In diesem Band werden verschiedene Horizonte des Nachdenkens über Nietzsche eröffnet, so wie es sich nach 1933 in den unterschiedlichsten Exil-Ländern um Deutschland herum darstellte. In den Beiträgen wird mit dem zentralen Bild vom EXIL bei Nietzsche sowohl auf die prinzipielle Distanz seines Denkes gegenüber jeder Form des Totalitarismus als auch auf dessen lebendigen Impetus von Philosophie als Unterwegs-Sein hingewiesen. Autoren sind u. a. der Nestor deutscher Nietzsche-Forschung Eugen Biser, aus Finnland Tarmo Kunnas, aus Israel Dominique Bourel, Milos Havelka aus (...) Prag und der Senior der Kritischen Theorie Hermann Schweppenhäuser. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 24 Heft: 1 Seiten: 401-406.

How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. First, it (...) reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right-kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that irrationality can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Length of manuscript: 85,000 words. (shrink)

It is often argued that there are no practical reasons for belief because we could not believe for such reasons. A recent reply by pragmatists is that we can often believe for practical reasons because we can often cause our beliefs for practical reasons. This paper reveals the limits of this recently popular strategy for defending pragmatism, and thereby reshapes the dialectical options for pragmatism. I argue that the strategy presupposes that reasons for being in non-intentional states are not reducible (...) to reasons to act. Pragmatists who want to preserve a motivational constraint on reasons therefore have exactly two options: either arguing that there are irreducible reasons for being in non-intentional states ; or arguing that we can believe directly for practical reasons. I argue that the prospects for the former option are dim because irreducible reasons to be in states are hard to square with the motivational constraint on reasons. Returning to the more traditional route of arguing for pragmatism by defending a version of doxastic voluntarism therefore seems to be the more promising way for pragmatists to go. (shrink)

Egalitarian theories assess when and why distributive inequalities are objectionable. How should egalitarians assess inequalities between generations? One egalitarian theory is (telic) distributive egalitarianism: other things being equal, equal distributions of some good are intrinsically better than unequal distributions. I first argue that distributive egalitarianism produces counterintuitive judgements when applied across generations and that attempts to discount or exclude intergenerational inequalities do not work. This being so, intergenerational comparisons also undercut the intragenerational judgements that made distributive egalitarianism intuitive in the (...) first place. I then argue that egalitarians should shed distributive egalitarianism: relational and instrumental arguments against inequality likely suffice to capture egalitarian concerns – including across generations – without encountering the problems produced by distributive egalitarianism. (shrink)

Freedom is among the central values in political philosophy. Freedom also features heavily in normative arguments in ethics, politics, and law. Yet different sides often invoke freedom to establish very different conclusions. Some argue that freedom imposes strict constraints on state power. For example, when promoting public health, there is a limit on how far the state can interfere with individual freedom. Others, in contrast, argue that freedom is not just a constraint but also an important goal of state power (...) and collective action. Good public health policy, for example, promotes people’s freedom. Of course, different arguments often draw on different theories of freedom. So, to evaluate such arguments, we need to analyze these different theories and their implications and assess their plausibility. -/- The broadly liberal tradition views freedom as being about external options. Such theories typically start with an account of when someone has a specific freedom or unfreedom to do something. For example, some argue that only a narrow set of interpersonal interferences count as constraints on freedom. Others argue that a far broader set of factors, including ill health and natural constraints, can reduce one’s freedom. -/- Since the 1980s and 1990s, scholarship has increasingly recognized that to use liberal freedom in normative arguments, one must move beyond specific freedom and unfreedom. Most laws and policies both subtract and add specific freedoms. What matters is how a person’s freedom is affected overall. Philosophers and economists have thus engaged in intricate debates about how to measure overall freedom. Moreover, policies and law affect not only one person at one point in time but also multiple persons across time. So, liberal freedom-based arguments also require distributive criteria for intertemporal and interpersonal distributions of freedom. -/- In the early 21st century, republicanism has developed into a prominent alternative to liberal theories. Republicans argue that being a free person is not just, or not even primarily, about liberal option-freedom. Freedom requires being free from dominating power. Republicans and liberals have engaged in a lively debate on who offers the better theory. In developing the republican ideal, republicans also engage in intramural debates. For example, is domination primarily an interpersonal or structural phenomenon? And what economic institutions does republicanism imply? -/- Theorizing around freedom has become richer and moved from narrower questions regarding specific freedom and unfreedom to overall freedom and to republican theories of nondomination. But recent theorizing also seeks to extend its focus and scope. Historically, theorizing started with the freedom of able-bodied male citizens within nation states. Recent theorizing shifts the focus to include issues around gender, disability, freedom at the international level, and the freedom of nonhuman animals and future generations. Beyond fascinating implications of existing theories, a more inclusive focus is likely to also yield important lessons on how current theories can be improved. (shrink)

The essays in this collection are the outgrowth of a workshop, held in June 1976, on formal approaches to the semantics and pragmatics of natural languages. They document in an astoundingly uniform way the develop ments in the formal analysis of natural languages since the late sixties. The avowed aim of the' workshop was in fact to assess the progress made in the application of formal methods to semantics, to confront different approaches to essentially the same problems on the one (...) hand, and, on the other, to show the way in relating semantic and pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena. Several of these papers can in fact be regarded as attempts to close the 'semiotic circle' by bringing together the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties of certain constructions in an explanatory framework thereby making it more than obvious that these three components of an integrated linguistic theory cannot be as neatly separated as one would have liked to believe. In other words, not only can we not elaborate a syntactic description of (a fragment of) a language and then proceed to the semantics (as Montague pointed out already forcefully in 1968), we cannot hope to achieve an adequate integrated syntax and semantics without paying heed to the pragmatic aspects of the constructions involved. The behavior of polarity items, 'quantifiers' like any, conditionals or even logical particles like and and or in non-indicative sentences is clear-cut evidence for the need to let each component of the grammar inform the other. (shrink)

Excerpt from Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen Der Titel der Sammlung musste naturlich eine Verallgemeinerung im Sinne dieses erweiterten Programmes erfahren. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such (...) as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

Synthetic biologists try to engineer useful biological systems that do not exist in nature. One of their goals is to design an orthogonal chromosome different from DNA and RNA, termed XNA for xeno nucleic acids. XNA exhibits a variety of structural chemical changes relative to its natural counterparts. These changes make this novel information‐storing biopolymer “invisible” to natural biological systems. The lack of cognition to the natural world, however, is seen as an opportunity to implement a genetic firewall that impedes (...) exchange of genetic information with the natural world, which means it could be the ultimate biosafety tool. Here I discuss, why it is necessary to go ahead designing xenobiological systems like XNA and its XNA binding proteins; what the biosafety specifications should look like for this genetic enclave; which steps should be carried out to boot up the first XNA life form; and what it means for the society at large. (shrink)

As part of the SYNBIOSAFE project, we carried out an open electronic conference (e-conference), with the aim to stimulate an open debate on the societal issues of synthetic biology in a proactive way. The e-conference attracted 124 registered participants from 23 different countries and different professional backgrounds, who wrote 182 contributions in six different categories: (I) Ethics; (II) Safety; (III) Security; (IV) IPR; (V) Governance and regulation; (VI) and Public perception. In this paper we discuss the main arguments brought up (...) during the e-conference and provide our conclusions about how the community thinks, and thinks differently on the societal impact of synthetic biology. Finally we conclude that there is a chance for an open discourse on the societal issues of synthetic biology happening, and that the rules to govern such a discourse might be set up much easier and be respected more readily than many would suggest. (shrink)

Sartre pädagogisch lesen, dies ist bislang versäumt worden. Zu entdecken ist in seinem Denken eine deutliche Nähe zum Bildungsbegriff des frühen Nietzsche und damit auch eine Akzentuierung der Selbstverantwortlichkeit des Subjekts gegenüber allen situativen Einschränkungen seiner Freiheit. In Zeiten einer drohenden Selbstabdankung des Subjekts ist die Anknüpfung an Sartres Verständnis der Authentizität hilfreich für das Bemühen um die Neuformulierung eines tragfähigen Bildungsbegriffs. Die Sportpädagogik gewinnt über Sartres Analysen des Körpers eine bis heute unerschlossene phänomenologische Perspektive auf ihre anthropologischen Grundlagen.

In der klassischen Metaphysik war der alle speziellen Aspekte der Wirklichkeit übergreifende Gesichtspunkt der des „Seins". Dem entspricht in Puntels Buch ein Theorierahmen für das uneingeschränkte „universe of discourse". Methodisch angemessen ist ihm ein nicht-fundamentalistisches kohärentiell-reflexives Begreifen, dem sich auch die Sache selbst in eben dieser Struktur darstellt, nämlich als Beziehungseinheit von Begriff und Wirklichkeit, von Semantik und Ontologie, woraus sich sowohl eine an der Sprache orientierte Sicht der Dinge ergibt als auch eine mit dem Ganzen koextensive, also sich selbst (...) einschließende Geist-Strukur als reflexiver Maßstab allen Begreifens. Damit ist eine „prima philosophia" wiedergewonnen, die als methodisch-inhaltlicher Rahmen für das Begreifen der einzelnen Bereiche des Universums geeignet ist, nämlich der Naturphilosophie und Anthropologie, der Ethik und Ästhetik, der Geschichts- und Religionsphilosophie.In classical metaphysics, „Being" constituted the one viewpoint, which encompassed all particular aspects of reality. In Puntel's book, corresponding to this viewpoint is a theoretical framework for the unrestricted „universe of discourse." For him, a non fundamentalist comprehension of reality will be methodologically adequate, insofar as it is both coherent and reflexive. For only in and though the structure of this comprehending can the subject matter present itself as a relational unity of concept and reality, and of semantics and ontology. This structure will yield both a view of things that is linguistically orientated, as well as a mind-structure that is coextensive with the whole of reality, itself included. This mind-structure serves, then, as a reflexive criterion for all acts of comprehension. With this, the book regains a „prima philosophia," understood as a methodological and content-filled framework suitable for the comprehension of individual spheres of the universe, namely, the philosophy of nature and anthropology, ethics an aesthetics, as well as the philosophy of history and religion. (shrink)

Purpose: The paper provides an overview of Ernst von Glasersfeld's life and theory, concentrating on subjects such as the acquisition of knowledge, language and communication, ethical questions, and aspects of teaching and learning. Conclusion: Ernst von Glasersfeld interests cover a wide range of disciplines. Therefore his work is genuinely rooted in interdisciplinarity.

Die Autorinnen und Autoren dieses Bandes analysieren in kritischer Weise die Breite und Tiefe des Diskurses zu Neuro-Enhancement, der sich aber nicht nur durch ethische Fragen auszeichnet. Sie zeigen, dass es darüber hinaus grundlegende philosophische, anthropologische und gesellschaftstheoretische Aspekte sind, die im Steigerungsbedürfnis spätmoderner Leistungsgesellschaften zu Tage treten. So scheint eine neue Wunschwelt vor der Tür zu stehen: Doping fürs Gehirn! Der rasante Fortschritt der Neurowissenschaften hat das menschliche Gehirn erreicht. Die Möglichkeiten der Leistungssteigerung könnten bald auch das „Innerste“ des (...) Menschen essentiell betreffen: sein Denken und Fühlen, Entscheiden und Handeln. Die Herausgeber Prof. Dr. Nicola Erny ist Professorin für Philosophie an der Hochschule Darmstadt. Dr. Matthias Herrgen lehrte am Philosophischen Seminar der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität in Münster. Prof. Dr. Jan Cornelius Schmidt unterrichtet Philosophie, Ethik und Technikfolgenabschätzung an der Hochschule Darmstadt. (shrink)

The present volume contains 14 contributions presented at a colloquium on "Structure and Approximation in Physical Theories" held at Osnabruck in June 1980. The articles are presented in the revised form written after the colloquium and hence also take account of the results of the discussion at the colloquium. It is a striking feature that the problem of approximation in physical theories has only recently found some attention in the philosophy of science, although the working physicist is con stantly confronted (...) with those questions. No interesting theory of exact science exactly fits its experimental data; almost every relation between different theories is an approximate one. There fore an adequate reconstruction of physical theories must take into account and conceptualize the moment of approximation. The majority of the articles in this book is centered around this subject. There are at least two elaborate, 'structuralistic' approaches to the formalization of physical theories in which the aspect of approximation has been incorporated: the approach due to P. Suppes, J. Sneed, W. Stegmuller ("S-approach") and the approach of G. Lud wig and his co-workers ("L-approach"). The articles in this book correspondingly fall into three classes: presentation, elaboration and critique of the L-approach [Hartkamper/Schmidt, Ludwig, Neumann, Werner, Schmidt, Mayr, Kamiah, Majer, Grafe] or of the S-approach [Moulines, Balzer, Cooke], and articles referring to both approaches or concerned with related matters [Scheibe, Pfarr, Castrigiano]. Of course, this is only a rough classification and each article must be appraised in its own right. (shrink)

The dissertation is mainly concerned with the following question: How can we be responsible for our attitudes? Traditional formulations of the philosophical problem underlying this question see it as a conflict between responsibility and the absence of voluntary control. I interpret it, by contrast, as a problem about the responsibility that we have for being (ir)rational. To illuminate this responsibility, I engage in discussions about the normative status of object-given reasons for attitudes, present a novel case against pragmatism about reasons (...) for attitudes, and propose that we can understand our responsibility for being (ir)rational by grounding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in our practice of holding each other answerable for our (ir)rationality. Properly distinguishing the direct answerability we have for our attitudes from the indirect accountability that we have for managing our attitudes allows us to see that not all kinds of responsibility presuppose control. Rather, attitudes for which we are directly answerable are within the space of reasons without always being within our control. (shrink)

Can associative learning take place without awareness? We explore this issue in a sequence learning paradigm with amnesic and control participants, who were simply asked to react to one of four possible stimuli on each trial. Unknown to them, successive stimuli occurred in a sequence. We manipulated the extent to which stimuli followed the sequence in a deterministic manner (noiseless condition) or only probabilistically so (noisy condition). Through this paradigm, we aimed at addressing two central issues: first, we asked whether (...) sequence learning takes place in either condition with amnesic patients. Second, we asked whether this learning takes place without awareness. To answer this second question, participants were asked to perform a subsequent sequence generation task under inclusion and exclusion conditions, as well as a recognition task. Reaction times results show that amnesic patients learned the sequence only in the deterministic condition. However, they failed to be able to reproduce the sequence in the generation task. In contrast, we found learning for both sequence structures in control participants, but only control participants exposed to a deterministic sequence were successful in performing the generation task, thus suggesting that the acquired knowledge can be used consciously in this condition. Neither amnesic nor control participants showed correct old/new judgments in the recognition task. The results strengthen the claim that implicit learning is at least partly spared in amnesia, and the role of contextual information available for learning is discussed. © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. (shrink)

Flourishing-for-all as emerged as a concept to respond to the apparent lack of capacity to translate the sustainability discourse into actual practices conducive to more sustainable societies. In this special issue, we assert that flourishing-for-all addresses the gap identified in the sustainability discourse that still needs conversion into practice, and that processes for catalyzing this necessary transformation need to be identified and implemented. The eight papers in this special issue address flourishing-for-all from different ontological, epistemological, and methodological perspectives, demonstrating a (...) wide interest in the topic, and the shared belief that both academia and practice must go beyond sustainability to embrace flourishing-for-all. They bring to the fore three important features of a flourishing-for-all approach: First, it allows for a more profound analysis of systemic sustainability-related problems; secondly, it highlights new relationships among the problem-related variables; thirdly, it extends the repertory and reach of possible solutions. (shrink)

Anhand von zwei zentralen Schriften Hans Blumenbergs - den Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie (1960) und der Arbeit am Mythos (1979) - widmet sich der Band einer Relekture der ausgefeilten gedanklichen wie sprachlichen Verfahrensweisen, die der Philosoph zumeist unkommentiert zum Einsatz bringt. GEfragt wird damit nicht nur nach den spezifischen Darstellungsmitteln der Texte und dem Verhaltnis, das diese zu den verhandelten Themenkomplexen unterhalten, sondern auch, inwiefern deren reichhaltiges Arsenal an Denk- und Ausdrucksweisen gegenwartig Anschlussmoglichkeiten fur kulturanalytische Fragestellungen bereithalt. Die Beitrage stammen (...) von: Thomas Ballhausen, Eckhardt Kohn, Sebastian Lederle, Oliver Muller, Wolfgang Muller-Funk, Mauro Ponzi, Vahidin Preljevic, Matthias Schmidt, Tanja Veverka, Luca Viglialoro und Rudiger Zill. (shrink)

Speakers tend to produce disfluencies when naming unexpected or complex items; in turn, when perceiving disfluency, listeners tend to expect upcoming reference to items that are unexpected or complex to name. In two experiments, we examined if these disfluency-based expectations are routine, or instead, if they adapt to the way the speaker uses disfluency in the current context in a talker-specific manner. Participants listened to instructions to look at objects in contexts with several images, some of which lacked conventional names. (...) We manipulated the co-occurrence of disfluency and reference to novel versus familiar objects in a single talker situation (Experiment 1) and in a multi-talker situation (Experiment 2). In the predictive condition, disfluent expressions referred to novel objects, and fluent expressions referred to familiar objects. In the nonpredictive condition, fluent and disfluent trials referred to either familiar or novel objects. Participants’ gaze revealed that listeners more readily predicted familiar images for fluent trials and novel images for disfluent trials in the predictive condition than in the nonpredictive condition. In sum, listeners adapted their expectations about upcoming words based on recent experience with disfluency. Disfluency is not invariably processed, but instead a cue that is flexibly interpreted depending on the local context even in a multi-talker setting. (shrink)

Charles Peirce developed Existential Graphs as a diagrammatic syntax for representing and reasoning about propositions, with three parts: Alpha for propositional logic, Beta for first-order predicate logic, and Gamma for aspects of modal logic, second-order logic, and metalanguage. He made several adjustments between 1909 and 1911 that merit further consideration: using heavy lines to denote possible states of things in which attached propositions would be true, drawing a red line just inside the edge of a page and writing postulates in (...) the resulting margin, shading oddly enclosed areas instead of drawing thin lines as their boundaries, and using multiple sheets of paper to represent different subjects within the overall universe of discourse. These modifications can be combined to constitute a plausible candidate for Delta, a fourth part that Peirce intended to add but never spelled out. It implements modern formal systems of modal propositional logic in accordance with a version of possible worlds semantics in which the laws for the actual state of things are facts in every possible state of things. (shrink)

Movies tell stories. Thrilling are especially those situations, when people have to make ethical decisions. Issues of medical ethics crop up not only in hospital series, but often in genres where this subject is hardly to be supposed: comedies, westerns, love stories and gangster movies. Enacting these conflicts means offering a solution, and in doing so films refer to moral values and – at the same time – function as seismographs for the social relevance of bioethical topics. But it is (...) possible that ethical principles of good decision-making fall victims to the drama of the story. Analysis of the portrayed conflict is similar to a case discussion in bioethics and represents a helpful adjunct to the procurement of analytical and communicative competences. (shrink)