Biomedical ontologies are emerging as critical tools in genomic and proteomic research where complex data in disparate resources need to be integrated. A number of ontologies exist that describe the properties that can be attributed to proteins; for example, protein functions are described by Gene Ontology, while human diseases are described by Disease Ontology. There is, however, a gap in the current set of ontologies—one that describes the protein entities themselves and their relationships. We have designed a PRotein Ontology (PRO) (...) to facilitate protein annotation and to guide new experiments. The components of PRO extend from the classification of proteins on the basis of evolutionary relationships to the representation of the multiple protein forms of a gene (products generated by genetic variation, alternative splicing, proteolytic cleavage, and other post-translational modification). PRO will allow the specification of relationships between PRO, GO and other OBO Foundry ontologies. Here we describe the initial development of PRO, illustrated using human proteins from the TGF-beta signaling pathway. (shrink)

The Protein Ontology (PRO) provides a formal, logically-based classification of specific protein classes including structured representations of protein isoforms, variants and modified forms. Initially focused on proteins found in human, mouse and Escherichia coli, PRO now includes representations of protein complexes. The PRO Consortium works in concert with the developers of other biomedical ontologies and protein knowledge bases to provide the ability to formally organize and integrate representations of precise protein forms so as to enhance accessibility to results of protein (...) research. PRO (http://pir.georgetown.edu/pro) is part of the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry. (shrink)

The Protein Ontology (PRO; http://proconsortium.org) formally defines protein entities and explicitly represents their major forms and interrelations. Protein entities represented in PRO corresponding to single amino acid chains are categorized by level of specificity into family, gene, sequence and modification metaclasses, and there is a separate metaclass for protein complexes. All metaclasses also have organism-specific derivatives. PRO complements established sequence databases such as UniProtKB, and interoperates with other biomedical and biological ontologies such as the Gene Ontology (GO). PRO relates to (...) UniProtKB in that PRO’s organism-specific classes of proteins encoded by a specific gene correspond to entities documented in UniProtKB entries. PRO relates to the GO in that PRO’s representations of organism-specific protein complexes are subclasses of the organism-agnostic protein complex terms in the GO Cellular Component Ontology. The past few years have seen growth and changes to the PRO, as well as new points of access to the data and new applications of PRO in immunology and proteomics. Here we describe some of these developments. (shrink)

The Protein Ontology (PRO) web resource provides an integrative framework for protein-centric exploration and enables specific and precise annotation of proteins and protein complexes based on PRO. Functionalities include: browsing, searching and retrieving, terms, displaying selected terms in OBO or OWL format, and supporting URIs. In addition, the PRO website offers multiple ways for the user to request, submit, or modify terms and/or annotation. We will demonstrate the use of these tools for protein research and annotation.

Representing species-specific proteins and protein complexes in ontologies that are both human and machine-readable facilitates the retrieval, analysis, and interpretation of genome-scale data sets. Although existing protin-centric informatics resources provide the biomedical research community with well-curated compendia of protein sequence and structure, these resources lack formal ontological representations of the relationships among the proteins themselves. The Protein Ontology (PRO) Consortium is filling this informatics resource gap by developing ontological representations and relationships among proteins and their variants and modified forms. Because (...) proteins are often functional only as members of stable protein complexes, the PRO Consortium, in collaboration with existing protein and pathway databases, has launched a new initiative to implement logical and consistent representation of protein complexes. We describe here how the PRO Consortium is meeting the challenge of representing species-specific protein complexes, how protein complex representation in PRO supports annotation of protein complexes and comparative biology, and how PRO is being integrated into existing community bioinformatics resources. The PRO resource is accessible at http://pir.georgetown.edu/pro/. (shrink)

The Protein Ontology (PRO) is designed as a formal and principled Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry ontology for proteins. The components of PRO extend from a classification of proteins on the basis of evolutionary relationships at the homeomorphic level to the representation of the multiple protein forms of a gene, including those resulting from alternative splicing, cleavage and/or posttranslational modifications. Focusing specifically on the TGF-beta signaling proteins, we describe the building, curation, usage and dissemination of PRO. PRO provides a framework (...) for the formal representation of protein classes and protein forms in the OBO Foundry. It is designed to enable data retrieval and integration and machine reasoning at the molecular level of proteins, thereby facilitating cross-species comparisons, pathway analysis, disease modeling and the generation of new hypotheses. (shrink)

Given the pain, discomfort, anxiety, heartbreak, and boredom that most humans experience in their lives, is it morally permissible to create them? Some philosophers lately have answered ‘No’, contending that it is wrong to create a new human life when one could avoid doing so, because it would be bad for the one created. This view is known as ‘anti-natalism’. Some contributors to this volume argue that anti-natalism is true because: agents have a prima facie duty to prevent (...) suffering; it is immoral to violate another’s right not to be harmed without having consented to it; and it is a serious wrong to exploit the weakness of a poorly off being to become a biological parent. Others here argue against anti-natalism on the ground, for instance, that many of our lives are not so bad and in fact are quite good and that the logic of anti-natalism absurdly entails pro-mortalism, the view that we should kill off as many people as possible. This book explores these and related issues concerning the evaluative question of how to judge the worthwhileness of lives and the normative question of what basic duties entail for the creation of new lives. Most chapters initially appeared as part of a special issue of the _South African Journal of Philosophy_ (2012) and are here reprinted along with two additional essays on the topic. (shrink)

According to the Asymmetry, adding lives that are not worth living to the population makes the outcome pro tanto worse, but adding lives that are well worth living to the population does not make the outcome pro tanto better. It has been argued that the Asymmetry entails the desirability of human extinction. However, this argument rests on a misunderstanding of the kind of neutrality attributed to the addition of lives worth living by the Asymmetry. A similar misunderstanding is shown to (...) underlie Benatar’s case for anti-natalism. GPI Working Paper No. 3-2021. (shrink)

Recent years have seen a surge of interest in the question of whether humans should reproduce. Some say human life is too punishing and cruel to impose upon an innocent. Others hold that such harms do not undermine the great and possibly unique value of human life. Tracing these outlooks historically in the debate has barely begun. What might philosophers have said, or what did they say, about human life itself and its value to merit reproduction? This article looks to (...) Kant, who wrote much on whether, by reproducing, humans do wrong or right morally. It assesses two main arguments: one examining whether perfect or imperfect duties condone reproduction, the other whether Kant’s teleological or, in the opposite sense, his eschatological outlooks can salvage reproduction. These two arguments are essential for building the entire argument. This article finds that, although Kant’s arguments against reproducing are strong, some of his writing seems to support reproduction as a good. Yet, must we must assume an author, even one who strove for systematicity, must be consistent over his entire oeuvre on every issue, especially if not handled directly in a single work? The article concludes that Kant does not sufficiently, systematically support anti-natalism as more moral than pro-natalism. It is best for the current debate to grapple with the very dilemma that daunted Kant. (shrink)

Current studies of anti/‐natalism have been carried out mainly in the context of western philosophy. In this article, we offer a pro‐natalist view based on Confucian and Afro‐communitarian philosophy (Sino‐African ethics). Grounded in this Sino‐African perspective, we uphold that there is, at least, one reason to believe that not only is it morally permissible to procreate, but also that on some occasions, procreating is what morality prescribes. Specifically, we contend that, from a Sino‐African perspective, procreating sometimes is the best (...) way to fulfil duties of reciprocity and care towards our parents. (shrink)

The goal of this article is to evaluate the defensibility of wide-spread beliefs concerning the moral value of procreating. Very many of us are ‘pro-natal’ — that is, we have a positive moral view of making more people — but pro-natalism is under serious threat. In particular, I argue that combining several arguments in procreative ethics generates a powerful case for the Anti-Natal Pro-Adoption View, or the view that we are obligated not to procreate, but instead to satisfy any (...) parenting desires through adoption. Although this article ultimately serves as a defence against ANPA, it does so in a very limited way: while it is false that we are obligated to adopt-rather-than-procreate, I contend, this does not mean that we are off the moral hook altogether. Failing in our obligations is only one way to fail morality. Our procreative acts may yet be bad, dishonourable, selfish, and open to multiple other criticisms. And indeed, I'm afraid many of them are. (shrink)

I defend two collapsing or reductionist arguments against Weak Pro-Natalism (WPN), the view that procreation is generally merely permissible. In particular, I argue that WPN collapses into Strong Pro-Natalism (SPN), the view that procreation is generally obligatory. Because SPN conflicts with the dominant view that procreation is never obligatory, demonstrating that WPN collapses into or entails SPN establishes epistemic parity (at least as concerns reproductive liberty) between WPN and Anti-Natalism (AN), the view that procreation is always impermissible. (...) First, I distinguish between two moral goods: the good of procreation itself and the good of procreative potential. Second, I contend that the average moral agent is obligated to assist needy children via adoption, fostering, or other financial or interpersonal support. Third, I present the first collapsing argument: If an agent’s justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources (financial or interpersonal) for their actual future offspring, that justification is preserved only if they eventually and actually procreate. Thus, their eventual procreation is morally obligatory, and SPN follows. Fourth, I present the second collapsing argument, which assumes procreative potential as the relevant good: If an agent’s justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources for their potential future offspring, that justification holds only if (a) the objective or subjective valuation of the opportunity is of the relevant type and valence to justify not assisting needy children and (b) the agent sincerely values the opportunity. Fifth, I argue that (a) is unsatisfied and that while (b) is satisfied in most cases, it entails that most agents are obligated to desire or be behaviorally disposed to pursue procreation for themselves (i.e., SPN). Thus, I conclude that both actual procreation and procreative potential are either insufficient justifications for not assisting needy children or that they entail obligatory pro-reproductive attitudes or behaviors. (shrink)

Infertility can be an agonizing experience, especially for women. And, much of the agony has to do with luck: with how unlucky one is in being infertile, and in how much luck is involved in determining whether one can weather the storm of infertility and perhaps have a child in the end. We argue that bad luck associated with being infertile is often bad moral luck for women. The infertile woman often blames herself or is blamed by others for what (...) is happening to her, even when she cannot control or prevent what is happening to her. She has simply had bad luck. We focus on the self-blame of infertile women and show how it stems from pro-natalism that targets women. We also argue that overall for women, regret is a better moral response to infertility than self-blame. (shrink)

I defend two collapsing or reductionist arguments against weak pro-natalism (WPN), the view that procreation is generally merely permissible. In particular, I argue that WPN collapses into strong pro-natalism (SPN), the view that procreation is generally obligatory. Because SPN conflicts with the dominant view that procreation is never obligatory, demonstrating that WPN collapses into or entails SPN establishes epistemic parity (at least as concerns reproductive liberty) between WPN and anti-natalism (AN), the view that procreation is always impermissible. (...) First, I distinguish between two moral goods: the good of procreation itself and the good of procreative potential. Second, I contend that the average moral agent is obligated to assist needy children via adoption, fostering, or other financial or interpersonal support. Third, I present the first collapsing argument: if an agent’s justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources (financial or interpersonal) for their actual future offspring, that justification is preserved only if they eventually and actually procreate. Thus, their eventual procreation is morally obligatory and SPN follows. Fourth, I present the second collapsing argument, which assumes procreative potential as the relevant good: if an agent’s justification for not assisting needy children is preservation of their resources for their potential future offspring, that justification holds only if (a) the objective or subjective valuation of the opportunity is of the relevant type and valence to justify not assisting needy children and (b) the agent sincerely values the opportunity. Fifth, I argue that (a) is unsatisfied and that while (b) is satisfied in most cases, it entails that most agents are obligated to desire or be behaviourally disposed to pursue procreation for themselves (i.e., SPN). Thus, I conclude that both actual procreation and procreative potential are either insufficient justifications for not assisting needy children or that they entail obligatory pro-reproductive attitudes or behaviours. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:This Birth and ThatSurrogacy and Stratified Motherhood in IndiaAmrita PandeIn 2006, i came across a short newspaper article about the emergence of a new industry in India—the industry of paid birth or commercial surrogacy. People from all over the world could now hire Indian women to give birth to babies for them, for a fraction of the cost of surrogacy elsewhere and with no government regulations. After some digging (...) around, I quickly realized that there was scarcely any objective, academic research about this new industry, and so began my ethnographic journey to the first clinic in not just India but in fact in the entire Global South to have a flourishing trade in both national and transnational surrogacy.1Academic inquiry into surrogacy arrangements is adequately interdisciplinary and has generated feminist, ethical, legal, and social debates for more than three decades (see, for example, Andrews 1987; Anderson 1990; Bailey 2011; Brennan and Noggle 1997; Hochschild 2012; Markens 2007; Oliver 1989; Ragoné 1994; Pande 2011; and Teman 2010). While defenders of surrogacy advocate it as a manifestation of women’s freedom and choice, much of the scholarship has displayed intense anxiety about this practice (Corea 1986; Dworkin 1983; Harding 1991; Neuhaus 1988; Raymond 1993; Roberts 1998b; and Rothman 1988). One view is that surrogacy reduces women to a mere breeder class, to the class of prostitutes, and another is that it is just another form of baby selling. Others consider the development of such reproductive technologies as a form of class and gender-based exploitation of women’s bodies. Two additional trends in this scholarship are worth emphasizing. First, [End Page 50] much of the debating takes place in abstraction and is rarely based on the actual experience of surrogates.2 Second,much of this work is about surrogacy in the Global North. This is not altogether surprising, since commercial surrogacy is a very recent phenomenon outside of the Global North.In this essay, I address these two gaps in the literature by analyzing the birthing narratives of surrogates in a clinic in India. As the surrogates compare their experiences of giving birth as a surrogate mother to their previous pregnancies, they underscore the paradox of an industry based on pro-natal technology in an otherwise anti-natal state. As importantly, these narratives are a clear manifestation of a global trend of “stratified motherhood”—“the hierarchical organization of reproductive fecundity and birth experiences that supports and rewards the maternity of some women while despising or outlawing the mother-work of others” (Rapp 2001, 469).Surrogacy in IndiaThe moral and ethical ambiguity surrounding surrogacy has made many countries, including China, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, and some U.S. states ban surrogacy altogether. Some countries have imposed partial bans, for instance Australia (Victoria), Brazil, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, South Africa, and the UK. Canada, Greece, South Africa, Israel, and the UK permit gestational surrogacy, subject to regulations. Then there are other countries with no regulations at all, such as Belgium, Finland, and India (Markens 2007; Teman 2010). Apart from the recent spurt of surrogacy in India, commercial surrogacy is most prevalent in California, USA, and Israel, where surrogacy is tightly controlled by the state and restricted to Israeli citizens. The Indian structure is closer to the liberal market model of surrogacy in California, where surrogacy births are primarily managed by private, commercial agencies that screen, match, and regulate agreements according to their own criteria (Pande 2009).India is not the only country to experience a rise in transnational surrogacy. Couples from countries such as the UK, Japan, Australia, and Kuwait, where surrogacy is either illegal or restricted, have hired surrogates in the United States to bear babies for them. However, while the total cost of such transnational packages is roughly between $100,000 and $120,000, in India the package costs one-third of that amount. Another factor that explains the popularity of India as a destination for transnational surrogacy is the informality of the market. Although commercial surrogacy is not illegal in India in 2002, currently there are no laws regulating surrogacy in clinics. Fertility clinics... (shrink)

East Asian countries such as South Korea have recently made headlines for experimenting with different methods to incentivise people to have (more) children, in a bid to reverse declining birth rates. Many such incentives—child benefits, cash bonuses, dating events, and so on—appear morally innocuous at first glance. I will demonstrate in this analysis, however, that they amount to stopgap measures which reveal fundamental shortcomings with the way various nation states are approaching the so-called ‘problem’ of fertility decline.

Camus considered the most crucial philosophical problem to be that of suicide—whether to discontinue your existence by endingit. Alternatively, a most crucial philosophical problem may be procreation—whether to continue human existence by making new humans. The topic has spurred an increasing amount of debate over the past decade, with marked diversion with Anscomb’s comment that it makes no moral sense to inquire whether one should reproduce. One might as well ask why digest food or why should the wind blow. This (...) article reviews some of the most recent literature on this topic, which shows little resemblance to Anscomb’s remark. (shrink)

David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and that – for all of us unfortunate enough to have come into existence – it would be better had we never come to be. We contend that if one accepts Benatar’s arguments for the asymmetry between the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, and the poor quality of life, one must also accept that suicide is preferable to continued existence, and that his view therefore implies both anti- (...) class='Hi'>natalism and pro-mortalism . This conclusion has been argued for before by Elizabeth Harman – she takes it that because Benatar claims that our lives are ‘awful’, it follows that ‘we would be better off to kill ourselves’ (Harman 2009: 784). Though we agree with Harman’s conclusion, we think that her argument is too quick, and that Benatar’s arguments for non-pro-mortalism deserve more serious consideration than she gives them. We make our case using a tripartite structure. We start by examining the prima facie case for the claim that pro-mortalism follows from Benatar’s position, presenting his response to the contrary, and furthering the dialectic by showing that Benatar’s position is not just that coming into existence is a harm, but that existence itself is a harm. We then look to Benatar’s treatment of the Epicurean line, which is important for him as it undermines his anti-death argument for non-pro-mortalism. We demonstrate that he fails to address the concern that the Epicurean line raises, and that he cannot therefore use the harm of death as an argument for non-pro-mortalism. Finally, we turn to Benatar’s pro-life argument for non-pro-mortalism, built upon his notion of interests, and argue that while the interest in continued existence may indeed have moral relevance, it is almost always irrational. Given that neither Benatar’s anti-death nor pro-life arguments for non-pro-mortalism work, we conclude that pro-mortalism follows from his anti-natalism, As such, if it is better never to have been, then it is better no longer to be. -/- . (shrink)

This article examines three divergent constructions about the salience of legal gender in lay people’s everyday lives and readiness to decertify gender. In our interviews (and survey data), generally participants minimised the importance of legal gender. The central argument in this article is that feminist socio-legal scholars applying legal consciousness studies to legal reform topics should find scrutinizing the construction of interview talk useful. We illustrate this argument by adapting and applying Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) ‘The Common Place of Law: (...) Stories from Everyday Life', ‘before’, ‘with’ and ‘against’ typology to interview talk about legal gender, and critique their cognitivist approach by offering a constructionist alternative. In our analysis, we offer a detailed discursive explication of three key legal consciousness themes. These themes offer a balanced representation of a dataset problematically ‘skewed’ towards sex-based rights feminist perspectives, namely that ‘before’ legal gender is an anti-decertification account, decertification would be risky for natal females; a ‘with’ legal gender construction is neither for nor against decertification per se, though the impact of decertification is produced in accounts as limited and unimportant; and ‘against’ legal gender is a pro-decertification classification, as not abolished legal gender is constructed as harmful to already marginalised groups. In concluding, we explore the reasoning for the lack of readiness for decertification currently, and return to the value of examining the construction of lay discourse about legal matters as talk is a form of social action. We suggest that applying discursive analysis to themes in legal consciousness studies enables a refocusing on the how rather than purely the what of divergent legal consciousnesses, and that this approach is a fruitful addition to feminist socio-legal studies. (shrink)

Pouco antes de falecer, Jorge Luís Borges determinou que sua esposa, Maria Kodama, não pu­blicasse seus livros regionalistas de juventude em suas obras completas, que assim ficariam incompletas, uma decisão tipicamente borgiana. A viúva preferiu não cumprir a determinação e as obras editadas se tornaram completas, na medida em que possam ser descobertos manuscritos ainda inéditos. Elas revelam um amplo arco, correspondendo à sua longa vida, da juventude muito argentina e profundamente bonaerense, do seu país e cidade natal Buenos Aires, (...) ao mun­do. Os seus artigos, publicados mais em revistas literárias que jornais, desde cedo revelam esta vocação universal. Jorge Luís Borges escreveu com freqüência sobre autores estrangeiros. Depois, os próprios temas dos livros vão mudando dos regionalismos e até localismos, rumo às dúvidas e ambigüidades intrinsecamente humanas de todas as partes do mundo, onde ele as imaginariamente situa. Ao fim e ao cabo, Jorge Luís Borges – traduzido e homenageado em muitos países – preferiu morrer em Genebra e lá ser sepultado, onde estudara na adolescência, quando fora muito feliz na descoberta inicial de outras culturas. Elas demoraram a nele predo­minarem, mas terminaram acontecendo. Mesmo assim, ele no íntimo nunca deixou de todo a argentinidade. Crescentemente cosmopolita, o nacionalismo jamais abandonou por completo o espírito de Jorge Luís Borges. Sua atitude pró-britânica, durante a própria Guerra das Malvinas, pode ser interpretada como protesto e advertência diante de uma derrota próxima. (shrink)

There are cases where many think it would have been better for some child never to have been born. We can imagine a life characterized exclusively by suffering, never containing even the briefest moment of pleasure. The life goes exceedingly poorly – so poorly, we think, that it would have been better for the child never to have been. However, most of us think that many lives are not of this sort. Many lives are at least all right: the good (...) moments outweigh the bad, and so it’s not better for those people never to have been born.David Benatar offers a compelling and challenging argument against this common view.See David Benatar [1]. He endorses anti-natalism, which is the view that there’s always a pro tanto moral reason, grounded in the interests of a potential child, against creating the child because it’s always better for the child never to have been born.As will be mentioned in note 13, there is strictly speaking a qualification: if one’s life contains no pains at all, then it’s .. (shrink)

The object of the study is the university quarter as a socio-cultural phenomenon. The subject of the study is the forms of cultural interaction between the university quarter and the city. The use of comparative and typological methods made it possible to identify and describe four forms of university presence in the city space, grouped around two basic directions. The first direction assumes the priority of the university in relation to the city, which gives rise to such a form of (...) their interaction as a "university city". In this case, university activity, in fact, fulfills the role of the economic basis of urban life. The second direction, which is characterized by the leading role of the city, is represented by the student quarter, campus, university quarter. And in this case, we can talk about the "growing" of the university into the urban space, which has both its positive and negative sides. Special attention is paid to the university quarter, the need for which is associated with the expansion of the university's interaction with the urban community. Combining the project nature, openness, flexible targeting, it demonstrates greater potential compared to traditional options. In turn, the university quarter project can be represented by various complementary options. The analysis of the Samara experience of its design revealed two promising forms of its implementation: building a citywide university space and updating the historical past on the basis of available university resources. (shrink)

M. J. Dewar argues that in Georg. 1.511–4 Virgil may have been drawing a disquieting parallel between Orestes, evoked through an imitation of Aeschylus , and Octavian, present a few lines above . Pausanias probably supports this suggestion; he shows that the link Octavian-Orestes existed quite early and in a sense favourable to Octavian, even though it may soon have been used in a negative sense by anti-Caesarian propaganda on account of the dark side of the myth. In front of (...) the temple of Hera in Argos there was still visible in the second century a statue representing Orestes, but identified by the inscription as Augustus. Certainly this parallel Augustus-Orestes was not proposed-and preserved - with polemical purpose in a famous sanctuary and in the Augustan age. Given the resemblance between history and myth and the moral weight of the famous myth itself, it is unlikely that we have to do with the mere re-use of any old statue. (shrink)

The philosophical, legal, and HCI literature concerning artificial intelligence (AI) has explored the ethical implications and values that these systems will impact on. One aspect that has been only partially explored, however, is the role of deception. Due to the negative connotation of this term, research in AI and Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) has mainly considered deception to describe exceptional situations in which the technology either does not work or is used for malicious purposes. Recent theoretical and historical work, however, has (...) shown that deception is a more structural component of AI than it is usually acknowledged. AI systems that enter in communication with users, in fact, forcefully invite reactions such as attributions of gender, personality and empathy, even in the absence of malicious intent and often also with potentially positive or functional impacts on the interaction. This paper aims to operationalise the Human-Centred AI (HCAI) framework to develop the implications of this body of work for practical approaches to AI ethics in HCI and design. In order to achieve this goal, we take up the analytical distinction between “banal” and “strong” deception, originally proposed in theoretical and historical scholarship on AI (Natale in Deceitful media: artificial intelligence and social life after the turing test, Oxford University Press, New York, 2021), as a starting point to develop ethical reflections that will empower designers and developers with practical ways to solve the problems raised by the complex relationship between deception and communicative AI. The paper considers how HCAI can be applied to conversational AI (CAI) systems in order to design them to develop banal deception for social good and, at the same time, to avoid its potential risks. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa a projeção continental do México revolucionário no pós 1917 a partir do caso brasileiro. Após a eclosão da Revolução Russa, o modelo bolchevique passou a rivalizar indiretamente com o protagonismo que o México revolucionário pretendia exercer no cenário latino-americano. Assim, a ideia de um “autoctonismo continental” passou a ser enfatizada na propaganda mexicana como elemento que faria da Revolução Mexicana um modelo mais apropriado de transformação social para os países latino-americanos. Discutimos neste artigo os aspectos tomados pela (...) propaganda mexicana e algumas apropriações da experiência revolucionária do México por parte dos brasileiros, com destaque para o caso dos socialistas. (shrink)