This paper draws on 'views and visions' responses collected at the time of the Land Use-UK project in 1996. Surveyors were groups of school children with contributions in more remote locations from adults. As well as mapping the landscape participants were asked about their hopes and visions for the grid squares surveyed. One kilometre squares were identified by stratified random sampling techniques from the Ordnance Survey National Grid. The responses indicated varying levels of optimism and pessimism. The sample of responses (...) in this paper relates to rural key squares ( N = 424) and urban key squares ( N = 413). Young surveyors appeared to be the most pessimistic and there was some correlation of increasing pessimism with increasing land use intensity. (shrink)

I discuss what learned and innate routines of self and other attribution agents need to possess if they are to enter into cooperative arrangements as described game theoretically. I conclude that these are not so different from belief desire psychology as described by philosophers of mind.

The dilemma confronted by Buridan’s Ass leads into a problem about nil-preference situations, to which there is a solution in the literature that is inspired by Alan Turing: we have evolved with a computational module in our brains that comes into play in such situations by picking a random action among the alternatives that detennines the subject’s choice. We relate these Buridan’s Ass situations to a larger, theoretically interesting category in which there is no alternative that is decisively superior (...) to others with respect to expected utility, and we try to show how our emotional makeup figures in a rational response, particularly as informed by symbolic utilitythat we draw down from our culture’s shared understandings. The category is theoretically interesting because it contains moral dilemmas, as well as hard cases in which an imponant choice must be made without an option that has clearly superior expected utility. We argue that our Emotional Response Model is preferable to Turing’s Randomizer for this category, as well as more illuminating about nil-preference situations or close approximations thereto. (shrink)

*Introduction by Joseph R. Strayer\n(ix-x) Not that Bloch was the greatest French historian of his generation, though he would certainly rank high in any list. Not even that he was the most widely read—others excelled in that art of combining exact knowledge with readability which has distinguished French scholarship for many years. Others have talked about the narrowness of purely political history, the evils of excessive specialization, and the unreality of the conventional periodization of history—without ever leaving their own limited (...) fields. Bloch not only said that history was a whole, that no period and no topic could be understood except in relation to other periods and topics, but he constantly taught [p.x] and wrote in accordance with this belief. …He worked constantly for a “wider, more human history,” for a history which described how and why people live and work together. He saw life as a whole, as a complicated interplay of ideals and realities, of conscious innovation and unconscious conservation. … Throughout the two volumes he sought, above everything else, to understand and explain the state of mind and the habits of life which could produce and support feudal organization.\n(32-33) It is very like the illusion of certain old etymologiests who thought they had said all when they set down the oldest known meaning of a word opposite its present sense, having shown… As if the main problem were not to understand how and why the transition had taken place. As if, above all, the meaning of any word were influenced more by its own past than by the contemporary state of the vocabulary which, in its turn, is determined by the social conditions of the moment. [Y: think about this when I give the meanings of sirhak]\n(64-65) …every historical research supposes that the inquiry has a direction at the very first step. In the beginning, there must be the guiding spirit. Mere passive observation, even supposing such a thing were possible, has never contributed anything productive to any science. \n(71) Every historical book worthy of the name oought to include a chapter, or if one prefers, a series of paragraphs inserted at turning points in the development, which might almost entitled: “How can I know what I am about to say?” I am persuaded that even the lay reader would experience an actual intellectual pleasure in examining these “confessions.”. (shrink)

Small family businesses have generally been shown to exhibit significant concern for social responsibility, especially at the community level. Despite the reported heterogeneity of family firms in their preferences for and participation in social responsibility, the drivers of such differences are not agreed upon in the literature. We draw from enlightened self-interest and social capital theories by exploring their complementary and competing implications for the effect of duration and community satisfaction on participation in community-oriented social responsibility. Additionally, drawing on the (...) association between gender and self-construal and evidence that gender shapes helping and giving behaviors, we assess the moderating role of the gender of the firm manager in these relationships. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 279 family businesses and find support that gender moderates the relationship between community duration and satisfaction and measures of CSR. (shrink)

We investigate whether the disclosure of a firm’s decision to organize as a benefit corporation (BC) rather than a traditional C corporation (CC) influences investors. We survey 136 investors and 57 MBA students and find that they expect BCs to attain higher future corporate social responsibility (CSR) than CCs even when both have equal CSR ratings. Approximately one third of our sample prefers to invest in BCs when CCs have greater financial returns, indicating a willingness by some investors to sacrifice (...) personal financial gain for social good. Our results suggest that investors weight the information contained in BC disclosures as reliable and value-relevant in their investment decisions. We extend the CSR disclosure literature by indicating how investors weight this new type of CSR information, which may affect how BCs fare as publicly traded companies. (shrink)

It is a surprising fact that moral philosophers have rarely examined the distinction between what I shall call ‘positive’ or ‘social’ morality on the one hand and ‘autonomous’ or ‘individual’ morality on the other. Accordingly, conceptual and moral issues of the greatest importance have been neglected. The distinction is, I take it, recognised by Hegel, when he contrasts Sittlichkeit with Moralität . However, the rival sides who give a conceptual or a moral preference to one concept over the other (...) rarely come to grips with one another, and the deep conflicts between them are concealed instead of being brought out into the open. Only in Burke's diatribe against Rousseau, Bradley's critique of Sidgwick , Hobhouse's crusade against Bosanquet , Prichard's attack on Green , Hart's criticism of Hare , and above all in Oakeshott's onslaught on Rationalism do we get a glimpse of one of the main issues of moral philosophy and of morality. For just as we have two concepts, so we have two moral conceptual schemes, each of which gives a central place to one concept at the expense of the other. Those who suppose that morality is or ought to be wholly or mainly a social concept may recommend submission to a tradition. Those, on the other hand, who suppose morality to be primarily an individual or independent concept will recommend independent decisions. I want in this paper, firstly, to explain the differences between the two concepts, secondly, to show that neither of them is conceptually illegitimate or degenerate, and lastly, to determine what place, if any, each ought to have in a rational morality. (shrink)

Coordinating behavior is widespread in contexts that include courtship, aggression, and cooperation for shared outcomes. The social significance of cooperative coordination (CC) is usually downplayed by learning theorists, evolutionary biologists, and game theorists in favor of an individual behavior → outcome perspective predicated on maximizing payoffs for all participants. To more closely model CC as it occurs under free-ranging conditions, pairs of rats were rewarded for coordinated shuttling within a shared chamber with unrestricted social interaction. Results show that animals learned (...) to work together with sensitivity to the task and type of partner. Moreover, social interaction and coordination influenced both consumption of the reward solution immediately following a session and preference for cooperation, suggesting that affective states and incentives related to cooperation extend beyond the outcomes obtained. These results support field studies by showing not only how cooperation is performed but also the importance of considering how the behavior of cooperating affects outcomes and preference for cooperating. (shrink)

This paper investigates behavior in finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner’s dilemma games when there is one-sided incomplete information and signaling about players’ concerns for fairness, specifically, their preferences regarding “inequity aversion.” In this environment, we show that only a pooling equilibrium can be sustained, in which a player type who is unconcerned about fairness initially cooperates in order to disguise himself as a player type who is concerned about fairness. This disguising strategy induces the uninformed player to cooperate in (...) all periods of the repeated game, including the final period, at which point the player type who is unconcerned about fairness takes the opportunity to defect, i.e., he “backstabs” the uninformed player. Despite such last-minute defection, our results show that the introduction of incomplete information can actually result in a Pareto improvement under certain conditions. We connect the predictions of this “backstabbing” equilibrium with the frequently observed decline in cooperative behavior in the final period of finitely repeated experimental games. (shrink)

It has recently been proposed that the evolution of human cooperativeness might, at least in part, have started as the cooptation of behavioral strategies evolved for solving problems of coordination to solve problems with higher incentives to defect, i.e. problems of cooperation. Following this line of thought, we systematically tested human subjects for spillover effects from simple coordination tasks (2x2 Stag Hunt games, SH) to problems of cooperation (2x2 Prisoner’s Dilemma games, PD) in a laboratory experiment with rigorous controls to (...) rule out subject confusion or habituation. Supporting the hypothesis that decision mechanisms for cooperation problems are linked with decision mechanisms for coordination, our main finding is that cooperation levels in PD games embedded in a sequence of SH games were significantly increased compared to a baseline sequence consisting only of PDs when subjects played in fixed pairs. No such effects could be found when players were randomly rematched each round. Additional findings include that this spillover effect cannot prevent a decay of cooperation over time, that there is no indication of a reversed effect, i.e. no signs of negative spillovers from failed cooperation to miscoordination, and that subjects self-reported preferences in SH games are prosocial. (shrink)

Supply networks as complex systems are significant challenges for decision-makers in predicting the evolution of cooperation among firms. The impact of environmental heterogeneity on firms is critical. Environment-based preference selection plays a pivotal role in clarifying the existence and maintenance of cooperation in supply networks. This paper explores the implication of the heterogeneity of environment and environment-based preference on the evolution of cooperation in supply networks. Cellular automata are considered to examine the synchronized evolution of cooperation and defection (...) across supply networks. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game reward schemes have been formed, and the heterogeneous environment and environmental preference have been applied. The results show that the heterogeneous environment’s degree leads to higher cooperation for both Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Snowdrift Game. We also probe into the impact of the environmental preference on the evolution of cooperation, and the results of which confirm the usefulness of preference of environment. This work offers a valuable perspective to improve the level of cooperation among firms and understand the evolution of cooperation in supply networks. (shrink)

Despite the positive effects of including patients’ preferences into therapy on psychotherapy outcomes, there are still few thoroughly validated assessment tools at hand. We translated the 18-item Cooper-Norcross Inventory of Preferences into German and aimed at replicating its factor structure. Further, we investigated the reliability of the questionnaire and its convergence with trait measures. A heterogeneous sample of N = 969 participants took part in our online survey. Performing ESEM models, we found acceptable model fit for a four-factor structure similar (...) to the original factor structure. Furthermore, we propose an alternative model following the adjustment of single items. The German C-NIP showed acceptable to good reliability, as well as small correlations with Big-Five personality traits, trait and attachment anxiety, locus of control, and temporal focus. However, we recommend further replication of the factor structure and further validation of the C-NIP. (shrink)

Should you reduce your energy consumption? Tragically enough, it may be better for you, and for everyone involved, to refrain from doing so even if you care about the climate. Given this tragedy, why cooperate? This paper defends the view that not cooperating is morally problematic because it is not universalizable (in a Kantian sense). That is, I will argue that we have universalizability-based reasons to cooperate as long as we have a preference for ‘collective success’ (e.g. a (...) sustainable planet). The problem is that defectors let others fix the problem for them, and in this way make an unfair exception of themselves. Moreover, even when selected agents might not share this preference, they still have to cooperate for the sake of others. (shrink)

Relevance Theory (RT) argues that human language comprehension processes tend to maximize “relevance,” and postulates that there is a relevance-based procedure that a hearer follows when trying to understand an utterance. Despite being highly influential, RT has been criticized for its failure to explain how speaker-related information, either the speaker’s abilities or her/his preferences, is incorporated into the hearer’s inferential, pragmatic process. An alternative proposal is that speaker-related information gains prominence due to representation of the speaker within higher level goal-directed (...) schemata. Yet the goal-based account is still unable to explain clearly how cross-domain information, for example linguistic meaning and speaker-related knowledge, is integrated within a modular system. On the basis of RT’s cognitive requirements, together with contemporary cognitive theory, we argue that this integration is realized by utilizing working memory and that there exist conversational constraints with which the constructed utterance interpretation should be consistent. We illustrate our arguments with a computational implementation of the proposed processes within a general cognitive architecture.Abbreviations: ACT-R Adaptive Control of Thought - RationalCOGENT Cognitive Objects within a Graphical ENvironmenTCS/SS Contention Scheduling/Supervisory SystemRBCP Relevance-Based Comprehension ProcedureRT Relevance Theory. (shrink)

In this paper, a logic for reasoning about coalitional power is developed which explicitly represents agents’ preferences and the actions by which the agents can achieve certain results. A complete axiomatization is given and its satisfiability problem is shown to be decidable and EXPTIME -hard.

What are preferences and are they reasons for action? Is it rational to cooperate with others even if that entails acting against one's preferences? The dominant position in philosophy on the topic of practical rationality is that one acts so as to maximize the satisfaction of one's preferences. This view is most closely associated with the work of David Gauthier, and in this collection of essays some of the most innovative philosophers working in this field explore the controversies surrounding Gauthier's (...) position. Several essays argue against influential conceptions of preference, while others suggest that received conceptions of rational action misidentify the normative significance of rules and practices. This collection will be of particular interest to philosophers of social theory and to reflective social scientists in such fields as economics, political science and psychology. (shrink)

Does the desirability of social institutions for public goods provision depend on the extent to which they include mechanisms for endogenous enforcement of cooperative behavior? We consider alternative institutions that vary the use of direct punishments to promote social cooperation. In one institution, subjects participate in a public goods experiment in which an initial stage of voluntary contribution is followed by a second stage of voluntary, costly sanctioning. Another institution consists of the voluntary contribution stage only, with no subsequent opportunity (...) to sanction. In a third stage subjects vote for which institution they prefer for future interactions: do they prefer one that does allow sanctions or one that does not allow sanctions? Our results show that even though sanctions are frequently used when available, the clear majority of individuals vote for the institution that does not allow sanctions. Thus, a distinction is required between the principles that guide the choice of institutions and the principles that apply to actions guided by institutions. Our results indicate that it is the wealth generated by the institution that determines its desirability. (shrink)

The article explores the problem of preferable technological changes in the context of work. To this end, it addresses the ‘why’ (motives and values) and the ‘how’ (organizational forms) of automation from a normative perspective. Concerning the ‘why,’ automation processes are currently mostly driven by values of economic efficiency. Yet, since automation processes are part of the basic structure of society, as is the division of labor, considerations of justice apply to them. As for the ‘how,’ the article suggests ‘fair (...) hybrid cooperation’ as an alternative ideal to guide automation priorities. It is achieved when the division of labor between humans and machines does not hinder, and preferably enables, workers’ experience of certain primary qualities in their work activity. By analogy with Rawls’ primary goods, these are qualities that it is necessary for every worker to experience in order to pursue their life plans: security, self-direction, self-development, dignity, and recognition. According to this criterion, the tasks to automate first are those hindering these contributive primary qualities. This provides us with a normative vocabulary and a standard to orient automation decisions but also to assess existing organizational forms and envisage alternative cooperative imaginaries. To illustrate how the ideal may play out in the real world, the article concludes with a ‘fair hybrid cooperation test’ and a nurse bots case for meaningful work. (shrink)

Developmental psychologists identify propensities for social engagement in human infants that are less evident in other apes; Sarah Hrdy links these social propensities to novel features of human childrearing. Unlike other ape mothers, humans can bear a new baby before the previous child is independent because they have help. This help alters maternal trade-offs and so imposes new selection pressures on infants and young children to actively engage their caretakers’ attention and commitment. Such distinctive childrearing is part of our grandmothering (...) life history. While consequences for other cooperative activities must surely follow, the novel rearing environments set up by helpful grandmothering can explain why natural selection escalated preferences and motivations for interactivity in our lineage in the first place, and why, unlike other aspects of infant development, social sensitivities are not delayed in humans compared with genus Pan. (shrink)

This paper reviews six attempts to give cooperative solutions to Prisoners Dilemmas: symmetry (agents are in identical situations, so should choose the same way, so should both choose cooperation because that’s better for each), mechanism (each agent should delegate the decision to a machine which will choose cooperation for them provided the other does likewise), inducement (the agents should make a side bet which pays off only upon both cooperating), resolution (each agent should resolve to cooperate, then act on (...) the resolution), alternative principle (rationality requires not dominance reasoning and so defecting, but constrained maximization or resolution compliance or “sophisticated” choosing, and so cooperation), and preference revision (each agent should acquire conditional preferences to cooperate, then cooperate provided the other agent has acquired similar preferences). It distinguishes one-stage from two-stage games, as well as endogenously available solutions (ones available to agents in the circumstances of the game merely due to the nature of rationality) from solutions requiring exogenous devices. It contrasts Edward McClennen’s endogenous solution, which is some combination of resolution and alternative principle solution, with David Gauthier’s endogenous alternative principle solution. It argues that all have problems, ones best solved by the endogenous preference revision solution defended by Duncan MacIntosh. (shrink)

Let me begin by admitting that I am wary of any comprehensive definition of consent. This bias stems from my professional concentration on criminal law, in which nouons of freedom and responsibility play vital roles in a wide range of contexts. In each context, however, one discovers that freedom means something different. A voluntary act is any bodily movement not caused by external force or nervous disorder. On the other hand, a voluntary act, however horrific its results, ordinarily may be (...) punished only if the actor was subjectively aware that the act was wrong. In any event, a voluntary act may be excused as the product of duress if another person procures the actor's cooperation in the crime by an illegal threat that would overcome the resistance of a person of ordinary firmness. (shrink)

Reciprocal altruism involves foregoing an immediate benefit for the sake of a greater long-term reward. It follows that individuals who exhibit a stronger preference for future over immediate rewards should be more disposed to engage in reciprocal altruism – in other words, ‘patient’ people should be more cooperative. The present study tested this prediction by investigating whether participants’ contributions in a public-good game correlated with their ‘discount rate’. The hypothesis was supported: patient people are indeed more cooperative. The paper (...) discusses alternative interpretations of this result, and makes some suggestions for future research. (shrink)

Purpose – Research described in this paper focuses on a need to consult inhabitants about a new technical solution introduced in a country-wide scale like it is in the case of a smart metering system – finally, all energy consumers will become its users. Its social acceptance is required. So it is a good example of an ethical approach to introduce an innovative solution in the society. The conducted research was intended to help developing strategy to build appropriate relationships with (...) energy consumers during the planned exchange of energy meters and to prepare energy consumers to make use of all functionality of the installed meters. The course of the conducted research and its results are presented. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – The described forms of cooperation with people are direct interviews in focus groups and a questionnaire survey involving representative social sample. They are described as a case study. An agenda of each interview and also a content of a questionnaire cover topics within the area of natural environment protection, a need to save energy, individual activities leading to energy saving, smart metering, its benefits and potential threats including risk of intrusion privacy. Selected results are included. Findings – Consultations based on focus groups and questionnaire surveys have been well accepted by the participants. Respondents feel a need to express their opinions on a given subject. Citizens' attention concerns mostly the economic aspects of a new system. Energy consumers are able to formulate and declare strong and weak points of smart meters. Some threats concerning intrusion of privacy have been expressed by respondents and included in the paper. Practical implications – General conclusion is the following – each large system is not only a set of technical devices and software routines but it is also a system built by humans and for humans. Wide consultations on a smart metering bring benefits and help ensuring social acceptance. The raising social awareness of the need to save energy is one more benefit from the undertaken activities. An importance of consulting people about new solution involving all inhabitants is emphasized. Direct and structured interviews are the preferred form of social consultations. it is highlighted by some of the pollsters involved in the survey that respondents tell the truth rather in a direct conversation than in a remote mode via internet. Originality/value – The described research took place in November 2012. Earlier only technical experts and academia were involved in discussions concerning smart metering. Selected data are included to show results of the research. The presented approach may help interested parties to introduce new solution and to avoid social opposition, rejection of the idea and misunderstandings. (shrink)

There is an idea, extremely common among social contract theorists, that the primary function of social institutions is to secure some form of cooperative benefit. If individuals simply seek to satisfy their own preferences in a narrowly instrumental fashion, they will find themselves embroiled in collective action problems – interactions with an outcome that is worse for everyone involved than some other possible outcome. Thus they have reason to accept some form of constraint over their conduct, in order to achieve (...) this superior, but out-of-equilibrium outcome. A social institution can be defined as a set of norms that codify these constraints.1 Simplifying somewhat, one can then say that social institutions exist in order to secure gains in Pareto-efficiency. (shrink)

I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, and rational (...) decision rules. I argue that Maximizing Rationality necessarily structures conclusive reasons for action. Thus conations of any sort can base rational choices only if the conations are structured like a coherent preference function; rational actions maximize on such functions. Maximization-constraining dispositions cannot integrate into a coherent preference function. (shrink)

It is argued that full-blown cooperation needs collective goals in a strong sense satisfying the "Collectivity Condition". According to this condition, a collective goal ist of the kind that necessarily, due of the goal-holders acceptance of the goal as their collective goal, if it is satisfied for one of the goal-holders it is satisfied for all the others. Not only collective goals but also other group-factors (such as possibly institutionalngroupmoden preferences and utilities) are argued to be relevant to rational cooperative (...) solutions of collective action dilemmas. (shrink)

This commentary argues that linguistic cooperation is essential even in discourse situations in which the nonlinguistic preferences of the participants are misaligned. The central examples involve indirect answers to direct questions. The analysis builds on the work of Asher and Lascarides, without, though retreating from the axioms of cooperativity as hastily as they do in the workshop paper (Asher & Lascarides 2008). I also argue (section 4) that discourse coherence and inferences from the common ground can account for much pragmatic (...) enrichment. (shrink)

In an earlier paper, I argued for an account of the metaphysics of grace which was libertarian in nature but also non-Pelagian. My goal in the present paper is to broaden my focus on how the human and divine wills relate in graced activities. While there is widespread agreement in Christian theology that the two do interact in an important way, what’s less clear is how the wills of two agents can be united in one of them performing a particular (...) action via a kind of joint or unitive willing. Insofar as the goal in these unitive willings is to have the human will and the divine will operating together in the human bringing about a particular action, I refer to this kind of volition as ”cooperative agency’. I explore two different models -- an identificationist model and an incarnation model -- regarding how the human agent is aligned with God in cooperative agency. I then argue that there are significant reasons for preferring the incarnational model over the identificationist model. (shrink)

In a laboratory experiment, we use a public goods game to examine the hypothesis that human subjects use an involuntary eye-detector mechanism for evaluating the level of privacy. Half of our subjects are “watched” by images of a robot presented on their computer screen. The robot—named Kismet and invented at MIT—is constructed from objects that are obviously not human with the exception of its eyes. In our experiment, Kismet produces a significant difference in behavior that is not consistent with existing (...) economic models of preferences, either self- or other-regarding. Subjects who are “watched” by Kismet contribute 29% more to the public good than do subjects in the same setting without Kismet. (shrink)

Reporting systems based on mobile technologies and feedback from regular citizens are becoming increasingly popular, especially as far as protection of environmental and cultural heritage is concerned. Reporting life-threatening situations, such as sudden natural disasters or traffic accidents, belongs to the same class of problems and could be aided by IT systems of a similar architecture. Designing and developing systems for reporting life-threatening situations is not a trivial task, requiring close cooperation between software developers and experts in different domains, who (...) could possibly find industrially recognized languages and notations difficult. Thus, the question is whether using simplified graphical domain-specific languages (SGDSLs) could help in creating a common communication platform. It has been revealed that domain experts have a preference for such languages as they offer good learnability, readability and ability to focus on the idea of application. The perspective of developers (technical persons) is introduced on the basis of feedback obtained from 84 students of Computer Science at the Lublin University of Technology, who attended comprehensive workshops followed by an anonymous survey. All participants received theoretical and practical training in modeling mobile software using the same set of languages as domain experts. An analysis of the results revealed that opinions expressed by technical and nontechnical persons concerning SGDSLs oriented on defining a flow of actions is consistent. Most respondents claimed that such languages might be valuable as tools for creating a common communication platform. (shrink)

This paper presents a logic of preference and functional dependence (LPFD) and its hybrid extension (HLPFD), both of whose sound and strongly complete axiomatization are provided. The decidability of LPFD is also proved. The application of LPFD and HLPFD to modelling cooperative games in strategic form is explored. The resulted framework provides a unified view on Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimality and the core. The philosophical relevance of these game-theoretical notions to discussions of collective agency is made explicit. Some key (...) connections with other logics are also revealed, for example, the coalition logic, the logic of functional dependence and the logic of ceteris paribus preference. (shrink)

In the dynamic choice literature, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that, on the one hand, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally irrational for her to give into temptation. On the other hand, resisting temptation also requires her to (...) act contrary to the preferences she has at the time of temptation. But that seems to be instrumentally irrational as well. I here consider the two most prominent types of argument why resisting temptation could nevertheless be instrumentally rational, namely two-tier and intra-personal cooperation arguments. I establish that the arguments either fail or are redundant. In particular, the arguments fail under the pervasive assumption in both decision theory and the wider literature on practical rationality that the agent’s preferences over the objects of choice are themselves the standard of instrumental rationality. And they either still fail or they become redundant when we give up that assumption. (shrink)

Students? perceptions of actual and preferred classroom environment were investigated using the What is happening in this class? questionnaire (WIHIC). The WIHIC assesses seven classroom environment dimensions: student cohesiveness, teacher support, involvement, task orientation, investigation, cooperation and equity. A sample of 978 secondary school students from 63 classes in Queensland responded to the WIHIC. For each item on the WIHIC, students recorded their perceptions of the actual (or real) and preferred (or ideal) classroom environment. Results revealed that statistically significant differences (...) between actual and preferred environments, and that the gap between actual and preferred environment was smaller for more positive classroom environments. (shrink)

This study investigated poultry farmers’ perceptions, preferences, and use of commercially compounded and self-compounded feeds in the Oyo Area of Oyo State, Nigeria. Data were collected from 120 poultry farmers through a structured interview schedule. The study concluded that poultry farmers prefer and use self-compounded feeds (SCF) instead of commercially compounded feeds (CCF) because (a) self-compounded feeds are of better quality than commercially compounded feeds, (b) there are no quality control measures in the poultry feed industry in the Oyo Area, (...) (c) commercially compounded feeds cost more than self-compounded feeds, and (d) farmers choose feed based on the perceived quality of the feed, their technical ability to produce feed by themselves, the cost of CCF, the storability of feed, and the cost and availability of transportation. Based on these findings, it is recommended that interested public and private agencies should organize annual extension workshops and training for poultry farmers in the study area on (a) feed formulation; (b) feed ingredient mixing and compounding; (c) selection of ingredients, mixtures, and additives; and (d) the establishment, operation, and maintenance of feed mills. Farmers should be encouraged to form feed mill cooperative societies. The performance of the Standards Organization of Nigeria (SON) should be monitored and evaluated to ensure its effective oversight of quality standards for agricultural products and inputs such as feeds and feed ingredients. (shrink)

When states cooperate in refugee protection and implement a scheme with fixed rules allocating refugees to host states, should they consider refugees' interests and preferences regarding where they receive protection? This article briefly examines the kinds of preferences and interests that are relevant to both refugees and states before discussing the moral principles determining the respective weight that should be attributed to them. We conclude that states must adhere to some minimal constraints concerning the consideration of refugees' concerns, and should (...) promote some further moral goals that go beyond these constraints. Finally, we suggest a scheme that meets all the moral demands we argued for and seems feasible without posing serious threats to the destination states. (shrink)

In the dynamic choice literature, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that, on the one hand, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally irrational for her to give into temptation. On the other hand, resisting temptation also requires her to (...) act contrary to the preferences she has at the time of temptation. But that seems to be instrumentally irrational as well. I here consider the two most prominent types of argument why resisting temptation could nevertheless be instrumentally rational, namely two-tier and intra-personal cooperation arguments. I establish that the arguments either fail or are redundant. In particular, the arguments fail under the pervasive assumption in both decision theory and the wider literature on practical rationality that the agent’s preferences over the objects of choice are themselves the standard of instrumental rationality. And they either still fail or they become redundant when we give up that assumption. (shrink)

In the present study it was shown that both decision heuristics and social value orientation play important roles in the building of preferences. This was revealed in decision tasks in which participants were deciding about candidates for a job position. An eye-tracking equipment was applied in order to register participants´ information acquisition. It was revealed that participants performing well on a series of heuristics tasks (availability, representativeness, anchoríng & adjustment,and attribution) including a confidence judgment also behaved more accurately than low (...) performers in the fulfillment of the preference tasks. It was also established that the high performers were not as influenced by whether uncertainty was presented in terms of probabilities or in terms of frequencies as was the low performers. With regard to social value orientation the results revealed that decision processing differences were more systematic between cooperators and competitors than between cooperators and individualists. Also, the cooperators did not seem to attend more to proenvironmental goals than to profit goals in the evaluation of the candidates. Finally, it was shown that accountable cooperators invested more time in their decisions than those that were not accountable, and that no such difference was observed between accountable and not accountable competitors or individualists. (shrink)

Massive amounts of data are collected and stored on a routine basis in virtually all domains of human activities. Such data are potentially useful to biomedicine. Yet, access to data for research purposes is hindered by the fact that different kinds of individual-patient data reside in disparate, unlinked silos. We propose that data cooperatives can promote much needed data aggregation and consequently accelerate research and its clinical translation. Data cooperatives enable direct control over personal data, as well as more democratic (...) governance of data pools. This model can realize a specific kind of data economy whereby citizens and communities are empowered to steer data use according to their motivations, preferences, and concerns. Policy makers can promote this model by recognizing citizens’ rights to access and to obtain a copy of their own data, and by funding distributed data infrastructures piloting new data aggregation models. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Herman Daly’s Economics for a Full World: His Life and Ideas by Peter VictorJeroen Van Den Bergh (bio)Victor, Peter (2022). Herman Daly’s Economics for a Full World: His Life and Ideas. Routledge, Oxon UK and New York USA (ISBN: 978–0–367-55694-5).Herman Daly (1938–2022) spent a lifetime thinking about how to achieve a sustainable economy. In an inclusive biography, Canadian economist and environmental scientist Peter Victor discusses his ideas, critiques (...) and debates with others, while clarifying his motivations and struggles. Daly has greatly influenced others, as reflected by numerous prizes awarded to him. This influence is confirmed by original text boxes in the book that contain statements of many colleagues about his work and person, obtained through a questionnaire survey by the author.As a young man, Daly decided to study economics as he imagined it combined humanities and science. He was disappointed in it being less scientific than hoped, but his environmental concern motivated him to work on reestablishing the foundations of the field in environmental science and ethics. Daly is best known for his critique of economic growth and his alternative of the “steady-state economy.” He contributed, however, many other novel concepts and ideas during his lifetime, such as the ends-means spectrum, empty vs full world, uneconomic growth and optimal scale.Victor explains these ideas in a calm pace, showing a deep knowledge of Daly’s work. He, moreover, is able to connect it to ongoing sustainability research. He does all this in the course of thirteen chapters, covering Daly’s early life, education and career, his views on economics, his personal philosophy and the role of religion, his proposal for a steady-state economy, and his opinions on economic growth, population and migration, money and banking, and the perils of trade. [End Page 117]Ultimate endsMany consider Herman Daly to be a heterodox and even heretic economist. He associates himself with ecological economics, the field he co-founded. But while some of his ideas seem radical, many of his core proposals do not deviate substantially from mainstream economics. For instance, his “ultimate ends” concept is perfectly consistent with the broad notion of “welfare” in standard economics. In line with this, many welfare economists—such as Samuelson (1961), Mishan (1967), Hirsch (1976), Sen (1976), Scitovsky (1976) and Frank (1985)—have expressed themselves as critical of GDP (gross domestic product) dominance and growthmania (van den Bergh 2009). In fact, neoclassical economics is not married to economic growth—this is more the empirical side of macroeconomics. While Daly recognizes these subtleties, some of his followers do not.Daly sees his Protestant religion as delivering the ultimate ends, but Victor notes that this has not led to concrete suggestions. Ultimate ends based in Christian religion may be motivated by the promise of eternal (after)life, which in effect means gratifying selfish preferences. Instead, a humanistic perspective—which Daly also seems to embrace—would stress solidarity with future generations and a bioethical view of solidarity with other species. These distinct viewpoints, combined with diversity of human preferences and experiences, suggest that it will be difficult if not impossible for democratic societies to agree upon ultimate means.The Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), a kind of greened or sustainable GDP metric, is Daly’s most concrete elaboration of ultimate means (Daly and Cobb 1989). For many OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, it indicates a stabilization of welfare, despite continued GDP growth (Lawn 2003; Posner and Costanza 2011). As clarified by Victor, The ISEW remains close to GDP, produces a monetary measure, has a simple and transparent calculation method, and received considerably attention from theoretical and empirical angles. In view of this, it may well represent the best candidate for a beyond-GDP metric that can replace the GDP. What urgently fails is an effective institutional procedure to achieve its widespread adoption (van den Bergh 2022).Religion, evolution and biodiversityDaly’s religious standpoint make him skeptical of the modern scientific worldview which regards the world to be governed by materialism and evolution, with no role for a higher purpose or an ultimate end. This led him... (shrink)

We hypothesize that when honesty is not motivated by selfish goals, it reveals social preferences that have evolved for convincing strategically vigilant partners that one is a person worth cooperating with. In particular, we explain how the patterns of dishonest behavior observed in recent experiments can be motivated by preferences for social and self-esteem. These preferences have evolved because they are adaptive in an environment where it is advantageous to be selected as a partner by others and where these (...) others are strategically vigilant: they efficiently evaluate the expected benefit of cooperating with specific partners and attend to their intentions. We specify the adaptive value of strategic vigilance and preferences for social and self-esteem. We argue that evolved preferences for social and self-esteem are satisfied by applying mechanisms of strategic vigilance to one's own behavior. We further argue that such cognitive processes obviate the need for the evolution of preferences for fairness and social norm compliance. (shrink)

Numerous studies show that humans tend to be more cooperative than expected given the assumption that they are rational maximizers of personal gain. As a result, theoreticians have proposed elaborated formal representations of human decision-making, in which utility functions including “altruistic” or “moral” preferences replace the purely self-oriented "Homo economicus" function. Here we review mathematical approaches that provide insights into the mathematical stability of alternative ways of representing human decision-making in social contexts. Candidate utility functions may be evaluated with help (...) of game theory, classical modeling of social evolution that focuses on behavioral strategies, and modeling of social evolution that focuses directly on utility functions. We present the advantages of the latter form of investigation and discuss one surprisingly precise result: “Homo economicus” as well as “altruistic” utility functions are less stable than a function containing a preference for the golden rule or for the common welfare that is only expressed in social contexts composed of individuals with similar preferences. We discuss the contribution of mathematical models to our understanding of human other-oriented behavior, with a focus on the classical debate over psychological altruism. We conclude that human can be psychologically altruistic, but that psychological altruism evolved because it was generally expressed towards individuals that contributed to the actor’s fitness, such as own children, romantic partners and long term reciprocators. (shrink)

Since Chinese scholars are playing an increasingly important role in shaping the national landscape of discussion on AI ethics, understanding their ethical concerns and preferred solutions is essential for global cooperation on governance of AI. This article, therefore, provides the first elaborated analysis on the discourse on AI ethics in Chinese academia, via a systematic literature review. This article has three main objectives. to identify the most discussed ethical issues of AI in Chinese academia and those being left out ; (...) to analyze the solutions proposed and preferred by Chinese scholars ; and to map out whose voices are dominating and whose are in the marginal. Findings suggest that in terms of short-term implications, Chinese scholars’ concerns over AI resemble predominantly the content of international ethical guidelines. Yet in terms of long-term implications, there are some significant differences needed to be further addressed in a cultural context. Further, among a wide range of solution proposals, Chinese scholars seem to prefer strong-binding regulations to those weak ethical guidelines. In addition, this article also found that the Chinese academic discourse was dominated by male scholars and those who are from elite universities, which arguably is not a unique phenomenon in China. (shrink)

I model an attempt by radical parties to topple a modus vivendi between a ruling government and a moderate opposition group. Cooperation between the regime and the moderate opposition is possible if each player prefers mutual cooperation to mutual confrontation. If each player also prefers mutual confrontation to cooperating while the other defects then radical parties have a chance at breaking up this accord. Radical parties can succeed in bringing the government and opposition to mutual confrontation if they can (...) agree on power-sharing arrangements after regime change. This paper also resolves central questions surrounding the trial and crucifixion of Jesus Christ. I use an institutional approach to infer player preferences from historical and biblical sources and then use game theory to model the interactions between participants in these events. In so doing, I clarify aspects of the Gospel narrative that have puzzled readers for the past 2000 years. (shrink)

Price discrimination is widespread in the American economy and sometimes can be defended as achieving socially preferable economic outcomes. However, the separation of markets required for price discrimination is often difficult to sustain. Sometimes those whom the seller wishes to charge higher prices are identified by imprecise markers. (Thus, as one example, airlines have traditionally attempted to identify business travelers willing to pay higher fares as those travelers unwilling to stay at their destination over a Saturday night.) Imprecise targeting complicates (...) efforts to prevent strategies of circumvention and sellers sometimes resort to claiming that buyers are morally bound to observe rules which sellers cannot otherwise enforce. This paper examines whether buyers can be morally bound by sellers to put themselves into discriminated-against classes.This paper takes the position that if, as often seems to be the case, there is a social consensus that consumers would not be morallyobliged to sort themselves into categories precisely designed to achieve the goals of price discrimination, then there is, a fortiori,a social consensus that consumers are not morally obliged to sort themselves into categories which are only crudely designed toachieve the goals of price discrimination, and which may in fact be counterproductive. (shrink)

Since the boat clash incident in September 2010, tensions have persisted between Japan and China over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Although territorial issues can easily become national symbols and used against other countries, nationalism hampers diplomatic concessions essential for diverse international resolutions. Greater the attention the public pays to such issues, lesser the room governments have for maneuvering. The Japanese and Chinese administrations will find it difficult to extricate themselves from the current deadlock if each party merely continues (...) to assert its sovereignty over the islands. This study examines the possibility of expanding both countries as stipulated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea China Fisheries Agreement (2000) established vast special water zones in the middle of the East China Sea instead of demarking the EEZs between the two countries. However, the Joint Fisheries Committee established in accordance with the agreement has not worked to prevent overexploitation and to maintain sustainable development of fishery stocks in the zones. Thus, this paper proposes that Japan and China launch an initiative for effective control of fishing resources in the East China Sea, most preferably in collaboration with related neighboring parties. (shrink)

This important collection of essays is a synthesis of foundational studies in Bayesian decision theory and statistics. An overarching topic of the collection is understanding how the norms for Bayesian decision making should apply in settings with more than one rational decision maker and then tracing out some of the consequences of this turn for Bayesian statistics. There are four principal themes to the collection: cooperative, non-sequential decisions; the representation and measurement of 'partially ordered' preferences; non-cooperative, sequential decisions; and pooling (...) rules and Bayesian dynamics for sets of probabilities. The volume will be particularly valuable to philosophers concerned with decision theory, probability, and statistics, statisticians, mathematicians, and economists. (shrink)

In a knowledge-based economy, the role of regions is regarded as very significant for creating and dispersing knowledge. Particularly, geographical clusters of firms in a single sub-national region and cross-border regions may contribute to transmitting certain kinds of knowledge between and among firms. In addition, markets prefer to favor specialized firms with a coherent body of knowledge when knowledge creation and the use of new knowledge become increasingly important for maintaining and improving a firm’s competitiveness. This means that regional policy (...) makers may not interfere directly with markets and firms when the process of globalization pushes national economies into a world of learning and innovation because the institutional framework for market exchange favors knowledge exchange in a globalizing economic system. This paper argues how a cross-border cluster in the Öresund region between Denmark and Sweden has been created, and which strategies it focuses on in order to strengthen its competitiveness and to generate a further development that aims to become a global innovative cluster. Moreover, it discuses whether the Nordic cross-border cluster, the Medicon Valley is a unique approach in the EU context or not. Finally, it argues how it has created technology innovation as well as contributed to the regional economic growth. (shrink)

Runaway social selection resulting from partner choice may have shaped aspects of human cooperation and complex sociality that are otherwise hard to account for. Social selection is the subtype of natural selection that results from the social behaviors of other individuals. Competition to be chosen as a social partner can, like competition to be chosen as a mate, result in runaway selection that shapes extreme traits. People prefer partners who display valuable resources and bestow them selectively on close partners. The (...) resulting phenotypic covariance between displays and preferences gives fitness advantages to both, creating runaway selection that could shape a whole suite of prosocial traits including altruism, moral capacities, empathy, and theory of mind. Even though they give a net fitness benefit, traits at the endpoint of runaway social selection can have substantial deleterious effects on other traits such as viability, ability to accumulate resources, or vulnerability to mental disorders. Social selection forces arising from self-interested partner choices may be an invisible hand that shaped capacities for commitment, altruism, and other prosocial capacities of the human social brain. (shrink)