réparation intégrale de ses préjudices et la nécessité de ne pas sacrifier les intérêts du responsable.

Richard Swinburne (in his "Responsibility and Atonement") argues for a sacrificial version of the Atonement, in which the individual penitent offers the life of Christ to God in (partial) reparation for his sins. I argue that any version of this account is both conceptually incoherent and morally unsatisfying and offer in its place a version of the exemplary theory of the Atonement which, I claim, meets the conditions he lays down for any satisfactory account.

The paper adopts philosophical research methodologies of conceptual clarification, critical analysis, and extensive argumentation. It attempts to jointly employ African metaphysical and epistemological grounds to address the problem of finding appropriate justification for reparations for Africa on the issue of past slavery and slave trade. The paper states that the crux of the problem is how to formulate a coherent theoretical framework, which provides a strong connection between the direct victims of slavery and slave trade and their descendants in Africa, (...) on the basis of which the latter could justifiably claim for restitutive justice against the wrong done to the former. Western traditional accounts usually define reparations such that the concept only intelligibly applies to moral relations among contemporaries, not between the departed and the living. This reasoning, therefore, forecloses any moral relations between the departed and the living, making it morally unjustifiable for the latter to claim for restitutive justice on behalf of the former. However, this study re-thinks the concept of reparations, using two core areas of African philosophy. African metaphysics recognizes that an experiential being is ontologically connected to the other, that is, any other experiential being and spirits, inclusive of ancestors. This relationship also invariably closes the epistemological gap between the experiential and non-experiential worlds, making them a unity within African cosmology. Situated within the present study, the foregoing shows that the living could justifiably claim for restitutive justice on behalf of the departed, the direct victims of slavery and slave trade. (shrink)

The debate concerning the legitimacy of awarding reparations for historical injustices focuses on the issue of finding a proper moral justification for granting reparations to the descendants of the victims of injustices which took place in the remote past. Regarding the case of Romanian communism as a more recent injustice, and analyzing the moral problems entailed by this historical lapse, within this paper I argue that overcoming such a legacy cannot be carried out, as in the case of historical injustices (...) situated more remotely in time, through the means of selective reparations, such as restitutions or compensations. For, even though they are justified from the perspective of rectificatory justice, selective reparations do not fulfill the requirements of social justice. Rather, I argue that the fall of the Romanian communist regime should have been followed by an equal distribution of all properties illegitimately seized by the state, to all adult Romanian citizens at that time, in order to attain the imperative of equal distribution of property among all citizens. The equal distribution thesis is the only way through which the Romanian society could have complied, at that moment of political and social renewal, with the requirements of justice. I also aim at explaining why other principles of justice, which either have or could have been implemented, cannot be properly justified. Finally, I analyze two main objections which could be invoked against my thesis, namely the economic efficiency objection and the legal realist objection. (shrink)

What do repair and reparation tell us about human beings? They speak to our (natural) vulnerability, our (moral) fallibility, and our (social) incompleteness, but also about the many capabilities we draw upon to mitigate these shortcomings. It is from the heart of human finitude that repair and reparation draw meaning.

La réparation du dommage corporel est omniprésente dans le projet de réforme du droit de la responsabilité civile présenté par la Chancellerie le 13 mars 2017, manifestant ainsi nettement la volonté de ses auteurs de conférer un statut juridique particulier à cette catégorie de dommage. Un tel souci se manifeste de deux manières. Il s’agit d’une part d’infléchir, dans un sens généralement plus favorable aux victimes, les règles de la responsabilité civile, pour assurer une indemnisation moins aléatoire et plus large (...) des préjudices consécutifs à une atteinte à la personne. Ainsi en est-il notamment de la dérogation au droit commun de la preuve, s’agissant d’établir la causalité en cas de dommage occasionné par le membre indéterminé d’un groupe. Ainsi en est-il également de la soustraction du dommage corporel de l’obligation faite à la victime dans le projet, de minimiser son préjudice. Il s’agit d’autre part de préciser les modalités de la réparation du dommage corporel. Le projet reprend à son compte certaines innovations intervenues ces dernières années (mise en place d’une nomenclature, d’un barème médical unique), et consacre aussi des solutions inédites, telles que le recours de principe à la rente (plutôt qu’à une indemnisation en capital) pour certains chefs de préjudices comme le besoin en tierce personne ou les pertes de gains professionnels) ou l’affirmation du principe de libre disposition des dommages et intérêts. (shrink)

There is widespread intuition that historical injustices require reparations. This paper considers one philosophical problem for reparations: the Nonidentity Objection. The Objection states that present agents are not owed reparations for historical injustices because without the historical injustice they would not exist. I show the Objection only challenges the possibility of reparations for historical injustice if we adopt a particular model of reparative justice that takes someone experiencing harms to be a necessary condition for reparative justice. Instead, if we adopt (...) a different model of reparative justice based on relational wrongdoing, we can avoid the Objection. I defend my solution by considering the Nonidentity Objection in detail. I show that it challenges harm-based models of reparative justice regardless of the account of harm that the Objection uses. And I demonstrate that common objections to wrong-based solutions to the general nonidentity problem do not apply in the case of historical injustice. I conclude by sketching challenges my wrong-based model faces and argue that despite these challenges we ultimately have reason to prefer it over harm-based ones. (shrink)

There is widespread intuition that historical injustices require reparations. This paper considers one philosophical problem for reparations: the Nonidentity Objection. The Objection states that present agents are not owed reparations for historical injustices because without the historical injustice they would not exist. I show the Objection only challenges the possibility of reparations for historical injustice if we adopt a particular model of reparative justice that takes someone experiencing harms to be a necessary condition for reparative justice. Instead, if we adopt (...) a different model of reparative justice based on relational wrongdoing, we can avoid the Objection. I defend my solution by considering the Nonidentity Objection in detail. I show that it challenges harm-based models of reparative justice regardless of the account of harm that the Objection uses. And I demonstrate that common objections to wrong-based solutions to the general nonidentity problem do not apply in the case of historical injustice. I conclude by sketching challenges my wrong-based model faces and argue that despite these challenges we ultimately have reason to prefer it over harm-based ones. (shrink)

This paper sketches an account of reparative justice for climate refugees, focusing on total land loss due to sea-level rise. I begin by outlining the harm of this loss in terms of self-determination and cultural heritage. I then consider, first, who is owed these reparations? Second, who should pay such reparations? Third, in what form should the reparations be paid? I end with thoughts on the project of reparative justice more generally, arguing that such obligations do not depend upon a (...) perfect account of how reparations might be fulfilled; we simply have an obligation to shoot the arrow as close to the target as we can. (shrink)

Compensation and reparation are two parts or forms of compensatory or corrective justice. This essay aims, first, to distinguish, define, and analyze these two forms as against distributive and penal justice; and, second, to provide a moral justification of a system or social practice of compensation and of reparation, drawing on the ideas of Aristotle, William Blackstone, Bernard Boxill, John Rawls, and James Sterba. Then, by applying the results of the analysis to the first genocide of the twentieth (...) century, the Armenian genocide, it illustrates certain difficulties in realizing reparative justice when the wrongful injury is perpetrated by a sovereign state, and it emphasizes the paramount importance in such cases of the acknowledgment of wrong by the perpetrator. (shrink)

All of these claims for reparations have mobilized popular support, and all share a degree of intuitive plausibility. The challenge to the theorist is to judge whether and which of such demands are grounded in sound principles of political normativity, so as to be able to select out the valid claims and to measure how the urgency of these claims compares with other demands on the public agenda. The most basic question for those considering the justifications of reparations is how (...) to orient their theories within the space of reasons. Do valid claims for reparation rest at the deepest level on reasons we have for redressing a past injustice? Or do they rather rest on reasons we have to improve our current relations so that we can get along better in the future? Are valid reparative demands backward- or forward-looking? (shrink)

There are many commonalities between the goals of transitional justice and domestic redress movements. We look at the movement for reparations for enslavement and Jim Crow in the United States as an example of a domestic reparations movement, and argue for the usefulness of the concept of transitional justice. We are particularly interested in showing that a future democratic transition – the end of mass incarceration – could animate a renewed push for reparations and a formal investigation into America’s legacy (...) of racial injustice. (shrink)

Given the basic tenets of just war theory and those of United States law regarding compensatory justice, it is argued that the U.S. invasion of Iraq from 2003-present is morally unjust and that the U.S. owes substantial reparations to Iraq. Imajuci u vidu osnovna nacela pravednog rata, kao i nacela kompenzacijske pravde pravnog poretka Sjedinjenih Americkih Drzava, autor zastupa stanoviste da je americka invazija na Irak, od 2003. godine do danas, moralno nepravedna i da SAD duguju znatnu odstetu Iraku.

One of the least studied aspects of programs of reparation, both in theory and in practice, is financing. This is odd given the fact that mobilizing resources, both domestic and foreign, is politically one of the most difficult tasks any society can undertake. This paper centers on the subject of financing reparation programs and attempts to answer the following questions: Which factors play a role in the process of mobilizing domestic and foreign resources to finance reparations? Is financing (...) solely a technical-economic problem, or does it involve political, social, and cultural factors? Why do governments prefer financing social programs instead of programs of reparation? How do the proposals made by truth commissions regarding financing affect the viability of programs of reparation? Which factors explain the efficacy of financing models of reparation programs? In order to address these questions, the paper has been divided into three main sections. In the first, programs of reparation are analyzed from the perspective of political economy, which means that both economic and non-economic factors that influence the mobilization of domestic and foreign resources by a transitional society are taken into consideration. The second section focuses on international experiences in the area of financing programs of reparation, with the purpose of extracting some lessons. The third section presents the main conclusions of the study. (shrink)

I argue that an account of national responsibility, as both collective and inheritable, that allows for making sense of holding nations responsible as an entity for past international injustices and to make reparations for these injustices is not at odds with the demands of global egalitarianism. A global distributive commitment does not deny this account of national responsibility; to the contrary, we can properly appreciate the scope of national responsibility only in light of what global justice truly demands. Thus while (...) I agree with David Miller that we can hold nations accountable for past international injustices, I do not agree with Miller that this is in tension with global egalitarianism. (shrink)