The article discusses the problems of philosophical geography, philosophical multipolarity, georationality. The debates on these issues are becoming interdisciplinary. Specialists in Eastern philosophies and cross-cultural communications as well as epistemologists, scientific methodologists, cognitive scholars, synergists became participants of the discussion held at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The problem of Eurocentrism in academic philosophy has become the main topic of discussion. The opponents of the “regional” multipolarity argued that the Western European tradition of rationality was (...) an example of the rationality per se. The proponents, who relied heavily on the ad professionem arguments, advocated multipolarity and demonstrated the irreducibility of the world-pictures, languages and ontologies of philosophical systems. A point of view was expressed that Eurocentrism had an ideological background. The disputants noted that there was need to redefine or clarify such fundamental concepts as logic, rationality, scientific rationality, universalism, processuality. The redefinition of the concept of rationality is for the studies of various types of rationality outside European cultures. Methodologists of science drew attention that the cognitive problems of intercultural communications turned out to be similar to the problems faced by theory of complexity. The analysis of philosophical, logical and other cases in various “zones of exchange” reveals a plurality of directions in the global and local socio-cultural spaces. The panelists raised the question of the role of philosophy in the global world and its responsibility in uniting nations. The authors of the article draw attention to many functions that the Western European conceptual system performs in the formation of philosophical language, mentality and communication. The dynamics of philosophical discussions, the dialogue of the West and the East lead to the clarification of philosophical positions, the emergence of new concepts and meanings as well as the formation of discourses of the future. (shrink)

The article is devoted to Miguel Servet (Michael Servetus, Spain – Miguel Serveto, also known as Miguel Servet, Miguel Serveto, Revés, or Michel de Villeneuve) – the XVI century Spanish thinker who was recognized as a heretic and burnt at the stake in Geneva in 1553.The author discusses the specifics of Servet’s philosophical system, the scientific background of his system, and his key ideas that have become a matter for auto-da-fė. The author argues that Servet’s concept was aimed to reconstruct (...) the “pure” Christian dogma, although he was not a professional theologist. The author claims that Servet used the deep knowledge in geography, astronomy, medicine, linguistics to create his complex system which was aimed to rescue the mankind from total destruction (Apocalypse). The author claims that Servet’s system could be considered as an example of interdisciplinary approach in the pre-disciplinary epoch. Moreover, Servet’s approach to the problem of personal salvation and the transformation of the humane nature is based on empirical scientific data. Hence, it is appropriate to consider his philosophical system as a mixture of theology, natural science and humanities. (shrink)

According to T. M. Scanlon's buck‐passing account, the normative realm of reasons is in some sense prior to the domain of value. Intrinsic value is not itself a property that provides us with reasons; rather, to be good is to have some other reason‐giving property, so that facts about intrinsic value amount to facts about how we have reason to act and to respond. The paper offers an interpretation and defense of this approach to the relation between reasons and values. (...) I start by acknowledging the role that substantive values play in specifications of our reasons, noting that this poses an apparent challenge to the buck‐passing account. The challenge can be met, however, if we adopt a deliberative understanding of substantive value, an interpretation that I proceed to develop and defend. In conclusion I consider recent attempts to capture the agent‐relativity of reasons within a teleological framework for thinking about the relation between reasons and values. I argue that these approaches rest on a deliberative understanding of value; the teleological framework thus turns out to illustrate the basic insight of the buck‐passing approach, rather than offering an alternative to it. (shrink)

1. Tasan ŭi kyŏnghak kwa yŏkhak -- 2. Tasanhak chʻongnon -- 3. Tasanhak kwa mongmin simsŏ -- 4. Sirhak sasang kwa Han sasang -- 5.Kaesin yuhak ŭro pon Hanʼguk chʻŏrhaksa -- 6. Kugyŏk Tasan sasŏ -- 7. Sasang uĭhak kwa saengmyŏng ŭihangnon -- 8. Hanʼguk munhwa ŭi insik, kugyŏkkanyangnok -- 9. Chamnok, susangnok, purok.

R F Dearden; Play and Pleasure, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 5, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 37–41, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1971.tb0044.

For most of the church's history, people have seen Christian ethics as normative and universally applicable. Recently, however, this view has been lost, thanks to naturalism and relativism. R. Scott Smith argues that Christians need to overcome Kant's fact-value dichotomy and recover the possibility of genuine moral and theological knowledge.

In his 1947 British Academy lecture on Naturalistic Ethics, Mr. W. F. R. Hardie is concerned to ask himself whether a naturalistic theory of ethics can give a “satisfactory account of our moral knowledge or convictions,” or whether some form of non-naturalism is demanded by our moral experience. It will be remembered that after a careful sifting and examination of certain features of our moral knowledge or convictions, Mr. Hardie suspends judgment between naturalism and non-naturalism, observing that “on the one (...) hand philosophers who start from the ostensible facts of our moral experience and thinking, and are most careful and accurate in their rendering of these facts, have tended to be led to objectivist and anti-naturalistic conclusions. Where they least carry conviction is in the moral epistemology which they assume or defend. When we reflect, with the epistemological issue in mind, on the actual process in ourselves of moral reflection and decision, we are more inclined to sympathize with a ‘moral sentiment’ theory than we ought to be if the rationalists are wholly in the right.” In what follows I wish to consider another feature of our moral experience which Mr. Hardie did not examine in his lecture and which appears to be of considerable importance, namely the situation where, to put it very roughly for the moment, we find ourselves at variance with another person or persons on a moral issue, where, for instance, I hold that a certain course of conduct is right, and the other person or persons hold that it is wrong, or vice versa , and where further we may pursue divergent courses of action accordingly. I wish to ask myself whether the naturalistic commentary on this situation of ethical disagreement is altogether satisfactory when we consider it in the light of “the ostensible facts of our moral experience and thinking,” whether, in fact, to use another phrase of Mr. Hardie's, it squares altogether with “our fundamental moral convictions” in regard to such a situation. The naturalistic commentary with which I am primarily concerned is that which is now sometimes labelled “the emotive theory of ethics,” and is to be found admirably developed, for example, in Professor Stevenson's book Ethics and Language. (shrink)

In Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen, we defended the following claims: Not only states of affairs, or facts, but also concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value ; The final value of a concrete object need not be intrinsic, i.e., it need not be exclusively based on the internal properties of its bearer; The final value of a concrete object is not reducible to the value of some states of affairs that involve the object in question. Our arguments (...) for – have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano-inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a yet another type of reduction proposal, according to which the ultimate bearers of final value are abstract particulars rather than abstract states or facts. While the proposal is attractive, it confronts serious difficulties. To recognise tropes as potential bearers of final value, along with other objects, is one thing; but to reduce the final value of concrete objects to the final value of tropes is another matter. (shrink)

I Norge er ikke surrogati tillatt, og myndighetene fraråder norske statsborgere å benytte seg av surrogati i utlandet. I denne artikkelen fokuserer vi på kommersiell gestational surrogati og stiller spørsmålet: Bør man tillate at norske statsborgere benytter seg av surrogati i India? De etiske problemstillingene rundt surrogati er mange og sammensatte og blir spesielt utfordrende når tjenesten tilbys i et land med store kulturelle og økonomiske forskjeller både internt og i forhold til Norge. Vi baserer analysen og drøftingen av dette (...) etisk utfordrende spørsmålet på Beauchamps og Childress sin veletablerte metodiske tilnærming innen biomedisinsk etikk. Vi anvender de fire allmennmoralske prinsipper: respekt for autonomi, velgjørenhet, ikke-skade og rettferdighet på sakskomplekset for å synliggjøre spenningene involvert i dette etiske dilemmaet. Med full bevissthet om at det ikke finnes noen lettvinte og omkostningsfrie løsninger på dilemmaer generelt og dette spesielt, konkluderer vi med at interessene til de berørte parter, og spesielt surrogatmødrenes, kan bli bedre ivaretatt om surrogati tillates under omfattende reguleringer. Dersom man velger å gjøre praksisen illegal, vil man også miste mulighetene til å påvirke prosessen og sikre rettighetene til de involverte partene.Nøkkelord: surrogati, Norge–India, utnyttelse, autonomi, regulering av prosessenEnglish summary: Should Norwegian citizens be permitted to use surrogacy in India?Surrogacy is not permitted in Norway, and the government strongly advises against Norwegian citizens travelling abroad to have children through the use of the surrogacy industry. In this article, we focus on commercial gestational surrogacy and debate the question: Should Norwegian citizens be permitted to use surrogacy in India? The ethical concerns regarding surrogacy are complex and are especially challenging when the service is offered in a country with big cultural and economic differences both internal and in comparison to Norway. We base our analysis of this ethical, challenging question on Beauchamp’s and Childress’s well-established approach within biomedical ethics. We apply the four principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and justice to shed light on the conflicts of interests in this ethical dilemma. With full awareness that there are no simple and correct solutions to dilemmas in general and on this issue, especially, our conclusion is that the interests of the involved parties, and especially those of the surrogate mothers, might be better attended to if surrogacy is allowed with extensive regulations. If this practice is made illegal, the opportunity to influence the process and secure the rights of the involved parties is lost. (shrink)

this article is based on a paper that I presented during the annual meeting of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, as a keynote speaker in the Coss Dialogue sessions. I was pleasantly surprised to hear that most participants of SAAP use the term "American" in its continental, rather than in the US-centric sense. I am glad that many of the philosophers of this community of knowledge have opened their dialogues to the voices and experiences south of the (...) Río Bravo. We are living during very difficult times in which cultures and practices of violence, as well as aggressive exclusion and intolerance, are affecting our communities on both sides of the border. In this context of multiple... (shrink)

In this paper I combine the embodiment thesis with extended mind theory by introducing a unique theory on consciousness based on one of the most neglected philosophers: Von Hartmann. There will be a discussion based on two contemporary debates within the field of cognition: the computational theory versus the embodied theory of mind and consciousness versus unconsciousness. With the help of the theory of Von Hartmann, I will ask the question why we are unconscious -- as both Von Hartmann and (...) contemporary neuroscientists suggest -- and whether consciousness should be a state of the brain or mind alone. Subsequently, I will present the argument that consciousness is every physiological state and that the body continuously creates ideas. Following extended cognition theorists, the suggestion will be made that the environment can shape these ideas. This will result in a critique against the contemporary emphasis on the unconscious will. (shrink)

Irani takes a strongly thematic and interpretive approach to Plato's dialogues by working through a system of interdependent concepts and arguments that are central to understanding Plato's views on philosophy, its value, and methods. One may approach the network of themes in various ways, but a natural starting point is with the preface, introduction, and Irani's description of the book as "primarily a work of interpretation" of two Platonic dialogues that constitute its subject matter, the Gorgias and Phaedrus.In the introduction, (...) Irani sets up a frame conversation based on the Phaedo in which Socrates urges those in his company to resist feeling hatred for arguments, using the analogy... (shrink)