In the following paper sources of a constitution are put in question in general, and more specifically, the constitutional culture of the European Union Law is being investigated in-depth with regard to principles of deliberative democracy and rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The change of a law application paradigm as well as the change of a legal systems’ nature are taken into account.

We present some equivalent conditions for a quasivariety \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal {K}}$$\end{document} of structures to be generated by a single structure. The first such condition, called the embedding property was found by A.I. Mal′tsev in [6]. It says that if \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\bf A}, {\bf B} \in \mathcal {K}}$$\end{document} are nontrivial, then there exists \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\bf C} \in \mathcal{K}}$$\end{document} (...) such that A and B are embeddable into C. One of our equivalent conditions states that the set of quasi-identities valid in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\mathcal{K}}$$\end{document} is closed under a certain Gentzen type rule which is due to J. Łoś and R. Suszko [5]. (shrink)

Predictive processing (PP) has been repeatedly presented as a unificatory account of perception, action, and cognition. In this paper, we argue that this is premature: As a unifying theory, PP fails to deliver general, simple, homogeneous, and systematic explanations. By examining its current trajectory of development, we conclude that PP remains only loosely connected both to its computational framework and to its hypothetical biological underpinnings, which makes its fundamentals unclear. Instead of offering explanations that refer to the same set of (...) principles, we observe systematic equivocations in PP‐based models, or outright contradictions with its avowed principles. To make matters worse, PP‐based models are seldom empirically validated, and they are frequently offered as mere just‐so stories. The large number of PP‐based models is thus not evidence of theoretical progress in unifying perception, action, and cognition. On the contrary, we maintain that the gap between theory and its biological and computational bases contributes to the arrested development of PP as a unificatory theory. Thus, we urge the defenders of PP to focus on its critical problems instead of offering mere re‐descriptions of known phenomena, and to validate their models against possible alternative explanations that stem from different theoretical assumptions. Otherwise, PP will ultimately fail as a unified theory of cognition. (shrink)

Blumenthal-Barby and her colleagues (2022) situate their discussion of philosophy and bioethics in the context of (reportedly) widely held assumption that, when compared to the early days of bioethics, the role of philosophy is now diminished across the field – the assumption we call the Disconnection Thesis. This assumption can be summarized, to use the authors’ own words, by the phrase “philosophy’s glory days in bioethics are over“. While in no place of the article they explicitly endorse the Disconnection Thesis, (...) at least some of the authors had previously endorsed it in print (Savulescu 2015). Such expressions of collective expert wisdom might be a valuable source of information on the discipline's history, but they should not be accepted uncritically. Given the explosion in the size and scope of bioethical research in recent decades, any scholar’s familiarity with the area is necessarily based on selective reading and might be biased. Hence, in this commentary, we examine what kind of more rigorous evidence could corroborate the Disconnection Thesis. In other words, if the role of philosophy in bioethics has been indeed diminishing, what kind of observable patterns should we expect to see? Drawing on our previous research (Bystranowski, Dranseika, Żuradzki 2022), here we focus on two useful perspectives: citation analysis and topic modeling. While the first approach allows us to indirectly measure the level of engagement of bioethicists with philosophical literature (by measuring the proportion of references from articles published in journals in bioethics that cite philosophy journals), the latter provides a window into the content and argumentative style of bioethical texts. (shrink)

The mainstream concept of death—the biological one—identifies death with the cessation of an organism. In this article, I challenge the mainstream position, showing that there is no single well-established concept of an organism and no universal concept of death in biological terms. Moreover, some of the biological views on death, if applied in the context of bedside decisions, might imply unacceptable consequences. I argue the moral concept of death—one similar to that of Robert Veatch—overcomes such difficulties. The moral view identifies (...) death with the irreversible cessation of a patient’s moral status, that is, a state when she can no longer be harmed or wronged. The death of a patient takes place when she is no longer capable of regaining her consciousness. In this regard, the proposal elaborated herein resembles that of Veatch yet differs from Veatch’s original project since it is universal. In essence, it is applicable in the case of other living beings such as animals and plants, provided that they have some moral status. (shrink)

Abraham Robinson’s framework for modern infinitesimals was developed half a century ago. It enables a re-evaluation of the procedures of the pioneers of mathematical analysis. Their procedures have been often viewed through the lens of the success of the Weierstrassian foundations. We propose a view without passing through the lens, by means of proxies for such procedures in the modern theory of infinitesimals. The real accomplishments of calculus and analysis had been based primarily on the elaboration of novel techniques for (...) solving problems rather than a quest for ultimate foundations. It may be hopeless to interpret historical foundations in terms of a punctiform continuum, but arguably it is possible to interpret historical techniques and procedures in terms of modern ones. Our proposed formalisations do not mean that Fermat, Gregory, Leibniz, Euler, and Cauchy were pre-Robinsonians, but rather indicate that Robinson’s framework is more helpful in understanding their procedures than a Weierstrassian framework. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to point out the modelling choices that lead to different systems of deontic action logic. A kind of a roadmap is presented. On the one hand it can help the reader to find the deontic logic appropriate for an intended application relying on the information considering the way in which a deontic logic represents actions and how it characterises deontic properties in relation to (the representation of) actions. On the other hand it is a (...) guideline how to build a deontic action logic which satisfies the desired properties. (shrink)

The measure of trust that people vest in their fellow citizens or institutions depends on three factors: the `reflected trustworthiness' of the target as estimated by themselves in a more or less rational manner, the attitude of `basic trustfulness' deriving from socialization, and the `culture of trust' pervading their society and normatively encouraging the trusting orientation. The author presents a model of a structural context conducive for the emergence of the culture of trust, and then argues that democratic organization contributes (...) to trust-generating conditions, such as normative certainty, transparency, stability, and accountability. This influence is found to be doubly paradoxical. First, democracy breeds the culture of trust by institutionalizing distrust at many levels of democratic organization. And second, the strongest influence of democracy on the culture of trust may be expected when the institutionalized distrust remains a resource used sparingly and only when there appear significant breaches of trust. (shrink)

In this article, I examine Michael Bratman’s account of stability in his planning theory of intention. Future-directed intentions should be stable, or appropriately resistant to change, over time. Bratman claims that the norm of stability governs both intentions and plans. The aim of this article is to critically enrich Bratman’s account of stability by introducing plasticity as an additional norm of planning. I construct plasticity as a kind of stability of intentions which supplements Bratman’s notion of “reasonable stability.” Unlike the (...) latter, plasticity applies mainly to cases in which plan states are abandoned without reconsideration. I focus on the intra-theoretical problems of PTI and elucidate: the distinction between future-directed intentions and plans, the conceptual difference between stability and inertia, which is only implicit in PTI, and the role of the environment of the planner, which has a vestigial role in Bratman’s work. I also defend my incorporation of pl... (shrink)

By pure calculus of names we mean a quantifier-free theory, based on the classical propositional calculus, which defines predicates known from Aristotle’s syllogistic and Leśniewski’s Ontology. For a large fragment of the theory decision procedures, defined by a combination of simple syntactic operations and models in two-membered domains, can be used. We compare the system which employs `ε’ as the only specific term with the system enriched with functors of Syllogistic. In the former, we do not need an empty name (...) in the model, so we are able to construct a 3-valued matrix, while for the latter, for which an empty name is necessary, the respective matrices are 4-valued. (shrink)

To explore the extent of embeddability of Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus in first-order logic (FOL) and modern frameworks, we propose to set aside ontological issues and focus on pro- cedural questions. This would enable an account of Leibnizian procedures in a framework limited to FOL with a small number of additional ingredients such as the relation of infinite proximity. If, as we argue here, first order logic is indeed suitable for developing modern proxies for the inferential moves found in Leibnizian infinitesimal (...) calculus, then modern infinitesimal frameworks are more appropriate to interpreting Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus than modern Weierstrassian ones. (shrink)

Trivalence is quite natural for deontic action logic, where actions are treated as good, neutral or bad.We present the ideas of trivalent deontic logic after J. Kalinowski and its realisation in a 3-valued logic of M. Fisher and two systems designed by the authors of the paper: a 4-valued logic inspired by N. Belnap’s logic of truth and information and a 3-valued logic based on nondeterministic matrices. Moreover, we combine Kalinowski’s idea of trivalence with deontic action logic based on boolean (...) algebra. (shrink)

English title: Master Eckhart’s God Confronted with Nietzschean Critique of Christianity. Author tries to demonstrate that the way of thinking about Christian God developed in the late Middle Ages by Master Eckhart goes beyond the interpretation which underlies Nietzsche’s criticism of Christianity as a religion of the other world. In the paper, Author first presents the said criticism, followed by the vision of God outlined by Eckhart. He demonstrates that Christianity, criticized by Nietzsche, uses a commonsense vision of God’s transcendence (...) based on spatial images. The author also demonstrates that Eckhart defines this transcendence in such a way that it does not fall under Nietzsche’s criticism, in particular it cannot lead to the depreciation of worldliness in favour of an invented other world, which Nietzsche observes. Eckhart’s thought makes room for Christianity ‘after Nietzsche.’. (shrink)

In the paper we provide an overview of issues related to the models used in the research on the logic of norms and actions. We present two models of the variability of the world: temporal (acyclic) and atemporal (cyclic). In the first one the past is always clearly defined, and the future is potentially “branched”. The second type of model allows for a return to the situation that took place. Next we describe different approaches towards agency modeling. We present the (...) most important paradigms, including the logic of actions, where actions are interpreted as transitions between the situations and STIT logic, which states only the responsibility of the agent for particular states of affairs. We discuss questions of determinism and indeterminism of actions, identification of basic actions and operations and the issue of identity. The final part of the paper is devoted to deontic categories. In particular, the applicability of the concepts of strong and weak permission and prohibition in different situational contexts, and their relationship to the two concepts of obligation: abstract and derived. (shrink)

We investigate a speci c model of knowledge and beliefs and their dynamics. The model is inspired by public announcement logic and the approach to puzzles concerning knowledge using that logic. In the model epistemic considerations are based on ontology. The main notion that constitutes a bridge between these two disciplines is the notion of epistemic capacities. Within the model we study scenarios in which agents can receive false announcements and can have incomplete or improper views about other agent's epistemic (...) capacities. Moreover, we try to express the description of problem speci cation using the tools from applied ontology { RDF format for information and the Protege editor. (shrink)

OBJECTIVE PREDICATION The author claims that there are two kinds of predicates that are used to describe cognitive states of mind like beliefs or perception. Using some of them, one can describe the cognitive states of mind directly, whereas using some others, one can describe these states in comparison with one’s own. For example, one can say that a person has a belief or one can say that that person’s belief is according to his own beliefs. In the latter situation, (...) he uses the predicate “to know”. The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John knows that p” are as follows: (1) Peter believes that John believes that p; (2) Peter believes that p; (3) Peter believes that the reasons for which John believes that p have a good justification. In a similar way one can ascribe to somebody a visual impression of an object x or to compare that person’s impressions with his own cognitive states. In the latter situation one uses the predicate “to see” (to perceive). The conditions that Peter uses correctly the sentence “John can see x” are the following: (I) Peter believes that John has visual impression of object x; (II) Peter believes that object x exists; (III) Peter believes that this that John has visual impression of object x is according to the laws of vision. When one uses predicates that describe cognitive states of mind of a person (possession of beliefs or sensory impressions), one speaks subjectively, whereas when one speaks objectively, he uses predicates that allow him to compare cognitive states of mind of a person with his own. Keywords: PREDICATION, BELIEFS, PERCEPTION. (shrink)

In the paper we discuss different intuitions about the properties of obligatory actions in the framework of deontic action logic based on boolean algebra. Two notions of obligation are distinguished–abstract and processed obligation. We introduce them formally into the system of deontic logic of actions and investigate their properties and mutual relations.

Public opinion has it that ethics should be concerned with studying and providing precise and reliable rules of conduct. This view is based in a long philosophical tradition which begins with the Stoics and continues at least to Kant; it is, however, a false view. There are good reasons to turn our attention to these aspects of moral thinking which refer to and emphasize the element of risk and uncertainty. In the article I briefly discuss two of such reasons: the (...) problem of moral luck and the problem of action based on ignorance. Consideration of these two problems leads to the conclusion that the most tricky element in moral thinking is the firm belief of the subject in the truth of the premises on which they base their actions and in the irrelevance of external factors to the assessment of their deeds. In this light I argue that the basic requirement for a moral justification of a particular action is not its conformity to a certain set of rules but the subject’s critical reflection on their course of action. Indeed, what turns an attitude into a moral attitude is an amoral, epistemological factor: criticism and openness to uncertainty. (shrink)

The article presents the key problems relevant to the issue of “transcendent Action,” as Peirce calls it. The author focuses on the relation between “belief” and the “transcendentals:” unity, truth, goodness, and beauty, in their peculiar Peirceian context. He considers firstly “belief” in the sense of “an original impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention” and, secondly, “Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, (...) and Beauty.” Finally, he considers Peirce's defense again two popular accusations: one on the part of the logicians which “confounds psychical truths with psychological truths,” and the second one regarding hedonism. (shrink)

The paper addresses some of the aspects of the neo-Aristotelian concept of good on the basis of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. The author’s general thesis is that the idea of good organizes its normativity along two vectors pointed towards nature and emancipation, which are interlinked, that is — the normativity of the good is always organized by both of them and it is inappropriate to refer to one of them only. This fault is made, the author believes, by Nussbaum who (...) does not offer enough resources to establish a sound naturalistic evaluative standard in her theory. To address this issue the author starts by discussing the capabilities approach as a form of the concept of good and proceeds by analysing Nussbaum’s view on family as an exemplar of the inadequacies of the approach. (shrink)

Citizen identification systems (known also as ‘ID card systems’, or ‘national identity management systems’, even though those definitions are not identical) are receiving a mixed acceptance, with their privacy, security and usability being criticised, specifically in the UK. This paper investigates whether it is possible to improve social acceptance of such systems in cases where they are incompatible with the perceived value of privacy, but without significantly changing their original architecture. The paper analyses requirements using four different scenarios that address (...) long-term privacy issues. Relatively small alterations to such systems are suggested that may significantly improve their adoption. (shrink)

Epistemicism seems to be the most dominating approach to vagueness in the recent twenty years. In the logical and philosophical tradition, e.g. Peirce, vagueness does not depend on human knowledge. Epistemicists deny this fact and contend that vagueness is merely the result of our imperfect mind, our dearth of knowledge, sort of phantom, finally, that it simply does not exist. In my opinion, such a stance not only excludes vagueness comprehended in terms of human knowledge, but which is worse, stems (...) from spurious logical arguments. The part of arguments called Sorensen’s Arguments or even Proofs were the subject of my analysis in the book Paradoksy and in the paper “Epistemicism and Roy Sorensen Arguments” published in the Bulletin of the Section of Logic. Here I shall only briefly refer to these works and focus mainly on the arguments launched by Tymothy Williamson. One of them is to uncover why we are not able to recognize the alleged sharp boundary between positive and negative extensions of any vague predicates. Williamson’s reasoning is based on his margin for error principle. Another argumentation of Williamson aims at the refutation of the principle I know that I know. It should be emphasized that all the aforementioned arguments are fundamental for epistemicism and all of them are fallacious because of either formal or false-premise fallacy. There is the circumstance that we cannot deem epistemicism logical. Finally, we show that within the epistemic frame the following thesis is valid: if what epistemicism states is the case, then what epistemicism states is not the case. This immediately implies → ¬p’) that it is not the case what epistemicism states. So, either epistemicism or logic. (shrink)

This article aims to show that our acceptance or non-acceptance of certain facts is influenced by our adoption of a philosophical world-picture as a kind of background knowledge on the basis of which one decides what does or does not exist, and what is true or false. For this purpose, I discuss the positions of the existential Thomists, as well as those of Wittgenstein and Abel, while also occasionally invoking the work of Putnam and Fleck. To begin with, it is (...) demonstrated that philosophical facts are accepted on the basis of a world-picture that is itself a tangle of facts, values, and theories exhibiting varying degrees of generality. Whether we embrace them or not is thus not determined by any sort of direct experience. There are no neutral philosophical facts. Our world-picture suggests what sort of facts we are prepared to accept, and what methods we use to explain them. It is on precisely this that the heuristic role played by world-pictures in “creating” philosophical facts depends. (shrink)

The expression “moral experience”, along with the concomitant notion of experience itself, seems to have been understood in divergent ways. Taking as a background three views currently operative in our culture - emotivism, the ethics of duty, and the notion of an ethics “beyond good and evil” - a conception of ethical experience will be presented based on the findings of Edith Stein as elaborated in her work "Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities".

In the paper, several data reduction techniques for machine learning from big datasets are discussed and evaluated. The discussed approach focuses on combining several techniques including stacking, rotation, and data reduction aimed at improving the performance of the machine classification. Stacking is seen as the technique allowing to take advantage of the multiple classification models. The rotation-based techniques are used to increase the heterogeneity of the stacking ensembles. Data reduction makes it possible to classify instances belonging to big datasets. We (...) propose to use an agent-based population learning algorithm for data reduction in the feature and instance dimensions. For diversification of the classifier ensembles within the rotation also, alternatively, principal component analysis and independent component analysis are used. The research question addressed in the paper is formulated as follows: does the performance of a classifier using the reduced dataset be improved by integrating the data reduction mechanism with the rotation-based technique and the stacking? (shrink)

This paper is a proposal of continuation of the work of C. Rauszer. The logic of falsehood created by her may constitute the starting point for construction of logic formalising reductive reasonings. The extension of Heyting-Brouwer logic to its deductive-reductive form sheds new light upon those classical tautologies which are rejected in intuitionism. It turns out that among HBtautologies there can be found all the classical ones. Some of them are characteristic for deductive reasoning and they are accepted by intuitionism. (...) Others formulate the laws of reductive reasoning. Many of them, including the law of excluded middle has been rejected in Heyting’s intuitionism. Intuitionism only permits for those reductive tautologies, which at the same time bear deductive character. Thus, the complete HB intuitionism does not reject any of the classical tautologies. Every classical tautology appears in HB logic in its deductive or reductive part. Some are even present in both parts. At the end it is shown that the law of excluded middle α∨¬α is a law of the reductive part of the traditional, Heyting’s intuitionistic propositional calculus. (shrink)

The process of continuing education of paramedics is based on gaining educational credits during five-year educational periods. One of the forms of self-improvement are Internet-based educational programs. The lack of regulations concerning the organizational and technical aspects of e-learning made the authors attempt to analyze the phenomenon. The aim of the article is to present an initial analysis of the role of online educational programs in comparison with other forms of professional training of paramedics. One in three respondents has recently (...) used one of the methods of distance learning. Despite the low awareness of the effectiveness of e-learning, almost 70% of the interviewees expressed a positive opinion about it and over 50% were willing to use such forms in the future. The respondents preferred online trainings in the asynchronous version, containing audio-visual materials and providing the possibility to obtain a certificate issued to the participant after completing the course. The demand for topics in the area of professional training included mainly the fields of Drug Therapy, electrotherapy, electrocardiogram evaluation, medical segregation, and help in delivery in pre-hospital conditions. Modern forms of distance learning do not make it possible to acquire practical skills, yet their role in professional training of paramedics is still significant. According to the authors, online educational programs constitute an effective complement to traditional training through the performance of tasks in a mixed form, known as blended-learning. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Ludwig Wittgenstein „przydzielony do Krakowa” [Ludwig Witgenstein „Assigned to Krakow”], edited by Józef Bremer and Josef Rothhaupt.

This article presents a conceptual history of representation in the political debates of the Polish émigré community in the period 1832–1846/48. As I argue, while the concept was present in the output of all political environments of the Polish Great Emigration, there were more discrepancies than similarities about how to understand it. As a result of debates about what the Polish diaspora in exile actually was and who had the right to represent it, the concept became a part and parcel (...) of political frays. In this way, the right to use it—and consequently to represent the whole Polish community and Polish nation as well—occupied a central place in the evolution of the concept of representation. (shrink)