Abstract

Much has happened in modal logic since 1947. In particular, in regard to the problem of interpreting such logics. In that fateful year Quine published his seminal paper “The Problem of Interpreting Modal Logic” from which this work takes inspiration. Since then a certain kind of model theory – universally referred to as “possible worlds semantics” – has come to dominate both advanced research and introductory textbooks. Many would say that the problem of interpreting modal logic has been resolved. In the work below I argue that some of the 1947 problems raised by Quine have indeed been resolved by the possible worlds model theory. But I also claim – perhaps against common perception, but in line with Quine’s persisting fifty-year-old skepticism – that one problem of Quine’s original paper is still alive: the problem of interpreting modal logic. Surprisingly, Quine’s best ally on these matters turns out to be the very philosopher who engineered the possible worlds model theory: Saul Kripke.