Özet Şii-İmamiyye’nin usûlde Mu’tezilenin etkisinde kaldığı iddiaları, hicri dördüncü asırdan itibaren dile getirilmektedir. Buna karşılık usûlî düşüncenin ilk mümessili sayılan Şeyh Müfîd’den itibaren mezhep içinden yükselen sesler bu iddiaları şiddetle reddetmişlerdir. Biz bu çalışmada Mu’tezile kelamına sistematik hüviyet kazandıran ve yazdığı eserlerle Mu’tezile kelamının bugüne ulaşmasında büyük pay sahibi olan Kâdî Abdülcebbâr ile İmamiyye’nin kelam düşüncesinin istikrar bulmasında ve Şeyh Müfîd’le başlatılan usûlî yaklaşımın benimsenip yaygınlaşmasında büyük bir yeri olan Ebû Ca’fer et-Tûsî arasında adalet ilkesi üzerinden bir karşılaştırma yaparak, söz (...) konusu iddiaların ne kadar sübut bulduğunu tespit etmeye çalıştık. Kısmi farklı izahları bir kenara bırakırsak, adalet ilkesinin ispat ve yorumlanmasında iki kelamcı arasında kayda değer bir farklılığın olmadığı görülmektedir. Abstract The claim that the Shi’i Imamite thought is heavily influenced by the Mu’tazilite outlook has been alleged since the fouth century of hijra. However, beginning with Shaikh Mufid, the first representative of the Usuli branch of Shi’a, the Shi’is vehemently denied this allegation. In this article, this issue is dealt with by making a comparison between the idea of Qadi Abd al-Jabbar, the prominent Mu’tazilite scholar who made a major contribution to the consolidation of the schools’ theaching and that of al-Tusi, who also made a contrubitued to the integration of the Shi’ite kalam and the spreading of the usuli approach initiated by Shaikh Mufid. Leaving aside the differences in deatil, it seems that there is no noteworthy difference between their approcah to the issue of justice. Key Words: Qâdî Abd al-Jabbâr, Abû Ja’far al-Tûsî, Husn-Qubh, Divine Justice, Free Will. (shrink)

1. Tasan ŭi kyŏnghak kwa yŏkhak -- 2. Tasanhak chʻongnon -- 3. Tasanhak kwa mongmin simsŏ -- 4. Sirhak sasang kwa Han sasang -- 5.Kaesin yuhak ŭro pon Hanʼguk chʻŏrhaksa -- 6. Kugyŏk Tasan sasŏ -- 7. Sasang uĭhak kwa saengmyŏng ŭihangnon -- 8. Hanʼguk munhwa ŭi insik, kugyŏkkanyangnok -- 9. Chamnok, susangnok, purok.

In his 1947 British Academy lecture on Naturalistic Ethics, Mr. W. F. R. Hardie is concerned to ask himself whether a naturalistic theory of ethics can give a “satisfactory account of our moral knowledge or convictions,” or whether some form of non-naturalism is demanded by our moral experience. It will be remembered that after a careful sifting and examination of certain features of our moral knowledge or convictions, Mr. Hardie suspends judgment between naturalism and non-naturalism, observing that “on the one (...) hand philosophers who start from the ostensible facts of our moral experience and thinking, and are most careful and accurate in their rendering of these facts, have tended to be led to objectivist and anti-naturalistic conclusions. Where they least carry conviction is in the moral epistemology which they assume or defend. When we reflect, with the epistemological issue in mind, on the actual process in ourselves of moral reflection and decision, we are more inclined to sympathize with a ‘moral sentiment’ theory than we ought to be if the rationalists are wholly in the right.” In what follows I wish to consider another feature of our moral experience which Mr. Hardie did not examine in his lecture and which appears to be of considerable importance, namely the situation where, to put it very roughly for the moment, we find ourselves at variance with another person or persons on a moral issue, where, for instance, I hold that a certain course of conduct is right, and the other person or persons hold that it is wrong, or vice versa , and where further we may pursue divergent courses of action accordingly. I wish to ask myself whether the naturalistic commentary on this situation of ethical disagreement is altogether satisfactory when we consider it in the light of “the ostensible facts of our moral experience and thinking,” whether, in fact, to use another phrase of Mr. Hardie's, it squares altogether with “our fundamental moral convictions” in regard to such a situation. The naturalistic commentary with which I am primarily concerned is that which is now sometimes labelled “the emotive theory of ethics,” and is to be found admirably developed, for example, in Professor Stevenson's book Ethics and Language. (shrink)

In this paper I combine the embodiment thesis with extended mind theory by introducing a unique theory on consciousness based on one of the most neglected philosophers: Von Hartmann. There will be a discussion based on two contemporary debates within the field of cognition: the computational theory versus the embodied theory of mind and consciousness versus unconsciousness. With the help of the theory of Von Hartmann, I will ask the question why we are unconscious -- as both Von Hartmann and (...) contemporary neuroscientists suggest -- and whether consciousness should be a state of the brain or mind alone. Subsequently, I will present the argument that consciousness is every physiological state and that the body continuously creates ideas. Following extended cognition theorists, the suggestion will be made that the environment can shape these ideas. This will result in a critique against the contemporary emphasis on the unconscious will. (shrink)

Irani takes a strongly thematic and interpretive approach to Plato's dialogues by working through a system of interdependent concepts and arguments that are central to understanding Plato's views on philosophy, its value, and methods. One may approach the network of themes in various ways, but a natural starting point is with the preface, introduction, and Irani's description of the book as "primarily a work of interpretation" of two Platonic dialogues that constitute its subject matter, the Gorgias and Phaedrus.In the introduction, (...) Irani sets up a frame conversation based on the Phaedo in which Socrates urges those in his company to resist feeling hatred for arguments, using the analogy... (shrink)

This article draws on resource‐based theory and the literature on strategic intent to develop a theoretical model that explains the concept of mission drift in microfinance institutions . We argue that the differential strategic intents of commercially oriented, for‐profit, and socially oriented nonprofit organizations drive the acquisition of disparate resources and capabilities, which in turn drives distinct performance outcomes, including a focus on different markets within the overall base of the pyramid . The article suggests that it is the dynamic (...) aspects of changing strategic intent and the consequent timing delays in the development of associated resources and capabilities that lead to various issues of mission drift. Finally, we suggest that cross‐sector alliances between for‐profit and nonprofit MFIs may benefit from the unique capabilities of both types of organizations and deliver the most and broadest impact on poverty alleviation in BOP markets. (shrink)

A conference celebrating the tercentenary of the publication of Leibniz’s Nouveau système will be held at the University of York, England, under the auspices of the Leibniz Gesellschaft of Hannover, and in collaboration with the British Society for the History of Philosophy, the Leibniz Society of North America, and the Lessico Intellettuale Europeo in Rome. Speakers will include R. M. Adams, S. Brown, G. Hartz, A. Lamarra, G. M. Ross, M. Mugnai, R. Palaia, G.H.R. Parkinson, P. Phemister, H. Poser, D. (...) Rutherford, C. Wilson. For further details contact Roger Woolhouse, Department of Philosophy, University of York, England Y01 5DD. (shrink)

Before talking about the vision of Orikhov's essence of the relationship between the church and the state, one must first determine what the church is about - Catholic or Orthodox. After all, the thinker lived in Poland when there were still strong, even parity positions of both denominations. He himself was brought up in a family where his father was Catholic and his mother was Orthodox. This was reflected in his mentality: he repeatedly publicly stated the benefits of certain tenets (...) of the Orthodox faith. But most of all he settled on the problem of relations between the Catholic Church and the state. (shrink)