In this work, the author has fashioned out of the logical and linguistic theses of his earlier books a full-scale but readily intelligible account of moral argument.

Many practical issues in medical ethics depend on an understanding of the concept of health. The main question is whether it is a purely descriptive or a partly evaluative or normative concept. After posing some puzzles about the concept, the views of C Boorse, who thinks it is descriptive, are discussed and difficulties are found for them. An evaluative treatment is then suggested, and used to shed light on some problems about mental illness and to compare and contrast it with (...) physical illness and with political and other deviancies which are not illnesses. (shrink)

Spiritual Theology's journey through these last decades shows an itinerary of development, the fruit of which is an ever more solid identity. This book seeks to present a perspective in that itinerary and in tune with the signs of our times: on one hand, militant secularism and, on the other, a widespread, concrete resurgence of experiences of transcendence. In this sense, the author is presenting a path of study organized around five concepts: presence, mystery, transcendence, lived experience, and transformation. In (...) effect, the inner transformation worked by the Presence of Mystery leaves a new knowing, in which the relationship with reality is renewed, since it has expanded and dilated beyond sensible perception, opening the subject up to an unlimited and real horizon of transcendence. The awareness of perceiving a 'greater reality' within reality leaves an emotional resonance that teaches a new way of feeling and reacting in the face of sensibly perceived reality. (shrink)

Philosophy &Public Affairs, Volume 47, Issue 1, Page 72-103, Winter 2019.

The nineteen essays that form this pioneering volume of comparative philosophy represent an exchange of ideas among specialists in Neoplatonism and specialists in Indian thought. These scholars have examined concepts and assertions that appear to be common to both philosophical traditions, as well as the possible historical influence of Indian sources upon late Greek philosophy, and specifically upon the Alexandrine Platonists. While most of the essays refer to Hinduism, several of them contain general surveys.

Hare first argues that his theory applies equally to instrumental and intrinsic goodness. He then goes on to show that his theory also holds for ‘good’ in both the non‐moral and moral context. People are falsely led to believe that ‘good’ is used differently in these contexts, Hare claims, because its descriptive meaning differs. Its evaluative meaning, however, is the same: in the moral context ‘good’ is always used to directly or indirectly commend people or human characters.

Hare argues that one exception to the rule that no imperative conclusion can validly be drawn from premises that do not contain at least one imperative are ‘hypothetical imperatives’ because their content, though of an imperative, is that of a statement implicit in the premises. He then argues that no ethical theory can be a ‘Cartesian’ moral system, i.e. consist of particular duties derived from self‐evident principles alone. Finally, three arguments are given why description can never be prescription, and thus (...) that no imperative can be inferred from indicative alone. (shrink)

Introduces the main themes of the book and expresses the basic conflict between freedom and reason.

Establishes that aesthetic judgements are universalizable and addresses the problem of delimiting moral from aesthetic and evaluative questions. It is argued that there are at least two kinds of grounds on which someone might claim to know what the best thing to do is: interests and ideals. The question of ideals is elaborated in the subsequent discussion. It is argued that when interests are not concerned, conflicts between ideals are not susceptible to much in the way of argument; conflicts between (...) interests, if ideals are not involved, can be reconciled by means of the moral reasoning generated by the logic of moral terms. (shrink)

Intuitionism, the second type of descriptivism, is the theory that the truth conditions of moral statements depend on irreducible moral properties, which must be defined in moral terms. The intuitionist claims that we have knowledge of moral truths derived from moral intuition. However, because it is a subjective experience, one person's intuition may differ from another's, and the theory offers no way to decide between them. Intuitionism, Hare argues, is really a kind of Subjectivist Naturalism, or Subjectivism; and, as with (...) Naturalism, it also leads to relativism. Therefore, because it is exhausted by these two theories, descriptivism in general must be abandoned if we are to attain the sort of objectivity that will allow us to avoid relativism. (shrink)

Provisionally characterizes the difference between indicatives and imperatives in terms of assent: while assenting to a statement involves believing something, assenting to a command involves doing something. Considering the logic of indicatives and imperatives, Hare distinguishes between the part of the sentence common to both and that which is different, but argues that the entailment relations of ordinary logic are relations between the phrastic of sentences for both moods. Moreover, Hare claims that no imperative conclusion can validly be drawn from (...) premises that do not contain at least one imperative. (shrink)

Revisits the question of the relation between ethics, considered as a study of the logical character of moral concepts, and substantive moral questions. It covers much of the ground of previous chapters in an attempt to forestall confusion and clarify the theses embraced in the course of the book. The naturalist theory of ethics is contrasted at length with the thesis on moral argument outlined in this book.

Hare argues that ‘good’ is not a simple property as e.g. ‘red’, for unlike ‘red’, ‘good’ does not always refer to a common property whenever it is applied. The same holds for ‘instrumentally good’. At the same time, though, we are able to learn the use of ‘good’ without being taught what in a particular class of objects entitles us to apply ‘good’ to a member of that class. Hence, Hare claims, all uses of ‘good’ must have a common meaning, (...) but different criteria of application. (shrink)

One of the most dynamic areas of plant molecular biology is the investigation of the actions of three classes of herbicides: s‐triazines (atrazine, simazine), glyphosate, and sulfonylureas (chlorsulfuron, sulfometuron methyl) (Figure 1). The results of this work are expected to provide the first significant applications of plant biotechnology: directly, in the genetic engineering of crop plants resistant to specific herbicides and, indirectly, in providing a molecular basis for the rational design of new herbicides for specific biological targets.s‐Triazines affect photosynthesis by (...) inhibiting the binding of quinones to the chloroplast membrane QB protein. An s‐triazine resistant QB protein isolated from weeds in fields consistently treated with the herbicide has a serine in place of a glycine in this highly conserved protein. Glyphosate inhibits 5‐enolpyruvyl‐shikimate‐3‐phosphate synthase (EPSP synthase), an enzyme in the aromatic amino acid biosynthetic pathway. Mutagenized bacteria produce a resistant EPSP synthase with a substitution of serine for proline. Sulfonylureas inhibit the acetolactate synthase (ALS) of bacteria, yeast, and higher plants; this enzyme catalyzes the first step in the synthesis of branched chain amino acids. Resistant ALS has been found in bacteria, yeast and tobacco with a proline substituted by serine in yeast ALS. These findings provide a strong basis for developing projected plant biotechnology applications. (shrink)