There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists of the kappa opioid (...) receptor (KOR). While these substances act on different neurotransmitter receptors, they all produce strong subjective effects that can be compared to the symptoms of acute psychosis, including ego dissolution. It has been suggested that neuroimaging of DIED can indirectly shed light on the neural correlates of the self. While this line of inquiry is promising, its results must be interpreted with caution. First, neural correlates of ego dissolution might reveal the necessary neurophysiological conditions for the maintenance of the sense of self, but it is more doubtful that this method can reveal its minimally sufficient conditions. Second, it is necessary to define the relevant notion of self at play in the phenomenon of DIED. This article suggests that DIED consists in the disruption of subpersonal processes underlying the “minimal” or “embodied” self, i.e., the basic experience of being a self rooted in multimodal integration of self-related stimuli. This hypothesis is consistent with Bayesian models of phenomenal selfhood, according to which the subjective structure of conscious experience ultimately results from the optimization of predictions in perception and action. Finally, it is argued that DIED is also of particular interest for philosophy of mind. On the one hand, it challenges theories according to which consciousness always involves self-awareness. On the other hand, it suggests that ordinary conscious experience might involve a minimal kind of self-awareness rooted in multisensory processing, which is what appears to fade away during DIED. (shrink)

Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. According to the strongest version of this claim, there can be no selfless states of consciousness, namely states of consciousness that lack self-consciousness altogether. Disagreements about this claim are likely to remain merely verbal as long as the target notion of self-consciousness is not adequately specified. After distinguishing six notions of self-consciousness commonly discussed in the literature, I argue that none of the corresponding features is necessary for (...) consciousness, because there are states of consciousness in which each of them is plausibly missing. Such states can be said to be at least partially selfless, since they lack at least one of the ways in which one could be self-conscious. Furthermore, I argue that there is also preliminary empirical evidence that some states of consciousness lack all of these six putative forms of self-consciousness. Such states might be totally selfless, insofar as they lack all the ways in which one could be self-conscious. I conclude by addressing four objections to the possibility and reportability of totally selfless states of consciousness. (shrink)

Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of `selfless' episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while undergoing it. (...) Call this the Memory Challenge. This paper argues that the Memory Challenge fails to undermine the credibility to reports of selfless episodes, because it rests on problematic assumptions about episodic memory. The paper further argues that we should distinguish between several kinds of self-representation that may be involved in the process of episodic remembering, and that once we do so, it is no longer mysterious how one could accurately remember and report a selfless episode as an episode that one went through. Thus, we should take reports of this kind seriously, and view them as credible counter-examples to the claim that consciousness constitutively involves self-consciousness. (shrink)

In this book we provide a collection of writing by eminent scholars in our field, in which we asked them to engage with the thoughts of many of the philosophers and theorists who have influenced thinking and practice about young children and their care and education. Some readers may feel their favourite philosopher or theorist has been omitted or been given little space but we do not claim the Handbook is comprehensive – there is always more to say, more to (...) write about. Further, it would be impossible to provide a real introduction to the vast and exciting discipline of Philosophy, which includes a number of different areas of study. (shrink)

This book is about what makes law possible. A stranger to contemporary legal practice might think such a book unnecessary, but the eight authors of this book share the view that what makes law possible is under siege today. The authors also share the hope that by exploring how law is a humanistic practice that involves whole persons, the siege will be reversed. The pathbreaking work of University of Michigan Law professor Joseph Vining provides the authors' focus for their varied (...) analyses of how law works not through force but, instead, through affinity.Vining's four books and other writings, spanning four decades, reveal the hidden connections by which men and women freely create and sustain a world of meaning through the phenomena we associate with law. Drawing on legal philosophy, theology, musicology, and other humanistic disciplines, the authors join Vining in discovering how law is, as Vining has written, “evidence of view and belief far stronger than academic statement or introspection can provide.” Law as Vining and the other authors reveal it is evidence of our better selves, not of the totalizing and brutalizing selves humans are capable of becoming, sometimes even under cover of law.In addition to the three editors, the book's authors are Joseph Vining, Rev. John McCausland, Hon. John T. Noonan, Jr., Steven Smith, and James Boyd White.Lawyers and all who care about law, the human future, and what human freedom can do to connect person to person as valued will find much to ponder in the chapters of this book. By avoiding jargon and the cliché, the authors follow Vining's lead in illuminating the deep springs of law's vitality and authority. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that ordinary conscious experience involves some form of sense of self or consciousness of oneself. Moreover, this claim is often restricted to a ‘thin’ or ‘minimal’ notion of self-consciousness, or even ‘the simplest form of self-consciousness’, as opposed to more sophisticated forms of self-consciousness which are not deemed ubiquitous in ordinary experience. These formulations suggest that self-consciousness comes in degrees, and that individual subjects may differ with respect to the degree of self-consciousness they exhibit at a (...) given time. In this article, I critically examine this assumption. I consider what the claim that self-consciousness comes in degrees may mean, raise some challenges against the different versions of the claim, and conclude that none of them is both coherent and particularly plausible. (shrink)

Stephen Jay Gould argued that the shape of animal life as we know it is a radically contingent accident of history determined more by fortune than comparative functional merit. Acknowledging the formative role of contingency in macroevolution is crucial, Gould believed, to vanquishing the lingering vestiges of progressivism that continue to buttress anthropocentric views of life. Gould’s contingency thesis has come under fire in recent years by proponents of convergent evolution who argue that not only is replication ubiquitous in evolution, (...) but also that it indicates an evolutionary process charging inexorably toward ever more complex and human-like outcomes. We argue here that although convergentist approaches are widely seen as inimical to the Gouldian view of life, in fact the two are indispensable allies in the anti-progressivist crusade, particularly in relation to the evolution of mind. We illustrate this by examining the progressivist foundations of comparative cognition science and the ongoing resistance to attributions of convergent minds. (shrink)

We investigate the context of discovery of two significant achievements of twentieth century biochemistry: the chemiosmotic mechanism of oxidative phosphorylation and the dark reaction of photosynthesis. The pursuit of these problems involved discovery strategies such as the transfer, recombination and reversal of previous causal and mechanistic knowledge in biochemistry. We study the operation and scope of these strategies by careful historical analysis, reaching a number of systematic conclusions: even basic strategies can illuminate “hard cases” of scientific discovery that go far (...) beyond simple extrapolation or analogy; the causal–mechanistic approach to discovery permits a middle course between the extremes of a completely substrate-neutral and a completely domain-specific view of scientific discovery; the existing literature on mechanism discovery underemphasizes the role of combinatorial approaches in defining and exploring search spaces of possible problem solutions; there is a subtle interplay between a fine-grained mechanistic and a more coarse-grained causal level of analysis, and both are needed to make discovery processes intelligible. (shrink)

There is disagreement as to the ontological status of works associated with an original. Some hold that works like paintings are identical to the concrete particular the artist worked on while creating the artwork. Others suggest that works of this sort cannot be instantiated more than once. In this paper, it is argued that, even if artworks like paintings cannot be instantiated in reproductions, they are nevertheless possibly instantiated more than once. Moreover, it is tentatively suggested that the same holds (...) for improvisations in music. Therefore, even the best candidates on offer do not allow for an identification of the work with a particular or for an identification of the work with a type that is instantiated maximally once. The argument rests on thought experiments, and an inference to the ‘best’ explanation. This inference is, of course, defeasible. Four alternatives, three of which are potentially fruitful, will be identified, and it will be argued that, on balance, these alternatives should be dismissed. (shrink)

Theistic and analytic philosophers of religion typically privilege classical theism by ignoring or underestimating the great threat of alternative monotheisms. [1] In this article we discuss numerous god-models, such as those involving weak, stupid, evil, morally indifferent, and non-revelatory gods. We find that theistic philosophers have not successfully eliminated these and other possibilities, or argued for their relative improbability. In fact, based on current evidence – especially concerning the hiddenness of God and the gratuitous evils in the world – many (...) of these hypotheses appear to be more probable than theism. Also considering the – arguably infinite – number of alternative monotheisms, the inescapable conclusion is that theism is a very improbable god-concept, even when it is assumed that one and only one transcendent god exists. [1] I take ‘theism’ to mean ‘classical theism’, which is but one of many possible monotheisms. Avoiding much of the discussion around classical theism, I wish to focus on the challenges in arguing for theism over monotheistic alternatives. I consider theism and alternative monotheisms as entailing the notion of divine transcendence. (shrink)

Philosophical and empirical research on bodily awareness has mostly focused so far on bodily disorders – such as anorexia nervosa, somatoparaphrenia, or xenomelia (body integrity dysphoria) – and bodily illusions induced in an experimental setting – such as the rubber hand illusion, or the thermal grid illusion. Studying these conditions can be illuminating to investigate a broad range of issues about the nature, function, and etiology of bodily experience. However, a number of psychoactive compounds can also induce a remarkably wide (...) variety of bodily effects that have received little attention despite their relevance to these issues. Some of these effects are similar to those associated with bodily disorders or experimental bodily illusions, while others appear to be unique. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of these lesser known bodily effects of psychoactive compounds, and outline some ways in which they can bear on recent debates regarding bodily awareness and bodily ownership. (shrink)

Bayne and Carter argue that the mode of consciousness induced by psychedelic drugs does not fit squarely within the traditional account of modes as levels of consciousness, and favor instead a multi-dimensional account according to which modes of consciousness differ along several dimensions—none of which warrants a linear ordering of modes. We discuss the assumption that psychedelic drugs induce a single or paradigmatic mode of consciousness, as well as conceptual issues related to Bayne and Carter’s main argument against the traditional (...) account. Finally, we raise a set of questions about the individuation of dimensions selected to differentiate modes of consciousness that could be addressed in future discussions of the multi-dimensional account. (shrink)

This is an extensive critical review of Euthanasia in International and Comparative Perspective. My Review is divided into five parts. First, I outline the book's strengths. I proceed by speaking of the need for clear and cohesive terminology. I then discuss end-of-life decision-making in some of the countries: Belgium, The Netherlands, and the State of Oregon in the United States, all allow PAS. Belgium and The Netherlands also allow euthanasia. I also discuss Israel's Dying Patient Law,13 enacted by the Knesset (...) on December 5, 2005. Finally, I make some suggestions for improvement, including a detailed proposal for PAS which I conceive to be the best policy when balancing one against the other the autonomy of the patient, on the one hand, and the safeguards against abuse when life might be considered too lightly, on the other. Indeed, the main difference between euthanasia and PAS is that in euthanasia, it is the physician who makes the final act of taking patient's life, whereas in PAS it is the patient who takes his or her life. In euthanasia, the physician has control over the process. In PAS, the physician controls the procedure up until the last act. The patient has control over the very act of suicide. (shrink)

SC was an 80-year-old Israeli woman. She suffered from multiple chronic conditions, including heart disease, pulmonary congestion, chronic leukemia, diabetes, and high blood pressure. She received medication to treat her medical condition. Her pressing problems were shortness of breath and severe pain in her left leg, the result of poor blood circulation. SC resided in a rehabilitative nursing home in Tel Aviv. One night she could not sleep. She sat on her bed, unable to lie down, and screamed with pain. (...) A nurse came and gave her some analgesics with no relief of her pain. The following day the institution's social worker visited her. SC sat in the dining hall with her older sister CA. The social worker asked SC .. (shrink)

When forecasting events, multiple types of uncertainty are often inherently present in the modeling process. Various uncertainty typologies exist, and each type of uncertainty has different implications a scientist might want to convey. In this work, we focus on one type of distinction betweendirect quantitative uncertaintyandindirect qualitative uncertainty. Direct quantitative uncertainty describes uncertainty about facts, numbers, and hypotheses that can be communicated in absolute quantitative forms such as probability distributions or confidence intervals. Indirect qualitative uncertainty describes the quality of knowledge (...) concerning how effectively facts, numbers, or hypotheses represent reality, such as evidence confidence scales proposed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. A large body of research demonstrates that both experts and novices have difficulty reasoning with quantitative uncertainty, and visualizations of uncertainty can help with such traditionally challenging concepts. However, the question of if, and how, people may reason with multiple types of uncertainty associated with a forecast remains largely unexplored. In this series of studies, we seek to understand if individuals can integrate indirect uncertainty about how “good” a model is (operationalized as a qualitative expression of forecaster confidence) with quantified uncertainty in a prediction (operationalized as a quantile dotplot visualization of a predicted distribution). Our first study results suggest that participants utilize both direct quantitative uncertainty and indirect qualitative uncertainty when conveyed as quantile dotplots and forecaster confidence. In manipulations where forecasters were less sure about their prediction, participants made more conservative judgments. In our second study, we varied the amount of quantified uncertainty (in the form of the SD of the visualized distributions) to examine how participants’ decisions changed under different combinations of quantified uncertainty (variance) and qualitative uncertainty (low, medium, and high forecaster confidence). The second study results suggest that participants updated their judgments in the direction predicted by both qualitative confidence information (e.g., becoming more conservative when the forecaster confidence is low) and quantitative uncertainty (e.g., becoming more conservative when the variance is increased). Based on the findings from both experiments, we recommend that forecasters present qualitative expressions of model confidence whenever possible alongside quantified uncertainty. (shrink)

L'obiettivo del presente articolo è l'osservazione storica delle politiche della memoria nel Brasile contemporaneo, con particolare attenzione al periodo tra il 2019 e il 2022 (governo Bolsonaro). Dall'analisi delle azioni giudiziarie proposte da diversi attori sociali e politici, l'articolo propone una riflessione sulle temporalità coinvolte nelle politiche della memoria nel contesto post-dittatoriale, soprattutto dalla prospettiva delle vittime del regime.

The authors address problems with “compulsory” arbitration clauses in contracts. Specifically, they note that consumers are misguided about their rights in such cases. In addition, arbitration clauses do not allow the press to cover any proceedings that may result. The arbitration clauses in contracts are written in legalese that consumers do not understand. The authors found that even university students had difficulty understanding the information in such clauses. An example of an actual case is included.

The ill?named debate between postmodernists and postlibertarians should be transcended; this requires the abandonment of both foundationalism and its converse, without abandoning common sense as well (which is no mean trick). Similarly, the debate over ?minimal statism? versus the planned economy is outdated. Instead of claiming to be in possession of foundations of our scientific?cum?political knowledge in broad terms, and instead of severely limiting our knowledge to given proofs, we offer the putative heuristics of critique in general and the critical (...) evaluations of contexts in particular. (shrink)

This paper looks at a constellation of three interrelated figures, the hypocrite, the imposter, and the chameleon, all of whom deceive others and at times themselves as they present themselves and are examined by others in different social settings. On closer examination, different facets of their public presentations come to light, some related to their motives, some to the expected goals of their conduct. The conduct of hypocrites overlaps with and resembles imposters insofar as they both suggest a possible nefarious (...) intentionality associated with undeserved outcomes or gains, as compared with chameleons, who seem at most to camouflage themselves in order to become undetected in their environments. The deceptive (and occasionally self-deceptive) character of the conduct of all three figures (whether understood interchangeably or not) remains of interest beyond the circles of social theorists and political pundits at least in the sense that it is condemnable as much as it is condemning, though to different degrees. (shrink)

Cet article vise à définir précisément la forme que prend l’action quand elle fait l’objet d’une mise en intrigue par un récit, de manière à éviter certaines dérives dans l’interprétation du phénoméne de la narrativité et de sa fonction anthropologique. Deux formes de dérives ou de réductionnisme sont d’abord envisagées : d’une part, la narratologie structuraliste a eu tendance à analyser de manière autonome les structures actionnelles formant la ‘fable’ des récits, ce qui l’a amenée à perdre de vue la (...) fonction que remplissaient ces actions au niveau de l’interaction narrative et à généraliser la théorie de l’action ainsi dégagée ; d’autre part, les travaux d’orientation cognitiviste, bien qu’ils aient ‘décloisonné’ l’analyse des structures narratives, ont eu tendance à se fonder sur un modèle schématique de l’action planifiée à la fois trop général et trop simpliste pour parvenir à cerner la fonction proprement narrative que remplissent les actions narrées. L’auteur propose de mettre en évidence, au niveau de l’interaction discursive, la fonction que remplissent certaines formes d’action narrées dans la mise en intrigue, notamment par le biais des effets de suspense et de curiosité qu’elles contribuent à produire. La mise en évidence du rôle fondamental que jouent les actions polémiques dans la dynamique du récit permet de conclure en opposant deux points de vue complémentaires sur l’action : alors que les approches ‘narratives’ mettent en évidence la singularité de l’événement narré, son caractère inédit, surprenant ou sous-déterminé, d’autres formes d’analyse ou de textualisation de l’action cherchent au contraire à cerner la règle ou la régularité derrière l’apparente ‘nouveauté’ de l’événement. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article traite de la question des rapports entre la dynamique de l'intrigue et la représentation de l'étranger dans sa dimension temporelle. A la suite de Bakhtine, il s'agira de montrer que le récit littéraire produit un “chronotope” dans lequel la représentation s'abaisse “au niveau d'une réalité actuelle, fluide et inachevée” (1978 : 472). On défendra l'idée que, loin de n'être qu'un dispositif commercial aliénant le lecteur, la tension narrative, qui représente la part dynamique de l'intrigue littéraire, produit un (...) espace temporel orienté permettant le déploiement de l'étranger. Cette réflexion visera par ailleurs à entamer un dialogue interdisciplinaire entre, d'une part, la poétique de l'intrigue telle que l'articule la narratologie contemporaine et, d'autre part, une réflexion philosophique visant la description phénoménologique de l'étranger. (shrink)

Représenter l’État sous les traits antiques de Janus bifrons, avec une face apparente et une face cachée, est dépassé. Aujourd’hui les deux faces de l’État se projettent sur un unique plan, comme dans certains portraits de Picasso. Autant dire que cette institution suscite des sentiments d’étonnement contradictoires. Pour les uns, il y aurait..

Drawing on the work of Max Weber, Edward Shils, Charles Camic and Thomas Spence Smith, among others, this article analyzes the effect of the breakdown of charismatic groups on tragic protagonists. Because criticism has usually focused on the isolation of tragic figures, little attention has been paid to group formation and group dissolution as significant components of tragedy. Yet group function makes a manifest contribution to tragic denouement: the vicissitudes of charismatic authority not only reflect but often bring about the (...) catastrophes in tragic drama. The article demonstrates this thesis in a concluding discussion of Shakespeare's Othello. (shrink)

This thesis investigates the relationship between consciousness and self-consciousness. I consider two broad claims about this relationship: a constitutive claim, according to which all conscious experiences constitutively involve self-consciousness; and a typicalist claim, according to which ordinary conscious experiences contingently involve self-consciousness. Both of these claims call for elucidation of the relevant notions of consciousness and self-consciousness. -/- In the first part of the thesis ('The Myth of Constitutive Self-Consciousness'), I critically examine the constitutive claim. I start by offering an (...) elucidatory account of consciousness, and outlining a number of foundational claims that plausibly follow from it. I subsequently distinguish between two concepts of self-consciousness: consciousness of one's experience, and consciousness of oneself (as oneself). Each of these concepts yields a distinct variant of the constitutive claim. In turn, each resulting variant of the constitutive claim can be interpreted in two ways: on a 'minimal' or deflationary reading, they fall within the scope of foundational claims about consciousness, while on a 'strong' or inflationary reading, they point to determinate aspects of phenomenology that are not acknowledged by the foundational claims as being aspects of all conscious mental states. I argue that the deflationary readings of either variant of the constitutive claim are plausible and illuminating, but would ideally be formulated without using a term as polysemous as 'self-consciousness'; by contrast, the inflationary readings of either variant are not adequately supported. -/- In the second part of the thesis ('Self-Consciousness in the Real World'), I focus on the second concept of self-consciousness, or consciousness of oneself as oneself. Drawing upon empirical evidence, I defend a pluralist account of self-consciousness so construed, according to which there are several ways in which one can be conscious of oneself as oneself – through conscious thoughts, bodily experiences and perceptual experiences – that make distinct determinate contributions to one's phenomenology. This pluralist account provides us with the resources to vindicate the typicalist claim according to which consciousness of oneself as oneself – a sense of self – is pervasive in ordinary conscious experiences, as a matter of contingent empirical fact. It also provides us with the resources to assess the possibility that a subject might be conscious without being conscious of herself as herself in any way. (shrink)

Summary This contribution examines the history of the production of Galileo's 1638 Discorsi. It provides a detailed narrative of Galileo's and his collaborators' attempts to secure a printer for the work. Through analysis of surviving correspondence, manuscripts, and proof copies, I examine in greater detail the working methods of Galileo and his correspondents, particularly in regards to the text's images. This examination serves as a boon to historians of the early modern book, as Galileo's surviving correspondence provides an unusually rich (...) record of his and his collaborators' activities. I show that the volume was produced through a collaborative process in which Galileo's correspondents played a significant role in determining the work's layout, images, and content. The study thus complements the claims of previous scholars, who have argued for the collaborative nature of much of Galileo's intellectual work. It also offers a new perspective on the Discorsi, a text which is often studied for insight into Galileo's process of discovery. (shrink)