In this article, I examine Michael Bratman’s account of stability in his planning theory of intention. Future-directed intentions should be stable, or appropriately resistant to change, over time. Bratman claims that the norm of stability governs both intentions and plans. The aim of this article is to critically enrich Bratman’s account of stability by introducing plasticity as an additional norm of planning. I construct plasticity as a kind of stability of intentions which supplements Bratman’s notion of “reasonable stability.” Unlike the (...) latter, plasticity applies mainly to cases in which plan states are abandoned without reconsideration. I focus on the intra-theoretical problems of PTI and elucidate: the distinction between future-directed intentions and plans, the conceptual difference between stability and inertia, which is only implicit in PTI, and the role of the environment of the planner, which has a vestigial role in Bratman’s work. I also defend my incorporation of pl... (shrink)

The mainstream concept of death—the biological one—identifies death with the cessation of an organism. In this article, I challenge the mainstream position, showing that there is no single well-established concept of an organism and no universal concept of death in biological terms. Moreover, some of the biological views on death, if applied in the context of bedside decisions, might imply unacceptable consequences. I argue the moral concept of death—one similar to that of Robert Veatch—overcomes such difficulties. The moral view identifies (...) death with the irreversible cessation of a patient’s moral status, that is, a state when she can no longer be harmed or wronged. The death of a patient takes place when she is no longer capable of regaining her consciousness. In this regard, the proposal elaborated herein resembles that of Veatch yet differs from Veatch’s original project since it is universal. In essence, it is applicable in the case of other living beings such as animals and plants, provided that they have some moral status. (shrink)

There is a current effort to borrow the concept of trauma from medicine and psychiatry and to introduce it into sociological theory. The author explicates the notion of cultural trauma as applicable to the theory of social change. He defines cultural trauma as the culturally defined and interpreted shock to the cultural tissue of a society, and presents a model of the traumatic sequence, describing typical conditions under which cultural trauma emerges and evolves. Drawing on the work of Robert K. (...) Merton on anomie, and of Anthony Giddens on risk, he suggests a number of typical strategies by which societies cope with cultural traumas. Cultural trauma is treated as a link in the ongoing chain of social changes; depending on the number of concrete circumstances, cultural trauma may be a phase in the constructive morphogenesis of culture or in the destructive cycle of cultural decay. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 1, January 2022.

To explore the extent of embeddability of Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus in first-order logic (FOL) and modern frameworks, we propose to set aside ontological issues and focus on pro- cedural questions. This would enable an account of Leibnizian procedures in a framework limited to FOL with a small number of additional ingredients such as the relation of infinite proximity. If, as we argue here, first order logic is indeed suitable for developing modern proxies for the inferential moves found in Leibnizian infinitesimal (...) calculus, then modern infinitesimal frameworks are more appropriate to interpreting Leibnizian infinitesimal calculus than modern Weierstrassian ones. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to investigate the relations between the basic moral categories, namely those of norms, ideals and supererogation. The subject of discussion is, firstly, the ways that these categories are understood; secondly, the possible approaches towards moral acting that appear due to their use; and thirdly, their relationship within the moral system. However, what is of a special importance here is the relationship between the categories of norms and ideals (or in a wider aspect — laudable (...) acts) and a thesis about their complementary character. For it seems that the omission of one of the elements that are analysed within a moral system must result in an essential limitation of both the possibilities of finding an adequate approach to a given moral problem (on a descriptive level), as well as defining the full set of normative guidelines. Therefore, as I shall argue, resigning from a two-level method of moral analysis may lead to the atrophy of the very idea of ethics itself. (shrink)

L’article aborde la problématique des actes normatifs de droit pénal adoptés en Pologne dans les années 1944–1956. L’auteur essaie de répondre à la question : comment le régime politique et l’idéologie stalinienne ont-ils influencé la manière de rédiger les textes juridiques de cette branche du droit lors des plus grandes répressions par le pouvoir d’après-guerre en Pologne? À partir de 1944, le droit pénal a été adapté aux besoins des autorités communistes, contrôlées par l’Union soviétique. Dans la période analysée, on (...) a introduit en Pologne plus de cent actes normatifs englobant des dispositions pénales. L’idéologisation du droit pénal est visible dans toutes les parties des actes normatifs : titres, préambules et dispositions juridiques. On retrouve dans leur contenu les valeurs politiques, économiques et sociales fondamentales pour l’idéologie du stalinisme, dont les thèses ont été mises en œuvre en Pologne après la fin de l’occupation allemande. (shrink)

The expression “moral experience”, along with the concomitant notion of experience itself, seems to have been understood in divergent ways. Taking as a background three views currently operative in our culture - emotivism, the ethics of duty, and the notion of an ethics “beyond good and evil” - a conception of ethical experience will be presented based on the findings of Edith Stein as elaborated in her work "Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities".

Bez wątpienia, Peirce nie oferuje w swoim pismach jasnego ujęcia koncepcji przekonania, a jego poglądy, ewoluujące w ciągu całego życia, nie wydają się prowadzić do wyraźnej konkluzji. Niemniej jednak pozostaje autorem inspirującym, który pozosta- wił trwałe osiągnięcia na gruncie logiki symbolicznej i semiotyki. Metoda hermeneutyczna, którą zastosowaliśmy w tej pracy, miała na celu, w zgodzie z jego własną wskazówką metodyczną, ukazanie koncepcji przekonania, którą można by uzgodnić z dostępnymi stwierdzeniami samego Peirce’a, jak również jego komentatorów.

The main thesis of this book - written by a well known epistemologist and philosopher of sciences is rather sceptical. Both parties of the conflict defend a complex set of beliefs, both a priori accept many narrow, but controversial assumptions, both often ignore the primary arguments of the opponent.

Last year marked the appearance of an English-language book entitled Philosophical Anthropology: Outline of Fundamental Problems. It is, in actuality, an English translation of the most frequently reprinted work of the distinguished philosopher and expert on the history of Jesuit philosophy in Poland, Father Professor Roman Darowski. Although Philosophical Anthropology: Outline of Fundamental Problems is, excluding some of its parts, a translation rather than a new book, the fact of its appearance in English deserves to be noted and discussed, as (...) the new English-language version will allow it to reach a significantly wider range of readers than before. (shrink)

This essay discusses certain problems raised by Edmund Husserl’s conception of meaning with regard to the analysis of aesthetic experience. By referring to Jacques Derrida’s critique of phenomenological idealism I show that the metaphor of “stratification”, adopted by Husserl in his “Ideas” to a problem of discursive expression, if applied to the analysis of a work of art i.e. painting, allows to avoid the objection of “metaphysics of presence” commonly raised towards the phenomenological method.To present the major issue from the (...) perspective of artistic practice, I interpret Honore de Balzac’s short story “Chef-d’oeuvre inconnu”. In conclusion I show that aesthetic consciousness establishes an affective and receptive dimension that is no longer logocentric. This is the main reason why modern phenomenology should focus on the problem of aesthetic experience. (shrink)

This paper provides moderate criticism of so-called normative theories of thinking and reasoning. The discussion focuses on the problems of idealization, adequacy, inconsistent yet non-trivial logics, logical omniscience etc. I called them “internal” to the normative approach, because they stem from the very properties of formal systems used to model these two human activities. Some arguments, however, refer to the current theories in cognitive science, including those which are developed within “descriptive” framework.

The main goal of our study was to investigate the role of insight into one’s own biases in the process of hypothesis validation in accordance to the two fundamental social perception domains on the example of confirmation bias. The study was conducted on a group of 593 participants with the use of a confirmation bias procedure, a free recall procedure and the Metacognitive Self scale. We manipulated with the domain and the value of information given to the respondents. We suspected (...) that individuals with a high metacognitive self, in opposition to low metacognitive self ones, would not process the given information according to the two fundamental social perception domains. The results verified the existence of an interaction effect of the metacognitive self and the domain of the information given about a perceived person on the susceptibility to follow the confirmation bias. Contrary to the low metacognitive self individuals, who show a higher tendency for the confirmation bias within the competence than the community domain, persons with a high insight into their own biases express the same level of confirmation bias in no respect to the domain of the information. The value of the information has no significant influence. (shrink)

The article presents the key problems relevant to the issue of “transcendent Action,” as Peirce calls it. The author focuses on the relation between “belief” and the “transcendentals:” unity, truth, goodness, and beauty, in their peculiar Peirceian context. He considers firstly “belief” in the sense of “an original impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention” and, secondly, “Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, (...) and Beauty.” Finally, he considers Peirce's defense again two popular accusations: one on the part of the logicians which “confounds psychical truths with psychological truths,” and the second one regarding hedonism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the basis for the moral obligation to remember. As the moral relation to the past is primarily a matter of shared identity, the kind of obligation in question splits into two related issues, namely, that of political, state-oriented and state-organized memory on which the political identity rests and that of memory labour grounded in social identities based in shared, time-extended projects. Drawing upon tensions between these two, I discuss time control and the (...) accumulation of identity as central to memory labour and, referring to John Zerzan’s critique of symbolical roots of power, pinpoint the moral basis of such an accumulation. On the basis of this, I argue for nesting the duty to remember in acknowledging the agent’s recognition of the relatedness and dependency of their agency and possibilities of flourishing which can be obtained thanks to adjusting the field of the virtue of practical wisdom so that it includes members of the time-extended community. (shrink)

The high point of the falsification of physical theories in a standard view of the philosophy of science is the so-called crucial experiment. This experiment is a kind of manipulated empirical test, which provides the criterion for distinguishing between two rival hypotheses, where one is an acceptable theory due to passing the test, and the other turns out to be an unacceptable theory as it does not pass the test. The crucial experiment was supposed to play a significant role because, (...) in virtue of an empirical disconfirmation of one theory, the experiment was assumed to confirm the other as true. However, in 1906, in La théorie physique, son object et la structure (hereafter quoted in English translation as The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906/1954)), Pierre Duhem famously argued against this view and stated that crucial experiments in physics are impossible as they are necessarily ambiguous and logically incomplete. His contention rested on the claim that, “[a] physical theory is not an explanation [of true reality in itself in virtue of some broad metaphysical ramification of physics]. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as accurately as possible a set of experimental laws” (ibid., p. 19). Furthermore, different theories could be equally suitable to represent a given group of experimental laws. And, assuming holism, no hypothesis could be tested in isolation, but merely as a part of a set of an entire scientific theory. The problem which Duhem identified in 1906 was slightly overshadowed and neglected in mainstream philosophy of science until the appearance of a challenging paper by Willard Van Orman Quine published in 1951 and entitled “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. Quine’s paper caused a revival of interest in Duhem’s original formulation and gave a new impulse towards the problem in the form of the so-called Duhem-Quine thesis. The aim of this paper is to reconsider whether Duhem was right to argue that there are no crucial experiments in physics. In order to assess the validity of the thesis, first, this paper makes an exposition of Duhem’s arguments in their favour, and analyses the major criticisms of this position offered in the subject-literature of Adolf Grünbaum, who explicitly attacked the arguments for the thesis as inconclusive and false. Then, this paper presents possible modes of defence of the Duhem-Quine thesis and argues that the original formulation of the thesis is well qualified and plausible. Finally, this paper offers a pragmatic interpretation of the theory choice. (shrink)

The issue “Human being in the digital era” is not superfluous. Every technology, i.e. literacy, print etc., gives tools, but at the same time impacts deeply human being. The article attempts to answer the following questions: what kind of change is taking place nowadays? what are the associated challenges? Is it true what Einstein once said: “The problems that exist in the world today cannot be solved by the level of thinking that created them”?

Basing itself on Edith Stein's research into philosophy of psychology and the humanities, this article focuses particularly on discussions of the theory of association. Stein's approach, rooted in Husserlian phenomenological perspective, seems to represent a significant contribution to the establish of an intellectual framework for the exploration of the philosophy of consciousness, and also seems helpful for inquiries into the issue pf practical know-how pertaining to remembering things, as well as the use of schemata in intellectual activity generally.

This paper studies some normative relations that hold between actions, their preconditions and their effects, with particular attention to connecting what are often called ‘ought to be’ norms with ‘ought to do’ norms. We use a formal model based on a form of transition system called a ‘coloured labelled transition system’ (coloured LTS) introduced in a series of papers by Sergot and Craven. Those works have variously presented a formalism (an ‘action language’) nC+ for defining and computing with a (coloured) (...) LTS, and another, separate formalism, a modal language interpreted on a (coloured) LTS used to express its properties. We consolidate these two strands. Instead of specifying the obligatory and prohibited states and transitions as part of the construction of a coloured LTS as in nC+, we represent norms in the modal language and use those to construct a coloured LTS from a given regular (uncoloured) one. We also show how connections between norms on states and norms on transitions previously treated as fixed constraints of a coloured LTS can instead be defined within the modal language used for representing norms. (shrink)

Participants of polemics connected with the psychotherapeutic aspect of psychoanalysis, discuss the most often about technique. Controversies considerable relating to psychological theory and philosophy, lying at bases of this technique, are treated as secondary. This approach creates conflicting directives of therapeutic technique, forges its ethical dimension and description of psychical life of individual, introduces in the area of culture notions and phenomena not dependent on the social control. Threats resulting from these should be counteracted by psychotherapist's theoretical and philosophical reflection.

It is our intention to re-investigate only a few of the innumerable epistemological problems concerning Paley's argumentation for the existence of God. Nowadays this argumentation is commonly considered as invalid. Modern philosophers believe that the Humean Dialogs on Natural Religion and the Darwinian theory of evolution deprived Paley's reasoning of any cognitive validity. This judgment seems to us unjustified. We shall try to demonstrate that the very meaning and the logical structure of Paley's argumentation are continuously misunderstood, and that critics (...) have attacked rather a false image of Paley's cognitive pathway. Furthermore, we will show that Paley actually argues for the existence of a single agent producing biological organs. Indeed Paley demonstrates, that a biological organ is a kind of objective whole, and by necessity one produced by a single agent. However, Paley's form of argumentation is not sufficient to indicate whether this agent might be identified with a divine Creator, or Aristotelian "soul" building and commanding biological organs, or the recently discovered, described and deciphered deoxynucleotide polymer present in the reproductive biological cell. (shrink)

Creature consciousness provides a physicalist account of the first-person awareness. I argue that non-reductive consciousness is not about phenomenal qualia ; it is about the stream of awareness that makes any objects of perception epistemically available and ontologically present. This kind of consciousness is central, internally to one’s awareness. Externally, the feel about one’s significant other’s that “there is someone home” is quite important too. This is not substance dualism since creature consciousness and functional consciousness are both at different generality (...) levels of physicalism. Surprisingly, pre-Hegel philosophy of pure subject is more fitting with the current engineering approach than analytical phenomenalism. The complementary view of subject- and object-related perspectives, may come from Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre; but here it is placed, securely within the physicalist paradigm. It is essential to the Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness, which helps us understand under what general conditions a machine would be first-person conscious, but when it is merely functionally conscious. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Filozofia analityczna. Koncepcje, metody, organiczenia [Analytic Philosophy. Concepts, Methods, Limitations], by Tadeusz Szubka.

Recent literature in experimental philosophy has postulated the existence of the abstract/concrete paradox : the tendency to activate inconsistent intuitions depending on whether a problem to be analyzed is framed in abstract terms or is described as a concrete case. One recent study supports the thesis that this effect influences judicial decision-making, including decision-making by professional judges, in areas such as interpretation of constitutional principles and application of clear-cut rules. Here, following the existing literature in legal theory, we argue that (...) the susceptibility to such an effect might depend on whether decision-makers operate in a legal system characterized by the formalist or particularist approach to legal interpretation, with formalist systems being less susceptible to the effect. To test this hypothesis, we compare the results of experimental studies on ACP run on samples from two countries differing in legal culture: Poland and Brazil. The lack of significant differences between those results suggests that ACP is a robust effect in the legal context. (shrink)

Among different types of autonomy of ethics, semantic autonomy seems to be the most interesting. It is a thesis about irreducibility of meaning of ethical terms to some other types of discourse. The paper proposes an argument for the semantic autonomy of ethics, based on a detailed interpretation of the Open Question Argument by G.E. Moore, and followed up by the reading of Philippa Foot's argument about weak objectivity of evaluative meaning of ethical terms. The result of investigation gives the (...) two-fold picture of modern understanding of morality: irrevisability of moral demands as attempted by any theoretical armchair endeavors, which are external to the moral practice, and democratic intersubjectivity of moral discourse. (shrink)

Affective knowledge of God is a kind of knowledge which follows human affectivity. This knowledge takes place on two levels: the level of the natural inclination of man towards God and the level of the religious bias of man towards God. What is the nature of affective knowledge of God? It seems there are three problems in question. First of all, as there is a natural inclination towards God in man, one will be restless unless one recognizes or finds God. (...) Secondly, one who loves God has a new deeper knowledge of the divine things through connaturality and inclination. Thirdly, as the result of one's encounter with God and of uniting with Him, man experiences certain subjective states which cannot be expressed by words. (shrink)

What determines whether the procedures for proving the affirmative statement of God's existence may be called a proof? Certainly, it is necessary that all premises be true and that a reliable inference schemata be applied. One premise appears to be the most critical in the theistic argument. This premise is the principle of sufficient reason. I hold the view that the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found among the premises of any metaphysical explanation of reality, so I suggest that (...) the terms “proof” and “argument” not be used. Instead, we could speak of ways of acquiring discursive knowledge of God and ways of indirect substantiation of God's existence. (shrink)

Leading authors in their fields present an interdisciplinary panorama of vital themes of the philosophy of language and track their historical origins. This book gives new life to historical ideas and additional depth to current debates.

We współczesnych dyskusjach dotyczących szczegółowych zagadnień z zakresu etyki medycznej sporo uwagi poświęca się kwestii odstąpienia od interwencji medycznej lub zasadności stosowania pewnych rodzajów terapii nie rokujących poprawy stanu zdrowia chorej osoby. W publikacjach autorów chrześcijańskich tematyka ta nie zajmowała nigdy centralnego miejsca, aczkolwiek różnego typu kwestie dotyczące kontynuacji bądź przerwania leczenia znaleźć można już na kartach wczesnochrześcijańskich filozoficznych i teologicznych traktatów i rozpraw. Dopiero współcześnie w związku z szybkim rozwojem nauk medycznych poświęca się temu zagadnieniu więcej uwagi. Niniejszy artykuł (...) przedstawia poglądy wybranych wczesnochrześcijańskich i scholastycznych myślicieli na kwestię odstąpienia od interwencji medycznych. Zachowane do naszych czasów teksty i opinie różnych autorów pozwoli nam, w pewnym stopniu, zrozumieć historyczny kontekst oraz kulturowe uwarunkowania proponowanych wówczas rozstrzygnięć etycznych. (shrink)

Simplicity was recently described in the philosophy of science as “perhaps the most controversial theoretical virtue” (Schindler 2018). It has been also argued that contrary to the standard view, simplicity is not merely a pragmatic virtue but also an epistemic one. Virtue epistemologists are also interested in epistemic virtues, but simplicity is usually absent in their discussions. This paper adduces several contemporary approaches to simplicity showing that in philosophy and in psychology it can be considered either as a virtue or (...) as a vice. The paper then refers to the thought of Thomas Aquinas as an example of a premodern understanding of the virtue simplicity and suggests that his notion of simplicity as a virtue might be developed today within virtue epistemology into an interesting complement to this “perhaps the most controversial theoretical virtue” (Schindler 2018) known from contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

The paper analyses the beginnings of systematic ontology in Jainism, which appears to have began after first century CE, albeit certain ontology-relevant terminology in a nascent form was present earlier. A clear expression of systematic ontological reflection is the existence of models that organize ideas and categories in a more consistent conceptual scheme. Jainism follows similar developments that had earlier taken shape in in the early Buddhist Abhidharma, proto-Sāṁkhya-Yoga and proto-Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In addition, the paper argues that the models, five in (...) total, can be used as a methodological tool to distinguish various historical layers in early Jaina writings. (shrink)

The paper examines available references to the Ājīvikas that are often identified by scholars, notably by Basham, as genuine quotations from Ājīvikas’ lost works. In addition, the paper analyses some additional material not previously indentifed as possible quotations relevant to Ājīvikism. Unfortunately, none of such references seem to be genuinely derived from an Ājīvika source: All of such passages or verses previously considered genuinely taken from Ājīvika literature turn out to have been composed by non-Ājīvika authors and usually derive either (...) from Jaina works or from fables and narrative literature. There is no clear proof that the Ājīvikas developed their own Sanskrit literature, much less philosophical literature in Sanskrit. Further, the faithfulness and reliability of reports of the Ājīvikas and paraphrases of their views cannot be assessed with any certainty. (shrink)

Since the discovery of the Neandertal bones 1856, the extremely old, fragmentary fossil remains of hundreds of man-like bodies have been discovered in Europe, Asia, and Africa. Even the oldest ones - usually the most incomplete - look man-like and „un-apish", even to a layman, if compared with a modem apish and human correlate. Sometimes, in the vicinity of these remains, primitive stone tools or the evidence of their production have been found. At present, it seems absolutely certain — within (...) the limits of our present physical and biological knowledge - that at least four million years ago, in Africa, some creatures resembling modern man were living, and that at least two and half million years ago, in Africa, stone tools were produced. In contrast with the firm, scientifically-arguable belief that all modem human tribes - however different they are - belong to a single species, in paleoanthropology an equally firm scientific belief is maintained that the extinct man-like forms belong to several different, „presapient", „prehuman'', more ape-like species. (shrink)

The German philosopher Robert Spaemann proposed a complex but incomplete concept of philosophy. It has features of a classical approach, but it is difficult to define what is classical in it. Its comparison to the contemporary version of classical philosophy developed by the Lublin School of Philosophy shows that Spaemann may be considered as a representative of a classical, though not metaphysical, manner of philosophizing. Both in philosophy, systematically perceived as a type of cognition, and history, perceived as a type (...) of discourse, classical influences can be observed in terms of the concept of philosophy, its object, purpose, and method. Despite the tension between philosophy as the cognition and philosophy as the discourse, in his concept these two aspects cannot be reduced one to another and cannot be separate from each other. The awareness that philosophy is an endless and controversial discourse on ultimate problems does not relieve philosophers from their efforts to pursue the truth about reality. And this is how Spaemann looks at his own philosophising. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas understands providence as the reason of directing things to ends, and as the execution of that directing, i.e. governance. Thus, providence is one of the fundamental attributes of the person that reveals the person's perfection and dignity. Providence consists in a free and reasonable directing of oneself and the reality subject to oneself in order to actualize potentialities of oneself and of other beings in the context of the ultimate goal of existence. Human providence joins the providence of (...) the Absolute with regard to the world. In spite of its deficiencies human providence reveals the essential dignity of the human person. (shrink)