H. G. Liddell & R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, rev. and aug. by Sir H. S. Jones. with the ass. of R. McKenzie, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940. ῥυθμός , Ion. ῥυσμός (v. infr. 111, IV), ὁ : (ῥέω) :— A. any regular recurring motion (“πᾶς ῥ. ὡρισμένῃ μετρεῖται κινήσει” Arist.Pr.882b2) : I. measured motion, time, whether in sound or motion, Democr.15c ; = ἡ τῆς κινήσεως τάξις, Pl.Lg.665a, cf. 672e ; “ὁ ῥ. ἐκ τοῦ ταχέος (...) - Études grecques (...) et latines. (shrink)

In a recent note Mr. T. B. Allen had corrected a reading of J. B. Cramer βρβειος ορ to προβτειος., but in a footnote he adds ‘When I made this correction I was not aware of the word πρβειος. Liddell and Scott and Sophocles share my ignorance. I found it in the Anecdota of Boissonade III 408: κ δ τν κρεν ρνιθας σθειν κα πρβεια κα περιστερς sim. 410, 412, 419. Boissonade quotes the word from a similar treatise by (...) Hierophilus, and the 1851 edition of Stephanus reproduces his note.’ This trisyllabic word πρβειος is obviously a ‘Reimbildung’ to ρνειος, μσχειος, ταρειος etc., and its occurrence clears up a papyrus reading which has long puzzled me. In P. Lond. 113, 10, 13 [VII] we read πρωβαων δερμτων, which Preisigke lists as ‘πρβαιος=προβτειος’ Until reading Allen's note I had supposed that the loss of the syllable -ατ- in προβτ-ειος, was a haplography induced by the following δερμ-τ-ων but there are now grounds for regarding the formation as genuine. Only the variation of the adjectival suffix -ειος × -αιος presents a difficulty. In clearing this up we shall be able to lay a number of ghost-words which have spooked in the second edition of Mayser's Grammatik der ptolemäischen Papyri. (shrink)

Ostensibly a directory of philosophical terms, this book is actually far more: a relatively sophisticated introduction into the thinking of Greek philosophers through a historical examination of key terms and concepts. Seeking as far as possible to set the terms in their own context without the ramifications of later context and connotation, Peters approaches each as it were both vertically and horizontally. Entries, given in Roman alphabetization, are arranged in dictionary style and range from a line or so to eight (...) or ten pages for crucial terms like noûs or psyche. An English-Greek index provides the Greek equivalent for English terms. Each entry is generously cross-referenced, and the whole preceded by a brief but stimulating preface and preliminary note on language and philosophy. "To lighten the historical baggage" Peters substitutes generally a terminology transliterated from the Greek; this offers the enormous advantage of breaking through the frustrating ambiguity of would-be English translations; it also makes the terminology available to the many without a knowledge of Greek. On the other hand it might have been useful to have retained the original Greek alphabetization alongside the Romanized transliteration--partly as a bridge to the recognition of the Greek terms as they occur in the literature, and partly as a bridge in the reverse direction for those for whom the Romanized transliteration likewise requires a pause of recognition. Again, the book is geared to "the intermediate student"--rather than to either the beginner who, as Peters himself observes, would be better served by a history of ancient philosophy and perhaps a dictionary of basic terms, or the professional scholar who would require a treatment "both more massive and more nuanced." Thus it offers far less in the way of detailed references but far more meat in terms of substantial content than, say, Liddell and Scott. Any frustration experienced by the professional scholar in the treatment of his own particular interest and competence is, however, outweighed by the value of the book as a tool of reference useful not only to students and scholars in philosophy, but also to those in classics, theology, and even linguistics.--R. D. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Lexicographica Graeca: Contributions to Greek LexicographyGregory R. CraneJohn Chadwick. Lexicographica Graeca: Contributions to Greek Lexicography. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. vi 1 343 pp. Cloth, $85.This books constitutes, as the opening sentence of the introduction states, “the product of a lifetime of Greek studies,” and every Hellenist is aware of John Chadwick’s work on Linear B. Less conspicuous but immensely important have been his lexicographic efforts, the influence that (...) he has had upon the new [End Page 636] supplement to LSJ, and the impact that he promises to have upon the desperately needed revision to the Liddell-Scott Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon. His Lexicographica Graeca allows us to assess many of his ideas and reveals to an audience beyond the committees, memos, and private presentations of scholarly production the directions in which he would like future work to proceed. The majority of the book consists of notes and analyses on individual entries in LSJ—one could describe Lexicographica Graeca as a three-hundred-page referee’s report that found its way into print. In many cases, the comments assume that readers will have first familiarized themselves with the LSJ entry. Few without strong lexicographic interests may find this exercise appealing, but anyone seriously concerned with the ways in which we write about Greek language will find plenty to consider in this publication. The thirty-page introduction, however, is well written and engaging, and I imagine that this section of the book will be much photocopied and much more widely read. In itself it is a document of great historical importance and should be scrutinized carefully by any subsequent historian of the study of Greek, for Chadwick articulates a succinct but broad-minded view of where Greek lexicography stands as the twentieth century comes to an end.Yet there is a central irony to this publication. Chadwick’s introduction dwells quite engagingly on the length of his career, but he makes it clear towards the end that he still sees himself as the bright young man who began more than forty years ago to challenge a hidebound establishment. He prophesies “with assurance” (and, it might be added, with obvious relish) “that many of the new ideas to be found in these pages will be attacked and rejected simply because they are not what everyone expects to find” (25). While I can see much that is new and can imagine outraged philologists shaking their heads at Chadwick’s presumption (if anyone of his distinction and seniority can be said to be presumptuous), I find the book itself to be significant precisely because it takes traditional lexicography about as far as it can go. It stands at—and, I suspect, marks—the end of a tradition of lexicographic practice that Liddell and Scott began more than a century and a half ago.All of our assumptions about what a lexicon can and might be must take into account the physical media at our disposal. The limitations and strengths of LSJ are inextricably intermeshed with the limitations and strengths of the printed codex. Chadwick is acutely aware of this: he prints (19) a formula that equates the “efficiency” of a lexicon to “usefulness” divided by “weight”: in other words, a 2 kilogram lexicon is half as efficient as a 1 kilogram lexicon. He agonizes over the fact that any enlargement would have to be justified in terms of the added weight (29). He is not unaware of electronic tools and offers the commonplace assertion (28) that “whatever the future of personal computers, it is hard to imagine that we shall ever be able to dispense with the printed book.” He then goes on to make a subtly perceptive statement: “For most purposes small-scale dictionaries will always be needed” (emphasis mine). The qualification [End Page 637] is significant in that he makes no attempt to argue explicitly for the value of massive print lexicons, instead shifting his ground to much more defensible smaller publications.The codex is a horrible medium for the publication of massive reference works in which readers look up small bits of information at a time and which ought to be updated on a regular basis... (shrink)

Analogy among characters is not the only structural device which blurs the boundaries of the self. The very repetition of the act of narration, involving a chain of quotations, makes the story a perfect example of what Jakobson calls "speech within speech"1 and divorces the various characters from their own discourse. In addition to the real author's speech to the real reader, crystallized in that of the implied author to the implied reader, the whole story is the speech of an (...) extradiegetic-heterodiegetic narrator who, in the footnote, calls himself "editor" and who sums up Liddell Hart's account and juxtaposes it with Yu Tsun's dictated statement. Just as the editor quotes Tsun, so Tsun, an extradiegetic-homodiegetic narrator, quotes Albert who in turn quotes Ts'ui Pên, sometimes verbatim, as in the case of the crucial letter, sometimes by conjecture, as in the instance of Pên's supposed declarations about the book and the maze. Quotation, then, is a dominant narrative mode in this story, and quotation is the appropriation by one person of the speech of another. Since a person is to a large extent constituted by one person of his discourse, such an appropriation implies, at least partly, an interpenetration of personalities. Thus both repetition through analogy and repetition through quotation threaten the absolute autonomy of the self. · 1. Roman Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in Essays on the Language of Literature, ed. Seymour Chatman and Samuel R. Levin , pp. 296-322. Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan is a senior lecturer in the department of English at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The author of The Concept of Ambiguity: The Example of James, she is currently writing on the poetics of repetition and, in collaboration with Moshe Ron, on contemporary narrative theory. (shrink)

Irani takes a strongly thematic and interpretive approach to Plato's dialogues by working through a system of interdependent concepts and arguments that are central to understanding Plato's views on philosophy, its value, and methods. One may approach the network of themes in various ways, but a natural starting point is with the preface, introduction, and Irani's description of the book as "primarily a work of interpretation" of two Platonic dialogues that constitute its subject matter, the Gorgias and Phaedrus.In the introduction, (...) Irani sets up a frame conversation based on the Phaedo in which Socrates urges those in his company to resist feeling hatred for arguments, using the analogy... (shrink)

This article draws on resource‐based theory and the literature on strategic intent to develop a theoretical model that explains the concept of mission drift in microfinance institutions . We argue that the differential strategic intents of commercially oriented, for‐profit, and socially oriented nonprofit organizations drive the acquisition of disparate resources and capabilities, which in turn drives distinct performance outcomes, including a focus on different markets within the overall base of the pyramid . The article suggests that it is the dynamic (...) aspects of changing strategic intent and the consequent timing delays in the development of associated resources and capabilities that lead to various issues of mission drift. Finally, we suggest that cross‐sector alliances between for‐profit and nonprofit MFIs may benefit from the unique capabilities of both types of organizations and deliver the most and broadest impact on poverty alleviation in BOP markets. (shrink)

A conference celebrating the tercentenary of the publication of Leibniz’s Nouveau système will be held at the University of York, England, under the auspices of the Leibniz Gesellschaft of Hannover, and in collaboration with the British Society for the History of Philosophy, the Leibniz Society of North America, and the Lessico Intellettuale Europeo in Rome. Speakers will include R. M. Adams, S. Brown, G. Hartz, A. Lamarra, G. M. Ross, M. Mugnai, R. Palaia, G.H.R. Parkinson, P. Phemister, H. Poser, D. (...) Rutherford, C. Wilson. For further details contact Roger Woolhouse, Department of Philosophy, University of York, England Y01 5DD. (shrink)