From social media to search engines to Wikipedia, the internet is thoroughly embedded in how we produce, locate, and share knowledge around the world. Who Should We Be Online? provides an account of online knowledge that takes seriously the role of sexist, racist, transphobic, colonial, and capitalist forms of oppression. Frost-Arnold argues against analyzing internet users as a collection of identical generic people with smartphones. The novel epistemology developed in this book recognizes that we are differently embodied beings interacting (...) within systems of dominance. Our social identities and global inequalities shape who we are, who we can be online, and what we know. Tackling problems of online content moderation, fake news, and hoaxes, Frost-Arnold shows that oppressive online structures and practices help fuel ignorance. But she also reveals how the internet provides opportunities for marginalized people and activists to share knowledge online. Drawing on feminist accounts of objectivity, veritistic social epistemology, epistemologies of ignorance, virtue epistemology, and the epistemic injustice literature, this book argues for a social epistemology that values truth and objectivity, while recognizing that inequalities shape our collective ability to attain these goals. Timely and interdisciplinary, Who Should We Be Online? weaves together internet studies scholarship from across the humanities, social sciences, and computer science. Presenting case studies of moderators, imposters, tricksters, fakers, and lurkers, this book both explains the problems with our current internet ecosystem and imagines liberatory online futures. (shrink)

Alvarez and Steward think the power of agency is a two-way power; Lowe thinks the will is. There is a problem for two-way powers. Either there is a unified description of the manifestation-type of the power, or not. If so, two-way powers are really one-way powers. If not, two-way powers are really combinations of one-way powers. Either way, two-way powers cannot help distinguish free agents from everything else. I argue the problem is best avoided by an Aristotelian view, which posits (...) a distinctive unity of explanation proper to two-way powers, grounded in a distinctive form of reasoning. (shrink)

In this innovative book, Gloria Frost reconstructs and analyses Aquinas's theories on efficient causation and causal powers, focusing specifically on natural causal powers and efficient causation in nature. Frost presents each element of Aquinas's theories one by one, comparing them with other theories, as well as examining the philosophical and interpretive ambiguities in Aquinas's thought and proposing fresh solutions to conceptual difficulties. Her discussion includes explanations of Aquinas's technical scholastic terminology in jargon-free prose, as well as background on (...) medieval scientific views - including ordinary language explanations of the medieval physical theories which Aquinas assumed in formulating his views on causation and causal powers. The resulting volume is a rich exploration of a central philosophical topic in medieval philosophy and beyond, and will be valuable especially for scholars and advanced students working on Aquinas and on medieval natural philosophy. (shrink)

The Pessimistic Induction over the history of science argues that because most past theories considered empirically successful in their time turn out to be not even approximately true, most present ones probably aren’t approximately true either. But why did past scientists accept those incorrect theories? Kyle Stanford’s ‘Problem of Unconceived Alternatives’ is one answer to that question: scientists are bad at exhausting the space of plausible hypotheses to explain the evidence available to them. Here, I offer another answer, which I (...) call the ‘Problem of Misleading Evidence.’ I argue that this proposal is, in important respects, superior to Stanford’s. (shrink)

Confused terms appear to signify more than one entity. Carnap maintained that any putative name that is associated with more than one object in a relevant universe of discourse fails to be a genuine name. Although many philosophers have agreed with Carnap, they have not always agreed among themselves about the truth-values of atomic sentences containing such terms. Some hold that such atomic sentences are always false, and others claim they are always truth-valueless. Field maintained that confused terms can still (...) refer, albeit partially, and offered a supervaluational account of their semantic properties on which some atomic sentences with confused terms can be true. After outlining many of the most important theoretical considerations for and against various semantic theories for such terms, we report the results of a study designed to investigate which of these accounts best accords with the truth-value judgments of ordinary language users about sentences containing these terms. We found that naïve participants view confused names as capable of successfully referring to one or more objects. Thus, semantic theories that judge them to involve total reference failure do not comport well with patterns of ordinary usage. (shrink)

In this chapter I seek to rehabilitate and elaborate the so-called “mischief rule” of English law. I begin by interrogating two views of legal and constitutional interpretation which make symmetrical mistakes about legal interpretation: Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin’s view in Demystifying Legal Reasoning and Jack Balkin’s in Living Originalism. Against these views I argue that the appropriate interpretation of laws is guided by the “mischief” the legislators were trying to remedy when they created the law and by what the (...) legislators and the subjects of the law understand when laws are created or changed. (shrink)

Drawing on research in posthumanism, science and technology studies and biosemiotics, this essay analyses the challenges epigenetic processes pose for our understanding of embodied subjectivity. It uses the work of Charles Sanders Peirce to argue that epigenetic processes are indexical in their patterned logic, that they are meaning-making processes and that, consequently, they can be conceived as a form of attention. To conceive of bodies as paying attention through epigenetic processes is to rupture the distinction between matter and meaning that (...) governs many philosophical categories. This in turn invites us to recalibrate our conception of the relationship between self, body and world. (shrink)

This essay explores the development of Simone Weil's conception of obedience across religious, political, and ethical contexts. By bringing together these strands of Weil's thought, it aims to illuminate some important connections in her treatment of obedience throughout these diverse topics. The author argues that Weil's political treatment of obedience is deeply influenced by ideas in Christian thought, and that this account is situated within an understanding of obedience in the natural world which is itself ethically loaded. Hence it is (...) suggested that Weil's account of obedience has something to offer philosophy today: namely, a conception of obedience which recognises the practical and ethical need for obeying others, but which is distinct from the mere submission to power. (shrink)

Many have tackled the question ‘What (if anything) is analytic philosophy?’ I will not attempt to answer this vexed question. Rather, I address a smaller, more manageable set of interrelated questions: first, when and how did people begin using the label ‘analytic philosophy’? Second, how did those who used this label understand it? Third, why did many philosophers we today classify as analytic initially resist being grouped together under the single category of ‘analytic philosophy’? Finally, for the first generation who (...) described themselves as analytic philosophers, what was their intended contrast class? Relatedly, when did ‘continental philosophy’ become the standard opposition? Some evidence I present justifies received answers to these questions; other evidence supports surprising and unorthodox answers to these questions. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs and analyzes Thomas Aquinas’ intriguing views on transeunt causal activity, which have been the subject of an interpretive debate spanning from the fifteenth century up until the present. In his Physics commentary, Aquinas defends the Aristotelian positions that the actualization of an agent’s active potential is the motion that it causes in its patient and action and passion are the same motion. Yet, in other texts, Aquinas claims that action differs from passion and “action is in the (...) agent” as subject. This paper proposes a solution for how to reconcile Aquinas’ varying claims about what transeunt causal activity is in reality. In addition to advancing understanding of Aquinas’ views on causal activity, the paper also offers insights into more general topics in his thought, such as the relationship between actualities and accidents and the nature of extrinsic accidents. (shrink)

New Materialisms brings into focus and explains the significance of the innovative materialist critiques that are emerging across the social sciences and humanities. By gathering essays that exemplify the new thinking about matter and processes of materialization, this important collection shows how scholars are reworking older materialist traditions, contemporary theoretical debates, and advances in scientific knowledge to address pressing ethical and political challenges. In the introduction, Diana Coole and Samantha Frost highlight common themes among the distinctive critical projects that (...) comprise the new materialisms. The continuities they discern include a posthumanist conception of matter as lively or exhibiting agency, and a reengagement with both the material realities of everyday life and broader geopolitical and socioeconomic structures. Coole and Frost argue that contemporary economic, environmental, geopolitical, and technological developments demand new accounts of nature, agency, and social and political relationships; modes of inquiry that privilege consciousness and subjectivity are not adequate to the task. New materialist philosophies are needed to do justice to the complexities of twenty-first-century biopolitics and political economy, because they raise fundamental questions about the place of embodied humans in a material world and the ways that we produce, reproduce, and consume our material environment. Contributors Sara Ahmed Jane Bennett Rosi Braidotti Pheng Cheah Rey Chow William E. Connolly Diana Coole Jason Edwards Samantha Frost Elizabeth Grosz Sonia Kruks Melissa A. Orlie. (shrink)

Nous remercions Dan Frost et Rebecca Guy de nous avoir autorisés à reproduire ce texte qui a déjà paru dans Recherches et pratiques pédagogiques en langues de spécialité, Vol. 35, N° spécial 1 | 2016 : Du secteur Lansad et des langues de spécialité. Résumé : La production orale pose de nombreuses difficultés pour les apprenants francophones en anglais et peut-être plus encore dans le secteur Lansad où ils sont souvent adultes et où le temps et les ressources sont (...) particulièrement limités. Le langage et - Linguistique et théorie du langage – Nouvel article. (shrink)

This provocative and original book challenges the commonplace that contemporary international interactions are best understood as struggles for power. Eschewing jargon and theoretical abstraction, Mervyn Frost argues that global politics and global civil society must be understood in ethical terms. International actors are always faced with the ethical question: So, what ought we to do in circumstances like these? Illustrating the centrality of ethics to our understanding of global politics and global civil society with detailed case studies, Frost (...) shows how international actors constitute one another in global social practices that are underpinned by specific ethical commitments. Case Studies examined include: The War on Iraq The 'Global War on Terror' Iran Human Rights Globalization and Migration The use of Private Military Companies. Global Ethics forces readers to confront their own necessary ethical engagement as citizens and rights holders in global society. Failure to understand international relations in ethical terms will lead to misguided action. This book should be read by all scholars and students of international relations as well as the general reader seeking an accessible account of the importance of ethical decisions in world affairs. (shrink)

Most contemporary theories of action maintain that there are basic actions. A basic action is something that one does intentionally without doing anything else intentionally as means to that end. Most contemporary theories of action also maintain that there are non-basic actions that are mistakes in performance, where a mistake in performance is a case of mucking up what one meant to do, without the failure being the result of prevention or abnormal interference. But most contemporary theories of action deny (...) that there are basic mistakes in performance: stretches of activity that would be basic actions were they to succeed, but are in fact mistakes in performance. I argue that we have reason to think that there are basic mistakes in performance, and if there are, then we must give up a key commitment common to much contemporary action theory. The commitment is that every particular imperfect expression of the will is grounded in some particular perfect expression of the will. Giving up this commitment has important metaphysical consequences for how we think of the will as a power of agency, and implies that causal deviance perhaps isn’t the main problem that causal theorists of action ought to worry about. (shrink)

This article argues that feminist theorists should conceive of the life sciences not only as a factual resource but also as a figural resource. It proposes that in shifting our conceptual orientation to biological science from fact to figure, feminists will be able to give theoretical life to scientific findings about the ways in which social environments and material habitats are processes integral to our development, growth, and social and political well-being. The figuration of ourselves as specifically biocultural creatures will (...) enable feminists to gain a stronger theoretical and analytic purchase on the ongoing mutual shaping of the biological and social dimensions of existence. This, in turn, will enable feminists to creatively re-imagine the fields and fora of feminist politics. (shrink)

Evidence-based medicine (EBM) calls for medical practitioners to “integrate” our best available evidence into clinical practice. A significant amount of the literature on EBM takes this integration to be unproblematic, focusing on questions like how to interpret evidence and engage with patient values, rather than critically looking at how these features of EBM can be implemented together. Other authors have also commented on this gap in the literature, for example, identifying the lack of clarity about how patient preferences and evidence (...) from trials is supposed to be integrated in practice. In this paper, I look at this issue from an epistemological perspective, (looking at how different types of knowledge in EBM can be used to make sounds judgements). In particular, I introduce an epistemological issue for this integration problem, which I call the epistemic integration problem. This is essentially the problem of how we can use information that is both general (eg, about a population sample) and descriptive (eg, about what expected outcomes are) to reach clinical judgements that are individualized (applying to a particular patient) and normative (about what is best for their health). (shrink)

Karen Frost-Arnold's response to comments Respuesta de Karen Frost-Arnold a los comentarios Karen Frost-Arnold's response to comments.

SINCE ITS PUBLICATION IN 1981, Alexandre Kojève’s Esquisse d’une phénoménologie du droit has received scant scholarly attention. Except for a brief note on the book by Michael S. Roth, and some scattered references here and there, the Esquisse has been eclipsed by Kojève’s Introduction à la lecture de Hegel and by his debate and longstanding correspondence with Leo Strauss in the latter’s On Tyranny. Despite the renown of these two books, the Esquisse is an indispensable work in Kojève’s corpus as (...) a whole. As the Esquisse was written after the Introduction, Kojève clarifies and elaborates upon many of the themes he raises there; and as the Esquisse was written before his response to Strauss’s On Tyranny, it helps to set the stage for this important philosophic debate. Furthermore, the Esquisse is clearly Kojève’s most political work, by which I mean that he most fully articulates his understanding of right, justice, and the universal and homogeneous empire. The Esquisse is his only book that is not an interpretation of the history of philosophy and political thought, and this means that Kojève’s own voice can be heard with an unrivalled clarity: the oft asked question whether Kojève is sincerely attempting to interpret another philosopher or is masking his own thoughts behind that interpretation simply does not apply in this case. Although the title of the book states that it is a provisional exposition, the Esquisse is certainly more unified or systematic than the Introduction, and Kojève declared that he was satisfied with it. Lastly, the Esquisse is also a highly accessible work, not being as abstract as some of his other epistemological writings. All in all, it is extremely puzzling why political scientists have not paid more attention to the Esquisse. (shrink)

Actors in international politics need to navigate a host of ethical challenges when deciding how to act in a certain context. They are confronted by the question: "What, from an ethical point of view, should I do?" with regard to a wide range of issues including the conduct of war, the just distribution of aid and trade, human rights, the care of the global environment, the rights of asylum seekers and refugees, genocide, money laundering, global terror, and many others. This (...) collection looks at classical and seminal research in the field with the broad framework of the moral standing of states; the moral standing of non-state actors; and the ethics of international relations. (shrink)

Polygyny does not necessarily entail sexual selection of men. All factors that affect the operational sex ratio must be considered. Data from contemporary hunter-gatherers indicate higher mortality rates in men than in women, and lost female reproductive time. If sexual selection did occur in ancestral hunter-gatherers, it was probably men selecting women and not women selecting men.

The Supper is indeed the memorial of a childless man, Jesus of Nazareth, who still today gives life to countless sons and daughters.

These comments, which take the form of criticism and response, were the basis of a zoom conversation at the Eastern APA, January 2021. Josh is putting them up on philpapers (with permission from all involved) in case they are helpful to people interested in the themes of this book.

Background Research in children is essential for them to benefit from the outcomes of research but involvement must be weighed against potential harms. In many countries and circumstances, medical research legally requires parental consent until the age of 18 years, with poorly defined recommendations for assent prior to this. However, there is little research exploring how these decisions are made by families and the ethical implications of this. Aim To explore key ethical debates in decision-making for participation of children and (...) adolescents in a human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine trial. Methods Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with Tanzanian girls (aged 9–16 years) who had participated in an HPV vaccine trial (n = 13), their parents or guardians (n = 12), and girls together with their parents (in paired parent-child interviews) (n = 6). The interviews were analysed using thematic analysis. Interview data came from a qualitative acceptability study undertaken as part of the Dose Reduction Immunobridging and Safety Study of Two Human Papillomavirus (HPV) Vaccines in Tanzanian Girls (DoRIS) trial. Results Girls and parents desired collaborative decision-making, with parents ultimately making the decision to consent. However, girls wanted a larger part in decision-making. Decisions to consent involved many people, including extended social networks, the trial team, media outlets and healthcare professionals and this resulted in conflicts to be negotiated. Deciding where to place trust was central in participants and parents considering decisions to consent and overcoming rumours about trial involvement. Conclusions Existing models of decision-making help to understand dynamics between parents, adolescents and researchers but neglect the important wider social impacts and the fundamental nature of trust. Children’s roles in discussions can be evaluated using the principles of consent: autonomy, freedom and information. Concepts such as relational autonomy help to explain mechanisms families use to negotiate complex consent decisions. Whilst interviewees supported the maintenance of legal parental consent, researchers must design consent processes centring the child to ensure that whole family decision-making processes are supported. (shrink)

Cartesian scepticism poses the question of how we can justify our belief that other humans experience consciousness in the same way that we do. Wittgenstein’s response to this scepticism is one that does not seek to resolve the problem by providing a sound argument against the Cartesian sceptic. Rather, he provides a method of philosophical inquiry which enables us to move past this and continue our inquiry without the possibility of solipsism arising as a philosophical problem in the first place. (...) In this paper, I propose that Wittgenstein’s method of dismissing the Cartesian sceptic can also be applied to the problems posed by the ‘moral sceptic’, who denies the truth of all ethical or moral claims. I will argue that in the same way Wittgenstein’s focus on public language enables us to dismiss the traditional problem of other minds, a focus on public moral practices or language-games also enables us to dismiss the idea that moral claims are always ‘meaningless’, ‘false’ or ‘nonsensical’. On this account, the moral sceptic is misguided in much the same way as the solipsist who implicitly admits the existence of other minds in her practices. The moral sceptic who still engages in moral activities also implicitly admits the existence of meaningful moral positions. Wittgenstein’s dismissal of the Cartesian sceptic, as I understand it, can be broadly divided into two parts. The first part is an account of language acquisition. This part outlines how we might come to see other humans as conscious, thinking, feeling beings from a causal perspective. This suggests that we can arrive at an understanding of other minds as a primary perception itself - without needing to posit this perception as a kind of deductive or inductive hypothesis. Secondly, we can see how this relates to an epistemic model of language. This focuses on the role of language as something which consists of rule-governed activities, where the existence of other minds is embedded in our understanding of the world as a kind of grammatical rule, rather than an observational hypothesis. From both these arguments the Cartesian sceptic is,, irrelevant to some forms of philosophical inquiry. This is because the sceptic takes the existence of other minds to be a rational hypothesis/inference when it is not. I suggest that this approach can be applied to moral scepticism if we take certain normative claims as grammatical dispositions, rather than rational or metaphysical propositions. Hence, the moral sceptic who offers a rational or logical critique of these moral foundations is not necessarily saying anything relevant to our practices – the moral stances which they refute as rationally meaningless were never based on purely rational or logical hypotheses in the first place. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch was a philosopher and novelist who wrote extensively on the themes of love, goodness, religion, and morality. In this article, we explore her notion of ‘moral vision’; the idea that morality is not just about how we act and make choices, but how we see the world in a much broader sense.

René Girard developed his theory largely as a response to what he saw as Freud's profound discovery, namely, a recognition that violence and conflict are at the root of all social relations. Girard, however, rejected Freud's psychology of the autonomous subject and his emphasis on the family of origin dynamics in favor of the intersubjective experience of mimetic desire occurring between persons anywhere at any age. With imitation of others as the guiding theoretical principle of mimetic theory, Girard placed psychological (...) movement in the relational realm and developed a psychology of interdividuality that offers a convincing account of the contagious rivalry that either directly or tacitly flows through much human... (shrink)

In this book, Catherine Frost uses evidence and case studies to offer a re-examination of declarations of independence and the language that comprises such documents. Considered as a quintessential form of founding speech in the modern era, declarations of independence are however poorly understood as a form of expression, and no one can completely account for how they work. Beginning with the founding speech in the American Declaration, Frost uses insights drawn from unexpected or unlikely forms of founding (...) in cases like Ireland and Canada to reconsider the role of time and loss in how such speech is framed. She brings the discussion up to date by looking at recent debates in Scotland, where an undeclared declaration of independence overshadows contemporary politics. Drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt and using a contextualist, comparative theory method, Frost demonstrates that the capacity for renewal through speech arises in aspects of language that operate beyond conventional performativity. Language, Democracy, and the Paradox of Constituent Power is an excellent resource for researchers and students of political theory, democratic theory, law, constitutionalism, and political history. (shrink)

In this symposium response, I suggest that a key to thinking about the implications of Hobbes’s materialism for his arguments about ethics, politics, and law is to trace his efforts to defend complex causation. I suggest that when we read Hobbes as trying to hold onto complex causation as an ontological and epistemological fact, we have to rethink the relationship between freedom, reason, sovereignty, and the law.