We argue in favor of merely disjunctive effects, namely cases in which an event or fact, C, is not a cause of an effect, E1, and is also not a cause of a distinct effect, E2, and yet C is a cause of the disjunctive effect (E1 orE2). Disjunctive effects let us retain the additivity and the distributivity of causation. According to additivity, if C is a cause of E1 and C is a cause of E2, then C is a (...) cause of E1 and E2. According to distributivity, if C is a cause of E1 and E2, then C is a cause of E1 and C is a cause of E2. We draw an analogy between causation and intensional notions like believing, wanting, and owing, which also admit of merely disjunctive cases. We argue that both the Lewisian counterfactual account of causation (including its recent emendation by Sartorio) and the contrastive account of causation fail to properly account for this phenomenon. (shrink)

In the last 30 years much philosophical discussion has been generated by Kripke’s proof of the necessity of origin for material objects presented in footnote 56 of ‘Naming and Necessity’. I consider the two most popular reconstructions of Kripke’s argument: one appealing to the necessary sufficiency of origin, and the other employing a strong independence principle allegedly derived from the necessary local nature of prevention. I argue that, to achieve a general result, both reconstructions presuppose an implicit Humean atomistic thesis (...) of recombination, according to which any two (non-overlapping) possible objects can simultaneously coexist in one and the same world. Yet recombination ill accords with the other assumptions of the proofs. I also argue that the locality of prevention does not entail strong independence. (shrink)

In this paper I explore three related topics emerging from Prior's work on the logic of time. First, what is the proper province of logic, if any? Is temporal (modal) logic just logic, on a par with the paradigmatic case of first-order quantification theory or even simple propositional logic? Second, what counts as an interpretation of a formal system? In particular, can formal semantics provide an interpretation? Third, what is the proper role of the meta-theory? In connection with this last (...) question we will see how Prior's attitude towards instants of time may teach us something about the analogous case of possible worlds. (shrink)

“Modal logic was conceived in sin: the sin of confusing use and mention.” So quips Quine. The stigma stuck with modal logic for a while. But by the mid-sixties, a whole cluster of mathematically elegant interpretations of modal logic became available. All are natural extensions of the classical Tarskian semantics of predicate logic. By the mid-seventies, Quine’s criticisms seemed obsolete. Today, we teach the model theory of modal logic as a matter of course. Quine’s “interpretive problem” is just forgotten. The (...) purpose of my dissertation is to revamp Quine’s thesis: the very foundations of modal logic—simple propositional modal logic, even before quantifiers are added—are shaky. Quine holds that the natural interpretation of the operator “necessarily” is in terms of a full-blooded metaphysical notion of real necessity. Such a notion, Quine conjectures, is committed to the “metaphysical jungle of Aristotelian essentialism”. Hence, the intended interpretation is to be rejected. Thus Quine: so much the worse for real necessity. An alternative comes to mind: a meta-level, formal rather than real, semantic interpretation of the operator of necessity. In the late forties, Carnap developed this line of interpretation which culminates in the aforementioned model theory (“Kripke’s possible world semantics”) in the sixties. On this basis a formal interpretation is introduced: it grounds necessity in the notion of model theoretic validity. As pointed by friends of the formal interpretation (Marcus, Parsons and Kaplan), no invidious essentialist claim is verified. But have Quine’s concerns been answered? Yes and no. Technical problems regarding quantification across modal operators, substitutivity, matters of scope, and the basis of cross-world identification have indeed been solved. However, no real interpretation of “necessarily” has been provided. I argue that the seeds of such an interpretation are present in Kripke’s philosophical discussion of de re necessities in Naming and Necessity. It is not model theoretic, and it does not reduce necessity to some non-modal notion, just as Quine predicted. Even more in his vein, the real interpretation is (i) metaphysically, grounded indeed in essentialist theses, and (ii) epistemologically, forced to give up Kant’s ideal that all necessities are known a priori. (shrink)

We present a finitary regularly algebraizable logic not finitely equivalential, for every similarity type. We associate to each of these logics a class of algebras with an equivalence relation, with the property that in this class, the identity is atomatically definable but not finitely atomatically definable.

The stream on political corporate social responsibility argues that companies have recently assumed state-like roles to influence global governance. However, following emerging calls for greater contextualization of CSR, we trace the historic evolution of PCSR in the case of Colombia and argue that such political engagement by firms is not new. Looking beyond a linear chronological account, we reveal the sedimentation process behind PCSR by exploring the archetypical political roles businesses have taken on in providing public goods and acting as (...) regulators, and chart their transformation. Our findings allow us to make two main contributions. First, by unearthing different strata of business and society relations, we enrich the research on PCSR, highlighting its historical sedimentation dynamics. By integrating institutional and historical perspectives, we respond to calls for complementary accounts of one of the premises found in the literature that considers globalization as the starting point of PCSR. Second, our exploration of the past and present of PCSR in Colombia provides scholars and practitioners with an overview of the complex state and stakes of CSR in that country. We also discuss the implications of sedimentation for PCSR theory and future research directions. (shrink)

This paper centers on Takashi Yagisawa’s book Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise (Oxford: 2010), which provides a novel and systematic analysis of modality and time. I consider the overall structure of Yagisawa’s treatment of modality and time, and discuss in detail the following three topics: (i) Possible worlds as modal indices, (ii) Trans-world identity, (iii) The claim that existence, unlike reality, is relative. My main conclusion is that Yagisawa's view of modality is driven by a strong primitivism, leading to (...) the endorsement of possibility, actuality, and presentness, but also possible worlds and times, as irreducible. The resulting view is saddled with the typical problems of primitivism on the one hand, and modal realism on the other. I criticize the view that existence is relative. (shrink)

Much has happened in modal logic since 1947. In particular, in regard to the problem of interpreting such logics. In that fateful year Quine published his seminal paper “The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic” from which this work takes inspiration. Since then a certain kind of model theory – universally referred to as “possible worlds semantics” – has come to dominate both advanced research and introductory textbooks. Many would say that the problem of interpreting modal logic has been resolved. In (...) the work below I argue that some of the 1947 problems raised by Quine have indeed been resolved by the possible worlds model theory. But I also claim – perhaps against common perception, but in line with Quine’s persisting fifty-year-old skepticism – that one problem of Quine’s original paper is still alive: the problem of interpreting modal logic. Surprisingly, Quine’s best ally on these matters turns out to be the very philosopher who engineered the possible worlds model theory: Saul Kripke. (shrink)

In this paper, I reconstruct Quine’s arguments against quantified modal logic, from the early 1940’s to the early 1960’s. Quine’s concerns were not technical. Quine was looking for a coherent interpretation of quantified-in English modal sentences. I argue that Quine’s main thesis is that the intended objectual interpretation of the quantifiers is incompatible with any semantic reading of the modal operators, for example as expressing analytic necessity, unless the entities in the domain of quantification are intensions, i.e. definitional entities. The (...) difficulty is that it makes no sense to say of an ordinary object that it bears a property necessarily or contingently when the necessity or contingency in question is analytic. However, starting in 1960, Quine claims that quantified-in modal sentences can be coherently interpreted only as essentialist predications. When we say about an object that it necessarily F ’s, we can only coherently mean that it essentially F ’s. In the paper, I argue that adequately qualified the thesis is plausible. Two important qualifications are needed. The first is the assumption that satisfaction is an irreducibly predicative notion, making any explication of satisfaction in terms of truth inadequate. The second is the ontological rejection of purely semantic, i.e. merely definitional, entities. With these qualifications in place, Quine’s rejection of the combination of objectual quantifiers and semantic modalities can be upheld. In this way, we vindicate a qualified version of Quine’s conjecture that quantified modal logic is committed to essentialism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against the commonly received view that Kripke's formal Possible World Semantics (PWS) reflects the adoption of a metaphysical interpretation of the modal operators. I consider in detail Kripke's three main innovations vis-à-vis Carnap's PWS: a new view of the worlds, variable domains of quantification, and the adoption of a notion of universal validity. I argue that all these changes are driven by the natural technical development of the model theory and its related notion of validity: (...) they are dictated by merely formal considerations, not interpretive concerns. I conclude that Kripke's model theoretic semantics does not induce a metaphysical reading of necessity, and is formally adequate independently of the specific interpretation of the modal operators. (shrink)

In this article I contrast two opposing forms of essentialism, definitional and transcendental versus productivist and historical, and trace both forms back to Kripke's Naming and Necessity (1980). Definitional essentialism, as developed by Fine, centers on kind-membership. Historical essentialism, as anticipated by Prior and developed by Almog, puts origin at its center. The article focuses on the fundamentally distinct manners in which these two views handle the necessity of origin thesis. In the final section of the article, inspired by a (...) Nietzschean genealogical methodology, I pursue a naturalization strategy and conclude that rather than origin being necessary, it is essentialist necessity that reduces to origin. (shrink)

In her recent defense of predicativism for proper names, Delia Graff Fara proposes the following non-metalinguistic being-called condition for the applicability of names as predicates: A name ‘N’ is true of a thing if and only if it is called N. The BCC is supposed to hold for names only. In this essay I criticize Fara’s BCC by arguing that the word ‘called’ is ambiguous, and that the BCC holds only for the particular sense of ‘calling’ as naming. I revise (...) accordingly Fara’s BCC and propose in its place a non-metalinguistic being-named condition. I also argue, against Fara, that being-named conditions are not unique to proper names: they hold for mass nouns, common count nouns, as well as for family names, which I distinguish from surnames. Finally, I discuss honorific titles and propose a being-entitled condition according to which a title ‘T’ is true of a thing just in case it is dubbed T. I conclude the paper with pragmatic, syntactic, as well as semantic considerations in favor of the thesis that names are a subspecies of non-hereditary, honorific titles. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze David Kaplan’s essay “Opacity”. In “Opacity” Kaplan attempts to dismiss Quine’s concerns about quantification across intensional (modal and intentional) operators. I argue that Kaplan succeeds in showing that quantification across intensional operators is logically coherent and that quantified modal logic is strictly speaking not committed to essentialism. However, I also argue that this is not in and of itself sufficient to support Kaplan’s more ambitious attempt to move beyond purely logical results and provide unified, uncontroversial (...) interpretations of both “believes” and “necessarily”. In the paper I raise several questions about the subject matter of logic and the role of semantics, with special focus on singular propositions. (shrink)

En este ensayo se destaca fundamentalmente las aportaciones de T.S. Kuhn, quien al aproximarse al conocimiento científico a partir del quehacer o práctica científica, observando a los observadores científicos, apunta a dos aspectos centrales sobre el cambio radical que ha experimentado la concep..

The papers in this dossier were written within the framework of two research projects on the refutation strategies of radical adversaries in Plato’s and Aristotle’s writings. Both projects, directed by Graciela Marcos and based in the Institute of Philosophy “Dr. Alejandro Korn” (Instituto de Filosofía “Dr. Alejandro Korn”) of the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras of the Universidad de Buenos Aires, were subsidised by the Secretaría de Ciencia y Técnica of this university and by the Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica (...) y Técnológica (ANCyPT), to whom we would like to express our gratitude. Special thanks also to Fabián G. Mié, who, for several years, has been working on the question of dialectic in Plato and Aristotle and with whom, even if he has not formally joined our team, we have had the good fortune to exchange ideas and discuss many of the issues related to both projects. Fabián Mié’s work is therefore added to the works presented by Lucas M. Álvarez, María E. Díaz, Martín S. Forciniti, Julián Macías and Graciela E. Marcos in this dossier. (shrink)

In the opening years of the 21st century, it became fashionable to describe the human genome as belonging to the common heritage of humanity. The United Nations, in its Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, now identifies the human genome as part of the common heritage, as does the international Human Genome Organization and the Council of Europe. The common heritage concept has played a prominent role in arguments against patenting the human genome or portions thereof. This (...) essay considers whether the common heritage designation will advance the political and legal goals of its proponents. (shrink)

Partiendo de la constatación husserliana de la crisis filosófica como crisis vital de una humanidad que se ha desviado de su _télos_ al implantar el modelo tecno-científico del dominio del mundo, el artículo investiga el lugar de la filosofía en el sistema educativo, explorando las reformas propuestas en Baviera y Prusia por Niethammer y Humboldt a principios del siglo XIX y que plantean, cada una a su modo, la necesaria incorporación de la filosofía a una educación de Estado que, frente (...) a las pretensiones utilitarias del filantropismo, logre elevar al hombre a su humanidad. En este sentido, retorna al concepto humanista de formación (_Bildung_) al que se consagran ambas reformas y que Gadamer recupera precisamente en _Verdad y método_ como un ideal para enfrentar la pretensión de universalidad de la ciencia moderna en relación a las nociones de conocimiento y de verdad, así como para pensar el horizonte ontológico de la experiencia hermenéutica. Es precisamente este ideal el que permite localizar el lugar de la filosofía en el conjunto del saber y conducir al hombre a su humanidad. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Ruth Barcan Marcus's early formal work on modal systems and the deduction theorem, both for the material and the strict conditional. Marcus proved that the deduction theorem for the material conditional does not hold for system S2 but holds for S4. This last result is at odds with the recent claim that without proper restrictions the deduction theorem fails also for S4. I explain where the contrast stems from. For the strict conditional, Marcus proved the (...) deduction theorem for S4 though restricted to arguments with necessary premises. I discuss Marcus's result and analyze her philosophical position on the significance of the deduction theorem for modal systems designed to express the notion of deducibility. (shrink)

Las frutas y hortalizas han sido siempre noticia debido principalmente a sus propiedades beneficiosas para la salud. Sin embargo, cada vez más ocupan titulares debido a su implicación en toxiinfecciones alimentarias. Por este motivo, desde 2008, las frutas y hortalizas frescas son consideradas por muchos organismos internacionales como un alimento de riesgo. Uno de los principales problemas microbiológicos de las hortalizas de hojas son las bacte­rias entéricas que pueden adherirse rápidamente al tejido durante el cultivo, coexistir con las bacterias epífitas (...) y persistir por largos periodos de tiempo. La prevalencia de microorganismos patógenos en las frutas y hortalizas es baja y la cuantificación de las bac­terias patógenas o de microorganismos indicadores generalmente muestra niveles muy bajos, lo que no justificaría el elevado número de alertas microbiológicas asociadas a este tipo de productos. Sin embargo, existen dudas sobre si los recuentos obtenidos utilizan­do las técnicas convencionales son capaces de reflejar realmente todos los microorganismos presentes en el producto vegetal, así como en el agua de riego y en el suelo. Varios estudios han demos­trado que cuando las bacterias son sometidas a distintos factores de estrés entran en un estado temporal de baja actividad metabóli­ca en el cual las células pueden persistir durante largos periodos de tiempo sin división celular, llamado estado de latencia o viable pero no cultivable. La relevancia que el estado fisiológico de las bacterias puede tener en el desarrollo de toxiinfecciones alimenta­rias causadas por las frutas y hortalizas es un tema de gran interés que está atrayendo más y más la atención de los investigadores. (shrink)

Human beings inhabit a symbolic reality that articulates meaning. This is culture understood as a web of meanings that actually builds our identity by providing guidance in the complexity of our environment. It is the complex interplay between identity and alterity, between interiority and exteriority, between familiarity and strangeness. Worldviews set up borders that delimit one's own world and others' ground by establishing stereotypes and prejudices. This article presents the results of a research project on prejudices towards the other in (...) students majoring in Education and Psychology with the aim of offering some reflections on what is at stake in social exclusion policies. (shrink)

This article argues that current data for the safety and efficacy of fecal microbiota transplants as a treatment for any indication, including recurrent Clostridioides difficile infection, is low-quality. It develops a governance proposal that encourages production of high-quality evidence by incentivizing well-designed RCTs of stool and stoolderived microbial products. The proposal would require that FDA change its current enforcement approach, but it would not require any change in statutes or regulations.

The present global financial crisis has revived the notion that competitive markets may lead some directors and executives to behave in opportunistic ways considered unethical and even illegal, through the pursuit of self-interest. This article proposes and tests an integrated model that offers new insights into the relationship between board structure, independence and firm value. By incorporating the proportion of independent directors on the board as a moderating factor in this relationship, this study contributes to a better understanding of the (...) entrenchment and convergence-of-interests hypotheses. Using empirical data obtained from 114 Spanish listed companies in a context of economic crisis, from 2007 to 2010, we conclude that having a board with a greater proportion of independent directors reduces the negative association existing between firm value and a large board size and significant board share ownership. (shrink)

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to present a pluralist thesis about the inferential role of logical constants, which embraces classical, relevant, linear and ordered logic. That is, I defend that a logical constant c has more than one correct inferential role. The thesis depends on a particular interpretation of substructural logics' vocabulary, according to which classical logic captures the literal meaning of logical constants and substructural logics encode a pragmatically enriched sense of those connectives. The paper is divided (...) into four parts: first, I introduce the motivation for the pluralist thesis of the paper; second I introduce the calculus for the different logics endorsed in the pluralist thesis; third, I motivate how the different behaviors of the logical vocabulary of these logics can be pragmatically interpreted, and fourth, I motivate how the different inferential roles that each substructural logic attribute to logical constants can coexist, and how we should reason with a logical constant c given this plurality. (shrink)

Este ensayo defiende que la ética de los valores desarrollada a partir de la fenomenología clásica incluye una interesante teoría del deber. Desarrollando algunas tesis de Max Scheler, se ofrece aquí una noción fenomenológica de “deber”, que está ligado a un valor muy peculiar: el valor de lo “justo”. Esto permite alejar por completo la ética fenomenológica de los valores de todo tipo de “consecuencialismo” y la sitúa en las cercanías del “deontologismo”. Pero el deber de la ética fenomenológica no (...) es un deber formal, sino fundado en el valor, de modo que podríamos hablar de un “deontologismo material”, que aspira a servir de mediación entre los dos grandes paradigmas clásicos. (shrink)