Volumes I and II provided a completely new translation of the philosophical works of Descartes, based on the best available Latin and French texts. Volume III contains 207 of Descartes' letters, over half of which have previously not been translated into English. It incorporates, in its entirety, Anthony Kenny's celebrated translation of selected philosophical letters, first published in 1970. In conjunction with Volumes I and II it is designed to meet the widespread demand for a comprehensive, authoritative and accurate edition (...) of Descartes' philosophical writings in clear and readable modern English. (shrink)

The Philosophical Writings of Descartes VOLUME 3. Volumes 1 and 2 provide a completely new translation of many of the major works in metaphysics, epistemology, and natural philosophy.

"Six Metaphysical Meditations" by René Descartes (translated by William Molyneux). Published by Good Press. Good Press publishes a wide range of titles that encompasses every genre. From well-known classics & literary fiction and non-fiction to forgotten−or yet undiscovered gems−of world literature, we issue the books that need to be read. Each Good Press edition has been meticulously edited and formatted to boost readability for all e-readers and devices. Our goal is to produce eBooks that are user-friendly and accessible to (...) everyone in a high-quality digital format. (shrink)

These two 1985 volumes provide a translation of the philosophical works of Descartes, based on the best available Latin and French texts. They are intended to replace the only reasonably comprehensive selection of his works in English, by Haldane and Ross, first published in 1911. All the works included in that edition are translated here, together with a number of additional texts crucial for an understanding of Cartesian philosophy, including important material from Descartes' scientific writings. The result should meet the (...) widespread demand for an accurate and authoritative edition of Descartes' philosophical writings in clear and readable modern English. (shrink)

These two volumes provide a translation of the philosophical works of Descartes, based on the best available Latin and French texts. They are intended to replace the only reasonably comprehensive selection of his works in English, by Haldane and Ross, first published in 1911. All the works included in that edition are translated here, together with a number of additional texts crucial for an understanding of Cartesian philosophy, including important material from Descartes' scientific writings. The result should meet the widespread (...) demand for an accurate and authoritative edition of Descartes' philosophical writings in clear and readable modern English. (shrink)

First published in 1923 as part of the Cambridge Plain Texts series, this volume contains Descartes' Discours de la méthode in the original French. A short editorial introduction in English is also included. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the works of Descartes and the development of rationalism.

Authentique zoologue, Aristote fait de l’homme un animal parmi d’autres au sein des êtres naturels. Les travaux scientifiques, cependant, malgré des rapprochements, mettent déjà en évidence sa singularité, tandis que l’animal non humain, considéré comme dépourvu de raison malgré des nuances, est exclu du champ de l’éthique dont la bestialité marque la limite. La vertu se conquiert en grande partie contre la part animale de l’homme mais l’animal en est incapable au sens strict. L’animal n’a guère valeur de modèle et (...) la lecture d’Aristote fournit peu d’arguments immédiatement exploitables en faveur de sa protection. (shrink)

Perceptual experiences inform us about objective properties of things in our environment. But they also have perspectival character in the sense that they differ phenomenally when objects are viewed from different points of view. Contemporary representationalists hold, at a minimum, that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Thus, in order to account for perspectival character, they need to indentify a type of representational content that changes in appropriate ways with the perceiver’s point of view. Many representationlists, including Shoemaker and Lycan, (...) argue that such contents are best construed in terms of mind-dependent properties. Other representationalists, including Tye and Dretske, hold that these contents involve only mind-independent properties. Susanna Schellenberg has recently developed an account of perceptual experience that would serve these latter representationalists extremely well. She suggests that we can do justice to the perspectival character of perceptual experience by appeal to representations of a certain type of relational properties, so-called ‘situation-dependent properties.’ In this paper, I critically engage with Schellenberg’s proposal in order to show how mind-independent representationalists can explain perspectival character. I argue that appeal to situation-dependent properties is problematic. I then show that mind-independent representationalists can account for perspectical character by means of scenario contents in Christopher Peacocke’s sense. (shrink)

Representationalists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical with, or supervenes on, an aspect of its representational content. As such, representationalism could be disproved by a counter-example consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. In this paper, I discuss two recently proposed counter-examples to representationalism that involve ambiguous or reversible figures. I pursue two goals. My first, and most important, goal is to show that the representationalist can offer (...) plausible responses to both counter-examples. My second goal is to show the implications of these responses for the nature of the spatial representational contents of perceptual experiences. (shrink)

Based on the new and much acclaimed two volume Cambridge edition of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes by Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch, this anthology of essential texts contains the most important and widely studied of those writings, including the Discourse and Meditations and substantial extracts from the Regulae, Optics, Principles, Objections and Replies, Comments on a Broadsheet, and Passions of the Soul.

This work was originally published anonymously.

El presente artículo se enfrenta al problema clásico sobre cómo interpretar lo que Aristóteles, en de An. III, 5, denomina “el intelecto que produce todas las cosas”, llamado comúnmente intelecto agente. Históricamente, se han presentado dos lecturas: una, que se remonta a Alejandro de Afrodisia, que lo asocia con el motor inmóvil y con la divinidad y otra, asociada a Teofrasto pero que tiene en Filópono y St. Tomás de Aquino a sus principales representantes, que lo considera una facultad puramente (...) humana. Esta última interpretación ha sido históricamente la más sostenida; sin embargo, en tiempos recientes ha habido un resurgimiento de interpretaciones del intelecto agente como “divino”. Lo que queremos mostrar en este texto es que este resurgimiento se debe, más que a una reinterpretación del intelecto agente, a una comprensión diferente de la divinidad en la filosofía aristotélica, con características inmanentes y más próximas al intelecto humano. (shrink)

This paper presents a dynamic perspective in which the psychological contract is treated as a structured set of beliefs that are held by individual employees about the mutual obligations of the organization as employer and themselves as employees. This set of beliefs is assumed to produce a state of commitment to the organization in which the employee is willing to accept work roles and tasks offered by the organization, and to carry them out in accordance with certain standards. The dynamic (...) model that is presented can help to explain why the commitment of employees remains relatively stable over time, and why it may suddenly decrease or increase under circumstances that are perceived as critical by the employee. The model assumes that the employee's evaluation of the organization's behavior changes over time, but that the structure of the psychological contract and the associated commitment change only when certain limits are overstepped. This perspective on changes in the psychological contract transforms the concept into a powerful construct that may lead to fruitful research on the dynamics of organization-employee relationships. Implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

It is a common assumption among philosophers of perception that phenomenal colors are exhaustively characterized by the three phenomenal dimensions of the color solid: hue, saturation and lightness. The hue of a color is its redness, blueness or yellowness, etc. The saturation of a color refers to the strength of its hue in relation to gray. The lightness of a color determines its relation to black and white. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of shadows forces us to (...) consider illumination as an additional dimension of phenomenal colors. For this purpose, I will first introduce two different interpretations of shadow-experiences, which Chalmers has called the simple and the complex interpretations, and show that they both fail to account for important phenomenal facts about shadow-experiences. I will then introduce my own alternative interpretation based on the idea that illumination is a dimension of phenomenal colors and explain how it can account for these facts. (shrink)

In this article, we distinguish between a ‘game code of conduct’, an ‘ethical and/or legal code of the military profession’, ‘codes of social intercourse’, and a ‘code of respect’, and we assess to what extent these codes are reflected in the chivalrous behaviour we see today. Chivalry has developed from archaic medieval game codes of conduct into a codification regarding the laws of war and humanitarian law, but also in behavioural standards that are formalized in books of etiquette. However, these (...) forms of moral codes of conduct do not overcome the problem of benevolent sexism, due to the fact that ‘chivalry’ is in essence a masculine ideology that excludes women from the military profession. Eventually, chivalric codes of social intercourse might develop into a code of respect, which may solve this issue. (shrink)

REGLA PRIMERA. Dirigir el espiritu de modo que forme juicios sólidos yverdaderos de todos los obietos que se presentan: tal debe ser el fin deiestudio.REGLA II. Debemos ocupamos solamente de aquellos objetos quepueden ser conocidos por nuestro espíritu de un modo cierto eindubitable.REGLA m. En el objeto que el estudio se propone se debe buscar no lasopiniones de los demás a las propias conjeturas, sino lo que se puede verclaramente, con evidencia, o deducir con certeza: porque la ciencia seadquiere de (...) ese y no de otro modo.REGLA N. El método es necesario para la investigación de la verdad.REGLA v. Estriba el método en el orden y disposición de las cosas a lasque debemos dirigir el espiritu para descubrir alguna verdad. Loseguiremos fielmente si reducimos las proposiciones obscuras y confusasa las más sencillas, y si, partiendo de la intuición de las cosas más faciles,tratamos de elevamos poco a poco a1 conocimiento de todas las demás.REGLA vr. A objeto de distinguir las cosas más sencillas de lasobscuras, y seguir con orden esta investigación, es necesario ver, en cadaserie de objetos y verdades deducidas directamente de otras verdades,cuál es la cosa más sencilla y la mayor, igual o menor distancia a que estáde todas las otras.REGLA VII. Para completar la ciencia, es necesario por un movimientocontinuo dei pensamiento, recorrer todos los objetos que se relacionan conel fin que nos proponemos, abrazándolos en una enumeración metódica ysuficiente.REGLA VIII. Si en la serie de las cosas que examinamos, bailamosalguna que no podemos comprender bien, nas· abstendremos de examinarlas siguientes porque el trabajo que empleáramos sería superfluo.REGLA IX. Es preciso dirigir todas las fuerzas del espíritu a las cosasmás fáciles y menos importantes, y detenernos en ellas mucho tiempohasta acostumbrarnos a ver la verdad clara y distintamente.REGLA x. Para que el espíritu logre sagacidad es necesario ejercitarlo,encontrando cosas que hayan sido ya descubiertas y recorriendo las artes,aun las menos importantes, y sobre todo las que explican o suponen elorden. REGLA XI. Si después de considerar intuitivamente algunasproposiciones simples, concluímos otra, es muy util recorrerlas todas conun movimiento continuo del pensamiento, reflexionar sobre sus relacionesmutuas y concebir claramente y a1 mismo tiempo el mayor numero posiblede ellas; porque haciendo esta nuestra ciencia adquiere mucha máscerteza y nuestro espíritu mucha mayor extensión.REGLA XII. Es necesario emplear todos los recursos de la inteligencia,de la imaginación, los sentidos y la memoria, lo mismo para tener unaintuición de las proposiciones simples, que para. comparar en formaconveniente lo que se busca con lo que se conoce, a fin de descubrirle poreste media, o para encontrar las cosas que necesitan ser comparadasentre si; en una palabra, no hay que olvidar ninguno de los medias que elhombre puede emplear.REGLA XIII. Cuando comprendemos perfectamente una cuestión, espreciso abstraerla de toda concepción superflua, reducirla a sus mássimples elementos y subdividiria en tantas partes como sea posible, pormedia de la enumeración.REGLA XIV. La misma regla ha de aplicarse a la extensión real de loscuerpos; y es necesario representaria a la imaginación por media defiguras claras; de esta manera será mucho mejor comprendida por lainteligencia.REGLA xv. Es de gran utilidad trazar estas formas y presentarias a lossentidos externos para conservar la atención en el espíritu.REGLA XVI. Acerca de las dimensiones que no exigen la atencióninmediata del espíritu, aunque sean necessarias para la conclusión, esmás útil designarias con figuras cortas que con figuras enteras; de estemodo no se equivocará la memoria y el pensamiento no se verá obligado adividirse para retener aquellas dimensiones, mientras se aplica a lainvestigación de las otras.REGLA XVII. Debese examinar directamente la dificultad propuesta,haciendo abstracción de que sean conocidos unas términos ydesconocidos otros, y siguiendo por la verdadera ruta su mutuadependencia.REGLA XVIII. Para esta no hay necesidad sino de cuatro operaciones:adición, sustracción, multiplicación y división; con frecuencia las dosúltimas no deben hacerse aqui, por no complicar inutilmente lascuestiones y porque más adelante podrán ser verificadas con másfacilidad. (shrink)

Le concept de « civilisation écologique » a initialement été développé par des intellectuels chinois, à la fin des années 1980, comme une critique de la modernité industrielle et du système capitaliste face à la catastrophe écologique planétaire en cours. À partir du milieu des années 2000, et suite à l’accentuation des contestations environnementales dans les grandes villes du pays, le Parti Communiste Chinois (PCC) a décidé de faire de cette notion un de ses slogans politiques phares, mais au prix (...) de vider ce concept de sa dimension critique pour l’instrumentaliser au service de la propagande d’État, de la croissance verte et du contrôle numérique des écosystèmes. La Chine serait-elle en train d’inventer de nouvelles normes de gouvernance? (shrink)

This article is a discussion of Hume's maxim Nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible. First I explain this maxim and distinguish it from the principle Whatever cannot be imagined (conceived), is impossible. Next I argue that Thomas Reid's criticism of the maxim fails and that the arguments by Tamar Szábo Gendler and John Hawthorne for the claim that “it is uncontroversial that there are cases where we are misled” by the maxim are unconvincing. Finally I state the limited but real (...) value of the maxim: it does help us, in certain cases, reliably to make up our minds. Along the way I show that Reid, his criticism of the maxim notwithstanding, actually employs it, and I furthermore argue that the principle What is inconceivable, is impossible is spurious. (shrink)

Quels sont les liens entre phantasia et perception? Aristote a bien découvert en la première, rattachée à la seconde, la faculté de se représenter en l'absence. Il y a certes des cas de représentation en présence imputés à la phantasia, mais cet emploi du terme, qui renvoie à des situations infraperceptives, est plutôt résiduel. Ces cas pathologiques sont pour Aristote assez peu dignes d'intérêt. On ne peut dire que la phantasia « interprète ». What is the link between phantasia and (...) perception? Although it depends on aisthêsis itself, Aristotle calls phantasia a faculty of representing in absentia, of which he is the discoverer. Of course, some cases of representation in praesentia are attributed to phantasia, but this use of the word is not central; these cases are cases below perception proper, and pathology of perception is of minor interest in Aristotle's mind. Phantasia is not an interpretation of the data. (shrink)

In his classic text, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that the structural principles of a society are just when they issue from a procedure that is fair. One crucial feature that makes the procedure fair is that the persons who will be subjected to these principles choose them after they have deliberated together in a condition marked by a certain balance of knowledge and ignorance. In particular, these people know enough to consider principles that are workable, yet converse (...) behind a “veil of ignorance,” unable to predict what their place in society will be and hence discouraged from slanting the principles toward any preferential interests. My paper questions whether this attempt to ensure the disinterestedness of the conversation of justice is feasible. I worry that when we approach this question practically, we discover that the education that furnishes us with the knowledge necessary to choose viable principles must at the same time preclude genuine ignorance about our social position and interests. As an alternative, I suggest that we convene the conversation of justice behind a “veil of existence.” In this condition, people possess knowledge about how their society works and even about their places in it; however, this knowledge does not foster preferential interests because all interests are subjected to the question of their existential meaning. As Jean-Paul Sartre explains in his essay, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” for our interests to be truly meaningful, they must be affirmed as free responses to our thrownness into existence. Yet how do we find the wherewithal to make such responsible choices rather than lapse into paralysis before their essentially arbitrary differences? My positive thesis is that we may do so by acknowledging how all of us in this existential predicament critically and mutually provoke each to commit oneself to depart from the others in specific ways. This process of provocation is thus educational. It broaches a conception of non-instrumental, non-mimetic, liberal study, one which I try to enact in a writing that employs direct address, regular returns to questions that put discourse at a loss, and expanding webs of association. In this manner, I hope to demonstrate that liberal study may deepen our appreciation of our communal nature, our camaraderie, and thus motivate us to participate unselfishly in the conversation of justice. (shrink)

Our lives are increasingly intertwined with the digital realm, and with new technology, new ethical problems emerge. The academic field that addresses these problems—which we tentatively call ‘digital ethics’—can be an important intellectual resource for policy making and regulation. This is why it is important to understand how the new ethical challenges of a digital society are being met by academic research. We have undertaken a scientometric analysis to arrive at a better understanding of the nature, scope and dynamics of (...) the field of digital ethics. Our approach in this paper shows how the field of digital ethics is distributed over various academic disciplines. By first having experts select a collection of keywords central to digital ethics, we have generated a dataset of articles discussing these issues. This approach allows us to generate a scientometric visualisation of the field of digital ethics, without being constrained by any preconceived definitions of academic disciplines. We have first of all found that the number of publications pertaining to digital ethics is exponentially increasing. We furthermore established that whereas one may expect digital ethics to be a species of ethics, we in fact found that the various questions pertaining to digital ethics are predominantly being discussed in computer science, law and biomedical science. It is in these fields, more than in the independent field of ethics, that ethical discourse is being developed around concrete and often technical issues. Moreover, it appears that some important ethical values are very prominent in one field (e.g., autonomy in medical science), while being almost absent in others. We conclude that to get a thorough understanding of, and grip on, all the hard ethical questions of a digital society, ethicists, policy makers and legal scholars will need to familiarize themselves with the concrete and practical work that is being done across a range of different scientific fields to deal with these questions. (shrink)

Aristote fait parfois état d’une pensée animale. Dans le De motu animalium, il paraît même considérer que les animaux ont recours à des syllogismes pratiques : il vaut cependant mieux résister à toute tentation de croire qu’il explique en ces termes le comportement animal, dans la mesure où il refuse d’attribuer aux animaux non humains le raisonnement, et tout d’abord l’universalité de la pensée ; or, qui dit absence de concepts ou de jugements universels dit incapacité d’établir les prémisses d’un (...) syllogisme. (shrink)

Current perspectives on attractiveness-related prosocial biases emphasize the contribution of evolutionarily shaped mating drives. Here, we extend these concepts by highlighting the pivotal role of the hypothalamic peptide oxytocin in augmenting the salience and rewarding value of social stimuli, including the partner's face, thereby fostering social bonding in general and the stability of monogamous pair bonds and offspring care in particular.

According to the monitoring theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious in virtue of being represented in the right way by a monitoring state. David Rosenthal, William Lycan, and Uriah Kriegel have developed three different influential versions of this theory. In order to explain colour experiences, each of these authors combines his version of the monitoring theory of consciousness with a specific account of colour representation. Even though Rosenthal, Lycan, and Kriegel disagree on the specifics, they all hold that (...) colours are represented by a single type of mental state. The main goal of this paper is to show that a more complex account of colour representation is needed for the monitoring theory of consciousness to do justice to the phenomenology of colour experiences. In particular, I will argue that the fine-grained character of colour experience—that is, the fact that perceivers can become conscious of small differences between colours—requires that colour representation be construed in terms of two different types of mental states, namely sensory states that represent appearance properties and colour representations that represent physical colours. (shrink)

Rene Descartes Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences by Rene Descartes The Discourse on the Method (French: Discours de la methode) is a philosophical and autobiographical treatise published by Rene Descartes in 1637. Its full name is Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences (French title: Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la verite dans les sciences). The (...) Discourse on The Method is best known as the source of the famous quotation "Je pense, donc je suis" ("I think, therefore I am"), which occurs in Part IV of the work. Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess. And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken the conviction is rather to be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of distinguishing truth from error, which is properly what is called good sense or reason, is by nature equal in all men; and that the diversity of our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being endowed with a larger share of reason than others, but solely from this, that we conduct our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention on the same objects. For to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime requisite is rightly to apply it. The greatest minds, as they are capable of the highest excellences, are open likewise to the greatest aberrations; and those who travel very slowly may yet make far greater progress, provided they keep always to the straight road, than those who, while they run, forsake it. (shrink)

This paper presents some modern and interdisciplinary concepts about creativity and creative processes specially related to problem solving. Central publications related to the theme are briefly reviewed. Creative tools and approaches suitable to support problem solving are also presented. Finally, the paper outlines the author’s experiences using creative tools and approaches to: Facilitation of problem solving processes, strategy development in organisations, design of optimisation systems for large scale and complex logistic systems, and creative design of software optimisation for complex non-linear (...) systems. (shrink)

The hexagonal structure for ‘the geometry of logical opposition’, as coming from Aristoteles–Apuleius square and Sesmat–Blanché hexagon, is presented here in connection with, on the one hand, geometrical ideas on duality on triangles (construction of ‘companion’), and on the other hand, constructions of tripartitions, emphasizing that these are exactly cases of borromean objects. Then a new case of a logical interest introduced here is the double magic tripartition determining the semi-ring ${\mathcal{B}_3}$ and this is a borromean object again, in the (...) heart of the semi-ring ${{\rm Mat}_{3}(\mathbb{B}_{\rm Alg})}$ . With this example we understand better in which sense the borromean object is a deepening of the hexagon, in a logical vein. Then, and this is our main objective here, the Post-Mal’cev full iterative algebra ${\mathbb{P}_4 = \mathbb{P}(\mathbb{F}_4)}$ of functions of all arities on ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ , is proved to be a borromean object, generated by three copies of ${\mathbb{P}_2}$ in it. This fact is induced by a hexagonal structure of the field ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ . This hexagonal structure is seen as precisely a geometrical addition to standard boolean logic, exhibiting ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ as a ‘boolean manifold’. This structure allows to analyze also ${\mathbb{P}_4}$ as generated by adding to a boolean set of logical functions a very special modality, namely the Frobenius squaring map in ${\mathbb{F}_4}$ . It is related to the splitting of paradoxes, to modified logic, to specular logic. It is a setting for a theory of paradoxical sentences, seen as computations of movements on the bi-hexagonal link among the 12 classical logics on a set of 4 values. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Thomas Reid on MemoryRené van Woudenbergthis paper is a discussion of Thomas Reid’s views on memory as an “avenue of knowledge.” Part 1 deals with various remarks Reid makes concerning memory, knowledge, and belief which he holds to be “obvious and certain.” Part contains a more detailed discussion of Reid’s thesis that “memory is unaccountable.” Part 3 inquires how Reid’s critique of the Way of Ideas fits with his (...) own views on memory.Reid’s dealings with memory are part of his broader inquiries into the intellectual faculties of the human mind. In the Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man Reid discusses not only memory, but other avenues of knowledge as well, such as perception and reasoning. In these essays Reid is doing straight epistemology. This is not to deny that Reid addresses other topics as well. In the essay on memory, for instance, Reid criticizes John Locke’s account of personal identity. But even then his discussion focusses on epistemological matters; one of his conclusions, for example, is that Locke confounded personal identity with the evidence we have of our personal identity, a thesis, Reid points out, that is bristled with absurd consequences. Although, then, Reid’s views on memory are related with his views on personal identity, I will abstain from a discussion of the latter. His epistemology of memory, I think, warrants attention in its own right.11. memory, knowledge, and beliefI.IIn Essay III of his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man [1784],2 entitled “Of Memory,” Reid writes: [End Page 117]It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things past. The senses give us information of things only as they exist in the present moment.(EIP 339)Memory, says Reid, gives us knowledge of things past, whereas sense perception gives us knowledge of things present. Reid takes it to be “obvious and certain” (as the title of the first chapter of Essay III indicates) that “The object of memory, or thing remembered, must be something that is past; as the object of perception... must be something which is present. What now is, cannot be an object of memory; neither can that which is past and gone be an object of perception” (EIP 340).These remarks may, however, occasion some doubts. One way of explaining Reid’s remark that the object of memory is something that is past, is that whenever someone, S, remembers something, viz., that p, p will be a proposition about something that is past.3 This explanation gives the right result for such propositions as there was snowfall in late August, and she once visited Finland4 But, as Norman Malcolm has observed, it does not always give the right results.5 For, he says, there are cases of S remembering that p, where p is not a proposition about the past. Let p be his telephone number is 2 79-289-59 75, or his car is in the garage. What is remembered, in these cases, is a proposition about something that is not past, but present (or: about what is presently the case). It is, so it seems at least, possible for S to remember the present.It even seems possible for S “to remember the future” (something Aristotle deemed impossible).6 S can remember, for instance, that the game starts at 8:00 P.M., or that there will be elections next year.No doubt some will find these suggestions preposterous. Still, we say such things as “I remember my telephone number” and “I remember the game starts at 8:00 P.M.” Someone who balks at the suggestion that we can remember present and even future things, therefore, has to find a way of dealing with these quite common modes of saying. One way would be to argue that these manners of saying are incorrect, another that they are elliptical. Since the first thesis is unconvincing (it is, after all, correct, i.e., correct English to use the expressions under consideration), we are left with the second, viz., that these modes of saying are elliptical. Can this be made acceptable? Let us see.Might... (shrink)

Recent meta-studies have shown that there are no known risk factors for suicidal behavior that could be used for behavior prediction, rendering the classic understanding of high and low risk for suicide questionable. The aim of this manuscript is to propose a new understanding of suicide risk that does not depend on predictive powers. In contrast, the developed Normic account of suicide risk, which is based on a possible world framework rather than probability calculations, suggests that the normalcy of an (...) event determines whether the risk for the event’s occurrence is high or low. I suggest that this normalcy stems from the norms of practical rationality for agents who consider self-killing. The more difficult it is to make sense of possible intentional self-killing, the more abnormal the event is, which renders the event less risky. Consequently, from the Normic account of suicide risk, an individual who has weak or no life-sustaining reasons is at high risk for suicide. In conclusion, although the prediction of suicide is beyond the current scope of clinical psychology, there are still reasonable options for understanding what distinguishes individuals at high risk from those at low risk for suicide. (shrink)

The identification of plausible epistemic approaches in science as well as the social problem definitions with which scientists implicitly work is essential for the quality of a deliberative public policy. While responding to the Nanofutures project, I will reflect on the essential elements of such a policy.

The current scientific discourse offers two opposing viewpoints about the roots of implicit biases: are they belief states or subdoxastic attitudes? The goal of this paper is to show that belief accounts of implicit biases are too demanding and lack a satisfying reasoning theory. Firstly, I will outline the concept of attitude and its relation to implicit biases. Next, I will briefly outline Mendelbaum’s view, who gives a paradigmatic example of a belief account of implicit biases. Afterward, I will concern (...) two flaws and discuss them in more detail. This shows that all current belief accounts of implicit biases do not emphasize these critical points enough, which makes them unsatisfying. (shrink)

Resumo: A reforma na educação básica promovida Lei 5.692/1971, no contexto do regime militar pós-1964, teve como uma de suas consequências a exclusão da Filosofia do ensino médio. Em resposta, educadores, estudantes e entidades ligadas a essa área de conhecimento iniciaram um amplo movimento pela volta da disciplina às escolas. No centro desse movimento estavam os Departamentos de Filosofia de algumas das principais universidades do país, os quais promoveram encontros nacionais para debater e planejar ações voltadas a esse objetivo. O (...) presente artigo pretende discutir brevemente as considerações do I Encontro Nacional de Departamentos de Filosofia, realizado em 1981, no Rio de Janeiro, do qual resultaram o Documento do Rio de Janeiro e, mais tarde, o Documento de Brasília, ambos com grande repercussão na imprensa. O texto é parte da dissertação de mestrado do autor, defendida em 1991, aqui atualizado e adaptado para fins de publicação. Espera-se que a retomada daquelas discussões auxilie professores e estudantes de filosofia a enfrentar os desafios com que se deparam contemporaneamente. Palavras-chave: Ensino de Filosofia; Documento do Rio de Janeiro; Documento de Brasília; Filosofia no ensino médio. The movement for the return of Philosophy to secondary education in the post-1964 context: the first National Meeting of Philosophy Departments and the Brasília Document Abstract: The reform in basic education promoted by Law 5.692/1971, in the context of the post-1964 military regime, had as one of its consequences the exclusion of Philosophy from secondary education. In response, educators, students and entities connected to this area of knowledge started a broad movement for the return of the subject to the schools. At the centre of this movement were the Philosophy Departments of some of the main universities, which promoted national meetings to discuss and plan actions aimed at this goal. The present article intends to briefly discuss the considerations of the 1st National Meeting of Philosophy Departments, held in 1981 in Rio de Janeiro, which resulted in the Rio de Janeiro Document and, later, the Brasilia Document, both of which had great echoes in the press. The text is part of the author's Master's dissertation, defended in 1991, here updated and adapted for publication purposes. It is hoped that the resumption of those discussions will help teachers and students of philosophy to deal with the challenges they face contemporarily. Key-words: Teaching of Philosophy; Rio de Janeiro Document; Brasilia Document; Philosophy in secondary education. Il movimento per il ritorno della filosofia nell'istruzione secondaria nel contesto post-1964: il primo Incontro Nazionale dei Dipartimenti di Filosofia e il Documento di Brasília Astratto: La riforma dell’istruzione promossa dalla legge 5.692/1971, nel contesto del regime militare post-1964, ha avuto tra le sue conseguenze l’esclusione della filosofia dalle scuole secondarie. In risposta, educatori, studenti e associazioni legate a quest’area del sapere hanno dato vita a un ampio movimento per il ritorno della disciplina nelle scuole. Al centro di questo movimento c’erano i Dipartimenti di Filosofia di alcune delle principali università del Paese, che hanno promosso incontri nazionali per discutere e organizzare azioni in tal senso. Il presente articolo intende discutere brevemente le considerazioni del 1° Incontro Nazionale dei Dipartimenti di Filosofia, tenutosi nel 1981 a Rio de Janeiro, che ha prodotto il Documento di Rio de Janeiro e, successivamente, il Documento di Brasília, entrambi di grande impatto sulla stampa. Il testo fa parte della tesi di Master dell’autore, presentata nel 1991, qui aggiornata e adattata ai fini della pubblicazione. Si spera che la ripresa di queste discussioni aiuti i professori e gli studenti di filosofia ad affrontare le sfide che si pongono al giorno d’oggi. Parole chiave: Insegnamento della filosofia; Documento di Rio de Janeiro; Documento di Brasilia; Filosofia nell'istruzione secondaria. Data de registro: 23/01/2023 Data de aceite: 23/08/2023. (shrink)